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ABSTRACT
The Civil War in Indian Territory, 1861-1865
Zachery C. Cowsert
This dissertation explores the American Civil War in Indian Territory, with a particular
focus on the experiences of the Five Tribes—Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and
Seminole. Throughout the dissertation, I offer three overarching arguments. First, the Civil War
in Indian Territory was truly an Indian civil war, shaped by Native American politics and culture.
Second, the Civil War constituted a forgotten but immensely destructive moment in Native
history, the second great trauma endured by the Five Tribes in the 19 th century following
westward removal. Third, the Civil War marked the violent crescendo of older Southeastern
issues of removal and acculturation; by the end of the Civil War, new Western issues challenged
Native American sovereignty, including land loss, railroads, allotment, territorial government,
white settlement, and finally statehood.
The six chapters within this dissertation offer new interpretations of Civil War Indian
Territory, and the first three chapters illuminate how Native Americans became mired in the
American Civil War and came to take opposing sides in that conflict. Chapter 1 exposes the
fraudulent nature of Confederate-Native negotiations in 1861, contending that political
intimidation, vigilantism, and fraud were necessary to secure alliance between the Confederacy
and the Five Tribes. Theses political tactics harkened back to the fraudulence of the removal era,
and also indicate the weakness of Confederate nationalism in Indian Territory. Chapter 2
examines Native backlash to Confederate treaties, charting the mass mobilization and political
and military resistance of Creek chief Opothleyahola and his followers in the autumn and winter
of 1861. Opothleyahola’s Rebellion constitutes a significant pan-Indian and slave rebellion
against Confederate authority and sparked the beginning of years of destructive, intra-tribal civil
war. Defeated and exiled to Kansas, the experiences and political power of “Loyal Indian”
refugees are explored in Chapter 3. Despite their destitute condition, Native American refugees
wielded a degree of political influence that ensured the United States military would attempt to
liberate Indian Territory in 1862 and likewise be accompanied by Native Americans enlisted in
the Indian Home Guard regiments.
The final three chapters document the wartime years between 1862-1865, wherein the
Confederate States and United States vied for military control of the region to the detriment of its
Native American denizens. Chapter 4 surveys the disastrous 1862 First Indian Expedition, a
Federal invasion of Indian Territory that failed due to a difficult environment and poor
leadership. Chapter 5 documents the failure of the Confederacy to live up to its treaty
obligations, which left Confederate military forces at a decided material disadvantage in the
crucial year of 1863. Confederate defeats at First Cabin Creek and Honey Springs permanently
shifted the strategic situation in the United States’ favor. Chapter 6 highlights how the war’s final
years devolved into an increasingly racialized struggle played out in raids and guerrilla warfare,
worsening the refugee crisis and undermining civil society.
The conclusion illuminates how the Civil War undermined Native American sovereignty
and left them vulnerable to Federal encroachment and westward expansion in the Reconstruction
era.
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Introduction
Ten year old Smaddie Pidgeon, a young Creek girl, stood on a hilltop in the winter wind
and looked back on the chaotic scene below her. Her experiences that evening stayed with her
throughout her life, and years later she related the scene to her son. Her party of Native refugees
was “overtaken and had refuge on a hill while groups of men had stopped along the way to check
the rear attackers.” As twilight set in, Smaddie watched the panicky fight unfold below, which
“seemed to be like the flicker of fireflies, with report of guns heard and flashed here and there
the shooting.” Smaddie and her party escaped her attackers that evening, and they made their
way from that hilltop in northeast Indian Territory to Union Kansas through the harsh winter of
1861-1862.1
The Confederate troopers attacking Creek and Seminole refugees like Smaddie’s party
that winter included white Southerners from Texas and Arkansas, men in regiments like the 2 nd
Arkansas Mounted Rifles and 3rd Texas Cavalry. Yet also among the Rebel ranks were the 1st
Creek Regiment, the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, and the 1st Seminole Battalion.
Less than a year into the conflict, the Civil War in Indian Territory already pitted Creeks against
Creeks and Seminoles against Seminoles, tearing Native Americans apart into their own brutal,
intra-tribal civil wars. And, as Smaddie Pidgeon’s memories attest, the war in Indian Territory
pulled civilians into a vortex of violence, fear, and destruction from its opening moments.
--In 1861, as dark clouds of secession and civil strife gathered on the horizon, Indian
Territory was home to the Five Tribes: Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole.
After centuries living in their ancestral homelands in the American Southeast, these tribes
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Interview with Jackman Pidgeon, February 21, 1938, Indian Pioneer Papers, WHC, OU.
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endured the tragedy of forcible removal westward by the United States in the 1830s and 1840s,
the Cherokee most infamously via the Trail of Tears. Suffering immense casualties on their
journey west, they were given new lands in Indian Territory—an entity carved from Arkansas
Territory in the 1820s whose borders nearly align with the modern state of Oklahoma.
In this unfamiliar territory, the Five Tribes found new homelands. The Cherokees
inhabited the northeastern corner of the territory, a region of gently rolling hills flowing west
from the Ozark and Boston Mountains. The Arkansas River bisected Indian Territory running
east towards the Mississippi, and along its northern tributaries could be found Cherokee farms
and towns, including the national capital at Tahlequah. Further west, Creek Nation encompassed
central Indian Territory amid the Cimarron and North Canadian Rivers, where the rolling hills
gave way to mild, open prairies. In the 1840s, following the conclusion of the long-fought
Second Seminole War, several thousand Seminoles settled in western Creek lands and were
granted nationhood in 1856. The Choctaws and Chickasaws inhabited southern Indian Territory,
where they benefited from the rich soil of both the Arkansas and Red River Valleys, though the
Ouachita Mountains protruded west out of southern Arkansas. As with the Seminoles, the
Chickasaws gained separate nationhood later in 1855. By 1860, nearly 50,000 members of the
Five Tribes inhabited the eastern half of Indian Territory. The Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek
Nations all boasted similar populations of approximately 13-14,000. The Choctaws numbered
just over 4,000 and the Seminoles barely mustered 2,000.2
As the title of “nation” suggests, these tribes constituted semi-sovereign states. Although
bound by treaties to the United States, they exercised a wide degree of autonomy over internal
affairs. The Five Tribes enjoyed civil governments replete with constitutions, legislatures, and

Michael F. Doran, “Population Statistics of Nineteenth-Century Indian Territory,” Chronicles of
Oklahoma 53:4 (1975), 501.
2
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principal chiefs. They boasted judicial systems and police forces. Whites were only allowed to
trade or settle within Indian Territory with tribal permission (just over 2,000 lived in Indian
Territory at the start of the Civil War). Missionaries preached Christianity and offered
rudimentary education, and newspapers like the Choctaw and Chickasaw Intelligencer provided
news from abroad. While most Indians engaged in subsistence agriculture, a wealthier class
utilized enslaved labor to build prosperous plantations. Although Five Tribes maintained a
population of over 8,000 enslaved blacks prior to the outbreak of the Civil War, the enslaved
population were concentrated in the hands of a tiny minority (only 2.3% of Indians owned
slaves). As their embrace of slavery suggests, Native Americans fostered economic and social
ties with neighboring Arkansas and Texas.3
While the decades immediately prior to the Civil War are often depicted as a brief golden
era for the Five Tribes, political and cultural schisms lurked under the surface. Acculturated,
wealthy, slave-owning Native Americans wielded immense influence on tribal governments.
These elites—men such as Cherokees Stand Watie, Choctaws Peter Pitchlynn and Robert M.
Jones, and Creeks brothers Daniel and Chilly McIntosh—were often of mixed ancestry (usually
phrased as “mixed-blood” in contemporary sources) and carried two identities, envisioning
themselves as both Native Americans and as Southerners. They embraced education,
Christianity, chattel slavery, plantation agriculture, and other American cultural and social
trappings. Moreover, these elites were often the same individuals who espoused the necessity of
removal a generation prior and who signed the fraudulent removal treaties of the 1820s and
1830s.

Michael F. Doran, “Negro Slaves of the Five Civilized Tribes,” Annals of the Association of American
Geographers 68:3 (Sept., 1978), 347.
3
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Yet these elites constituted only a minority of tribal populations. Although centuries of
acculturation had indelibly shaped the lives of nearly every member of the Five Tribes, many
natives continued to retain elements of their traditional indigenous lifestyles: they practiced
syncretic religion, dressed in traditional Indian garb, spoke in their native tongue, and managed
humble homesteads. For these Native Americans, acculturation must be contained, else their way
of life might be lost. Their loyalties lay with those who championed and protected their
lifestyles, men like Cherokee Chief John Ross and Creek leader Opothleyahola. They had
fiercely opposed removal westward, and they harbored deep suspicions of their wealthy brethren
who had signed the removal treaties and sought to forge stronger ties with white America.
These internal factions—the acculturated elites and traditionalist masses—profoundly
shaped Native Americans’ decision-making and experiences during the Civil War.4 While
slaveholding elites sought social status and material protection in the Confederacy, traditionalist
Indians initially balked at the prospect of war and when pressed, preferred instead to fight against
this vision of acculturation by remaining loyal to the United States. In short, the American Civil
War in Indian Territory was an Indian Civil War, waged by Natives over differing Native visions
of the future within their own Native nations.

4

Scholars have not coalesced around a set of terms to describe the cultural divisions within the Five Tribes.
Early scholars often took “mixed-blood” and “full-blood” terms at face value, suggesting that race explained Native
Americans cultural attitudes and decision-making. More recently, Theda Perdue and others have explicitly rejected
this idea, warning that “we have privileged whiteness, and as a result, we have underestimated the power and
persistence of the culture into which they [“mixed blood”] Indians were born and chose to live.” Scholars have
implemented other terms: conservative, progressive, mestizo, mixed-ancestry, etc. to label these cultural and
ancestral divides.
I have utilized the terms traditionalist and acculturated in this dissertation, which focus on cultural attitudes
rather than race. I also hope these terms avoid positive or negative connotations (which I believe conservative and
progressive can suggest). These terms are not perfect. By 1860, acculturation had taken deep root among the Five
Tribes. Even the most “traditionalist” Indians farmed, utilized tools, firearms, and cloth, knew something of
Christianity…in short, these societies had already experienced centuries of irreversible acculturation. Yet a spectrum
of acculturation remained, and in particular, differing views on the futures of these tribes—more tightly woven to
American and Southern society or placing limits on American influence to preserve Natives lifestyles—existed. I
hope these terms (traditionalist and acculturated) address that spectrum, despite their limitations. Theda Perdue,
Mixed Blood Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2003), 68-69.
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Despite significant support for neutrality and peaceful status quo under existing Federal
treaties, Native elite and regional Confederates waged a successful and fraudulent political
campaign to pull the Five Tribes into Confederate orbit and the Civil War. Over the course of
four years, that conflict proved violent and destructive to Indian Territory and its inhabitants. The
Confederacy secured Indian alliances with grand promises of material aid and reinforcements; in
reality, the Confederacy’s paltry assistance left its military forces in Indian Territory, including
Confederate Indians, unable to halt Federal advances into the region. Yet the United States never
prioritized Indian Territory either, invading the region several times with mixed results, gaining
footholds but never providing true security. Neither the Confederate or United States possessed
the means or will to fully control Indian Territory. The result was the worst possible outcome: a
seemingly endless series of invasions and retreats, raids and guerrilla warfare, banditry and
abandoned homes, and an ever-growing refugee crisis.
When the war finally came to an end, much of Indian Territory—especially Cherokee,
Creek, and Seminole Nations—lay in ruins. Farms ransacked and burned, fields run fallow,
livestock long confiscated, and towns desolately empty. Nearly three-fifths of the Territory’s
Native population were destitute refugees, clinging to Federal outposts or crowding into
Confederate refugee camps for survival. And many didn’t survive. Thousands of Cherokees,
Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles perished during the Civil War, though the final
terrible tally will likely never be known. Among the Cherokees, nearly one-third of the
population perished, and nearly a quarter of Creeks died during the war. The Civil War proved to
be the second great trial of the Five Tribes in the 19th century, eclipsed only by the horrors of
westward removal itself. Yet this terrible saga remains obscured in the shadow of the larger
American Civil War and is non-existent in public memory.

5

--Occurring years after westward removal and overshadowed by the grandeur and scale of
the Civil War east of the Mississippi, the Indian Civil War in Indian Territory remains an
obscure corner of history, overlooked by scholars and buffs alike. With a few exceptions, only in
the past few years have scholars begun to seriously explore the war in Indian Territory and the
experiences of its participants. Yet a detailed history of the politics and military affairs of
wartime Indian Territory remains to written. Over the course of six chapters, I hope to fill that
historiographical lacuna by a carefully examining how and why Native Americans were pulled
into the Civil War, how Confederate alliances devolved into Indian civil war, both the
Confederacy’s and United States’ attempt to exert military control over the region, and finally
how the war impacted Native American civilians and communities.5

5

Wiley Britton and Annie Heloise Abel pioneered the first serious historical accounts of the Civil War in
Indian Territory. Wiley Britton’s two volume Civil War on the Border (1890-1904), Memoirs of the Rebellion on the
Border, 1863 (1882) and The Union Indian Brigade in the Civil War (1922) offer narrative accounts of the war in
the region. They are also autobiographical, as Britton served in the 6th Kansas Cavalry in Indian Territory for much
of the war. Annie Heloise Abel wrote a three volume history of Native Americans in the Civil War: The American
Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist (1915), The American Indian in the Civil War, 1862-1865 (1919), and The
American Indian under Reconstruction (1925). Though a century old, Abel’s work remains the most exhaustive
treatment of Civil War Indian Territory.
Although local historians continued to explore Civil War Indian Territory in the early/mid-20th century
(often publishing in the Chronicles of Oklahoma), a long gap occurred before another book length treatment
emerged. Lary and Donald Rampp produced The Civil War in the Indian Territory (1975), focused on military
affairs in the region. They draw heavily from published sources, and their account of military affairs is succinct but
uneven. W. Craig Gaines’ The Confederate Cherokees: John Drew’s Regiment of Mounted Rifles (1989) marks the
beginning of a modern wave of scholarship on the Civil War in Indian Territory. Gaines utilized Drew’s regiment as
a window into fractious Cherokee politics in the war’s early years. Benton and Christine White’s Now the Wolf Has
Come: The Creek Nation in the Civil War (1996) tells a compelling tale but adopts a problematic first-person
narrative that blurs the lines between scholarship and storytelling. Clarissa Confer’s The Cherokee Nation in the
Civil War (2007) offers a short overview of Cherokee participation in the war, paying especial attention to civilian
suffering and homefront. Mark Lause explores the radical abolitionist Kansans who shaped the Indian expeditions
into the region in Race and Radicalism in the Union Army (2009). Mary Jane Warde’s When the Wolf Came: The
Civil War and the Indian Territory (2015) provides the first extensive, scholarly overview of Civil War Indian
Territory in a century. Although her archival source base is limited, Warde weaves a narrative of wartime Indian
Territory that focuses on the social and cultural implications of the war and makes connections to wider Oklahoma
history. This dissertation seeks to complement her work by providing a detailed history of political and military
events, as well as the experiences of wartime refugees. M. Jane Johansson’s Albert C. Ellithorpe, the First Indian
Home Guards, and the Civil War on the Trans-Mississippi Frontier (2016) provides a hybrid biography, regimental
history, and primary source collection to shed light on Union Indian participation in the war.
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Chapter 1 explores the forging of alliances between the Fives Tribes and the Confederate
States of America. In the spring of 1861, faced with an existential rebellion and limited
resources, the United States withdrew its military forces from Indian Territory. The withdrawal
of the United States from the region created a power vacuum, leaving Native Americans to fend
for themselves. Although many Natives desired to remain neutral in the coming “white man’s
war,” wealthy, slaveholding Indian elites believed their futures and property were best secured
within the Confederacy. Neighboring white Confederates exploited these internal rifts, engaging
in military occupation, vigilantism, political intimidation, and outright fraud to secure treaties of
alliance with the Five Tribes. These fraudulent treaties, reminiscent of the deceitful removal
treaties of an earlier era, provided an unstable foundation for the Confederate-Indian alliances
and ultimately provoked Native resistance.
Moreover, the Confederacy’s deceitful political tactics and Native reluctance to alliances
attest to the Confederacy’s inability to instill a deep sense of nationalism or loyalty among the
entirety of the Indian population. If, as Stephanie McCurry has argued, the Confederacy was “a
republic of white men, defined by slavery and the political exclusion of the mass of Southern
people,” many Native Americans rightfully questioned their place within that nation. While the
Confederacy struggled informally to bring women, enslaved African-Americans, and nonslaveholders into line with their nation-building project, it made explicit promises to the Five
Tribes via signed treaties. These obligations would prove difficult to fulfill.6

6
Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 2. McCurry’s Confederate Reckoning argues the Confederacy’s “profoundly
narrow and mistaken vision of what nation making, war, and history required” contributed to disillusionment and
dissent among Southern women and African-Americans during the war. McCurry is not the first scholar to explore
the limitations (or outright failure) of Confederate nationalism. Paul Escott’s After Secession: Jefferson Davis and
the Failure of Confederate Nationalism highlights the Confederate government’s unwillingness to address the
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Rather than submit to Confederate treaties, however, a large number of Creeks and
Seminoles, along with smaller parties from other tribes and hundreds of African-American
runaway slaves, mobilized and revolted in the autumn and winter of 1861. Chapter 2 navigates
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion, named after its venerable Creek leader.7 This anti-Confederate
Indian rebellion represented the backlash to the fraudulent diplomacy between tribal
governments and the Confederate States. Comprised of thousands of Native Americans and
African-Americans, Opothleyahola’s Rebellion constituted a major pan-Indian rebellion against
white politics and a significant slave rebellion. This alliance between Native tribes and runaway
slaves threatened Confederate control of the Territory and sparked fear among pro-Confederate
tribal governments. Unwilling to let the challenge go unanswered, the Confederacy responded
with military force in the winter of 1861. Just as the Confederacy faced internal dissent among
Southern Unionists, enslaved African-Americans, dependent white Southern women, and others,
the Confederacy confronted Native resistance on its frontier.8

wartime plight of its everyday citizens, fostering political apathy toward the Confederate project. Paul Quigley
advances another narrative, arguing that emotions—wartime loss and suffering—were what attached Southerners to
the Confederate cause, rather than any deep ideological attachment to the Confederacy. Collectively, this scholarship
explores the severe limitations of the Confederacy’s efforts to instill nationalism among its citizens. In Indian
Territory, the Confederacy’s murky political tactics similarly failed to persuade many Native Americans the
Confederate cause was worthy of support. Paul D. Escott, After Secession: Jefferson Davis and the Failure of
Confederate Nationalism (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977); Paul Quigley, Shifting Grounds:
Nationalism and the American South, 1848-1865 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
7
I have chosen the word rebellion to indicate these Indians’ resistance to both the pro-Confederate tribal
governments (which they believed to be illegal) and to the Confederacy itself. While the Confederate-Creek treaty
proved fraudulent, the pro-Confederate Creek faction and the CSA held de facto control of much of the Nation.
Hence, dissident Creeks, Seminoles, blacks, and others were rebelling against the de facto authority in the region.
Opothleyahola’s name is indelibly linked to the rebellion, both among its participants and later historians, and he
was its leader throughout.
8
The Confederacy resorted to political maneuvering to ensure secession elsewhere, and throughout the war
required force to quell internal dissent. Stephanie McCurry’s Confederate Reckoning calls the secession movement
“a long political season of fear mongering, coercion, and violence,” and her work exposes how politically precarious
pro-Confederate slaveholders’ political power proved to be, even in the Deep South (most notably in Georgia). As
she notes, “nowhere in the Lower South outside of South Carolina were ordinances of secession passed
unanimously.” The Confederacy subsequently failed to account the political agency of white Southern women, who
demanded entitlements from the strained Confederate states, and enslaved black who engaged “in an array of
insurrectionary activities calculated to destroy the institution of slavery, their masters’ power, and the prospects of
the C.S.A. as a proslavery nation.” McCurry’s arguments recall Thomas Emory’s earlier The Confederacy as a
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Not simply a prelude to the war in Indian Territory, the rebellion constituted a significant
political and military event in its own right. Opothleyahola’s Rebellion plunged the Territory into
intra-tribal civil war, pitting Creeks against Creeks, Seminoles against Seminoles, and Cherokees
against Cherokees. It also constituted perhaps the largest slave rebellion in the Civil War. It
brought “hard war” to Indian Territory, played out in a brutal winter campaign in November and
December. Opothleyahola’s forces were finally defeated and routed at the Battle of Chustenahlah
and subsequently fled to Kansas amid the snows and winds of a bitter winter. In the final days of
the campaign, Confederate forces targeted civilians like Smaddie Pigeon, hinting at the brutality
of the war to come.
Chapter 3 surveys the experiences of the nearly 7,000 Native Americans refugees who
survived the winter and spring of 1861-1862 in Kansas. Exiled from their homes in Indian
Territory, Native Americans struggled to survive the ravages of disease, inclement weather, and
shortages of provisions and shelter. Despite their destitute condition, however, Native refugees
were not powerless. Just as African-American runaway slaves across the South forced the United
States to embrace emancipation, Native American refugees likewise reshaped Federal military
policy by forcing the U.S. to finally intervene military in Indian Territory. Working in
conjunction with ambitious Kansas politicians and military officers, Native Americans and local
white officials finally secured permission for an Indian Expedition to liberate Indian Territory
and allow the “Loyal Indian” refugees to return home. Furthermore, Native Americans secured

Revolutionary Experience, wherein he points to the “class conflict, riots, strikes, and disloyalty to the point of armed
resistance” that beset the wartime Confederacy. McCurry, Confederate Reckoning, 118; Thomas M. Emory, The
Confederacy as a Revolutionary Experience (1971, repr., Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 117.

9

the right to participation in the expedition through the formation of the Indian Home Guard
regiments.9
The 1862 Indian Expedition, comprised of Native Americans, Kansans, and
Midwesterners, was envisioned as a triumphant return to Indian Territory for both the United
States and the Loyal Indians. Instead, it proved a listless disaster. Chapter 4 examines how a
military campaign that began with such promise ended in mutiny and humiliation. Inexperienced
Union officers—Kansan political appointees—proved unable to overcome serious logistical and
strategic challenges imposed by Indian Territory. Enduring one of the hottest summers in the
region’s history, Union soldiers suffered from limited access to clean water and scant provisions.
Although equally inept Confederate officers failed to mount meaningful resistance to the
invasion, Union leaders jumped at threats both real and imagined. Unable to secure a decisive
battlefield confrontation, short on provisions and long on alcohol, and seeing illusory foes on
their flanks and rear, the expedition ended in mutiny and retreat.
While the Indian Expedition failed to secure the liberation of Indian Territory from
Confederate control, it succeeded in sowing further discord and misery among the Territory’s
inhabitants. Faced with the return of the United States army, the Cherokee Nation split into two

9

The ability of Native American refugees to shape Federal military policy resembles African-American
refugees’ successful efforts to transform the Civil War into a war of emancipation and allow the enlistment of black
soldiers. See Amy Murrell Taylor’s Embattled Freedom: Journeys through the Civil War’s Slave Refugee Camps
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2018) and Chandra Manning’s Troubled Refuge: Struggling for
Freedom in the Civil War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2016).
The United States ultimately raised three Indian Home Guard regiments from Indian Territory, whose
service proved integral to military efforts in the region. We can understand their service in the context of both
Southern Unionism—Southerners who resisted the Confederacy and who enlisted in the United States army. Indeed,
every Southern state except South Carolina provided at least one unit for United States service. United States
Colored Troops, many of which were constituted from runaway slaves (some from Indian Territory), proved
successful on the battlefield and a vital contribution to the Union war effort. See William W. Freehling, The South
vs. The South: How Anti-Confederate Southerners Shaped the Course of the Civil War (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2001); Richard Nelson Current, Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy
(Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press, 1992); Joseph T. Glatthaar, Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance
of Black Soldiers and White Officers (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990).
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as thousands of Cherokees defected to the Union. In the wake of a Federal invasion and retreat,
guerrillas, bandits, and vengeful neighbors—both pro-Union and pro-Confederate—began to
terrorize the countryside. Instead of returning the Loyal Indian refugees to their firesides, the
expedition only swelled the ranks of the destitute.
Refusing to concede defeat, the Union again invaded Indian Territory the following year.
Mirroring the war’s crescendo in other theaters, 1863 proved the decisive year of the Civil War
in Indian Territory. Detailing the military clashes that summer, Chapter 5 exposes how the
Confederacy failed to uphold its treaty obligations to Indian Territory. Poorly clothed and
equipped, underpaid, and bereft of quality arms or artillery, Confederate soldiers in Indian
Territory fought at a decided material disadvantage in the critical engagements at First Cabin
Creek and Honey Springs, the largest Civil War battle in Indian Territory. These material
shortfalls—combined with questionable leadership—contributed to Confederate defeats. These
defeats not only gave the Union a permanent foothold in the region, but they also contributed to a
wider collapse of the Confederacy’s Arkansas River defensive line in the Trans-Mississippi
theater. This disastrous turn of military affairs gutted Confederate morale and severely
undermined Confederate Indians’ faith in their white allies.
The defeat at Honey Springs irrevocably shattered the Confederacy’s hold over much of
Indian Territory. Unable to challenge Federal forces directly, the Civil War in Indian Territory
deteriorated into a series of destructive raids conducted by both sides. Confederate Indians were
also drawn into the fighting in southern Arkansas in 1864, participating in the massacre of black
soldiers at the Battle of Poison Spring. Chapter 6 chronicles this descent into increasingly
violent, racialized warfare and the centrality of guerrilla warfare and raiding to the region’s
wartime experience. It also surveys the impact of the war upon civilian communities and the
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final return of Loyal Indian refugees to Indian Territory, whose return was not the triumphant
homecoming imagined. With neither the Confederate or United States able to exercise full
military control over the region, the refugee crisis, famine, disease, and guerrilla warfare plagued
the landscape.10
The Civil War in Indian Territory devastated the Five Tribes’ population, communities,
and sovereignty and left them with an uncertain future. In many ways, the Civil War represented
the bloody crescendo of years of factionalism stemming from the old Southeastern problems of
acculturation, white encroachment, and removal. As Reconstruction loomed, however, new
problems arose. With significant portions of all Five Tribes having fought for the Confederacy,
and Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles having endured intra-tribal warfare, new treaties with the
United States needed to be negotiated, and Natives possessed little leverage or unity.
I conclude by offering a brief synopsis of how the Civil War in Indian Territory
disastrously undermined Native sovereignty in the face of Reconstruction and paved the way for
fundamental new “Western” problems. The United States pushed an agenda of acculturation and
assimilation, pan-Indian government that erased tribal distinctions, emancipation and black
citizenship, the establishment of railroads, and a demand for yet more land. Ironically, the tribes
most loyal to the United States—the Creeks, Seminoles, and Cherokees—suffered the worst in
these negotiations, while the Choctaw and Chickasaws secured more favorable terms. Yet in the
end, the Civil War and Reconstruction in Indian Territory marked a new era of increased United
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States interference in Native affairs, American meddling that would eventually lead to allotment,
white settlement, the dissolution of tribal governments, and Oklahoma statehood.11

11
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“We Are Choosing in What Way We Shall Die:”
Factionalism and Fraud in Confederate-Native Diplomacy, 1861
“If the North was here so we could be protected, we would stand up for the North. But now if we do not go in for the
South, the Texans will come over here and kill us.” -Unknown Choctaws, 186112
---

On Sunday, April 21, 1861 a delegation of Choctaw Indians met with Commissioner of
Indian Affairs William Dole and Secretary of the Treasury Salmon Chase in Washington, D.C. It
was to be a mundane, if important meeting, regarding payments owed the Choctaw tribe for their
Mississippi homelands sold decades ago. Now settled in the southern portion of Indian Territory,
the Choctaw commission—including its leader Peter Pitchlynn—looked forward to concluding
years of negotiations, receiving a large settlement, and returning home.13
Instead, the meeting quickly took a more ominous turn. Commissioner Dole and
Secretary Chase confided to the Choctaws their belief that the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indian
agent, Douglas Cooper, harbored Confederate loyalties. Before most of the funds could be
dispersed, the United States wanted to know the Choctaws’ loyalties and desired a requisition for
the funds from the Choctaw General Council to reassure the U.S. of the Choctaws’ loyalty.14
Peter Pitchlynn and the Choctaw delegation took the disturbing news in stride and shared
their own concerns with Dole and Chase. As civil war loomed on the horizon, the Choctaws held
“great apprehensions of attacks upon their people, by citizens of Texas and Arkansas.” Hoping to
stay above the fray, they declared “their determination to maintain a neutral position in the
anticipated difficulties throughout our country.” The Choctaws departed for home the next day,
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needing to take stock of political affairs in their country and hoping to secure a requisition for the
funds owed. William Dole was pleased with the meeting, and subsequently urged the Federal
government to provide the Indians with arms for defense and to maintain troops in Indian
Territory to keep order and loyalty among the region’s denizens.15
The April meeting between the Choctaws and the Federal government laid bare the issues
confronting Native Americans of Indian Territory, the United States, and the nascent
Confederacy in the spring of 1861. The Five Tribes of Indian Territory—Cherokee, Chickasaw,
Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole—found themselves trapped in the continental heart of a nation
seized by civil strife. Bordered by Union Kansas and Missouri to the north and Confederate
Arkansas and Texas to the east and south, many Native Americans like Peter Pitchlynn hoped to
navigate a path of neutrality in the days ahead. Other Natives, however, envisaged a future
within the Confederacy, where their slaves and political rights could be better secured. These
differing political views were sharpened by cultural clashes over acculturation and old political
feuds dating back to removal. Faced with the American Civil War, internal tribal politics pushed
and pulled Indians in differing directions and ultimately propelled them to intra-tribal civil wars.
For the Federal government, and especially for Commissioner of Indian Affairs William
P. Dole, Indian Territory posed a difficult problem in a season flooded with difficult problems.
The firing on Fort Sumter ensured that civil war lay ahead, and as Upper South states seceded the
Confederacy grew larger by the week. Troops were needed everywhere, money was needed
everywhere, and decisions needed to be made about how to prioritize troops and funds on hand.
For the Lincoln Administration and the War Department, Indian Territory hardly registered as a
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consideration. For William Dole and the Office of Indian Affairs, the loyalties and needs of
Indian Territory loomed larger. These disjointed priorities of various Federal agencies ultimately
led to the disastrous withdrawal of United States forces from Indian Territory, which in turn
opened a political vacuum in which the young Confederacy exerted pressure on vulnerable
Native Americans.
If the United States’ policy towards Indian Territory was shaped by officials in
Washington, D.C., the Confederate States’ interest in Indian Territory was driven by Arkansans
and Texans who anxiously desired to know the loyalties of their Indian neighbors. Confederate
Indian agents, military officers, politicians, and citizens took matters into their own hands, using
a combination of political pressure, violence and intimidation, occupation, clever politicking, and
outright fraud to secure treaties of alliance with the Five Tribes. They were assisted by wealthy,
slaveholding Native elites who envisioned themselves as both Southerners and Indians, and who
sought to protect their material interest within the Confederacy.
By the autumn of 1861, each of the Five Tribes of Indian Territory had inked treaties of
alliance with the Confederate States. Yet these treaties papered over serious cultural political
fault lines among Native Americans, exacerbated by the fraudulence with which they were
negotiated. Ultimately, Confederate machinations in their alliances with the Confederacy proved
their undoing.
--The young second lieutenant stepped out of General Winfield Scott’s office, having
reported for duty and ready for his next assignment—whatever it may be. He didn’t have to wait
long. That night, lounging in the lobby of the Willard Hotel in the heart of Washington, D.C., the
lieutenant was approached by several other United States officers. Invited to play a game of pool,
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the lieutenant quickly learned that more than billiards was at hand. “While engaged in the game,”
the young officer recalled, “the Captain quietly asked me where I lodged and requested me to go
to my room when the game should be finished and he would follow me.” At the surreptitious
hotel room meeting, the cadre of officers asked the lieutenant “if I was able and willing to
undertake a long journey involving an unknown amount of fatigue and danger.” The feisty
officer responded, “try me.” The task was straightforward: deliver dispatches to the commander
of Federal troops in Indian Territory, ordering him to evacuate to the safety of Kansas. It was the
night of April 16, 1861, and the next morning Lieutenant William Woods Averell headed west
across a disintegrating United States.16
Several weeks and 1,300 miles later, Lieutenant Averell and his Indian guide approached
the outskirts of Fort Washita, a small Federal post in Chickasaw Nation, Indian Territory. The
journey west had been a harrowing one. Traveling in plain clothes, Averell made it to southwest
Missouri easily enough. Upon arriving at Fort Smith, Arkansas, where he expected to deliver his
orders, Averell discovered the fort was no longer in Federal hands; instead he found “mounted
men riding madly, secession flags flying and women displaying them from windows.” Trading
twenty dollars and his gold watch for a fresh mount, Averell headed west into Indian Territory to
chase down the wayward Federal command. In Choctaw Nation, Averell was questioned by men
“whose villainous countenances were shaded by Texan sombreros,” and when the lieutenant’s
answers failed to satisfy them, he was forced to flee overland into the brush to escape. Hoping to
reach the Federal garrison at Fort Arbuckle, Averell learned from a local sutler that the fort had
been abandoned, and the Union garrison had concentrated further west at Fort Washita.17
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And so, after failing to deliver his secret orders to either Fort Smith or Fort Arbuckle, the
haggard lieutenant and his local guide warily neared Fort Washita. The pair quickly found that it,
too, had fallen and was occupied by hostile Texan militia. Before despair could set in, however,
they learned that the Federal garrison was only a few miles up the road. “With my fleet steed and
a good will, those six miles were soon accomplished,” Averell remembered, “and it was with an
exultant heart that I saw my old comrades in arms just forming squadrons for the march.” 18
William Averell made his way to the front of the column in search of Lt. Colonel
William H. Emory. A noted surveyor and explorer, Emory was found “looking grim as a grizzly
bear” astride a horse. “Colonel!” Averell exclaimed, “You don’t seem to know me!” No, I
don’t,” Emory replied. “Who are you?” “I am Lieutenant Averell, with dispatches from
Washington, and here they are,” Averell replied. Emory’s grim countenance transformed, and he
cried, “My God! Averell, how did you get here?” Other young officers, riding up, also expressed
their curiosity and disbelief. “Not one of them recognized me,” Averell recalled. Having
survived the harrowing journey, Averell was offered a stiff drink and “was at home under the
flag of my country and surrounded by old friends and comrades.”19
The terrible irony is that Averell’s dispatches were nearly obsolete upon delivery.
Colonel William Emory hardly needed prompting from Washington to know his situation was
dire. Arkansas had seceded and Fort Smith surrendered to the east, and Texan militias were
scouting into southern Indian Territory with regularity. As the secession crisis unfolded and the
political landscape shifted under Emory’s feet, he decided to consolidate the scattered Union
garrisons across Indian Territory at Fort Washita, hoping to march north with hist 750 men to
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Not all the officers under Emory’s command agreed with his
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decision; there were protests that an evacuation would leave the Five Tribes defenseless, either to
aggressive Plains Indians or to the Confederacy. Emory did not budge from his decision,
however, believing that Arkansas’ secession made Indian Territory too vulnerable to occupy.
Thus, the Federal column marched north. For several days they were followed by a party of
Texans, and on May 5, Emory sent a small rear-guard force to confront the pursuers. The
Texans, perhaps not ready to shed blood, surrendered, a peaceable end to the first military
confrontation of the Civil War in Indian Territory. The column finished the journey without
incident, reaching Fort Leavenworth by late May.20
Back in Washington, D.C., Commissioner of Indian Affairs William P. Dole knew little
of Col. Emory’s retreat from Indian Territory. Faced with interrupted mail routes, Indian agents
of dubious loyalty, and an uncommunicative War Department, Dole was in the dark. In late
April, Dole reminded Secretary of the Interior Caleb Smith of the United States’ “obligations to
protect the Indians from the incursions of all enemies,” and asked “to be informed if it is not [the
government’s] intention to keep in the country a sufficient force.” Unaware the War Department
had already issued orders to retreat, both Secretary Smith and Commissioner Dole argued for the
importance of a Federal force in Indian Territory which would “secure the neutrality of the
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Indian tribes.” If soldiers were unavailable, at least arms could be provided for the Indians’
defense.21
Simultaneously then, while the Office of Indian Affairs asked for United States troops to
secure Indian Territory, the War Department pulled them out. The lack of coordination within
the executive and the mismanagement of Indian affairs left the United States devoid of any real
presence in Indian Territory. When Colonel William Emory, Lieutenant William Averell, and
several hundred Union soldiers reached Kansas, they hardly could’ve imagined how disastrous
their departure would be for the Native Americans they left behind. The Union having departed
the region, another year would pass before a blue-clad soldier returned. Their hasty evacuation of
Indian Territory represented a complete withdrawal of the United States from the affairs of the
Five Tribes during the critical summer of 1861. With the retreat of Emory’s column and the
United States, the Five Tribes were alone.
--Around the same time Lieutenant Averell reached Indian Territory, Peter Pitchlynn
likewise made his way home to Choctaw Nation. He found his country in turmoil. Encompassing
southern Indian Territory and sharing a long border with Texas, Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations
were the first to feel the impact of the brewing conflict between the United States and the
Confederacy.
Removed from their lands in Alabama and Mississippi in the 1830s, the Choctaws and
Chickasaws resettled in Indian Territory and established prosperous communities along the Red
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River and Canadian River Valleys. Missionaries opened academies, preaching Christianity and
teaching English, writing, and arithmetic. Native Americans traded with the white neighbors in
Texas, and they sent their goods and crops down the Red River to the Mississippi River and New
Orleans. The Choctaw Intelligencer offered local and national news to its readers. Although their
position near the Texan plains prompted occasional raids by Plains Indian tribes, antebellum
Federal posts at Forts Arbuckle, Cobb, and Washita guarded their southwestern frontier. In 1855,
the Chickasaw, who had resided since removal under Choctaw rule, were granted their
independence and carved their own Chickasaw Nation out of south-central Indian Territory.
Like the other Five Tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws had undergone centuries of
acculturation, and years of interacting with white Southerners prompted the Choctaws and
Chickasaws to embrace the institution of chattel slavery. Although most Native Americans
engaged in subsistence farming and owned few, if any slaves, a small but deeply influential
planter elite arose who owned significant plantations and relied heavily upon slave labor. One of
the richest men in Indian Territory, Choctaw planter Robert M. Jones oversaw six plantations
that produced hundreds of bales of cotton annually, sent downriver in Jones’ own steamboat.
Two hundred and twenty-seven slaves worked Jones’ fields, and on the backs of their labor he
became the first millionaire in Choctaw Nation. Wealthy men like Jones, often of mixedancestry, were undoubtedly invested in the protection and expansion of slavery. Hardening racial
views in antebellum Choctaw Nation attest to the political importance of slavery. All free blacks
were expelled from Choctaw Nation in 1840, and after 1846, manumission of Choctaw slaves
required the approval of the national legislature. Slavery served as a bedrock within Choctaw and
Chickasaw societies and economies.22
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Although Peter Pitchlynn had advised William Dole of the Choctaws’ desire for
protection and neutrality, wealthy slave-owners like Robert Jones thought differently. Upon
Pitchlynn’s return to Choctaw Nation, he was surprised to discover serious steps had already
been taken by the Choctaw General Council in preparation for a possible split with the United
States. Back in February, the Council issued a resolution “that in the event a permanent
dissolution of the American Union takes place…we shall be left to follow the natural affections,
education, institutions, and interests of our people, which indissolubly bind us in every way to
the destiny of our neighbors and brethren in the Southern States.” The resolution especially
sought “to assure our immediate neighbors, the people of Arkansas and Texas, of our
determination to observe the amicable relations in every way so long existing between us.” In
March, delegations from the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations met to coordinate their efforts as
secession progressed.23
Yet as spring advanced, events began to unfold more rapidly and the first signs of both
external intimidation and internal rifts among the Choctaws began to appear. When the United
States Army evacuated Forts Arbuckle, Cobb, and Washita in May, Texan militia companies
seized the opportunity to secure their northern border and occupied the former U.S. military
posts. The sudden appearance of armed Texan troops within Choctaw and Chickasaw borders
left some Indians uneasy. “Arrived home yesterday,” Choctaw Sampson Folsom penned, “but
find our lovely country in the hands of Texanian [sic] filibusters. They are making inroads upon
our soil under the plea of driving out the military of the United States, with whom,” Folsom

23
“Resolutions expressing the feelings and sentiments of the General Council of the Choctaw Nation,”
February 7, 1861, Official Records, vol. 1, 682; “Resolutions Passed by the Convention of the Choctaws and
Chickasaws,” March 11, 1861, Peter Pitchlynn Papers, Helmerich Center for American Research, Thomas Gilcrease
Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Oklahoma (hereinafter referred to as Gilcrease Institute); Angie Debo,
The Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic (1934, repr., Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 80-81.

22

noted, “we have treaty obligations.” This was unacceptable, Folsom thought, since “what they
will do next is make white settlement in our midst.” Folsom even went so far as to claim he “was
for raising five thousand Choctaws and Chickasaw troops at once to keep out Land Pirates and
abolitionists.” Having been removed from his homeland once already in his lifetime, Folsom
worried that Texas occupation was the opening act of yet further white encroachment. 24
The Texan occupation of Fort Washita and other posts was hardly the only violation of
Choctaw and Chickasaw sovereignty that spring. In May, Texan vigilantes launched a dedicated
campaign to drive out missionaries—many of whom hailed from the North and were suspected
of being abolitionists—from Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. An early target of the Texans’ ire
was Reverend Horace A. Wentz of New York, who had been engaged in illicit arms trafficking
by selling revolvers and carbines around Choctaw Nation. On May 20, the arms-dealing reverend
was accosted by a party of “rough fellows” who “seized…bound and carried [him] back to
Doaksville” in Choctaw Nation. The vigilantes “fired revolvers about his ears,” but the New
Yorker remained defiant at the prospect of death. At the behest of a local merchant, Wentz was
freed and fled north. Wentz hurried out of Indian Territory and within a week of his capture and
release, he sat safely ensconced in Cincinnati, Ohio, where he had once gone to school at Lane
Theological Seminary, a bastion of anti-slavery thought.25
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The kidnapping of Reverend Wentz had far more to do with the simple, if illegal, sale of
revolvers. Fellow missionary Calista B. Downing revealingly reported back to her superiors in
New York that “Mr. Wentz by selling revolvers secretly, has been ‘suspected’ of abolitionism,
and there is so much excitement, not only in the Nation, but among our Texas and Arkansas
neighbors.” Indeed, the harsh reaction to Rev. Wentz’s sale of revolvers was merely a
manifestation of a much larger fear of abolitionism, a fear that existed on both sides of the
Choctaw-Texan border. And although Wentz had escaped the Texans’ grasp, they remained
determined to “sweep the Territory from the Texas border to the Kansas line, ‘cleaning out’
northern men everywhere.” Abolitionists “should go up,” according to the Texans, indicating
their desire to hang any anti-slavery men they found.26
Horace Wentz’ arms-dealing gave Texans an excuse to prowl Choctaw Nation and
determine the political sentiments of its missionaries. On the day Wentz was arrested, a “small
company of Texans,” arrived at the home of missionary John Edwards. “Their first object,”
Edwards reported, “was to search for revolvers. I let them search to the hearts’ content.”
Unable to find any weapons in Rev. Edwards’ home, they soon began to question his political
leanings. Although Edwards assured them he was not an abolitionist, trouble arose when
Edwards refused to pledge that he “would take up arms for the South” in the event of war. The
captain ordered Edwards to leave the Territory, but upon learning that the missionary’s young
son was sick, ordered the family to leave when the boy recovered. Edwards’ exodus was
hastened when his “friends at Doaksville learned that a conspiracy was formed to go and hang
him.” Edwards fled north.27
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Other missionaries faced similar encounters with Texan intruders. On Tuesday, May 21,
an “armed mob…mostly from Texas” arrived at Spencer Academy at noon. The Texans arrived
at Spencer Academy “ostensibly for the purpose of searching for arms & ammunition supposed
to be secreted there.” Their excuses failed to fool George Ainslie, however, who determined that
the Texans’ “true purpose was to hang Mr Wentz had he been found.” Rev. C.C. Copeland also
received a vigilante visit; faces in the mob were “blackened and otherwise disguised.” “I have
been compelled by lawless men,” Copeland complained, “to leave my field for the present at
least. The Vigilant Committee who ordered me away, gave me no reasons for their procedure, so
that I am ignorant of the charge against me.” Copeland sought shelter with friends near Paris,
Texas.28
These threats of violence compelled most missionaries to leave Choctaw Nation. Calista
Downing determined that “there is a class of persons in this neighborhood who ‘respect nothing
but revolvers.’” Horace Wentz similarly complained from Cincinnati that “there is along the
Texas line on both sides the fence a set of men whose character has no parallel this side of the
Infernal legions.” Nancy Shepherd lamented for the “poor girls of my charge here…if we are
withdrawn from the field.” Sue McBeth declined to provide the “sad details of the breaking up of
our missions…and the dark cloud that overhangs & envelops.”29
Just as the Texan occupation of forts within Indian Territory left certain Choctaws
uneasy, Texan vigilantism likewise worried certain Native Americans. To be sure, the Choctaws
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were no friends of abolitionism and moreover, some Choctaws privately expressed their
dissatisfaction with the missionaries’ presence. “I am of the opinion,” declared Choctaw George
Harkins in 1853, “that those stinking abolitionists will yet cause the Choctaws a great deal of
trouble…They are a treacherous hypocritical set of Yankees.” Harkins continued angrily, “I am
done with missionary schools…I want to see Choctaw have independence about them. Show
some resentments when their rights are trampled on.” Yet these violations of Choctaw and
Chickasaw sovereignty angered many. Missionary George Ainslie acknowledged that “the
Choctaws are now arroused [sic] by these invasions of their territory and meetings were held to
organize and arm in home defence [sic].”30
Texan occupation of Federal forts and Texan vigilantism across southern Indian Territory
did not meet with the approbation of all Choctaws and Chickasaws. This unease hardly suggests
an immediate willingness to cooperate with Texas or the Confederacy; moreover, it made clear
that Texans and Southerners would prioritize their defense and foreign policy designs over
Native American sovereignty. Finally, Texan interference within Chickasaw and Choctaw
Nations sent a clear message to all those unwilling to offer anything but their full-throated
support for the Confederacy: stay silent or leave.
It is clear many of the wealthy, slave-holding members of Choctaw General Council
supported an alliance with the Confederacy. It is far less clear, however, how many of the poorer,
non-slaveholding, less acculturated Choctaws and Chickasaws felt about the possibility of
allying with the South and entering the war. Many Chickasaws and Choctaws were traditionalists
who embraced ancestral ways of clothing, farming, religion, and language. Most did not speak
English, much less write it. Yet the correspondence and reports of missionaries long embedded
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within these tribes offer a window into the sentiments of everyday Indians on the verge of the
Civil War.
Writing to each other and their superiors back east, missionary correspondence hardly
reveals a wave of war fever or Confederate nationalism among common Choctaw and
Chickasaws. In April of 1861, Reverend C.C. Copeland reported, “There is some commotion
among the Choctaws in regard to the division among the states, some wishing to secede, but the
majority opposed to secession for the present.” In May, Copeland reiterated his message: “We
have just heard exciting news of war. The Choctaws & Chickasaws are trying to be quiet and
take no part in the strife, but whether they will be allowed to do so or not is uncertain.”
Copeland’s assessment suggests that many Choctaws and Chickasaws wanted no part in the
coming war. Rev. S. Orlando Lee was told that “the full bloods were strongly for the north.”31
Rev. Lee’s allusion to blood is an intriguing one. To a greater or lesser extent, all of
Indian Territory’s Five Tribes contained intra-tribal factions divided along ancestral and, more
importantly, cultural lines. Generally, “full-blood” Native Americans tended to preserve
traditional Indian attitudes and ways of life, while “mixed-blood” Indians embraced acculturation
and adopted white—particularly Southern—lifestyles. Within the Cherokee, Creek, and
Seminole tribes, debates over allying with the South and subsequent Civil War exposed the
seriousness of the fault lines that divided these factions, ultimately leading to intra-tribal
bloodshed.
Racial and especially cultural divisions existed within the Choctaw as well. Scholars have
well documented how “progressives” of mixed ancestry often stood at odds with “conservatives”
within the Nation. As Richard White deftly explains of the progressives: “They were, for all their
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patriotism, different from their countrymen. Their interests and attitudes reflected their position
as the children of white fathers, the settlers of the borderlands, the owners and heirs of the cattle
herds and later the cotton plantations.” On the outbreak of the Civil War, it was the progressives,
aided by Texas vigilantes, who strove to forge a Choctaw-Confederate alliance. While S.
Orlando Lee might have been overzealous in declaring “the full bloods were strongly for the
north,” especially given their desire to generate sympathy and funds back home, it seems likely
that the greatest support for neutrality existed among full-blooded Choctaw conservatives.32
Whatever the extent of support for neutrality, the best hope for Choctaw neutralists rested
with Peter Pitchlynn. Despite his own status as a wealthy, educated, acculturated Choctaw
leader, Pitchlynn’s years spent in Washington, D.C. and the North exposed him to wider
American society and fostered a lackluster attachment to slavery. Moreover, having returned
from his recent negotiations in Washington, he was eager to the see the Choctaw Nation remain
loyal to the United States and receive the payments he had negotiated.33
Pitchlynn worked assiduously to ensure that his tribe would remain neutral, at least for
the time being. Knowing the broad support for the Confederacy among the General Council
members, Pitchlynn’s tactic was to convince Principal Chief George Hudson that neutrality
remained the best course of action. Working with Hudson, Pitchlynn drafted a message for
Hudson to deliver to the General Council in June recommending neutrality. In the speech,
Pitchlynn argued the Choctaws were legally bound to the United States by treaties. These treaties
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gave the Choctaws “a complete title & right to the land we now live on” and moreover noted “all
our interest funds are now in the hands of president Lincoln.” Although Pitchlynn conceded that
“we cannot and must not oppose our Southern friends,” he believed continuing relations with the
United States was the best course at present. Finally, he called for unity in the face of an
uncertain future: “Let us be Choctaws, let us be as one people, our only hope is to have a union
among ourselves.” Pitchlynn’s tactic worked. “[Pitchlynn] gave all his influence to have the
Choctaws take a neutral position,” commented Reverend Lee. “Col. P. so far succeeded as to
induce him [Chief George Hudson] to prepare a message recommending neutrality.” 34
Despite his success in swaying Chief Hudson towards neutrality, Pitchlynn’s political
campaigning did not go unnoticed by his political opponents. Pitchlynn soon received the
missionary treatment and was visited by an armed mob of Texan vigilantes who called him an
“abolitionist” and threatened his life. It was clear that if the Choctaw leader should continue to
support neutrality, his life may be forfeit.35
In late May, hope for neutrality eroded further when the Chickasaw legislature passed
resolutions which dissolved their treaties with the United States, proclaiming “our geographical
position, our social and domestic institutions, our feelings and sympathies, all attach us to our
Southern friends.” The Chickasaws moreover believed the Lincoln Administration would wage
“a war of subjugation or extermination…[which] will surpass the French Revolution in scenes of
blood and that of San Domingo in atrocious horrors” and called upon neighboring Indian tribes
to united in defense against “Lincoln hordes and Kansas robbers.” The Chickasaws authorized

34
Debo, Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic, 81; Baird, Peter Pitchlynn, 126-127; Undated, unsigned
speech draft, Peter Pitchlynn Papers, Gilcrease Institute; Abel, American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 7778; S. Orlando Lee quoted in Abel, American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 77-78.
35
Debo, Rise and Fall of the Choctaw Republic, 81; Clayton E. Jewett, Texas in the Confederacy: An
Experiment in Nation Building (Columbia: University of Missouri, 2002), 83; S. Orlando Lee quoted in Abel,
American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 77-78.

29

negotiations of alliance with the Confederacy, and they specifically declared “the Chickasaws
look with confidence especially to the Choctaws…and hope they will speedily unite with us in
such measures as may be necessary for the defense of our common country and a union with our
natural allies, the Confederate States of America.”36
Following the Chickasaw resolutions, in early June pro-secessionist Choctaws and
Texans met in Doaksville, a prominent town within Choctaw Nation, to discuss the matter of
breaking ties with the Union and allying with the Confederacy. The meeting “was largely
attended by white men from Texas.” Also present was George Hudson, Principal Chief of the
Choctaw Nation and well-coached by Pitchlynn on the merits of neutrality. Unbeknownst to
Hudson, however, was that his and Pitchlynn’s agreement on neutrality had become known to
the pro-secession Choctaws and Texans in attendance. The pro-Southern Choctaws had learned
of Hudson’s newfound neutrality from Douglas H. Cooper, the once-Federal Indian agent to the
Choctaws and Chickasaws and an ardent secessionist.37
Hudson was immediately upstaged and ambushed. He was not the first to speak. Instead,
the impassioned and angry Robert Jones, slaveowner and ardent secessionist, took the floor and
demanded that “any one who opposed secession ought to be hung” and “any suspicious persons
ought to be hung.” The whites from Texas continued the verbal onslaught, lobbying for a
Choctaw-Confederate alliance. Facing a hostile crowd comprised of both his fellow Choctaws
and Texans, who had well-proved their proclivity for vigilantism, George Hudson was
thoroughly cowed. 38
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When the Choctaw General Council met a few days later, Chief Hudson abandoned Peter
Pitchlynn, his prepared statement, and neutrality. Instead of holding fast to treaties with the
United States, Hudson now argued those treaties were broken. “They [the United States] have
refused to pay us our money guaranteed and appropriate to us by Act of Congress…and have
abandoned military posts placed in our country for our protection.” Hudson further warned that
the North would invade Indian Territory. Pointing to their shared border and institutions with the
South, Hudson advocated the Choctaws “stand by them as our only hope. They will stand by us
and cordially join us in defending our rights.” Hudson finished by recommending a host of
resolutions, including a formal “Treaty of alliance and amity” with the Confederacy, the
organization of the Choctaw militia, and finally a “league of confederation” with their fellow
Chickasaws, Seminoles, Creeks, and Cherokees to ensure Indian unity.39
Although Hudson buckled under secessionist pressure, the General Council proved more
reluctant to carry through Hudson’s recommendations. According to Rev. Lee, “They feared that
their action would result in the destruction of the nation.” Joseph Folsom supposedly claimed,
“We are choosing in what way we shall die.” Lee reported that various Choctaws told him “if the
north was here so we could be protected we would stand up for the north but now if we do not go
in for the south the Texans will come over here and kill us.”40
On June 10, the Choctaw General Council declared themselves an “absolutely and
unconditionally free and independent people” and “ready and willing to enter into a Treaty of
Alliance and Amity with the Southern Confederacy.” In the adopted resolutions, the Choctaws
spelled out their reasons, including the apparent dissolution of the Union, the abandonment of the
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Territory by the U.S. military, and the threat of “invasion by the abolition hordes of the North.”
On June 14, George Hudson announced the decision publicly at Doaksville and outlined the
creation of a “mounted regiment of Choctaw and Chickasaw riflemen called for by the
Confederate States of America.” Command of the regiment was given to Douglas H. Cooper, the
now former U.S. Indian agent who had leaked Chief Hudson’s stance on neutrality to the
secessionist camp. The Choctaw Nation had joined the Confederacy and entered the Civil War. 41
--On June 22, 1839, three heinous murders were carried out across Cherokee Nation and
Arkansas. Pulled from his bed by a party of assailants at dawn, John Ridge was dragged out into
the yard, his screaming wife and children kept at bay. Several attackers held Ridge in place,
while another lifted a knife and stabbed Ridge twenty-six times, the last being a slice across the
throat. That night, in “a scene of agony…[which] has darkened my mind with an eternal
shadow,” Ridge’s son Rollin watched as his mother wept beside her dead husband and Cherokee
men filed past the body to pay their respects. “And in addition to all these, the wife, the mother,
and the little children, who scarcely knew their loss, were the dark faces of those who had been
the murdered man’s friends, and possibly some who had been privy to the assassination, who had
come to smile over the scene.”42
Elias Boudinot left a Christian missionary that same morning, when he was approached
by four Cherokees asking for his assistance in procuring medicine. As he turned back to the
missionary to retrieve the medicine, he was stabbed in the back. A tomahawk was then used to
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hack his skull to pieces. An observer witnessed the scene and sent a runner to warn Stand Watie,
Elias Boudinot’s brother, that his life may also be in danger. Watie escaped to safety, but snuck
back that night to gaze upon his dead brother’s visage alongside a growing crowd. He offered ten
thousand dollars for the names of the murderers. The crowd was silent.43
The same day, Major Ridge rode along an Arkansas road, heading back to Cherokee
Nation from Van Buren and just a mile from the Cherokee line. A group of assassins waited
patiently with rifles perched, and when Major Ridge came into view, they riddled him with five
bullets. A slave accompanying Ridge fled the scene and spread the word.44
John Ridge, Elias Boudinot, and Major Ridge, along with Stand Watie and a select few
other prominent leaders, had all signed or supported the Treaty of New Echota, inked with the
United States government four years earlier in 1835. The treaty ceded all Cherokee lands east of
the Mississippi River to the United States in exchange for new lands in the west, five million
dollars in payment, and funds for the journey. To the Ridges, Boudinot, Watie, and others who
came to be known as the “Treaty Party,” removal was a mournful but necessary step to preserve
Cherokee Nation and its sovereignty as white encroachment on Cherokee lands continued to
mount. “I am one of the native sons of these wild woods,” Major Ridge declared. “We can never
forget these homes, I know, but an unbending, iron necessity tells us we must keep them. I would
willingly die to preserve them, but any forcible effort to keep them will cost us our lands, our
lives and the lives of our children.”45
Yet the majority of the Cherokee Nation, including its executive Chief John Ross, firmly
opposed removal. The Treaty of New Echota did not enjoy the support of the Cherokee
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government or its people. It was signed by a minority of Cherokees in direct violation of
Cherokee law, which decreed the penalty for the cession of Cherokee lands without tribal
approval was death. Ironically, the author of this 1829 law was John Ridge. The Cherokee
signers at New Echota knew what they had done; upon signing the document, Major Ridge
reportedly stated, “I have signed my death warrant.”46
Over the next several years, most notably in 1838, approximately 18,000 Cherokees were
forcibly removed from their eastern homelands via the infamous “Trail of Tears.” As many as
8,000 Cherokees perished during the journey. Upon arrival in Indian Territory, west of Arkansas,
the Cherokees found themselves in three camps: the Treaty Party, the Anti-Treaty (or Ross)
Party, and the Old Settlers, who had willingly moved to the Territory years prior. Attempts to
unify the fractious Cherokees failed, and it was in this chaotic environment that Major Ridge,
John Ridge, and Elias Boudinot were murdered.47
Their assassins were Cherokee men carrying out the “blood law” of the Cherokee Nation;
executing the Treaty men for their betrayal at New Echota. Yet the slayings were not sanctioned
by John Ross or other prominent Cherokee officials, and the killings unleashed a wave of
reprisals, assassinations, and murders that swept across Cherokee Nation for years. Only in 1846
did the violence come to a halt, as the three factions unified under a single Cherokee national
government via a treaty signed at Washington, D.C. John Ross and Stand Watie supposedly
shook hands. But the old feuds were not forgotten, nor forgiven.48
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Although the Cherokees enjoyed a few short years of peace, by the late 1850s, rising
sectionalism and tensions over slavery nationally spilled over into Cherokee Nation. A pair of
Baptist missionaries, Evan Jones and his son John, brought abolitionism into Cherokee Nation
with a “sincere desire and earnest prayer that [slavery] may be speedily brought to an end.”
While the Joneses quietly spread their anti-slavery ideals among traditionalist Cherokees,
wealthier, slaveholding Cherokees began forming their own pro-slavery institutions. By 1855, a
pro-slavery secret society emerged within Cherokee Nation, perhaps first taking shelter within
the local Cherokee Masonic lodge, but by 1860 emerging as a distinct Cherokee chapter of the
pro-slavery Knights of the Golden Circle, a secret fraternal order that spread across the South
advocating the emergence of a slave empire throughout the American South, Caribbean, and
Central America (hence “golden circle” of slavery). In the Cherokee charter, Stand Watie, John
Rollin Ridge, Elias Cornelius Boudinot, and many other Treaty Party member swore “to form a
more perfect union and protect ourselves and property against the works of Abolitionists.”49
In response, traditionalist Cherokees opposed to the growing influence of white culture
and slavery formed the Keetoowah Society in 1858. Present at the founding were prominent
Cherokee leaders, including Lewis Downing and Thomas Pegg, and Reverends Evan and John
Jones. Politically linked to John Ross, the Keetowah wore two crossed pins on their shirts as
signs of their membership, and hence were often referred to as “Pin Indians.” Comprised of
traditional, conservative Indians, the Keetowah practiced a syncretic religion that blended
aspects of Christianity, Cherokee tradition, and brotherhood. An eventual constitution further
declared, “Only fullblood Cherokees uneducated, and no mixed blood friends shall be allowed to
become a member.” Although generally anti-slavery, as scholar William McLoughlin has deftly
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argued, the “immediate purpose of the Keetowah Society was to combat those mixed-bloods who
wanted to link the Cherokees’ destiny to that of the white southern nationalist movement in the
United States.” The emergence of abolitionism and the creation of anti- and pro-slavery secret
societies within Cherokee Nation were igniting along older cultural and political fault lines
which had laid dormant for over a decade. The approach of the Civil War threatened to fan the
burning embers into a conflagration.50
--In late May of 1861, Albert Pike stepped off a steamboat from Little Rock into the
frontier town of Fort Smith. Portly and bearded, Pike’s large figure embodied both his wellknown reputation in Arkansas and his high estimation of his own abilities. A former Arkansas
newspaperman and lawyer, Pike served briefly in the Mexican War. During the 1850s, he
returned to law and successfully represented the Creek, Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in legal
claims against the Federal government. A prominent Freemason, a self-styled poet and
freethinker, Pike was well known in Arkansas social and political circles. In the eyes of
Confederate Secretary of State Robert Toombs, Pike’s credentials marked him as an excellent
choice to serve as Confederate commissioner to the Native American tribes west of Arkansas.
Tasked with forging treaties of amity and alliance, Pike confidently set out from Fort Smith into
Indian Territory.51
As the Confederacy’s official envoy to Indian Territory, Pike symbolized the interest held
by the Confederate States in securing alliances with Native Americans. Southern hopes of
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securing Indian alliances emanated from two different points, for varying reasons. For the
Confederate government in Richmond, securing Indian Territory seemed a matter of national
interest and security. Rebel officials suspected the United States held designs upon Indian
Territory and would occupy the land and liberate the Indians’ slaves. This was hardly the case, as
the Union army’s abrupt withdrawal from Indian Territory in May indicates. Nevertheless,
Confederate assumptions of Federal aggression promoted, as Secretary of War Leroy Walker
stated, “the earnest desire of the Confederate States to defend and protect them [the Indians]
against the rapacious and avaricious designs of their and our enemies at the North.” To secure
military control of Indian Territory, the Confederacy required alliances with the Five Tribes.
Brigadier General Benjamin McCulloch was appointed to command the District of Indian
Territory “to guard that Territory against invasion from Kansas or elsewhere,” while Albert Pike
was sent to negotiate the treaties.52
While the Confederate government in Richmond wanted alliances with the Native tribes
of Indian Territory, local Arkansans and Texans felt they needed such alliances. As witnessed in
the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations, Trans-Mississippi Southerners closely monitored political
affairs in Indian Territory, believing the Indians’ allegiance was vital to their safety. From the
start of the secession crisis, Arkansans fretted over the loyalties of their Native neighbors to the
west. In January, 1861, secessionist commissioner David Hubbard reported “the counties
bordering on the Indian Nations…would hesitate greatly to vote for secession, and leave those
Tribes still under the influence of the Government at Washington.” Hubbard believed “these
Indians are at a spot very important, in my opinion, in this great sectional controversy, and must
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be assured that the South will do as well as the North, before they can be induced to change their
alliances and dependence.”53
Arkansans demanded to know the Indians’ allegiance in any upcoming conflict. Governor
Henry Rector warned Cherokee Chief John Ross that “the Indian country west of Arkansas is
looked to by the incoming administration of Mr. Lincoln as fruitful fields, ripe for the harvest of
abolitionism, freesoilers, and Northern mountebanks. We hope, to find in your people,” Rector
urged, “friends willing to co-operate with the South in the defense of her institutions, her honor,
and her firesides, and with whom the slaveholding States are willing to share a common
future.”54
Living less than ten miles from the Cherokee line, the citizens of Boonsboro, Arkansas
were more direct with Chief Ross. “We have a right to know, what position will be taken by
those who may greatly conduce to our interests as friends, or to our injury as enemies,” a
committee of prominent citizens declared. “Not knowing your political status with this present
contest, as the head of the Cherokee Nation, we request you to inform us by letter…whether you
will co-operate with the northern or southern sections…we prefer an open enemy to a doubtful
friend.”55
Cherokee Chief John Ross rebuffed these early inquests as to Cherokee intentions. To
Henry Rector, Ross deftly reminded the governor of the Cherokees’ existing treaties with the
Federal government; “thus, the Cherokee people are inviolably allied with their white Brethren
of the U. States in War—and friends in peace.” Yet he also promised that Cherokee “institutions,
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locality & natural sympathies are unequivocally with the slave holding States. And the contiguity
of our Territory with your state, in connection with the daily social and commercial intercourse
between our respective citizens forbids the idea, that they should ever be otherwise than
Steadfast friends.” To the concerned citizens of Boonsboro, Ross swore a “position of strict
neutrality,” hoping that “if my present position does not constitutes as ‘active friends,’ you will
surely not regard us as an enemy.” Chief John Ross was confounding Southerners with his
hopeful neutrality, his adherence to Federal treaties alongside sincere promises of friendship.56
Leaving Fort Smith for Tahlequah in Cherokee Nation, Commissioner Albert Pike and
Brigadier General McCulloch received a similarly elusive treatment at the hands of the Cherokee
chief. Ross claimed “his intention was to maintain the neutrality of his people; that they were a
small and weak people, and would be ruined and destroyed if they engaged in the war; and that it
would be a cruel thing if we were to engage him in our quarrel.” Frustrated, Pike reported that
“We used every argument in our power to change his determination, but in vain.” Making little
headway, General McCulloch promised to adhere to Cherokee neutrality. Pike prophesied that
neutrality would prove impossible and vowed to return at a later date. He then ventured west to
North Fork Town in Creek Nation, hoping to find better luck among the other Five Tribes. 57
--The chiefs gathered in the large hall, anxious for the political battle that lay ahead.
Although many tribal leaders were present, many others were missing. Too few were present to
hold a full National Council, but the gathering was still impressive. Lending to the gravity of the
meeting was the weight of its topic. It was February 12, 1825, and the leaders of the Creek
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Nation arrived at Indian Springs in central Georgia to decide the future of their tribe. The issue
was an old one, one that countless tribes faced across the American centuries: the encroachment
of white settlers and the possibility of removal.
The Creeks had long been divided along geographical lines: Lower Creeks, who lived
along the Chattahoochee River, and Upper Creeks, whose towns dotted the Coosa River Valley
to the north. Although united into a single Creek Nation, significant cultural and political divides
had developed among the Upper and Lower Creeks. While Lower Creeks embraced economic
and social relationships with white neighbors, the Upper Creeks proved more resistant to white
encroachment and assimilation. Both factions, however, participated in a colonial deerskin trade
that ultimately gutted Creek culture and made the Creeks dependent upon Euro-American trade.
These economic and cultural crises were sharpened by the disastrous Creek War of 1813-1814,
when millenarian Upper Creeks revolted against the United States. The conflict proved
disastrous; a bloody civil war finally crushed by Andrew Jackson’s army at the Battle of
Horseshoe Bend. Fighting alongside Jackson had been a contingent of Lower Creeks. 58
The divide between the Lower and Upper Creeks was starkly apparent at the Indian
Springs meeting. The particular issue at hand was a treaty drafted by the Federal government that
would cede all Creek lands in Georgia and most of their holdings in Alabama to the United
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States. In exchange, the Creeks would receive land west of the Mississippi, along with a
substantial cash payment. The dual Creek factions were split on the issue, and on this cold
February day, the respective champions of both camps would speak to the headmen of the entire
tribe. Also present were Federal commissioners from Georgia and two Cherokee chiefs, John
Ross and Major Ridge.59
The first to speak was Chief William McIntosh. A deeply respected Lower Creek leader
who fought alongside Andrew Jackson at Horseshoe Bend, McIntosh believed that removal was
inevitable. Better to make the transition now with favorable terms, than to needlessly delay
removal. “This mighty nation has become dwarfed,” McIntosh declared, “and it will only be a
matter of time when there will be no game in the country, and they will be without food.” The
future of the tribe lay to the west, McIntosh reasoned. “Beyond the Great River is the bright sun
and the sky as blue and the water as sweet as they are here. Our people will go with us. To love
the ground is mean; to love the people is noble.” Speaking for nearly two hours, McIntosh’s
speech seemed to strike a chord with the listeners, who then turned to hear the words of the
opposing speaker that day.60
A young warrior just in his late twenties, Opothleyahola rose in response to McIntosh’s
words. Despite his age, the Upper Creek leader enjoyed a growing place of prominence within
the Creek Nation. Having fought alongside the Red Sticks against Andrew Jackson and William
McIntosh at Horseshoe Bend, Opothleyahola swore never again to raise arms against the United
States. Although he may have disavowed rebellion, he was wary of ceding more land to the
Americans. Speaking on behalf of himself and other Upper Creek leaders, Opothleyahola made
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his views clear. “I am induced to believe that it may be best for us to remove, but we must have
time to think of it; and, should the chiefs who are here sell the land now, it might create
dissensions and ill blood among the Indians.” Opothleyahola’s fervent speech was a bid for time
and a bid for unity. To sign the treaty now, without the full approval of the Creek National
Council, was unthinkable. In a terse final warning, Opothleyahola addressed William McIntosh
directly, “I have told you your fate if you sign that paper. I once more say, beware.”61
Despite Opothleyahola’s plea and the absence of a number of Creek leaders and
delegations, William McIntosh and dozens of others signed the Treaty of Indian Springs. Though
clearly fraudulent and ultimately renegotiated, the Treaty of Indian Springs planted profoundly
bitter seeds among the Creek Nation. Though handsomely rewarded with $40,000 for his part in
signing the treaty, William McIntosh paid dearly within a few short months. By ceding tribal
land without the tribal government’s permission, McIntosh violated Creek law. On May 30,
1825, several hundred Creek warriors surrounded McIntosh’s home on the Chattahoochee River,
war-whoops filling the air. The house was set ablaze. Women, children, and white persons in the
house were allowed to exit. Susannah McIntosh begged for her husband’s life in the yard, to no
avail. The leader in charge of the party cried out, “McIntosh, we have come. We have come. We
told you if you sold the land to the government, we would come.” Upon Williams McIntosh’s
appearance at the doorway, he was riddled with bullets. His body was scalped. William’s son
Chilly McIntosh and his comrade Moty Kennard escaped through a window, swimming across
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the nearby Chattahoochee to safety. Although his involvement is unclear, rumors nevertheless
swirled that Opothleyahola helped orchestrate the assassination.62
The death of William McIntosh did not deter removal; Creeks migrated west for several
years before Andrew Jackson forced final removal upon the Creeks in 1832. Yet the fraudulent
circumstances of the Treaty of Indian Springs and the assassination of William McIntosh sowed
deep divisions that simmered for decades among the Creek tribe. These divisions—and old feuds
between Opothleyahola and the McIntsohes—were not forgotten on the eve the Civil War. Even
slaves knew of the rivalry. Nellie Johnson, an African Creek enslaved by Roley McIntosh (one
of William’s brothers), recalled that “old Master’s pappy [William] was killed by the Creeks
because he signed up a treaty to bring his folks out here, and old Master [Roley] always hated
that bunch of Creeks…I think old man Gouge [Opothleyahola] was one of the big men in that
bunch.” The political feuds over removal, the factional divide between the Upper and Lower
Creeks, and the deadly rivalry between Opothleyahola and the McIntosh profoundly shaped the
negotiations of the Confederate-Creek alliance in 1861.63
--In June of 1861, as the Confederacy formed and the Chickasaws and Choctaws were
drawn into Confederate orbit and the Cherokees clung to neutrality, a delegation of Creek,
Seminole, and Cherokee leaders set out across the rolling prairies of northern Indian Territory.
Included among the band was prominent Upper Creek leader Oktaharsharjo. Backing the
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enterprise was Cherokee Chief John Ross, who desperately wanted to maintain Indian neutrality
and unity as war loomed on the horizon.64
Heading west, the party made their way to Antelope Hills. Rising among the plains, the
low-lying Antelope Hills are situated along the Canadian River near the Texas panhandle. The
hills were a well-known location deep within western Indian Territory, where nomadic Plains
tribes ruled the vast, open landscape. Over the course of the several days, the delegates from
eastern Indian Territory conferred with their counterparts from the western half, including
Anadarko, Caddo, Comanche, Delaware, Kickapoo, Tonkawa, Wichita, and others. Although
relatively little is known about the conference proceedings, the general goal was to encourage all
of the tribes—east and west—to remain neutral and unified in the coming days. The meeting
apparently went well, and the delegates departed and made their way home.65
While these delegates were away, promoting the cause of peace and Indian cooperation,
Albert Pike made his way from Tahlequah to North Fork Town, the capital of Creek Nation.
Pike’s timing was not fortuitous; it was planned. The clever Arkansan understood perfectly well
that with so many Indians in favor of neutrality away on business, the Confederacy possessed a
perfect opportunity to negotiate with friendly members of the Creek and Seminole tribes. As
Pike himself bragged about the pro-neutrality Indians, “I defeated all that by treating with the
Creeks at the very time that their delegates were at the Antelope Hills in council.”66
With prominent Upper Creek leaders absent, Albert Pike found sympathetic ears at North
Fork Town. Gathered there were not only many Lower Creek leaders but also the Chickasaws
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and Choctaws, who had already renounced their treaties to the United States and pledged loyalty
to the Confederacy but still needed to negotiate a formal treaty. Pike treated with the Chickasaws
and Choctaws first, a relatively quick affair given their prior proclamations. The Confederate
commissioner then sat in council with the Creeks present, working to forge a Confederate-Creek
alliance.
The wealthy, slaveholding Creeks negotiating with Pike envisioned themselves as not
only Creeks, but also as Southerners. They firmly believed their material interests to be
intertwined with those of the Southern Confederacy. Captain Charles Bruslé, assigned to
accompany Pike throughout Indian Territory, was struck by the cultured air and Southern
patriotism of the Creeks he encountered. “These gentlemen show the very smallest evidence of
Indian blood, are very affable, courteous and polite in manners,” Bruslé noted. “One would
imagine he was among the most refined of the American race, did he not know them to be halfbreeds. They are similar in dress to the Americans, and intensely Southern in feeling and
sentiments. They despise a Yankee as they would a rattlesnake, with all that deadly hatred so
characteristic of the race.”67
With political opposition absent, Pike had little difficulty treating with the prosecessionist Indians present; discussions for a Confederate-Creek treaty of alliance were soon
underway. The treaties Albert Pike negotiated with the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks at
North Fork Town were exceptionally generous. Pike had been given a wide degree of discretion
in negotiations, and he determined to give the Indians plenty of guarantees, “formal, full, and
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ample, by treaty, if the Indians will accept them and make treaties.” The Confederacy promised
to assume all the annuities owed by the Federal government to the Indians. The tribes would
retain sovereignty of their respective nations, including judicial sovereignty and the ability to
restrict the settlement of non-tribal citizens. Native Americans were granted full citizenship
within the Confederacy. The treaties expressly preserved the institution of slavery. Particularly
substantial were promises of representation in Confederate Congress, and a legitimate path to
statehood should they choose. From a military perspective, the Confederacy promised to defend
Indian Territory and would bear the expense of its defense alone. In return, the Choctaw and
Chickasaws would raise a mounted regiment for Confederate service; the Creeks would likewise
raise another. These regiments would be led by Indian officers, equipped and paid (the same
wages as white men) by the Confederacy.68
Imbued with Southern sympathies, welcoming of Southern culture, invested in the
institution of slavery, and presented with deeply favorable treaty terms—which one historian
declared “more favorable to the Creeks than any treaty they ever made with the United States”—
the Creeks present at North Fork Town assented to the treaty. However favorable the terms, , the
treaty still required ratification by the Creek National Council, which meant the treaty needed to
be presented to Upper Creek leaders. When Oktaharsharjo and other Upper Creeks returned from
their Antelope Hills expedition, they were stunned to find a treaty with the Confederacy had
already been negotiated and drawn up, merely awaiting their signatures. The Upper Creeks
balked. Despite Albert Pike’s best efforts, Oktaharsharjo and other recalcitrant Creeks remained
steadfast in opposition. As one Creek remembered, “They already had a treaty with the United
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States, which was good enough for our safety, and that we should call upon our great Great
Father for protection, which had been granted us in our former treaties.”69
Unwilling to sign the treaty, the opposition Creeks walked out of the Council
proceedings. Despite the walkout, the remaining members of the Creek National Council signed
the final treaty anyways, sealing the Confederate Creek alliance on July 20. Among the signees
was Chilly McIntosh, the son of long-dead Chilly McIntosh, and Moty Kennard; these two had
together escaped William McIntosh’s burning house on the Chattahoochee over three decades
prior. Kennard was now the principal chief of the Lower Creeks. Also signing was the principal
chief of the Upper Creeks Echo Harjo, one of the few Upper Creeks to support the Confederate
treaty. The signatures of three Creeks who walked out in opposition, including Oktaharsharjo,
were fraudulently affixed to the treaty as well. Within the month, a mounted regiment of Creek
soldiers was mustered into Confederate service, and Daniel McIntosh—youngest son of
assassinated William McIntosh—was elected its colonel.70
Also in opposition to the Confederate-Creek treaty was old Opothleyahola, who had once
risen to speak out against a fraudulent treaty with the United States. Now in his sixties,
Opothleyahola no longer held any official position within the Creek government, yet he
remained a deeply respected and powerfully influential figure within Creek Nation. It is not clear
just when Opothleyahola decided to oppose the Confederate treaty. Some reports suggest he was
present at North Fork throughout the negotiations and approved of the alliance, only to later
change his mind. Other accounts indicate he opposed the treaty from the start. Regardless of
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exactly when Opothleyahola chose sides, it is clear that his bitter history with the McIntosh
family played a key role in his decision.71
Years later, Albert Pike would scorn that “Ho-poi-ilth-thli-Yahola was not ‘loyal.’ He
feared the McIntoshes, who had raised troops, and who he thought meant to kill him for killing
their father long years before.” Other Creeks likewise recalled that Opothleyahola “for reasons
entirely of a domestic character and in no wise [sic] connection with the National question at
issue, withdrew from the country and assumed a hostile attitude.” The influence of the McIntosh
clan in securing the Confederate-Creek alliance, and perhaps the election of Daniel McIntosh to
command of the 1st Creek Mounted Volunteers, helped propel Opothleyahola into the opposition
camp. With old rivalries not forgotten, and perhaps fearful of the McIntosh’s newfound power,
Opothleyahola played an increasingly large role among Creek opposition in the days ahead.72
For Oktaharsharjo, Opothleyahola, and many other Creeks, the Confederate-Creek treaty
of 1861 must have been reminiscent of the fraudulent 1825 Treaty of Indian Springs. Once again,
a treaty with a foreign power had been signed without the consent of the full National Council.

71
Albert Pike to D.N. Cooley, February 17, 1866, The Cherokee Question, 23-28; Creek delegation, quoted
in Annie H. Abel, American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 362n. In an 1866 report to the United States
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Albert Pike claimed that after his failed May meeting with John Ross, Ross
“persuaded Opotheyaholo, the Creek leader, not to join the Southern states, and had sent delegates to meet the
northern and other Indians in council near the Antelope Hills, where they all agreed to be neutral.” Pike’s statement
suggests that Opothleyahola was likely in the neutral camp prior to negotiations at North Fork Town. In the same
report, Pike then later states that Opothleyahola wasn’t loyal to the U.S., but only fearful of the McIntoshes, and that
“If Mr. Ross had treated with us at first, the Creeks would have done the same.” Overall, Pike’s comments suggest
John Ross’ manipulations and fears of the McIntoshes kept Opothleyahola from supporting the Confederacy. It’s
worth noting that Pike makes no mention of Opothleyahola being present during negotiations at North Fork Town.
However, a committee of Creeks claimed after the war that Opothleyahola “was however present at the making of
said Treaty and give said Pike to understand that he fully concurred in the result of our deliberations.” This
statement comes from a document transcribed fully in a footnote of Annie Heloise Abel’s American Indian as
Slaveholder and Secessionist (1915). As with a number of Abel’s footnotes, her citations have not aged well. The
National Archives has reorganized its files on Indian Affairs, making it difficult to retrace her footsteps and find her
sources. Without greater context for the document, it’s difficult to place too much veracity in its account, especially
since it seems to have been written by former Confederate Creeks. Overall, it seems probable that Opothleyahola
possessed reservations about the treaty throughout the negotiation process, and publicly opposed the treaty sometime
after Oktaharsharjo and other dissident Creeks walked out of the treaty proceedings.
72
Albert Pike to D.N. Cooley, February 17, 1866, The Cherokee Question, 23-28; Creek delegation, quoted
in Annie H. Abel, American Indian as Slaveholder and Secessionist, 362n.

48

Once again, the McIntosh family stood at the center of such fraudulence. In negotiating with the
Creek Nation, Albert Pike drew upon a long tradition of deceitful diplomatic tactics utilized by
whites to garner concessions from Native Americans. Yet in 1861, these fraudulent tactics would
not be met with legal dissent, but instead by political mobilization and eventually violence.
On August 5, those Creeks who opposed the Confederate alliance—the “Loyal Creeks”—
met in council and declared the treaty void.73 They elected Sands their principal chief, but over
the next few weeks it became clear that Opothleyahola would be the movement’s leader. On
August 15, Sands and Opothleyahola wrote President Abraham Lincoln a letter:
Now I write to the President our Great Father who removed us to our present homes, &
made a treaty, and you said that in our home we should be defended from all interference
from any people and that now white people in the whole world should ever molest unless
the come from the sky but the land should be ours as long as grass grew and waters run,
and should we be injured by anybody you would come with your soldiers & punish them,
but now the wolf has come, men who are strangers tread our soil our children are
frightened & the mothers cannot sleep for fear.
I was at Washington when you treated with us, and now White People are trying to take
our people away to fight against us and you. I am alive. I well remember the treaty. My
ears are open & my memory is good.74
By rejecting the authority of the Creek National Council and the Confederate-Creek
treaty, electing Oktaharsharjo chief, and appealing to the Federal government for help, the Loyal
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Creeks drew a line in the sand, sowing the seeds for greater intra-tribal conflict. Their actions
were born out of the fraudulent diplomatic tactics of Albert Pike and his Lower Creek allies, and
out of the feuds and fear that existed between Opothleyahola and the McIntosh family.
--Having inked treaties with the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks, Albert Pike rode
further west to Creek Agency to meet with the Seminoles. Numbering only a few thousand souls,
the Seminoles were the smallest of the Five Tribes. They were also the last to remove westward,
having fought several fierce wars of resistance against the United States in the Everglades of
their ancestral Florida home. Only by the early 1840s had most of the Seminole been finally,
forcefully removed to Indian Territory, where they settled to the west of the Creek Indians with
whom they were culturally and linguistically related. Given their fierce resistance to outside
influence and removal, the Seminoles were also the least acculturated of the Five Tribes,
although nearly one thousand slaves inhabited their nation.75
Conservative and wary of white men and their institutions, the Seminoles were
disinclined to ally with the Confederacy from the start. In March, they had spurned overtures by
Choctaws and Chickasaws to prepare for the Union’s dissolution and ally with the South. The
occupation of Forts Arbuckle, Cobb, and Washita further left the Seminoles uneasy as to
Southern intentions. As with the other Five Tribes, the Federal government’s agents to the
Seminoles proved to be ardent secessionists. Josiah Washburne, the Seminole agent from 18531857, and Samuel Rutherford, their agent until 1860, both worked to convince the Seminoles
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their fate was intertwined with the Confederacy. They emphasized the shared institution of
slaveholding and warned that the United States’ dissolution was assured. Europe would intervene
on the South’s behalf, and as the Union splintered, the Federal government would be unable to
pay the Seminoles their annuities.76
When Albert Pike sent word he desired to meet the Seminoles at the Creek Agency, his
message was accompanied by a letter vouching for the Confederate cause written by former
agent Josiah Washburne. Unfortunately for Pike, however, the Seminoles had another source of
information: U.S. Indian agent Edwin H. Carruth. Perhaps one of the only Federal authorities in
contact with the Five Tribes during the summer, Carruth actually met with Seminole Chief John
Jumper and several other Seminole chiefs shortly after Albert Pike’s request for a meeting
arrived. The loyal Union agent spent the day helping the Seminole leaders understand the true
political situation. “None were more eager for information than the Seminoles,” Carruth
reported, “and they well understood the fact that should the south fail in her rebellion, the
seceding tribes would forfeit lands, annuities, and be liable to punishment.” Carruth read
newspaper reports to the chiefs, pulled out a map of the United States to explore the geopolitical
situation, and generally did his best to dissuade the Seminoles from joining the Confederacy.
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“Not a man among them at that time was in favor of going with the south…Jumper left with the
four men he had selected for the Creek agency, to see Captain Pike, with, I believe, the honest
intention of being true to the government,” Carruth stated.77
The next day, Chief John Jumper and the Seminole delegation departed for the Creek
Agency. Tall, well-built, and possessing, as one onlooker thought, a “dark expressive
countenance, serious…a semi-savage and imposing look,” Jumper was a full-blood Seminole
who spoke no English. Yet he was anxious to see the Seminoles embrace American culture. In
the past few years, he had pushed for more missionary schools, the embrace of Christianity, and
the banning of alcohol among his tribe. Though perhaps disinclined to break with Seminole
treaties with the United States, he would listen to what Albert Pike had to say.78
Pike hoped that by meeting the Seminoles at the Creek Agency within Creek Nation, he
could draw upon the influence of the newly-minted Confederate-Creek alliance to sway
Seminole minds. The plan backfired. Although Pike apparently made some headway with John
Jumper and several others, word soon spread to the Seminoles of the fraudulent circumstances
regarding the Creek treaty, and that many Upper Creeks had walked out of council proceedings.
Several Seminoles departed the Creek agency, but Jumper and several others remained with Pike
and began planning for the negotiation of a Confederate-Seminole alliance. Pike was offering
Jumper and the Seminoles generous treaty terms similar to those received by the Creeks and
others. Jumper was swayed, but the tribe needed convincing. 79
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Moving directly into Seminole Nation, Pike again met with Seminole leaders. Once
again, Pike’s pitch apparently met with mixed results. Although Jumper was now supportive of a
Confederate alliance, many other Seminoles were not. They desired to remain true to existing
Federal treaties. Undoubtedly, their recent discussion of national affairs with Edwin Carruth also
helped immunize them against Pike’s claims that the Federals would invade Seminole Nation.
Despite Seminole disunity, however, John Jumper and several others signed a treaty of alliance
with the Confederates. Once again, Pike convinced a tribal minority to sign an alliance against
the wishes of many Indians. Edwin Carruth believed John Jumper had been bribed, and further
noted that while Jumper “felt true to the [Federal] treaties…the Forts west were in possession of
its enemies, their Agent would give them no information on the subject, & he feared that his
country would be overrun, if he did not yield.”80
Just as Albert Pike’s dishonest diplomacy had fractured the Creek tribe, a number of
prominent Seminole leaders quickly revolted against the fraudulent Confederate-Seminole treaty,
including Halleck Tustenuggee, Billy Bowlegs, John Chupko, and Pascofar. These men soon led
several hundred Seminole followers to join the dissident Creeks under Oktaharsharjo and
Opothleyahola in their growing political rebellion against the Confederacy.81
--While Opothleyahola, Oktaharsharjo, and thousands of Creeks and Seminoles rejected
Confederate overtures, John Ross and the Cherokee Nation finally succumbed. The catalyst for
changed proved to be Stand Watie, Ross’ old rival. Watie and other members of the Treaty Party
desired an alliance with the Confederacy and chafed under Ross’ policy of neutrality, which they
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believed “tied up our hands & shut our mouths & put the destiny & everything connected with
the Nation & our lives &c in the hands of the Executive.” Watie and his followers worried that
Ross wielded too much power.82
Stand Watie worked diligently to undermine neutrality and pull his nation into a
Confederate alliance. In this endeavor, he was not alone. In May, citizens of Fayetteville,
Arkansas reached out to Watie “urging you, as a private and public citizen of the Cherokee
Nation, to join us in our efforts for mutual defence [sic].” The Arkansans promised they could
deliver guns and ammunition to Watie “for the use of the Cherokees in the defense of their and
our frontier.” In mid-July, despite John Ross’ proclamation of neutrality, Brigadier General
Benjamin McCulloch commissioned Stand Watie a Confederate colonel and authorized Watie to
raise troops. Although Watie himself wasn’t present, a small number of Cherokees fought
alongside Benjamin McCulloch’s Confederate forces in their August victory at Wilson’s Creek
in southwestern Missouri.83
Attuned as ever to Cherokee politics, John Ross sensed the political ground shifting under
his feet. With Watie and his followers flouting neutrality, the Cherokee Nation was at risk of
being torn apart by competing factions and pulled into the war anyway. Moreover, Confederate
victories at First Manassas and Wilson’s Creek loomed large; the Confederacy seemed to be
winning the Civil War. Finally, as summer shifted into fall, John Ross became keenly aware of
the Cherokees’ precarious position as the only tribe in Indian Territory still clinging neutrality.
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Always a believer in Indian unity, worried over the increasing influence of his political rival in
Watie, and acknowledging the geopolitical reality of his situation, John Ross finally acceded to a
Confederate alliance.
On August 21, Chief John Ross addressed nearly 4,000 Cherokees who gathered in
Tahlequah, “the largest known [meeting] among this people for many years.” Ross began by
noting “that evil times have befallen the great Government with which we have been connected.”
Acknowledging internal divisions within his nation, the chief urged the Cherokees to remain
unified, asking “whether you are arrayed in classes one against the other—the full-blood against
the white and mixed blood citizens—say whether you are faithful to the constitution and laws of
your country? whether you abide by all the rights they guarantee, particularly including that of
slavery?”84
Having appealed for unity, Ross laid his case bare. “The permanent disruption of the
United States into two governments is now probable. The State [Arkansas] on our border and the
Indian Nations about us have severed their connection from the United States and joined the
Confederate States. Our general interest is inseparable from theirs and it is not desirable that we
should stand alone.” Reversing course on neutrality, Ross now asked the people to “signify your
consent…for an alliance with the Confederate States upon terms honorable and advantageous to
the Cherokee Nation.” Ross sent a courier to Albert Pike, asking him to return to Cherokee
Nation to negotiate a treaty.85
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On September 25, the Cherokee Nation once again gathered in Tahlequah. Albert Pike
and John Ross had agreed to the terms, identical to those offered the other Five Tribes, and Pike
was pleased that Ross had come around. “I not more doubted then that Mr. Ross’ whole heart
was with the South than that mine was,” Pike reflected. The time had come to sign the treaty, and
many were on hand to observe the ceremony.86
Besides for the thousands of civilian onlookers, two Confederate Cherokee regiments
oversaw the day’s events. Col. Stand Watie stood by, with 80 or 90 of his devoted followers
alongside. Yet Watie’s outfit was dwarfed by the nearly 900 new recruits of Colonel John
Drew’s Cherokee regiment. The nephew of John Ross, John Drew and the other officers of his
regiment were firmly loyal to the Ross faction, and the rank and file of the regiment were
comprised of full-blood, traditional Cherokees (many of whom belonged to the Keetowah
Society). The creation of Drew’s regiment—a unit essentially loyal to John Ross first and
foremost—indicated that despite joining the Confederacy, Chief Ross had no intention of losing
influence or power to rival Stand Watie.87
With the two lopsided Cherokee regiments present, speeches were made, and Albert Pike
presented John Drew’s regiment with a Confederate flag; Ross “exhorted them to be true to it.”
Then John Ross and Stand Watie, in a rare moment of reconciliation, shook hands. Ross
“expressed his warm desire for union and the harmony of the nation.” Watie responded
acerbically “that there now existed a party in the nation known as the pin party, and as long as
they held their political organization there could be no peace.” Watie, perhaps frustrated that
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Ross outmaneuvered him again by creating John Drew’s regiment, threatened to undue the
civility of the moment by referencing the Keetowah Society and tribal divisions. Ross disavowed
knowledge of the “Pin Party,” however, and after a “little parley,” the treaty was signed. The
Cherokee Nation and Confederacy were allied, their fortunes linked.88
--By September of 1861, all Five Tribes had joined their fates to the Confederacy via
treaties of alliance. Enthusiasm for the Confederacy and the prospect of war ran high in certain
circles, and by the end of the year nearly 3,600 Native Americans from these tribes would be
clothed in Confederate gray. On paper, Albert Pike accomplished much that summer, forging
alliances despite political opposition and securing Indian Territory for the would-be Confederate
nation.
Yet these paper treaties masked the fraudulent diplomacy, deep political and cultural
schisms, and mounting anti-Confederate resistance that lurked underneath the ConfederateIndian alliances. For many Native Americans, the Confederate alliances forged that summer
represented yet another generation of fraudulent treaties made without the consent of the whole
tribe. Among the Chickasaws and Choctaws, whatever support for neutrality that existed was
snuffed out by Texan mobs and the machinations of wealthy, slaveholding tribal leaders. Among
the Creeks and Seminoles, only brazenly unethical, illegal diplomatic maneuvers by both Albert
Pike and willing Indian conspirators produced treaties with the Confederacy. Unsurprisingly,
pro-neutrality and pro-Union elements mobilized quickly among these nations. The ConfederateIndian treaties would not stand unchallenged.
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“Now the Wolf Has Come”: Opothleyahola’s Rebellion, 1861
“There is a disposition in some to scoff at the brave Muscogees, who marched northward with Opethlolehola,
fighting as they went. When an impartial history shall be written, the wrapt prophet shall pause over the bloody
ledges on the Red Fork of Arkansas, while the ghosts of martyred heroes murmer ‘momen’”
-Cherokee Tomahawk, Fort Gibson, March 13, 186589
---

Seven year-old Mary Perryman was frightened. The events of the past few days confused
the young slave girl: the visits of strange Indians urging her family to run away, the secret
conversations in the woods between her father Jacob and uncles William and Hector, the late
night tears of her mother, the incessant cooking of food the children weren’t allowed to eat.
Now this morning at sunrise her master Mr. Mose Perryman, a Creek Indian, came down
to her family’s cabin “waving a shot gun and hollering at the top of his voice.” Mary later
recalled that she “never saw a man so mad in all my life, before nor since!” This moment of fear
was compounded by the realization that her father—and indeed all the enslaved men on the
Perryman farm—had disappeared. Her mother consoled her, “Don’t’ you worry about your
pappy, he’s free now. Better be worrying about us. No telling where we all will end up!” Mose
Perryman ordered his remaining slaves to pack their belongings, determined to “take all you
black devils to a place where there won’t no more of you ran away.” Mary and her mother were
sent south, farther from the turmoil wreaking havoc in Creek Nation in the summer of 1861 and
causing slaves to escape.90
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Around the same time that Mary’s life upended, ten year-old James Scott, a Creek Indian
himself, was equally perplexed by recent events. His family tasked him to round up the cattle, a
seemingly routine chore that James quickly realized was anything but routine. “I wondered at the
vast amount of cattle being killed and the meat being dried, the pork being cooked down, and all
the other numerous preparations,” James later remembered. “At all of the houses of the
neighbors, I saw all sorts of preparations with little knowledge of its meaning.” Only later would
James understand why he and his family—mother Larney, father Artuss, and sister Lizzie—took
part in the “stirring events and the flight of the Muskogee” in the summer and autumn of 1861. 91
The fraudulence of the Confederate-Creek treaty negotiated in July bore bitter fruit for
both the Creek Nation and the Confederate States. Beginning in August, Creek leaders began
working to undermine the Confederate-Creek alliance and remain neutral in the looming civil
war. Over the course of the autumn, their resistance to the Confederacy transformed from a
political rebellion into a literal one, wherein thousands of Native Americans and runaway slaves
left their homes and formed a motley army under the command of Creek chief Opothleyahola in
rejection of their tribal governments and the Confederacy.
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion constituted both a major pan-Indian rebellion against the
Confederacy. Thousands of Creek, Seminoles, and Cherokees—along with smaller parties from
another dozen tribes—joined Opothleyahola in dissent. Their rebellion signified resistance to
wealthy, acculturated tribal elites who sought to forge links to the Confederacy; it was resistance
to yet another series of fraudulent treaties reminiscent of removal, but this time, Natives would
not acquiesce. Beyond an Indian rebellion, however, it was also a slave revolt, the largest of the
American Civil War. Nearly 500 African-Americans, most of them runaway slaves, joined
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Opothleyahola’s army, using the rebellion as an avenue towards freedom. This rebellion, then,
marks a moment of great agency for both traditionalist Natives and enslaved African-Americans,
who revolt in hopes of changing their political fortunes.
Often depicted by scholars as a prelude to greater conflict later in the war,
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion should be understood as the catalyst the plunged the region into intratribal warfare and a significant military event in its own right. The rebellion produced a rare
winter campaign that played out over three battles. The campaign witnessed shifting politics and
unclear loyalties, ambitious leaders and sharp battles, and warfare that reflected both American
and Indian roots and blurred the line between civilians and soldiers. Opothleyahola’s Rebellion
tore at the roots of the Confederate-Indian alliances and paved the way for years of intra-tribal
warfare to come.
--Having rejected alliances with the Confederacy and called to the United States for help—
crying that “now the wolf has come”—the pleas of Loyal Creeks and Seminoles reached the
reached the desk of Edwin H. Carruth, a Federal Indian agent in Kansas who had the unenviable
job of serving tribes in Confederate-held Indian Territory whom he couldn’t visit. Carruth
accordingly urged the Creeks to send “a delegation of your best men” to meet with him in
Kansas. Carruth further promised that “the President will not forget you. Our armies will soon go
south and those of your people who are true and loyal to the Government will be treated as
friends…His soldiers will soon drive these men who have violated your homes from the land
they have treacherously entered.” 92
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In promising the Creeks prompt aid, Edwin Carruth either engaged in wishful thinking or
willfully deceived the Loyal Creeks. Throughout 1861, Federal authorities in Washington were
deluged with requests for troops from all over the South; Union forces numbered too few to meet
the many demands of the war’s early months. Indian Territory did not register as a strategic
priority in Washington, D.C., and there was little chacne of Federal troops being dispatched to
Kansas to liberate Indian Territory with any haste. Carruth could not have been blind to these
circumstances. Finding himself in an impossible position, perhaps Carruth simply sought to
hearten the Loyal Creeks to the South, and in this he probably succeeded.
Although we don’t know how Sands and Opothleyahola reacted to Carruth’s message—
indeed, one of the frustrating aspects of examining Opothleyahola’s campaign is the dearth of
sources from Loyalist perspectives—the news likely cheered the Loyal Creeks. It was their first
meaningful contact with the Federal government since May, and Carruth pledged a return of
United States forces to Indian Territory to put an end to Confederate scheming. In accordance
with Carruth’s request, a combined delegation of Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickasaws headed
north to meet with Carruth in Kansas. Leading the Creek portion of the delegation was none
other than Sands himself, leaving Opothleyahola in charge of the Loyal Creek faction in Indian
Territory.93
Whatever Sands and the Loyal Creeks hoped to find in Kansas, they must have been
sorely disappointed; little Federal assistance awaited the Indian delegation upon their arrival.
Nevertheless, the Loyal Creeks claimed they could provide “five or six thousand warriors to the
Government to fight for the cause of their Great Father at Washington.” The local Kansan press
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approved of the Loyal Indians’ zeal, noting that they “would be a valuable accession to the
Federal army in putting down their rebellious brethren…we trust they will be accepted and
assigned to those parts where their mode of warfare will be most efficient.”94
Yet there was no Federal force preparing to strike at the Confederates’ grasp over Indian
Territory. Rather than meeting with a liberating army, the delegation was instead forwarded on to
Washington, D.C. to meet with President Lincoln personally. It was a symbolic gesture, meant to
generate goodwill and indicate that the Federal government hadn’t forgotten its Indian wards. In
practice, it proved meaningless: the journey to Washington took weeks, and it effectively
removed Sands from the picture in Indian Territory. Carruth’s promises proved empty, and yet
again, the United States government had failed to uphold its obligations to the denizens of Indian
Territory. It would be under Opothleyahola’s leadership alone that the Loyal Creeks would face
the deteriorating situation in the weeks and months ahead.95
With Sands absent, Opothleyahola took up the mantle of leadership decisively. By early
September, if not sooner, Opothleyahola commenced a widespread mobilization of all those
opposed to the Confederate alliance. Thousands of men, women, and children left their homes
and began gathering at Opothleyahola’s plantation on the Canadian River. The numbers
continued to swell as the weeks passed; although estimates of the party’s size vary, it is probably
fair to suggest that between four and six thousand followers joined Opothleyahola that autumn. 96
What did Opothleyahola and his followers hope to accomplish? Illiterate, Opothleyahola
left almost no written record, and contemporary sources from the vantage point of Loyal Indians
are equally scarce. Even simply understanding what happened can be a struggle. Recognizing the
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limitations of sources, we must carefully examine Confederate writings, civilian diaries,
newspaper accounts, and oral histories to uncover just what happened and why during
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion in the autumn and winter of 1861.
By refusing to ally with the South, Oktaharsharjo, Opothleyahola, and others were
rebelling against the authority of both the Creek National Council and the Confederacy. As
historian Troy Smith has noted, “the assemblage of Indians and blacks represented a rejection of
the Five Tribes’ governments.” The Loyal Creeks feared for their safety, and mobilizing afforded
them some degree of protection. As Oktaharsharjo later recounted to Federal Indian agents: “We
have no opportunity to defend ourselves, although the Union men among us are the more
numerous. The Texans were on one side of us, and other Southern men on another, and we had
to back out. We had not means of helping ourselves. All odds were against us. Many of our men
said we must fight, but others said wait until assistance comes from afar.” 97
Recognizing the perilous political waters into which they had waded, and fearing the
possibility of Confederate retribution, Oktaharsharjo, Opothleyahola, and other Creek leaders
orchestrated the mobilization of thousands of dissident Creeks, Seminoles, African-Americans,
and others into camps along the North Fork of the Canadian River. Two striking features define
this immense Indian rebellion: its diverse composition and tremendous size. Unsurprisingly,
thousands of Creeks constituted the bulk of the rebellion: primarily Upper Creeks, although some
Lower Creeks joined the old chief as well. Hundreds of Seminoles who also opposed their
nation’s Confederate alliance likewise joined. So too did hundreds of African-Americans,
“Interview with the Chiefs and Commissioner Dole,” Lawrence Republican, January 2, 1862; “The
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including African-Creeks and African-Seminoles, both free blacks and enslaved, who hoped the
rebellion presented an opportunity to gain their freedom. Small numbers of Native Americans
from nearly a dozen other tribes rounded out this deeply diverse rebellion. For each of these
groups, the challenges and processes of mobilizing looked different.
For Creek Indians, especially Upper Creeks, joining Opothleyahola stemmed from both
their desire to stay out of the war and their loyalty to their local towns and leaders.
Opothleyahola’s old age and long history as a leader within his tribe lent him considerable
influence amongst the Creeks, and Opothleyahola desperate attempted to keep his people out of
out of the fraudulent Confederate alliance and the Civil War. James Scott, the ten-year old Creek
boy whose family would join Opothleyahola along the Canadian River, recalled Opothleyahola’s
personal efforts to keep the Creek Nation out of the war. “Opuithli Yahola’s heart was sad at all
the war talk,” James recalled. “He visited the houses of his followers or any of the Indians and
gave them encouragement to face all these things, but above all to stay out of the war. It was no
affair of the Indians.” Not only had Opothleyahola walked amongst his own people advocating
peace, but he had likewise taken part in the July delegation to Antelope Hills, where he urged the
Plains Indians to stay out of the war. Creeks, Seminoles, and Plains Indians alike all understood
Opothleyahola’s pro-neutrality, anti-Confederate politics clearly, and by joining him they
indicated their approval of his desire for peace.98
As Creeks chose to leave their homes to join the rebellion, they enjoyed the luxuries of
both time and unity. They could pack their belongings into wagons, round up livestock, prepare
food, secure their homes, and convoy together with other families on the journey to
Opothleyahola’s camp. James Scott rounded up the cattle, watched as the beef cooked and pork
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dried, and with his father, mothers, and sister, joined a wagon train to the Canadian River. They
trusted Opothleyahola, “the recognized grand old man who had led them only a few years before
over the Trail of Tears” and believed he would lead them through the present crisis again. Whole
families left to join the Creek chieftain. Willie Larney’s grandfather and parents travelled with
Opothleyahola throughout Indian Territory into Kansas; so did Joseph M. Grayson’s father.
Willie Tiger’s grandfather, a Euchee Creek Indian, joined a group of Opothleyahola’s followers
on Brown’s Creek. Creeks left their homes ready for the journey, at their own pace, and often in
the company of family and friends.99
--Members of other tribes, most notably the Seminoles, joined Opothleyahola as well. As
with the Creeks, the Seminoles had been divided over a Confederate alliance. Although initially
in support of neutrality, the absence of the United States and the presence of Texan troops in
former U.S. army forts near his border convinced Seminole leader John Jumper “that his country
would be overrun, if he did not yield.” Shortly after the Creeks signed their treaty with the
Confederates on July 20, the Seminoles followed suit on August 1. Yet as word spread among
the Seminoles that certain Creek chiefs had not been present for the treaty negotiations and
opposed the alliance, a number of prominent Seminoles denounced the Seminole-Confederate
alliance. Seminole leaders such as Billy Bowlegs, John Chupco, Pascofar, and Halleck
Tustenuggee all gathered groups of Seminole followers, perhaps as many as 900, and joined
Opothleyahola.100
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The addition of the Seminoles to the growing rebellion proved valuable, as some of these
Seminoles were veterans of the long-running Seminole Wars in Florida. Whereas the Creeks,
Cherokees, and other “civilized” tribes had enjoyed decades of relative peace, the Seminoles
opposed removal violently and waged years of guerrilla warfare against the United States army
in the swamps of Florida. Ironically, these veterans of the conflict against the United States
would soon be pitted against the Confederacy, and their military experience likely proved
valuable to Opothleyahola.101
The informal leader of these Seminoles was Halleck Tustenuggee. In his fifties,
Tustenuggee gained a reputation as a fierce, intractable foe of the U.S. Army during the Second
Seminole War. A man with “features as delicate as a female,” one Seminole War veteran
described Halleck Tustenugge as “a great rogue,” “a capital actor,” and as “self-willed and
unmanageable as an unbroken mule.” Halleck opposed removal westward so staunchly that he
murdered his sister for her willingness to migrate. Halleck was duped into his own capture in
Florida, and he was sent to Indian Territory unwillingly. When one member of his warband
accused Halleck of betraying the Seminole cause, the Seminole chief “sprang like a tiger” on the
poor fellow and bit off his right ear, shouting “Halleck-tustenuggee! I’ll make you understand
that I am your chief, whether prisoner or not!” It was this fierce individual would lead the
Seminoles into battle during the Opothleyahola’s rebellion.102
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Although most of the Native Americans in Opothleyahola’s swelling camps were Creeks
and Seminoles, smaller contingents of Indians from a wide variety of tribes also joined the
rebellion. Loyalist Indians from the other Five Tribes also made their way to Opothleyahola,
including Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees. Members of other eastern tribes that had been
removed to Indian Territory—including Shawnees and Delaware—likewise joined the Creek
chieftain. A smattering of individuals from the “wild tribes” of the Plains also joined in
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion, including Comanches, Kickapoos, and Wichitas, among others. One
Confederate lamented that “warriors from no less than eighteen tribes” had joined the rebellion.
In seeking to understand why Plains Indians would join the old Creek chief, it is worth
remembering that Opothleyahola had recently visited Antelope Hills in July for the express
purpose of convincing the Plains Indians to remain neutral. Opothleyahola likely fostered
personal connections with the Plains tribes during this visit, and it was perhaps these connections
that drew some of them to his aid that autumn.103
--Hundreds of African-Americans, both enslaved and free, joined Opothleyahola’s
Rebellion too. Historian Steven Hahn has argued that slaves “could be acutely aware of conflict
that erupted between white people and nations ruled by white people; that slaves often imagined
a set of possible allies and enemies…that slaves often became conversant with institutions and
issues of local and national politics.” This argument transplants well to Indian Territory, where
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slaves held a nuanced understanding of Indian politics, and clearly understood that
Opothleyahola represented a plausible ally and a route to freedom.104
Among the Creeks in particular, slaves had cause to run away. In recent months, the
Creek Nation had passed legislation designed at constricting the freedom of slaves within their
borders, instituting rules requiring slaves to carry a pass while traveling, barring slaves from
owning weapons of any kind, barring slaves from business transactions, preventing black slaves
from preaching to Indians, etc. Moreover, free blacks were barred from the Nation; free blacks
within the Nation either had to leave its borders or choose a master and voluntarily enslave
themselves. Thus, as Gary Zellar has noted, “Whether it was the promise of freedom
extended…or to defend a certain kind of freedom already experienced by some, African Creeks
resisted their enslavement in the most convincing ways available to them.” For nearly 500
African Creeks and African Seminoles, that meant joining Opothleyahola.105
Slaves knew of Opothleyahola by reputation, and they also knew of his rebellion against
the Confederacy and the Lower Creeks. Lucinda Davis had heard of Opothleyahola as a great
orator. “Dey say when he was a little boy he was called Hopothli, which means ‘good little boy,’
and when he git grown he make big speeches and dey stick on de ‘yoholo.’ Dat mean ‘loud
whooper’.” Nellie Johnson understood that her master Roley McIntosh (the brother of
assassinated William McIntosh, and Daniel and Chilly McIntosh’s uncle) had a bitter
relationship with Opothleyahola, and she was well aware that Upper Creeks “all go off after that
old man Gouge, and he take most of the Seminole, too.”106

104

Steven Hahn, Political Worlds of Slavery and Freedom (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009),

73-75.
105

Gary Zellar, African Creeks: Estelvste and the Creek Nation (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
2007), 42-43, 47; Dallas Herald [Dallas, TX], April 10, 1861.
106
Baker, eds., “Lucinda Davis,” WPA Oklahoma Slave Narratives, 107-117; Baker, eds., “Nellie
Johnson,” WPA Oklahoma Slave Narratives, 224-228; Chapman, Chief William McIntosh, 14.

68

But most of all, slaves indicated their understanding of Opothleyahola by joining his
ranks, recognizing his rebellion offered a path to freedom. Indeed, Opothleyahola’s followers
actively recruited slaves to escape to his camp. Mary Grayson recalled “some Upper Creeks
came up in the Choksa bottoms talking around the folks there about siding with the North. They
were talking, they said, for old man Gouge.” Yet Grayson’s father Jacob and two uncles,
William and Hector, had already escaped. Even before Opothleyahola could reach them, slaves
reached Opothleyahola.107
The Grayson men’s departure is indicative of the struggles runaway slaves faced, as they
did not enjoy same luxuries as Indians who decided to join the Creek chief. Slaves had to run
away from their masters; they literally escaped to Opothleyahola. Discussions and preparations
for the journey were short and secret, and hard choices had to be made about who could make
the journey to freedom and who had to be left behind. Instead of days or weeks to pack and
prepare, slaves had to travel light, and Mary Perryman’s mother could only cook limited amounts
of food in the secrecy of darkness. Moreover, as Mary’s mother’s tears attest, there were
powerful emotional costs, as well. While Jacob, William, and Hector fled, Mary and her mother
remained in bondage. Also left behind was William’s daughter Phoebe, who recalled “runaways
was riding ponies stolen from their masters.”108
Despite the unique hardships they faced, the fact that hundreds of slaves and free blacks
fled to Opothleyahola speaks both to their political awareness and their understanding that
Opothleyahola was indeed an ally. Opothleyahola understood the value that slaves brought to his
camp and recruited them to his side. Thus Opothleyahola’s great mobilization brought together
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Creeks, Seminoles, Indians of many other tribes, and enslaved and free blacks—all mustered in
opposition to the Confederacy and willing, if necessary, to fight for their freedom.
As Upper Creeks, Seminoles, other “civilized” and “wild” Indians, and AfricanAmericans rallied around Opothleyahola throughout September and October, the size of the
rebellion swelled into the thousands. Although estimations of Opothleyahola’s party size vary, a
reasonable approximation would place the total between 4,000-6,000; included in this estimation
are nearly 900 Seminoles and 500 African-Americans. Although civilians and families
comprised the bulk of the assemblage, the mobilization nevertheless also provided
Opothleyahola with a makeshift “army.” He had between 1,500 and 3,000 warriors at his
disposal at various times over the course of the rebellion.109
When taking into account the total population of Indian Territory, the size and scope of
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion becomes staggering. In 1860, Indian Territory possessed an Indian
population approaching 50,000; the Creek Nation alone numbered 13,500. Assuming that 5,000
followers joined Opothleyahola, most of whom were Upper Creeks, than roughly one-fourth of
the entire Creek Nation left their homes to join “Old Gouge” on the banks of the Canadian River.
Seminole Nation numbered over 2,200 in 1860; two-fifths of all Seminoles in the Territory
joined Opothleyahola. Out of the nearly 2,500 slaves held by Creek and Seminole masters, close
to one-fifth of them escaped and linked up with the rebellion. In sum, one out of every ten
Indians in the Territory left their homes that autumn in rebellion against the Confederacy. This
was a remarkable act of dissent; unparalleled among Unionists in the South. The figures offer a
final, hammering reminder of the fraudulent way in which Confederate-Indian treaties were
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negotiated, the weakness of the Confederate cause among many Native Americans, and the
willingness of many Indians to fight against the Confederacy.110
--The great mobilization under Opothleyahola did not go unnoticed. The gathering of
thousands of disaffected “Loyal” Indians caused first concern, then fear and panic, and finally
action among the Confederate authorities in Indian Territory. As the ranks of rebellious Indians
swelled, Confederate authorities attempted to gather sufficient military strength while
simultaneously hoping to diplomatically bring Opothleyahola to heel and prevent the shedding of
blood. These overtures of peace fell flat, and Opothleyahola’s Rebellion resulted in a rare winter
offensive in November and December. Thousands of Native American, Texan, and Arkansan
troopers struck out to hunt down the defiant old chief and “either compel submission to the
authorities…or drive [Opothleyahola] and his party from the country.” The resulting military
campaign and exodus of Opothleyahola’s followers into Kansas deserves greater attention
afforded to it by historians, as it sheds light on the brutal nature of warfare that would come to
haunt Indian Territory.111
--Within days of the Creek Nation’s schism and Opothleyahola’s and Sand’s appeal to
President Lincoln, news of the emerging unrest in Creek country reached Confederate
authorities. The first reports of Opothleyahola’s activity came to Colonel Daniel McIntosh. A
“fine-looking, intelligent gentleman,” who “will compare well to any Colonel in the army,”
Daniel belonged McIntosh clan with whom Opothleyahola had long feuded. He commanded the
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recently raised 1st Creek Mounted Rifles. In early September, McIntosh penned a warning to
Colonel John Drew of the Confederate Cherokees, cautioning Drew that if prompt action were
not taken, the Creek rebellion might spill over into Cherokee Nation. “We have had many reports
from Hopoithyalo of an allarming [sic] character,” McIntosh advised. “But it is now certain that
he has combined with his party all the surrounding wild tribes and has openly declared himself
the enemy of the all the South. Negros are fleeing to him from all quarters—no less than 150
have left within the last three days.” Warning that the growing rebellion “cannot long exist here
without seriously affecting your country,” McIntosh recommended the rebellion “be put down
immediately” and asked that Drew’s Cherokees “come over in haste” to Creek Nation.112
While McIntosh fretted over the rising size of the revolt taking place in his country,
rumors ran rife throughout the Nation that Opothleyahola intended to wage war. In early
September, word reached North Fork Town, a prominent Creek village nestled between the two
forks of the Canadian River, that Opothleyahola’s force numbered 3,000, “had raised the union
flag, and sent notice to the women and children to leave North Fork, as he intends to sack and
burn the village.” Panicky Creeks fled the town; “[n]o one would stop in the place.” Although
the report of impending attack proved incorrect, the affair demonstrates the panic that gripped
the Nation as the rebellion increased in size. 113
Calls for help by Creek Confederates grew more urgent as September passed into
October. On September 30, the 1st Creek conducted a military review. One observer noted the
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Creeks were “of all ages, sizes, colors, and descriptions, some painted red, some black…but a
more determined set of looking men, I never saw.” When the Confederate Creeks were told to
prepare to march against Opothleyahola, they let loose a “savage yell” which “seemed to burst
forth from every mouth” and fired their guns into the nearby woods. Although the Confederate
Creeks apparently possessed no apprehensions about battling their wayward brethren, McIntosh
worried that Opothleyahola would march on him. Within days of the military review, McIntosh
turned to Brigadier General Albert Pike asking for military assistance. McIntosh reported that his
scouts now pegged Opothleyahola’s force at 6,000, and rumors of an attack on McIntosh
abounded. Once again, McIntosh pleaded for help. “Sir the time has now come when this matter
must be looked into, I would suggest that you send over the forces in the Cherokee Nation and
those in the Choctaw Nation.” With the combined weight of the Confederate Indian regiments,
“we go up and put an end to the whole matter. I think this all important, and ought to be done
immediately.”114
McIntosh’s pleas for help were accompanied by those of Moty Kanard and Echo Harjo,
the principal chiefs of the Confederate Creeks. The two men wrote another missive to John
Drew, urging him to send his Cherokees to the Creeks’ aid. “We are threatened daily of an attack
from the dissatisfied portion of the Creeks,” they reported. Even worse, “dispite [sic] all appeals
to patriotism and treaty obligations our ranks are diminishing.” Opothleyahola’s continued
presence in the Nation was sapping Confederate strength and morale, and the chiefs cautioned
that “unless we get aid from some quarter, our difficulties will continue to an unaccountable
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extent.” The Creek chiefs promised Drew food and forage if he would send even part of his
command to assist the Creek Nation.115
Despite these pleas for help from Confederates in the Creek Nation, immediate military
aid was not forthcoming. Although appeals for help reached on John Drew, his 1 st Cherokee
Mounted Rifles only began recruitment in late August; its ranks were not yet filled. Drew simply
possessed too few men and arms to be of much assistance. Likewise, the recently-recruited 1st
Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles under Colonel Douglas Cooper were nearly bereft of
arms as well. Cooper complained that he “could not arm over three companies from all the guns
in the regiment.” While Opothleyahola’s ranks swelled throughout autumn, local Confederate
forces were simply unprepared to challenge the recalcitrant Creek chief, whose warriors
numbered in the thousands.116
Hoping to avoid bloodshed and stave off a war for which they were unprepared, various
Confederate leaders pursued diplomatic efforts to bring Opothleyahola to the table. The first was
Cherokee Chief John Ross. On August 24, John Ross sent a brief message to “the Chiefs and
Headmen of the Creek Nation,” announcing the Cherokees’ decision to ally with the Confederate
States. He hoped to “preserve and maintain the Brotherhood of the Indian Nations in a common
destiny,” and he also informed the Creeks of John Drew’s appointment to raise a regiment of
Cherokees for Confederate service.117
This was the first that the Loyal Creeks heard of the Cherokee-Confederate alliance, and
the news stunned them. John Ross spearheaded the movement for Indian neutrality, and to learn
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that he had suddenly shifted course and allied with the Confederacy was hard to believe. Dubious
of the message’s authenticity, on September 14 Oktaharsharjo and Opothleyahola wrote back to
Ross for clarification, admitting, “We don’t know wether [sic] this is the truth or no.” Ross
quickly responded in the affirmative, and expressed hope that “under the present extraordinary
crisis, for all the red Brethren to be united among themselves in the support of our common
rights and interest by forming an alliance of peace and friendship with the Confederate States of
America.”118
Opothleyahola and the Loyal Creeks viewed John Ross’s alliance with the Confederacy
as a betrayal, but it did nothing to dissuade them from their rebellion. Indeed, many in
Opothleyahola’s camp suspected that a majority of Cherokees disfavored the Confederate treaty.
In October, Creek Chief Moty Kennard wrote to Ross informing him of Opothleyahola’s
recalcitrance, noting that the rebellion was “adding to their number the dissatisfied from every
Tribe.” Kennard worried, “If some timely remedy is not used for its arrests it will and must end
in civil war,” and asked Ross to send “a few of your old men well known to the party to give
them…brotherly talk in the right direction.” 119
Hoping for peace, John Ross proved willing to “do anything in my power to adjust and
harmonize” the disaffected Creeks, and he promptly sent a delegation of Cherokees, headed by
Joseph Vann, to treat with Opothleyahola. He further invited Opothleyahola and other Creek
leaders to visit Ross personally at Tahlequah, “where we may smoke the Pipe of Peace and
friendship around our great council fire.” Ross also conferred with Albert Pike, who agreed to
support the mediation effort and “kindly issued letters of Pardon to Opothleolo & his
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People…also, of Safeguard for him & Six others to visit me at this place [Tahlequah].” Pike’s
offer to pardon Opothleyahola and his follower was a stunningly obtuse proposal, given that it
was Albert Pike’s underhanded negotiating tactics and fraudulent treaty-making that gave
Opothleyahola and his followers immediate cause to rebel in the first place.120
While Joseph Vann’s delegation set out to talk to Opothleyahola, the military situation in
Indian Territory darkened. The October rumor that Opothleyahola was planning to attack Daniel
McIntosh’s Confederate Creek regiment caused Col. Douglas Cooper to detain the 9th Texas
Cavalry—passing though Indian Territory on their way to Arkansas—and send them to
McIntosh’s aid. When the rumors of the attack proved false, Col. Cooper allowed the Texans to
continue their journey to Arkansas, where they might face the Federal threat along the Missouri
border. Nevertheless, the sudden presence of armed Confederate Texans in the area heightened
tensions in Opothleyahola’s camp and throughout the countryside, causing Ross to fire off
another message to Opothleyahola informing him that the Texans short-lived presence was the
product of “mischievous lies circulated by wicked and designing men,” and the Texans had
already “passed thro this place in peace and good order” to Arkansas.121
Joseph Vann’s delegation managed to find an audience with Opothleyahola, but “failed to
elicit anything definite.” Opothleyahola claimed that he initially journeyed to the Canadian River
simply to “make a Cowpen,” and in hopes “to live in peace & quiet away from the scene of strife
and confusion.” The thousands of followers who joined him did so due to “false and exaggerated
reports,” and that his followers likewise “also wished to live in peace.” Opothleyahola also
vowed that “he had no design whatever of making war upon any Body. His wish was to be at
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peace with all the red and white people.” The old Creek chief further stated that he would share
Vann’s concerns with his fellow headmen who “were not all then present” and inquire as to their
position on the matter of peace. Lastly, he claimed to have made an effort to reach out to the
McIntosh clan in hopes of settling their differences. Still, Opothleyahola made known his
discomfort with the Confederacy. He compared the Confederate Creeks to “people, who after
having used an axe a long time, see a new one and take it instead”; Opothleyahola “preferred the
old axe.”122
Opothleyahola appears to have told several half-truths in his meeting with the Cherokee
delegation. Opothleyahola’s story that he played no part in mobilizing the thousands who now
accompanied him along the banks of the Canadian—that like-minded lovers of peace simply
“gathered around him”—ignores the fact that Opothleyahola’s followers actively sought out and
recruited Creeks and African-Americans to join their ranks. Likewise, Opothleyahola’s claim
that “he had no design whatever of making war” proved equally disingenuous. There were
members of Opothleyahola’s camp who had indeed advocated taking the offensive, but the
shortage of ammunition and gunpowder quashed their aspirations. More importantly, however,
Opothleyahola had actively communicated with the Federal government in hopes of spurring a
Federal military expedition into Indian Territory to push out the Confederates and liberate Creek
Nation. It is probably true that most of Opothleyahola’s followers wanted peace, and perhaps
Opothleyahola thought he could avoid war for his people by letting the U.S. Army tackle the
tough task of reasserting Federal authority. Regardless, Opothleyahola’s letter to President
Lincoln and the subsequent Loyalist delegation to Kansas and Washington were explicitly
designed to provoke a military response from the United States. Opothleyahola may not have
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wanted to wage war himself, but he surely wanted the United States military to rid Creek Nation
of the Confederacy’s presence. Col. Daniel McIntosh suspected Opothleyahola’s duplicity, and
he simply believed the whole affair was an attempt by Opothleyahola “to gain time, hoping to
receive backing from the North.” 123
Diplomatic efforts began to break down in the wake of Vann’s visit to Opothleyahola in
October. Moty Kennard and Echo Harjo wrote to John Ross thanking him for his efforts to
secure peace, but the two Confederate chiefs ultimately felt “there was no hope for a friendly
adjustment of the difficulty.” Echoing Daniel McIntosh’s suspicions, the Creek chiefs
determined that “if they [Opothleyahola’s party] get aid from the North which they are making
every effort to do they will be our most formidable enemy.” Opothleyahola’s warriors knew the
lay of the land just as well as the Confederate Indians, and the daily escape of black slaves to
Opothleyahola’s camps caused “great injury to many of our best citizens.” Ultimately, the chiefs
concluded, it was “necessary for them to be put down at any cost. Therefore so soon as we are
reinforced which we daily expect we shall proceed without further delay and put an end to the
affair.”124
For John Ross, the probability of an intra-Creek, inter-Indian civil war was horrifying.
After all, through most of 1861 Ross stood as the most ardent proponent of neutrality. The
Cherokee Nation was the last of the Five Tribes to ally with the South, and Ross’s decision to
ally with Confederacy was largely the result of political maneuvering by Stand Watie, It was also
rooted in Ross’s desire to preserve inter-tribal peace among the Native Americans of Indian
Territory. Now Ross and Opothleyahola stood on opposite sides of a growing precipice; opposite
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sides of a looming civil war. Failing to fathom the depths of that precipice, Ross implored
Kennard and Harjo to continue diplomatic efforts at a peaceful solution. “Brothers, we are
shocked with amazement at the fearful import of your words! Are we to understand that you
have determined to make a Military demonstration, by force of Arms, upon Opothleyaholo & his
followers, at the cost of civil war among your own people and thereby involve your red Brethren,
who are in alliance with the Confederate States?” Ross begged the Creek Confederate chiefs to
“preserve peace and harmony.” He advised that the Creek chiefs issue a proclamation to
Opothleyahola’s follower asking that they “return to their respective Homes with their families”
and that “Indian Regiments should be judiciously quartered” in the Creek Nation to preserve
peace.125
However admirable, Ross’s continued hopes for peace were foolish. He seems never to
have truly understood the gravity of the rebellion in Creek Nation, nor did he comprehend that
Opothleyahola’s party was in fact in league with Federal authorities. Although much ink and
effort was spent by Confederate authorities to find a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the crisis in
Creek country, the reality was the opposing parties were at an impasse. The Creek National
Council negotiated and ratified a treaty with the Confederacy that Opothleyahola’s party would
never accept. By mobilizing in opposition and communicating with Union authorities,
Opothleyahola openly defied the Creek National Council and the Confederacy. The escape of
hundreds of slaves to the rebellion’s camps only forced the issue further. While Opothleyahola
may have wanted to avoid war for his people, the Confederate Creeks and Confederate military
correctly identified him as a threat to their authority and to Indian Territory. Ironically, in
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Opothleyahola’s bid to keep his people out of the Civil War by spurning the Confederacy, he
invited war to his doorstep.
--By late October, Confederate forces finally began moving into position to strike at
Opothleyahola; Daniel McIntosh received his long looked-for reinforcements at last. Col. Cooper
arrived in Creek Nation with the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles and took command.
Also present was a small battalion of Confederate Creeks and Seminoles under Lt. Col Chilly
McIntosh, Daniel’s brother, and Seminole Chief and Major John Jumper. Col. John Drew’s 1 st
Cherokee Mounted Rifles also briefly arrive in late October, but since they had yet to be
mustered in, they returned to Fort Gibson.126
Also en route to join this ad-hoc Indian brigade was the 9th Texas Cavalry. A youthful
regiment hailing from North Texas, the 9th was led by Colonel William Sims and Lt. Col.
William Quayle. Hailing from North Texas, these young volunteers were eager for combat, and
they had orders to make their way to Ben McCulloch in northwestern Arkansas. As the 9 th
Texas’s various companies marched north they united in Boggy Depot, a prominent town and
trading post in Choctaw Nation in early November. The 9th Texas Cavalry was the first of several
Texan cavalry regiments to become embroiled in Opothleyahola’s Rebellion.127
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As the regiment marched north, Private Allison Sparks experienced an encounter that
foreshadowed the violence to come. On a detachment ahead of the regiment sent to gather
supplies, Sparks watched curiously as a “small Indian negro boy on a horse rode up.” The young
boy spoke the detachment’s captain, then “rode away at a gallop, uttering a curious scream,
terminating in something resembling the gobbling of a turkey.” The captain informed Sparks the
cry “was the Indian war-whoop, and meant mischief to us.” The Texan detachment took shelter
in a nearby mission, horses “saddled for fight or flight,” watching as “the Indians in every
direction appeared to be in great excitement.” Left unharmed, the Texans later learned that the
Indians the encountered were “a detachment left that night to join Hapothlehola.” 128
On November 11, the 9th Texas Cavalry rode into North Fork Town in Creek Nation. As
they settled in for the evening and feed their horses, a messenger arrived from Col Douglas
Cooper. As he had in October, once again Col. Cooper pounced on passerby Texan soldiers as an
opportunity to reinforce his command in the face of the enemy. Cooper requested that the Texans
join him in the field against Opothleyahola. The accommodating Texans consented and
immediately prepared to move out. Ammunition and provisions were issued, and the men slept
for a few hours. At four in the morning the men were roused and set out. There was some fear
the Texans might be intercepted by the enemy, so the men marched “in perfect silence” and at
“rapid pace,” which was hastened upon receiving yet another message from Cooper stating that
his force was “was retreating to meet us--& urging us to hurry on as fast as possible.” They
bedraggled troopers continued their quick pace towards Cooper throughout the 12 th, expecting to
“find Cooper engaged with the enemy.” Instead, they men arrived at Colonel Cooper’s camp
unscathed to find all was well. James Bates angrily wrote to his mother that the enemy had not
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“ever been nearer than 25 miles…we were not a little vexed at riding our horses so hard to no
purpose.”129
Douglas Cooper’s urgent dispatches to the 9th Texas Cavalry hint at both his worry,
inexperience, and his respect for Opothleyahola. The day before commandeering the Ninth,
Cooper wrote Lt. Col. William Ross of the 1st Cherokee Mounted Rifles that he was “mistaken in
regard to Hopoithlayahola’s pacific intentions, as from reliable information, I am perfectly
satisfied he is now meditating an attack on my camp.” Rumors also indicated that Opothleyahola
was working with 1,000 Kansan Jayhawkers near the Arkansas River, and he order Drew’s
regiment of Cherokees to make a “rapid march” to intercept the Kansans. This impending attack
was likely the cause of Cooper’s panicked missives to the 9 th Texas. Unfortunately for
Opothleyahola, there were no Kansans by his side; the 9th Texas tired their mounts for naught,
and Drew’s Cherokees spent several days hunting for jayhawkers that weren’t there.130
Over the next few days, the white Texans got an education in their newfound Native
American allies and Indian politics. George Griscom informed his diary that the enemy was
“Comd’d by ‘Opothlehola’ the full blooded chief & composed of all the full bloods,” while the
“the C S indians by col Chilly McIntosh a half breed & comprised of all the half breeds &
quatreen.” These two Creek camps, Griscom learned, “were naturally antagonistic to each other
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on account of family feuds “‘Old Ginge [Gouge]’ the nick name of Opothy…years back
beheaded McI’s [McIntosh’s] father in old States. Hence they were enemies.” Allison Sparks
recalled that “Gouge had once been a great warrior of the Creek Nation and was at enmity with
the family of McIntosh, the reigning chief, and in order to revenge his hatred had assembled all
the least civilized of his own tribe, together with allies from other tribes, and espoused the cause
of our common enemy with the Seminoles.” James Bates wrote his mother that the enemy “are
principally Creek Indians—with the remnant of a few wild tribes together with a few jay
hawkers,” led by “Opotheohola or as we call him—‘Gouge.’” Although the Texans occasionally
got minor details of the Creek feud wrong, their quick mastery of the political crises in Creek
Nation was impressive.131
While learning about Creek politics and their enemy, the Texans also got to behold their
Indian allies, who made quite an impression. When the Texan troopers arrived at Cooper’s camp
after their hard ride on November 12, they were met “with the most extravagant demonstrations
of joy firing guns shouting & war dancing untill [sic] nearly morning.” Allison Sparks recalled
that the Indians “received us with a great joy as we marched through their camp and fired us a
great salute, which we returned with about the same unmilitary regularity.” The Indians’
excitement at the Texans’ arrival, along with the prospect of finally taking the offensive, led to a
great war dance on either November 13 or 14, the highlight of campaign preparations.132
“Many people seem to think the Indian war dance a frivolous affair,” Sparks opined, “but
from my observation it is really a very serious ceremony.” As the Creeks, Choctaws, and
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Chickasaws gathered for their dance, an Indian speaker arose and spoke to the crowd. A fellow
Indian translated the gist of the speech for Private Sparks:
“Friends, Hapothlehola, one of our race who has been honored and loved by his people,
has become made with his brothers and has gathered to him all the wild tribes and
marched them to our homes. We offered to meet him as a friend and brother, but he
turned his back to us…What does this mean? Ask the old men who have lived beyond the
‘Great Water’ and they will tell you it means WAR! It means that they will kill our
children, it means that they will burn our homes, it means they will take away our
squaws, it means they will drive off our cattle; and when we have grown weak for want
of food they will hunt us down in the mountains and scalp us like wolves...Will you
swear that you will never take ease again until the last of those who seek to do us harm
are driven over the border? Then let us paint our faces, a sign that we look no more upon
the squaw until her enemies are no more.”
Throughout the speech, the orator lifted a “huge club” covered in blood and hair, and the crowd
several times erupted into “screams and gobbles” and the firing of guns. 133
In the wake of the Creek orator’s speech, the war dance was performed in a ring “filled
with painted Indians, marching a side-like manner, stepping high and fast, while they chanted a
strange song.” The usually stoic George Griscom penned in his diary that the Creeks “gave us
the real war dance of both nations with which our boys were delighted.” Griscom confessed that
he and other Texans joined in the dance. With rations prepared, speeches made, dances
performed, the time to end Opothleyahola’s Rebellion arrived.134
---
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At 8 a.m. on the morning of November 15th, Colonel Douglas Cooper’s troopers, some
1,400 Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, Seminoles, and Texans, set out to find Opothleyahola and
“either compel submission to the authorities of the nation or drive him and his party from the
country.” As promised during the war dance, the Indians’ faces were “painted red with streaks &
spots of black,” and upon the outset of the march they let loose “whoops & yells & screams.”
James Bates thought they struck “a most hideous appearance.” The Indians “rode small ponies
and were dressed in garb ranging from a common gent’s suit to a breech [cloth] and blanket.”
The Indians carried a variety of arms, including rifles, smoothbore guns, and bows and arrows.
This “motley assembly” set forth to defeat Opothleyahola. Upon hearing of Cooper’s offensive,
one denizen in Creek Nation fervently wrote, “We hope this insurrection, which has assumed
rather formidable proportions, will now be ‘crushed,’ and ‘Old Poth.,’ the insurgent chief be sent
as a hostage to Richmond.”135
Over the next few days, the Confederate cavalry moved northwest up the Deep Fork of
the Canadian River towards the “supposed” camp of Opothleyahola. The camp was successfully
found within a few days; Opothleyahola was not. The old Creek chief had begun moving
northwest himself towards the Kansas line. We can speculate as to why Opothleyahola would
decide to move north in late October and November. First, even by this late date, Opothleyahola
may still have held out hope for Union reinforcements; Confederate reports indicated
Opothleyahola “anxiously” awaited help from Kansas. Yet the old chief must also have begun to
harbor doubts about whether the United States army was really on its way. Moving towards
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Kansas was a smart move either way: if reinforcements were en route, Opothleyahola could link
up with them sooner, but if Opothleyahola was on his own, he and his followers would be nearer
to the relative safety of Kansas. Second, with thousands of mouths—civilian and warrior alike—
to feed, forage and sustenance may well have become problematic. Moving north into fresh
territory would’ve eased logistical concerns. Third, given the widespread sympathies within the
Creek, Seminole, and even Cherokee Nations towards Opothleyahola, he was surely apprised of
Cooper’s whereabouts and actions. The old chief undoubtedly knew the Confederates were
finally mobilizing to take the offensive, and he may well have known about the arrival of the 9 th
Texas, too. Moving north away from Cooper may have been a practical move to avoid fighting a
battle in the dead of winter.136
As Opothleyahola moved north, the Confederates quickly caught his trail and followed
suit. The path of “Old Gouge” wasn’t hard to find; the rebellious Indians left “a trail as large as a
common stage road,” “well beaten and plainly marked, a “distance of several miles in width.”
Moreover, Opothleyahola’s followers left a barren landscape in their wake. As George Griscom
scrawled in his diary, Opothleyahola moved north, “burning & destroying the country as he
goes—we get no feed for our hoses [horses] scarcely and but a little corn & not much grass.”
Opothleyahola’s followers were lighting the prairies ablaze to keep the Confederate’s horses
hungry.137
As the Rebel troopers kept on Opothleyahola’s trail, they began finding “fires while yet
burning,” and “videtts [videttes; mounted scouts] of the enemy were nearly always to be seen in
front to the right or left and occasionally to the rear.” Lt. Colonel Quayle informed his men in the
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9th Texas that they “were to march after the enemy until overtaken and beaten.” Lt. Colonel
Quayle of the 9th Texas ordered blue and red strings tied around every man’s left arm, including
the arms of the Indians. Since the “motley assembly” of Confederates contained men in uniforms
of every description, the strings were meant to tell friend from foe. Further, Quayle warned the
Texans that Opothleyahola’s men would “wear a piece of corn shuck.” The Confederates were
closing in on Opothleyahola and battle loomed.138
On November 19, 1861, the Confederates finally caught up to the old Creek chieftain
near the Red Fork of the Arkansas River; in the afternoon, smoke from his campfires dotted the
sky and several prisoners were taken. Opothleyahola’s scouts were seen on the horizon. Anxious
to close with the enemy, Lt. Col. Quayle of the 9th Texas impetuously charged ahead, only to
find the camp “recently deserted.” Spotting more enemy scouts on the horizon and sure they
were close, several companies of Texans ploughed onwards “at a furious rate” across four miles
of open prairie as the sun began to set. As the Texan companies charged ahead of the rest of their
regiment, Col. Cooper arrived on the field and ordered the remainder of the 9 th Texas and his
own Choctaws and Chickasaws to halt. Assuming it was too dark to continue, Col. Cooper
ordered the men to fall back to a nearby creek and make camp.139
Meanwhile, the detachment of Texan cavalry charging onward managed to find
Opothleyahola’s army. The rebellious Indians sat ensconced on two round hills amid a belt of
timber, the whole position in the shape of a “horseshoe,” in front of which lay the prairie across
which the Texans had been charging. As the Texans came upon the position, Captain Brinson of
Company D, perhaps not realizing he had stumbled across the entire enemy force of several
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thousand, bravely and foolishly “charge’d & came into line in fine style” with about 75 men. As
Brinson’s men charged forward, Opothleyahola’s warriors let loose a “a pony chased by dogs,”
hoping to stampede the Texans’ horses. The Texan horses remained steady, but several of
Texans fired at the dogs. As the charging Texans swept close to the enemy, perhaps as close as
50 yards, the Indians unleashed “a volley of balls and arrows” from the concealment of the
timber. The Texans could see the Indians “when they raised to fire upon us,” and returned fire.
As this small company of Texans made their grand charge into the “nick” of the prairie
within the Indian position, the other companies of the 9th Texas present now swung into action.
The Texans, who probably numbered now more than 300, found themselves in a precarious
position. Benjamin Vines later wrote to his wife, “We was surrounded with Creaks [sic] except
one little space where we marched. It was in the shape of a horse shoe nyer [nearer] than any
comparison then [sic] I can make. The enemy was discharging their guns from every side except
the side in which we marched in at.” As arrows and bullets flew in from three sides,
Opothleyahola’s warrior set fire to the prairie “in a half Dozen places affording them light to
fight by.”
Nearly surrounded, heavily outnumbered, the Texans fell back several hundred yards.
During this first retreat, Captain Charles Stewart of Company ordered his men to halt and
brought his pistol up to fire. He was struck by a ball in the head, “made an unusual noise,” and
fell slowly off his horse, the pistol discharging as he fell. The round from Stewart’s pistol
“passed very close” to the face of young Allison Sparks, whose sleeve and collar were covered
with “a large wad of his brain.” Benjamin Vines also witnessed the incident, and wrote that “the
last words we heard him say was ‘form on me boys.’” The skirmish continued in the twilight of
dusk, the flickering prairie fires casting shadows across the long grass. Ben Vines fired “as fast
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as I could load,” and took “good aim by the fire lights,” sure that “my old musket called several
of them.” 140
As the Texans blundered into the clever ambush set by Opothleyahola, Col. Cooper in the
rear learned of the Texas companies’ discovery of the enemy. He hastily organized his
command, including the other half of the 9th Texas Cavalry, who had just taken off their saddle
when the order came to mount up and ride. The Choctaws and Chickasaws moved out first,
reached the battlefield quickly, and promptly struck the enemy; “a bloody fight of 15 minutes”
ensued. The Texan companies already engaged with the enemy heard a “loud roar [which] told
us of our relief and we thought thank ‘God’ as we passed through the line,” the Texans “fell back
on the Choctaws.” The Texans watched the Choctaws and Chickasaws go forward into the short,
“very severe” fight. Around this time, Company D of the 9th Texas, who had performed the
daring charge to open the engagement, now accomplished another spectacular feat by forming a
square—a tactic little used on the battlefield. Sergeant George Griscom, the adjutant of the
company, wrote proudly in the margins of his diary, “Regt forms a hollow square, Adjt
performing the feat.”
The remaining companies of the 9th Texas also arrived on the field shortly after the
Choctaws and Chickasaws charged in, and the Texans likewise “went out to the prairie and
formed into line of battle.” Yet the sky had grown so dark that James Bates complained “we
could not distinguish an Indian from a white man [at] three paces…“it was impossible for us to
tell even in daylight which of the Indians were our friends and which our enemies.” Private
William Coffman disliked the feeling of helplessness that accompanied inaction: “I felt very
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much like shooting after I was shot at.” The Texans could only look on and listen as the dueling
camps of Indians fought one another in the darkness.141
The arrival of the Choctaws and Chickasaws seemed to have blunted Opothleyahola’s
warriors’ success, and shortly thereafter they shrunk back into the darkness. Within minutes, the
Battle of Round Mountain, the first major Civil War engagement in Indian Territory, was over.
Despite the sharpness of the skirmish, Confederate casualties proved relatively light: six killed,
five wounded and missing. Most of these casualties came from 9th Texas Cavalry in the opening
minutes of the fight. The casualties of Opothleyahola’s command are harder to determine. Col.
Cooper claimed that Gouge lost 110 men lost, but Cooper would prove to have a penchant for
bloating enemy casualty figures, and considering the course of the engagement, this numbers
seems exaggerated. A Texan major reported 61 enemy killed, a more reasonable figure.
Ultimately, we will never know.142
Opothleyahola’s performance at Round Mountain revealed the old chief possessed a
sharp strategic and tactical mind. His decision to burn the prairie to deny the advancing
Confederates forage was astute, and his attempt to stampede the enemy’s horses by letting loose
the pony chased by dogs clever. Opothleyahola’s warriors occupied a strong defensive position
tactically, and in all likelihood, the rebellious Indians planned the ambush that lured the 9 th Texas
Cavalry straight into their “horseshoe.” Lighting the prairie on fire not only provided the Indians
with light, but the smoke and confusion likely aided their retreat as well. In sum, despite
commanding an ad-hoc army of warriors from a dozen tribes, lacking proper arms and
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ammunition, possessing no training and little cohesion, Opothleyahola outsmarted Cooper and
turned in a smart performance at Round Mountain as a commander. The Confederacy could only
claim victory because the Opothleyahola retreated during the night, a decision probably driven
by the necessity of protecting the thousands of civilian refugees accompanying his force. The
strategic objective of defeating Opothleyahola or pushing him out of the country had not been
accomplished; although Confederate newspapers spun the skirmish as a Rebel victory, the reality
was evident in one observer’s comment that “the whole thing has to be done over.”143
After a night spent sleeping in line with strong pickets on watch, the Confederates
advanced at daylight on November 20 and entered the chieftain’s abandoned camp. In his desire
to quickly escape the enemy’s reach, Opothleyahola left behind a dozen wagons loaded with
sugar, salt, coffee, flour and other supplies. Oxen, cattle, sheep, over a hundred ponies, and
several carriages were all found abandoned. More darkly, soldiers also uncovered the bodies of
two Southern soldiers “taken prisoner by them & beaten to death.” George Griscom experienced
“feeling for the 1st time as one does when leaving comrades slain on the field” and witnessed
Confederate “Creeks taking some scalps the 1st I ever saw.” Though a sharp but small skirmish,
the ugliness of war was on full display.144
Notably silent in Confederate sources is any real discussion regarding for whom all these
captured supplies were intended. While it was widely known that Opothleyahola was harboring
large numbers of civilian refugees, Confederate commanders and soldiers alike expressed little
remorse for driving these hapless civilian further from their homes. The large quantities of food
and supplies captured after Round Mountain were just as certainly intended for the needs and
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wants of women and children as for old Gouge’s warriors. By forcing Opothleyahola to abandon
his supplies, the Confederate offensive was in turn inflicting suffering upon the civilians
Opothleyahola harbored.
--In the wake of the Battle of Round Mountain, the two sides were given an unexpected
respite. General Ben McCulloch in Arkansas believed that Federal forces in southwest Missouri
were preparing to attack. He requested that Col Cooper “take a position near the Arkansas line,
so as to co-operate with him.” Cooper, whose army occupied a landscape burnt by the enemy and
devoid of forage, was perfectly willing to head eastward and give his command respite from
campaigning. The whole command turned east and south and headed for Concharta near Fort
Gibson on the Arkansas River, reaching that place on November 24. After several weeks of
meager campaign rations, the men delightedly wolfed down biscuits, pork, and apples. The men
took stock of their captured mounts, and Private Sparks noted that many soldiers named their
new ponies “Gouge, in honor to his former associations.”145
This reprieve from campaigning proved temporary. The immediate Federal threat to
northwest Arkansas failed to materialize. Moreover, despite several days’ opportunity to escape
north into Kansas, Opothleyahola chose to remain in Indian Territory. Having received an
invitation from a “disaffected Cherokee,” Opothleyahola’s force moved east into the Cherokee
Nation. No longer needed to support McCulloch, Cooper once more decided “to prosecute the
operation against Hopoeithleyohola without delay and with the utmost energy.” Cooper was also
undoubtedly nervous about Opothleyahola striking out into Cherokee Nation. The Cherokees’
loyalties to the South were tenuous, and Opothleyahola could not be allowed to establish himself
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in that country long for fear of splitting its populace. Thus, Cooper’s command set out again on
November 29; the Rebel forces were again comprised of the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw
Mounted Rifles, the 1st Creek Mounted Rifles, a battalion of Choctaws, and the 9th Texas
Cavalry. The Texans may not have been thrilled at the prospect of further service with Cooper.
James Bates confided in his diary that “It is the prevailing opinion that Col Cooper is afraid of
old Potheohola and wants us between him and danger.” Also accompanying the Confederates
were a sizable detachment of Colonel John Drew’s 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles, finally
mustered in and ready to take the field. Included in Drew’s ranks were more than a few members
of the Keetowah Society, a Cherokee secret society whose stance against acculturation and
slavery made them uneasy bedfellows with the rest of the Rebel soldiers in Cooper’s
command.146
Opothleyahola’s decision not to retreat into Indian Territory in the wake of Round
Mountain, despite having approximately two weeks to do so and having not received any Federal
reinforcements, suggests the Creek chief was growing bolder and more confident. Undoubtedly,
Opothleyahola found many sympathizers among the Cherokee, and he probably gained more
followers by entering Cherokee lands. Fresh food and forage could be had. But Opothleyahola’s
move was also an offensive one; he knew full well that the Confederacy would once again strike
at him, and his continued presence in the Territory invited further engagement.
As Opothleyahola’s band moved into Cherokee Nation, they “committed outrages on
Cherokee citizens,” primarily by sacking the homes of several pro-Confederate locals. As
Cooper’s Confederates pursued Opothleyahola from the Creek Nation into Cherokee Nation,
they found evidence of his vandalism. At one home, an observer found that the “Creeks have
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destroyed all his household property, what they did not take away they demolished, ripping open
feather beds, smashing a clock, etc., and killed his hogs, not to eat, but wantonly, because he was
warm instead of cold.” George Griscom of the 9th Texas came across the Perryman planation on
the Arkansas River, “where we see some of the horrors of war in the ruined condition of things
here the furniture and everything of value about the house is demolished.” 147
On December 8, Confederate troopers caught up to Opothleyahola’s forces along the
banks of Bird Creek in Cherokee Nation. Learning that perhaps Opothleyahola possessed “a
desire to make peace,” Col. Cooper sent James Vann of the Cherokee regiment to the Creek
warrior ensuring that “we did not desire the shedding of blood among the Indians” and proposing
peace talks be held. James Vann, after his visit to Opothleyahola’s camp, returned to Cooper at
dusk with lamentable news. Contrary to reports, Opothleyahola had no intentions of buckling,
and indeed, “his warriors, several thousand in number, were all painted for the fight” and
intended to attack that night. James Bates reported an even worse account of events, writing in a
letter home that “Opotheohola refused to treat and threatened to kill [Vann] if he did not join
him.” Vann apparently agreed but claimed he needed to go bring in his wife, thereby making his
escape. Accord to Bates, “Van also reported that Optheohola intended attacking us that night and
he had had from 7,000 to 10,000 warriors—all armed with rifles, six shooters and hatchets.”
Although Vann’s account was undoubtedly exaggerated, it was sobering news. Given the months
of failed negotiations with Opothleyahola, Cooper could not have been surprised that this
eleventh hour attempt at armistice fell flat. There would be no peace among the Indians. But
Opothleyahola’s aggressive posturing was disconcerting.148
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Opothleyahola’s continued defiance and reports of his vast army unnerved the Cherokees.
Faced for the first time with battle, John Drew’s regiment of Cherokees, “panicstricken…dispersed, leaving their tents standing, and in many instances their horses and guns.”
As word spread that battle with Opothleyahola loomed, many traditionalist Cherokees grappled
with the prospect of fighting Indians with whom they empathized. Exacerbating the situation
were soldiers who belonged to the Keetowah Society, who were perhaps in contact with
Opothleyahola’s camp itself. The Keetowahs fanned the flames of panic, warning of an
imminent attack and encouraging the traditionalist Indians to defect. Tying cornhusks to their
hair (similar to the badge worn by the rebellious Indians at Round Mountain), the Keetowahs and
others slipped away from Drew’s camp during the night and joined their fellow traditionalists
alongside Opothleyahola. When the defected Confederate Keetowahs met their Union
counterparts, they exchanged passwords. “Who are you?” one would ask. “Tahlequah—who are
you?” came the response. “I am Keetowah’s son,” was the final reply. Armed with such
passwords and devices, Drew’s regiment melted away “in less than 20 minutes.”149
John Drew’s detachment of the 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles numbered 480 men at the
outset of the campaign in late November. By the end of the night only a few dozen men
remained; the rest either fled in desertion or defected to Opothleyahola’s ranks. It marked the
only time in the Civil War that a Confederate regiment defected en masse to the Union side.
More importantly, however, the defection of John Drew’s Cherokees revealed the schism within
the Cherokee Nation over secession and the war. Between Opothleyahola’s band and Drew’s
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defectors, hundreds of Creek, Cherokees, and Seminoles were now ostensibly serving the Union
cause by fighting the Confederacy. The treaties of alliance with the Confederate States, formed
just months prior, were wilting; three of the Five Tribes were falling into their own intra-tribal
civil wars.150
Surely this must have been an unnerving moment for Colonel Douglas Cooper.
Opothleyahola was coming, and the Cherokees were gone. Luckily for Cooper, however, reports
of Gouge’s imminent attack proved false. Still, Cooper now knew that his enemy numbered over
2,000 warriors, and Cooper’s command had shrunk by some 400. Moreover, as at Round
Mountain, Opothleyahola’s warriors enjoyed a stronger tactical position. The rebellious Indians
occupied high ground, with Bird Creek fronting the northern end of their line and several ravines
guarding their southern flank.
On the morning of December 9, after spending an anxious night “quietly awaiting the
enemy,” Cooper wisely decided to withdraw south. Private Allison Sparks thought this a
masterful bit of generalship by Cooper, believing southward march was a ruse “to call
[Opothleyahola] from his mountain stronghold, so we could better get at him.” Cooper did
indeed send a Creek scouting party to “ascertain whether the enemy had come down from the
mountains.” Yet Cooper did not intend to fight at Bird Creek. He “thought our force too small
since the desertion of the Cherokees to contend against Opotheohola,” and wanted to move south
to reestablish communications and gather reinforcements.151
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Opothleyahola, positioned on the west side of Bird Creek, expected Cooper to ford Bird
Creek and attack. As the Confederates marched south, parallel to Opothleyahola’s lines but
clearly with no intentions of taking the offensive, the rebel Indians took matters into their own
hands. As the Confederates tramped south, the Confederate Creek scouts returned, reporting that
Opothleyahola’s force was on Bird Creek in large numbers ahead of the column. Almost
simultaneously, the sharp report of guns was heard to the rear. Nearly 200 enemy warriors
attacked Cooper’s rear guard as he marched south, a “feint,” meant to “draw us down to their
desire and selected place” for battle. Opothleyahola was forcing a fight at Bird Creek.152
To Douglas Cooper’s credit, the Confederate commander responded to the threat quickly
and decisively. Cooper sent Captain R.A. Young’s company of the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw
in pursuit of the enemy marauders who struck the rear guard. Young chased the fleeing enemy
nearly two miles before losing them in the swampy brush along Bird Creek. Meanwhile, Cooper
“gave the order to ‘right about’” and formed his entire command three columns facing west to
towards Bird Creek and Opothleyahola’s army: the Choctaws and Chickasaws on the right (with
whom Young’s company would link up), the Texans and Drew’s small band of steadfast
Cherokees in the center, and the Creeks to the left. Cooper sent these men forward “at a quick
gallop,” and the Confederates went forward to clash with wily old Opothleyahola yet again.153
The Battle of Chusto-Talasah developed along two fronts. The heart of Opothleyahola’s
position rested along the northern end of the field, along the banks of a steep, horseshoe bend in
Bird Creek 400-500 yards wide, convexly protruding west into the prairie. The bend proved
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“densely covered with heavy timber, matted undergrowth, and thickets, and fortified additionally
with prostrate logs.” A small clearing rested in the center of the bend, wherein sat a house, a corn
crib, and a rail fence, destined to become the vortex of the fighting. Bird Creek itself was “deep”
and “fordable but at certain points known only to the enemy.” On the east bank of the creek
nearer the Confederates, the banks of the stream were cut by 30 foot bluffs, and both sides of the
creek were densely wooded. While Opothleyahola’s warriors lurked on both banks of Bird Creek
around the horseshoe bend, the rebellious Indians’ line also extended over a mile to the south,
where another large contingent of Opothleyahola’s warriors occupied a lower, straighter stretch
of Bird Creek and a number of ravines that extended east in front of the creek, out into the open
prairie south of the horseshoe bend. As James Bates estimated, the Loyal Indians’ “main force
was on each wing.”154
The battle opened to the south as Daniel McIntosh’s Creeks to the left and a portion of
the 9th Texas Cavalry under Col. William Sims surged forward across the open prairie to strike
Opothleyahola’s right flank along the ravines and timber of Bird Creek’s. The fighting began
slowly, cautiously “like warning drops of rain before a shower.” As the Confederate Creeks and
Texans pushed forward, the Texans dismounted as the pace of fire quickened. James Bates
experienced combat for the first time, and wrote home to his mother, “After the first excitement
was over—the first few rounds fired—I ceased to have any apprehension whatever of danger.”
He quickly learned to distinguish the sound of smoothbore and Minie bullets. He also discovered
that an “arrow produces a sound something like a bird flying swiftly through the air.” 155
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James Bates had plenty of opportunities to hone his acoustic understanding of warfare as
the Texans, Confederate Creeks, and their rebellious counterparts clashed amid the ravines and
timber. “One volley followed another in such quick succession that one continuous roar was kept
up.” For approximately an hour the two sides blasted away at one another, but finally Daniel
McIntosh’s Creeks managed to get in among their enemy counterparts and “met them in hand-tohand encounter,” “making desperate charges…using their knives and the butts of their guns.”
The two opposing parties of Creeks, just months before united and now driven to fratricide,
struggled for life and death among the thickets and trees. The Confederates finally drove
Opothleyahola’s warriors out of the timber back across Bird Creek. The rebellious Indians
reappeared briefly upstream, but a final, bloodless Texan charge “routed them completely.” Col.
Daniel McIntosh crowed that his Confederate Creeks, “without any exception, fought
bravely...charged upon the enemy and drove them out of their strong fortified place.” The Creeks
and Texans owned the southern part of the battlefield.156
Things were proving more difficult for Confederate forces further north, tasked with
piercing the seemingly impregnable, fortified horseshoe bend held by Opothleyahola’s warriors.
At the outset of the battle, as Captain Young’s company chased away the Creeks who had
attacked the rearguard, the rest of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Regiment formed up and rode
across the open prairie towards Bird Creek. Owing “to the great difference in their horses and
ponies,” the regiment’s rapid advance became rather disjointed. Thus the Choctaws and
Chickasaws came upon Bird Creek piecemeal and across a broad front. Dismounting as they
reached the timber and brush along the east bank of the creek, some companies made it to
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water’s edge without finding the enemy. Captain Jackson’s McCurtain’s men were not so
fortunate. His dismounted troopers “commenced firing on the enemy” as soon as they reached
the creek, and as they shifted south along the creek’s edge, they came across the small clearing
with the small house. “[T]he front of the house was crowded by the enemy,” and the
Confederates opened up a brisk fire. The other portion of the 9th Texas, under Lt. Col. Quayle,
assisted the Choctaws and Chickasaws in the attacks on the creek. The engagement spread “all
along the creek,” and other Choctaws and Chickasaws still searching for foes to fight in the
brush were drawn to the growing sound of battle.157
From this opening phase of the battle, a rearranging of the Confederate line brought the
battle to a climax around the horseshoe bend. Lt. Col. Quayle’s Texans, who had been fighting to
the left of the Choctaws and Chickasaws, swung around their allies’ right, where they discovered
a ravine to the north that led into Bird Creek. McIntosh’s Creeks and Col. Sims’ Texans, having
successfully “dispersed” the rebellious Indians on the southern end of the line, “mounted our
horses and galloped to the assistance of our friends above.” Col. Sims’ Texans moved to the far
north and reunited with the rest of their command fighting around the ravine on the far northern
end of Opothleyahola’s line. James Bates was surprised to “find them engaged in a contest more
fierce if possible than ours had been.” The reunited Texans had to attack the ravine across open
prairie, and they “were exposed to a heavy fire untill we succeeded in drivin them from a ravine
running nearly parallel with the creek.” Finally captured, the northern ravine offered “some
degree” of shelter while the two sides exchanged fire.158
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The final struggle emerged in the late afternoon, as the impetuous Captain R.A. Young
managed to lead his troopers across Bird Creek and captured the house in the center of the
horseshoe bend. Sensing victory, the Choctaws and Chickasaws surged forwards several hundred
yards into the brush; in their spontaneity, the Confederates had charged too far forward, and
Young’s company was raked with fire from the front and flanks as they fell back. Cooper’s men
charged forward yet again, only to once more be forced back. The “fight raged with the greatest
fury” at close quarters, Opothleyahola’s men “alternately yielding and advancing and pouring
upon our troops a galling fire.” On a third attempt, the Confederates managed to hold the house,
and Daniel McIntosh’s Creeks arrived “to the relief of the exhausted men of the Choctaw and
Chickasaw regiment” and made one final attack upon the enemy in the heart of the horseshoe
bend.159
After nearly four hours of intense fighting, the battle stumbled to a sudden conclusion.
Colonel Cooper reported that in the wake of Daniel McIntosh’s final assault, Opothleyahola’s
warriors “disappeared from our entire front.” Moreover, there were reports of enemy warriors
threatening the Confederates’ baggage and horses in the rear, ammunition was running low, and
the sun setting. Col. Cooper ordered his men to withdraw. For James Bates and the 9th Texas
Cavalry still engaged along the ravine to the north, however, the battle hardly felt decided. As
the sun set, the Texans were ordered to retreat, an order obeyed with “some reluctance.” Bates
felt confident that with “one more hour of daylight we would have routed them completely.” “As
it was,” Bates penned to his mother, “we were forced to leave the enemy in possession of part of
the field and though others think differently I can’t call our victory complete.”160
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The affair at Round Mountain constituted a sharp skirmish; by comparison, the
engagement at Chusto-Talasah proved a true battle, with thousands of men fully engaged for
nearly four hours along a mile and a half front. The Confederate forces, numbering 1,100 after
the desertion of John Drew’s Cherkoee, suffered 15 killed and 37 wounded. Opothleyahola’s
ranks probably contained between 2,500 and 3,000 warriors, but perhaps were as large as 4,000.
Once again, Col. Cooper reported an inflated casualty count of the enemy’s losses, claiming old
Gouge lost 500 men. Considering the course of the battle, James Bates’ recorded estimate of 150
enemy killed was likely nearer to the truth.161
Given the circumstances, both Opothleyahola and Col. Cooper performed admirably at
Chusto-Talasah. As at Round Mountain, Opothleyahola managed to dictate the battle’s
placement, and once again, his tactical positions were superb. Positioning his troops along the
horseshoe bend—long a favored Creek tactic—gave his warriors a strong defensive position
from which to fight. His warriors utilized timber and thickets, creeks and ravines to their
advantage. As one Confederate Choctaw captain complained after the battle, “The mode of
warfare adopted by the enemy compelled us…to abandon strict military discipline and make use
of somewhat similar movements in order to be successful.” Confederate cavalry was forced to
dismount and fight a confusing battle on terms that favored the enemy. That a battle even took
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place under such lopsided tactical constraints can also be credited to Opothleyahola; the Loyal
Indians’ attack upon the Confederate rear guard instigated the general engagement
Opothleyahola wanted, while allowing the chief to retain his defensive positions tactically. As
Douglas Cooper and his troopers were painfully learning, Opothleyahola and his army were not
to be underestimated.162
Once again in the wake of a battle, Opothleyahola slipped away in the night. The camps
of his civilian followers were nearby, and he probably had their protection in mind after a full
day’s fight. Yet Opothleyahola may also have understood how close his army came to defeat on
December 9. The rebellious Indians lost their hold on the southern stretch of the creek early in
the battle, and as the sun set, Opothleyahola’s control of the horseshoe bend was tenuous at best.
Despite the Loyal Indians’ numerical superiority and strong defensive dispositions, the
Confederates nearly managed to break their lines altogether.
As for Col. Cooper, his generalship at Chusto-Talasah likewise deserves a degree of
commendation. Cooper was probably wise in his attempt to withdraw from the area after the
defection of John Drew’s Cherokees, and perhaps such a retreat was still possible even after the
initial attack on his rear guard. Yet he acted decisively and aggressively in choosing to attack,
and he managed to bring all of his small command into the fray. The Creeks and Texans secured
the south end of the battlefield within an hour. On the northern end of the field, Cooper’s own
Choctaws and Chickasaws attacked in somewhat piecemeal fashion, but performed yeoman’s
work and bore the brunt of the fighting. Cooper personally led his men throughout the
engagement; George Griscom admiringly wrote that “the men behaved well & were cheered on
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by the Gallant Col Cooper who was ever present when the bullets flew the thickest, hat off
encouraging his men.” Cooper’s decision to withdraw at sunset drew the contempt of James
Bates, and perhaps it was an error on Cooper’s part. But exhaustion, nightfall, and especially a
shortage of ammunition were no minor impediments. Overall, Cooper turned in a competent, if
not spectacular, performance.163
Although Douglas Cooper won the Battle of Chusto-Talasah, his strategic objective of
quashing Opothleyahola’s Rebellion remained unrealized. As at Round Mountain, holding the
field of battle accomplished little. Despite two sustained efforts, the campaign against the
Opothleyahola and the Loyal Indians was not faring well. Opothleyahola had proved a dangerous
opponent, one who demonstrated increased confidence as he marched through Cherokee Nation
and lashed out at Chusto-Talash. His army remained intact, and his continued presence in
Cherokee Nation was both an embarrassment and a threat. Worse, the political situation among
the Cherokees seemed to be deteriorating. Most of the Cherokees in John Drew’s regiment
revealed themselves to be Confederates in name only, unwilling to take up arms against their
fellow traditionalist and Keetowah brethren. And although Cooper’s command fought well at
Chusto-Talasah, the disparity in numbers and defection of Drew’s Cherokees dimmed the
prospect of decisively defeating the Loyal Indians. As one observer lamented in the wake of
Chusto-Talasah, “a winter campaign will now be necessary,” further suggesting at least two
regiments of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, and a battery of artillery necessary to make any
future battle against Opothleyahola “successful and conclusive.” In short, despite his efforts, Col.
Cooper could not defeat Opothleyahola alone.164
---
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Acknowledging his need for additional help, Cooper reached out to Colonel James
McIntosh in Arkansas for assistance. James McQueen McIntosh, no relation to the Creek
McIntosh clan, graduated last in his class from West Point in 1849. At the start of the war he
joined the Confederate cause, quickly rising to the colonelcy of the 2 nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles.
Aggressive, brave, and perhaps reckless, James McIntosh saw combat early in the war, leading a
violent charge of Louisianans and his own Arkansans upon the Federal foe at Wilson’s Creek.
He was thought highly of by Arkansans and his troopers. In the winter of 1861-’62, General
Benjamin McCulloch travelled to Richmond to secure supplies for his department. “[T]o the
delight of all,” McCulloch left McIntosh in charge of affairs in Indian Territory, and it was Col.
James McIntosh who would come to Cooper’s aid that winter.165
In the wake of Chusto-Talasah, Cooper’s force had retired to Choska along the CherokeeCreek line. Cooper desired both reinforcements and resupply, but he also hoped that his presence
would “counteract any movement among the people [Cherokees] in aid of Hopoeithleyohola and
his Northern allies.” Although Cooper already possessed the 9th Texas Cavalry, the beleaguered
Confederate colonel asked James McIntosh for “additional white force” to finally quash
Opothleyahola and steady the politically wavering Cherokees. “The true men among the
Cherokees,” Cooper warned direly, “must be supported and protected or we shall lose the Indian
Territory.” Cooper received word from Colonel McIntosh that several Texan cavalry units were
en route, along with orders for ammunition and supplies to be sent to Cooper’s command.
McIntosh “hoped with this additional force I [Cooper] would be able to march against
Hopoeithleyohola with certainty of success.” Cooper’s plea for reinforcements was a tacit
admission of his failures thus far.166
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On December 17, James Bates prophesied, “Things are rapidly approaching a climax in
this section…” The very same day, Col. James McIntosh trotted out of Van Buren, Arkansas at
the head of 1,600 Texan and Arkansas horseman to “settle matters in the nation.” Arriving at
Fort Gibson in eastern Cherokee Nation on December 20, where the brash Confederate colonel
met with a surprised Douglas Cooper. An ambitious man, Douglas Cooper was not pleased to
discover that McIntosh had taken the field personally, and although McIntosh reinforced
Cooper’s command with a battalion of Texan cavalry, most of the white reinforcements stayed
under McIntosh’s personal control. James McIntosh likely saw an opportunity to garner glory in
Indian Territory during Benjamin McCulloch’s absence. McIntosh may also have harbored
doubts about Douglas Cooper’s ability to take care of the Indian problem himself.167
Despite Cooper’s surprise at McIntosh’s arrival, the two men worked out a strategy to
entrap Opothleyahola in a wide pincer movement. McIntosh would move up the Verdigris River
in the direction of Opothleyahola’s camp, while Cooper would swing wide along the Arkansas
River and attempt to get in the Loyal Indians’ rear, cutting off any escape routes northward.
McIntosh likewise recalled, “On account of the scarcity of forage it was mutually determined
that either force should attack the enemy on sight.”168
On December 22, James McIntosh departed Fort Gibson with 1,380 troopers, including
portions of the 3rd Texas Cavalry, the 6th Texas Cavalry, the 11th Texas Cavalry, an independent
company of Texan scouts, and several hundred soldiers of McIntosh’s own 2nd Arkansas
Mounted Rifles. Within a few days, McIntosh found himself close to Opothleyahola’s trail. He
also received word from Col. Cooper that Cooper’s force was moving slowly, that “his (Colonel
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McIntosh’s) well-appointed command was too fast for mine.” Cooper did inform McIntosh,
however, of Stand Watie’s 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles presence, and Cooper thought that
Watie’s men might be able to reinforce McIntosh prior to any engagement.169
On December 26, the day after McIntosh’s troopers celebrated a bitterly cold Christmas,
the Texan expedition finally located Opothleyahola’s army along the banks of Shoal Creek in the
Osage Hills of Cherokee Nation. McIntosh’s command relied upon an Indian guide to help him
find Old Gouge’s camp, and upon his approach toward the enemy, McIntosh determined to strike
the enemy promptly, regardless of the fact that neither Cooper’s nor Watie’s commands had
arrived. The aggressive, brash West Point was ready to “settle matters” immediately. 170
As the expedition’s advance guard approached Opothleyahola’s position, the troopers
crossed Shoal Creek only to find themselves under “heavy and continuous firing” from a forested
hilltop on their right. The battle was set to begin, and once again, Opothleyahola’s warriors
enjoyed a strong defensive position, positioned on hilltop with Shoal Creek skirting part of the
hill’s slopes. Halleck Tustenuggee’s Seminole warriors were dismounted among the oak trees
along the lowers slopes of the hill; “each tree on the hill-side screened a stalwart warrior.” One
Confederate trooper admiringly admitted, “their main army occupied a very strong position,
fortified by nature on a high hill, a real breast work of rocks and standing trees.” At the crest of
the hill were Opothleyahola’s Creeks, mounted on horseback and ready to sweep away the
enemy. The rebellious Indians were ready for a fight, “barking like a dog howling like a wolf &
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yelling and gobbling like a turkey,” boldly daring the Texans to attack. McIntosh promptly
obliged.171
McIntosh made his dispositions quickly. He ordered the 6th Texas Cavalry to deploy right
along the banks of Shoal Creek, then dismount, ford the creek, and attack the enemy hilltop on
foot. The 3rd Texas Cavalry, 2nd Arkansas Mounted Rifles, and the independent Texan company
crossed Shoal Creek to form the center of McIntosh’s line, with the 11th Texas Cavalry forded
Shoal Creek and formed on the left. As the 6th Texas moved downstream and began the process
of fording Shoal Creek and at the base of the hill, the rest of the command dismounted prepared
for a massive charge up the rocky slope into the center of Opothleyahola’s line. “Bullets and
arrows were coming pretty fast” as the Texans formed their lines, wrote Private Douglas Cater of
the 3rd Texas Cavalry. “A feather arrow passed in front of my face just before we were ordered to
dismount,” remembered Cater, “and produced a strange sensation in me.” As Cater encountered
Indian arrows and prepared to see battle for the first time, his fellow trooper Henry Miller openly
wept upon learning his duty was to hold the horses in the rear.172
Around noon, the order to charge blared forth, and “one wild yell from a thousand throats
burst upon the air, and the living mass hurled itself upon the foe.” The dismounted Confederate
troopers surged forward at the double-quick, “dashed up the sides of the mountain, over cover of
trees and rocks, amid a shower of leaden hail from the enemy’s rifles.” The Indians fired “volley
after volley of rifles and arrows” as the Texans scrambled over the rocks. As the Southerners
made progress up the hill, the Seminoles fell back into Opothleyahola’s mounted men, producing
confusion. For a brief moment, the two sides collided at the summit of the hill, and “hand to
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hand encounters became general along the whole line, and fearful and deadly strife ensued for a
short time.” The Texans “rushed over [the hill’s] side with the irresistible force of a tornado, and
swept everything before it.”173
Unable to withstand the fierce frontal assault, the Loyal Indians tumbled back, retreating
into “the rocky gorges and deep recesses of the mountains” behind them. The Confederates,
instead of immediately pursuing, went back to their horses, remounted, and then took off in
pursuit of their fleeing foe. “Some of those fellows,” John Cater admitted, “were very brave and
daring and would not leave, but continued to shoot. One big feather cap fellow stood out from
the trees and continued shooting until he fell.” Having emptied both shotgun barrels and a
revolver at the brave Indian warrior, Cater thought he might’ve killed the man himself.174
The Texans pursued the enemy into the rocky ravines and thickets behind the hill. On the
far left of the Rebel line, Col. Young’s 11th Texas Cavalry swung wide and “succeeded in cutting
off many of the enemy.” As the Texans pushed onward, they approached Opothleyahola’s main
encampment, and the Loyal Indians made final stand. Yet with their main force broken and
scattered, Opothleyahola’s Indians could not stop the Texan tide, and by 4 p.m. the Confederates
“remained victors in the center of Hopoeithleyohola’s camp.” Under the direction of Colonel
James McIntosh, the Confederates at the Battle of Chustenahlah accomplished what Douglas
Cooper could not. Opothleyahola’ Rebellion had been put down. The Confederates suffered 9
killed and 40 wounded in the four hour engagement; the Confederates placed the enemy’s
casualties at 250.175

173
Cater, As It Was, 103; “Report of Col. James McIntosh,” January 1, 1862, Official Records 8, 22-25;
“Letter from Chustenahala,” Van Buren Press, January 9, 1862 [letter dated December 27, 1861].
174
Report of Col. James McIntosh,” January 1, 1862, Official Records 8, 22-25; Cater, “As It Was,” 103104.
175
“Report of Col. James McIntosh,” January 1, 1862, Official Records 8, 22-25; Cater, “As It Was,” 103104.

109

As the Confederate regrouped, they took stock of what they had captured. As at Round
Mountain, the loot at Chustenahlah included 30 wagons, 70 oxen, 500 ponies, hundreds of cattle,
sheep, and plenty of provisions and property. Unlike previous engagements, however, the
Confederates were now responsible for hundreds of captured Indians themselves, a testament to
how disastrous the Confederate breakthrough had been for the Union forces. At least 160 women
and children, 20 blacks, and one wounded warrior were captured by the Confederate forces.
After the battle, John Miller recalled “the women and children, whose camps had been
destroyed, hovering together, and freezing in the snow, while ‘round them lay the bodies of
children, and women with babies still clasped in their arms, frozen to death.” 176
Over the next week, Confederate forces pursued Opothleyahola’s broken band almost to
the Kansas line. James McIntosh’s Texans, Col. Cooper’s mixed Indian and white force, and
Stand Watie’s 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles all took part in the hunt, continuing to kill and
wound small numbers of Indians while also capturing prisoners and more supplies. Although
unable to capture the bulk of Opothleyahola’s band (which had probably fractured into several, if
not dozens of parties), by hounding the enemy, close to one hundred more prisoners were
captured, hundreds of cattle taken, a pair of wagons burned, and several more warriors killed and
wounded. Finally satisfied that Opothleyahola had been permanently driven from the Territory
into Kansas, the hunt was called off. Opothleyahola’s Rebellion was broken and defeated.177
---
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While Confederates enjoyed their triumph, the sting of defeat for Opothleyahola’s
followers at Chustenahlah marked only the beginning of their sad saga. Unfortunately, few
contemporary records exist detailing their journey north into Kansas, but close reading of
Confederate sources and post-war interviews do provide some insight into their struggles.
Although a reasonable estimate of Opothleyahola’s total party approximates 5,000, it is unclear
just how many made the final journey north to Kansas following the disaster at Chustenahlah.
Colonel McIntosh thought old Gouge took “not more than 400 to 500 Creeks with him,” though
perhaps this estimate only referenced Opothleyahola’s warriors. Considering the thousands of
Creeks, Seminoles, defected Cherokees, and runaway slaves accompanying Opothleyahola, and
the Confederates’ capture of only several hundred Loyal Indians, it seems likely that several
thousand Unionists ultimately made the trek. By late January, 1862, nearly 6,000 Indian refugees
had taken shelter in Kansas, most of who journeyed to Kansas with Opothleyahola. While
Chustenahlah dispersed the Loyal Indians, and perhaps persuaded some to come into the
Confederate fold, it appears that most stayed true to their sentiments and accepted a Kansan
exile.178
The journey north into Kansas by Opothleyahola’s followers is one of the most
heartbreaking, and relatively unknown, chapters of the Civil War. An exodus of immense
suffering and fear, thousands of refugees were pushed from their homes to camps on the cold
plains of Kansas. The Confederate pursuit of the Unionist Indians forced Gouge’s followers to
both fend off Confederate attacks on their rear guard and push onward at a quick pace. Jackman
Pidgeon remembered the stories his mother Smaddie, a Creek Indian, told of their unhappy
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journey north. “There were times, as she told,” Pidgeon related, “when they were overtaken by
their pursuers, those serving with the Confederates,” but Opothleyahola’s sheer numbers allowed
his followers to fend off their attackers. At one point, Smaddie Pidgeon’s party was overtaken by
the Confederates, and warriors were forced to “check the rear attackers.” Smaddie watched the
subsequent fight unfold from a hilltop. “At dark, as the firing kept on, the scene…seemed to be
like the flicker of fireflies, with reports of guns heard and flashes here and there of the shooting.”
These attacks caused the greatest panic. Ten-year old James Scott witnessed one such
heartrending scene during a Confederate assault. “One time we saw a little baby on its blanket in
the woods. Everyone was running because an attack was expected and no one had the time to
stop and pick up the child. As it saw the people running by, the little child began to wave its little
hands. The child had no knowledge that he had been deserted.”179
These constant attacks, beyond exciting panic, fear, and suffering, also meant that
wagons, cattle, and other much needed supplies often had to be abandoned in order to escape.
James Scott recalled, “We faced many hardships, we were often without food, the children cried
from weariness and the cold, we fled and left our wagons with much needed provisions, clothing
and other necessities…When our provisions went low, some of the members of the tribe turned
to eating horse flesh.” Considering the dozens of wagons, large herds of cattle and sheep, and
stockpiles of other sundry goods already abandoned in the aftermath of the battles in November
and December, Opothleyahola’s followers trekked north with very little.180
Other memories suggest incredible acts of brutality took place. “Some women carrying
children would be overtaken by Confederate soldiers and the soldiers snatched the children from
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the arms of the mothers and smashed their heads against the trees.” Missionary Stephen Foreman
in the Cherokee Nation, wrote in his diary, “They [the Confederates] are just from
Opothleyahotah’s [sic] camp, whither they went to give him, as they said a brushing…It is
estimated that they killed about two hundred prisoners, including some women and children.”
As Confederate troopers overran parties of rebellious Indians trying to escape to Kansas, the
lines between civilian and soldier blurred.181
The environment proved almost as vicious a foe as the Rebel pursuers. Many Confederate
accounts of the period reference the bitter cold and lack of forage. James Bates wrote of taking
walks to keep warm in the night. “Cold enough to freeze my breath on my mustache,” he
complained in his diary. The “rough Broken” country was “very rugged,” and would’ve proven
difficult to traverse for civilians tramping on foot. Even James McIntosh noted in his official
report that the Confederates, and hence also Opothleyahola’s sad band, marched “on ground
covered with snow and at other times facing the chilly blasts from the north.” Creek Indian
Lindy Scott was told stories of how “the leg, arm, toes or fingers of some of the Indians were lost
by being frozen and they would have to be amputated in the best manner possible.” The lack of
clothing showed, too, as “many of the Indians [went] barefooted in the sleet and snow.”182
Arrival along the Verdigris River basin in Kansas offered shelter from the Confederates
but not from the elements. Poor, handmade tents—stitched together with rags, handkerchiefs,
anything—offered little protection from the snow and wind. When an army surgeon visited in
February, he found seven children stark naked. Two thousand ponies died in the Kansas camps
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from the cold, and poor sanitation made the water “unfit for use.” The refugees continued to
suffer until their eventual removal to the land around LeRoy, Kansas, and the arrival of supplies
from the United States.183
Thousands of Creeks, Seminoles, Cherokees, runaway slaves, men, women, children, and
elderly made the three hundred mile exodus from Indian Territory to the Verdigris River in
Kansas. Hounded by Rebel pursuers, whipped by the wind and cold, bereft of provisions or
property, the journey exacted an unknown price, although surely hundreds perished along the
way. Upon witnessing these refugees stumbled into their Kansan camps, Indian agent George
Cutler simply stated, “I doubt much if history records an instance of sufferings equal to these.” 184
--Born out of the fraudulence and intimidation with which the Confederacy conducted its
affairs with Native Americans in Indian Territory, Opothleyahola’s Rebellion constituted a
massive uprising against both tribal governments and the Confederate States. Comprised of
thousands of “civilized” and “uncivilized” Indians, free blacks and runaway slaves, the rebellion
challenged the fraudulent alliances forged by acculturated Native elites and the Confederacy,
while in the process liberating African-Americans from the bonds of wealthy Indian
slaveholders.
This immense affront to Confederate power and society did not go unchallenged, and
despite overtures of peace, the Confederacy ultimately relied upon force to quash
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion. This task proved easier said than done, and Opothleyahola and his
ad-hoc army demonstrated strategic and tactical brilliance throughout the winter campaign. Yet
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at Chustenahlah, the rebellion’s back was broken by the discipline of Texan troopers, and
Opothleyahola’s followers endured unimaginable tragedies as they battled Confederate foes,
harsh environments, starvation and depredation on their long exodus to Kansas.
Two terrible ironies emerge from Opothleyahola’s Rebellion. For Opothleyahola and his
followers, the political rebellion begun in August was meant to keep Native Americans out of the
Civil War. Yet by November and December, their rebellion turned violent, inaugurating a bloody
Indian civil war throughout the Territory. The peace they hoped to keep was broken by their
attempt to keep it. For the Confederacy, however, their victory in crushing Opothleyahola’s
Rebellion contained the seeds of their own destruction. When Opothleyahola’s followers arrived
in Kansas, they soon began clamoring to go home. The arrival of thousands of refugee Indians in
Kansas forced the United States to finally turn its attention to Indian Territory, and it prompted
the twin Federal invasions of the Territory in 1862 and 1863. In defeating and expelling
Opothleyahola and his followers, the Confederates in Indian Territory were hastening the return
of the United States.
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“These Indians Say They Are Not Whipped Yet”:
The Kansas Refugee Crisis and the Political Origins of the First Indian Expedition
“I started for the camp of the southern refugee Indians, which were at the time located on the Verdigris; and, on
reaching them, I found the terrible tale which had been told me most true, but only a shadow of what really existed.”
–George Cutler, Indian Agent, September 30, 1862185

--In early February 1862, several inquiring newspapermen sallied forth from the small,
central-Kansan town of Emporia to inspect a newly founded refugee camp five miles south along
the Cottonwood River. The camp consisted of some 200 Native American refugees struggling to
survive in the midst of an unusually harsh winter on the plains. “We found them,” the Kansans
reported, “suffering immeasurably from the cold.” Their clothing was “thin, ragged and dirty,”
and the Indians lived in tents scraped together from wagon covers, buffalo hides, and old quilts.
Though supplied with food, the reporters found six Indians sharing a single pot and spoon for
their breakfast, which consisted of plain hominy. Although Emporia citizens charitably donated
sundry goods to the Indians, which “seemed to please them ‘muchly’,” the Kansans admitted the
“gifts did not go far in such a large crowd.”186
Hoping to learn more about their newfound neighbors, the newspapermen attempted to
spark a conversation with the breakfasting Indians, but “very few of them can talk English and
those who do are not inclined to be at all communicative.” Still, the Kansans seemed to coax a
conversation out of the forlorn natives. “Many of them are remnants of families broken up by the
guns of the blood-thirsty Texan Rangers, and by murderous deeds of their own secession
brethren…Parts of families were there who knew nothing of the fate of their nearest relatives,
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and sadness was depicted on many countenances.” The Indians lamented the prosperous homes
and burgeoning corn fields they left behind. “They loved freedom and the Union more than
these, and for opinion’s sake are made absolute beggars. What an example these red men have
set for thousands of timid white men!” the Kansans concluded. “We hope the Government will
do its duty toward these Indians, at an early day.”187
The refugee camp the Kansans investigated was one of many that dotted the southeastern
Kansan plains beginning in the winter of 1862. The inhabitants of the Cottonwood refugee camp
were several hundred Creek Indians, followers of Opothleyahola who, in the wake of their
decisive defeat at the Battle of Chustenahlah the previous December, were driven from Indian
Territory into exile. Bereft of supplies, thousands of Native Americans trudged across the frozen
plains to refugees camps like the Cottonwood throughout winter and spring. By April, 7,600
Indian refugees were spread across several hundred miles of southeastern Kansas, dependent
upon the Office of Indian Affairs and charitable Kansans for survival. While recently scholarship
has explored the experiences and agency of African-American and white Southern refugees, this
chapter examines Native American refugees and their ability to shape Federal military policy.188
The failure of Opothleyahola’s Rebellion in the cold winter of 1861 produced an
immense refugee crisis in the hot spring of 1862. These Indian refugees arrived in Kansas just as
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the United States determined to mount a military expedition into Indian Territory. The Indian
Expedition was the product of Kansan politics, refugee demands, and military necessity. Kansas
politicians, notably Senator James Lane, desired a regional military expedition that would bring
opportunities for field service and Federals funds to their corner of the war. While initially meant
to return Federal authority to Indian Territory as military necessity, refugee Natives added a
sense of moral urgency to the expedition. Despite their material destitution, refugee Loyal
Indians and their agents wielded a considerable amount of agency and managed to add a new
objective to the Indian Expedition: liberate Indian Territory to allow expatriated Loyal Indians to
return home.
Moreover, Loyal Indians would accompany the Indian Expedition as members of the
United States Indian Home Guard regiments. Just as runaway and refugee African-Americans
convinced the United States to enlist their services, so too did refugee Native Americans break
racial barriers by enlisting in the military. Ultimately, the origins of the Indian Expedition
stemmed from the cutthroat world of Kansan politics, recognition of a military disaster in Indian
Territory, and the demands of Native Americans clamoring to return home with guns in hand.
--Even before word of Opothleyahola’s Rebellion reached the North, the possibility of an
Indian Expedition south into Indian Territory arose amidst the murky arena of Kansas politics.
Rumors of a possible expedition south emanated from and circulated around one man: Kansas
Senator James Lane. A well-known, polarizing entity in Kansas, Lane was a political and
military opportunist who leveraged crises to his personal advantage. A one-time Democrat
hailing from Indiana, Lane moved to Kansas during the violent days of “Bleeding Kansas,”
embraced militant abolitionism, and led Free-Soil “jayhawkers” through the conflict. His
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notoriety and ardent politicking awarded him a coveted position as one of Kansas’ first Senators
after statehood in 1861. At the outbreak of the Civil War, Lane raised a brigade of Kansan troops
that quickly earned a reputation as an ill-disciplined force, plundering and pillaging among the
slaveholding communities of western Missouri. Yet Lane possessed bigger aspirations, and any
expedition from Kansas into the South—Indian Territory, Texas, Arkansas…anywhere—
promised a chance at greater military and public glory.189
During the autumn and winter of 1861-’62, Lane waged a political campaign to create a
military department encompassing at least Kansas, Indian Territory, and Arkansas; Lane, of
course, expected to head the department. Armed with such a command, Lane could launch an
expedition south and earn glory on the battlefield. Lane first broached the idea with Abraham
Lincoln in October of 1861, generously offering to command the department “and devote all my
thoughts and energies to the prosecution of the war.” Lane also met with the Loyal Indian
delegation passing through Kansas in October, pitching the Indians on the possibility of a
campaign southward. Although the government did indeed create a Department of Kansas
(which also encompassed Indian Territory), Lincoln appointed General David Hunter rather than
Senator James Lane to command it. Despite Washington’s rejection of Lane’s offer to take the
field, by November rumors of “Lane’s Expedition” were circulating through Kansas newspapers
anyways. Angry at Hunter’s appointment, Lane remained undeterred and continued playing a
hand in Kansas military affairs.190
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While Lane promoted an expedition south and rumors floated around Kansas throughout
the winter, the Lincoln Administration became increasingly concerned over the state of military
affairs in Indian Territory. The Confederate-Indian alliances caught the administration off-guard,
and they were similarly surprised to discover that the Confederacy was raising Native American
regiments for field service. Washington, it seemed, expected the Indians to stay out of the Civil
War. In his annual report to Congress on December 2, Abraham Lincoln addressed his growing
concerns, admitting Indian Territory had been lost to “insurrectionists,” and that the Confederacy
was recruiting Indian soldiers. Lincoln, however, knew from correspondence with “several
prominent chiefs” that many Indians remained loyal, “expressing a wish for the presence of
federal troops to protect them. It is believed upon the repossession of the country by the federal
forces the Indians will readily cease all hostile demonstrations, and resume their former relations
to the government.” Lincoln’s December address to Congress indicated that Washington was
finally taking stock of Confederate influence over Indian Territory, and Lincoln was prepared to
mount and Indian Expedition to reassert Federal control.191
In late December, the Loyal Indian delegation of Creeks (including Oktaharsharjo),
Seminoles, and Chickasaws finally arrived in Washington after months of travel. The Indians
met with Commissioner of Indian Affairs William Dole and later Lincoln himself. During these
meetings, the Indians—unaware of the outbreak of full rebellion back home—made clear that
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many in the Territory “look to the North and the treaties for help.” Oktaharsharjo opined that, “A
boy when he get into any difficulty, goes to his father, and we have come on here in our
difficulty, to our Great Father. Now we are satisfied he was right, and that the South is wrong.”
Commissioner Dole declared to the native delegation, “You have seen in your travels the power
of the North. This power will be used if necessary to defend your people, and to put down this
armed rebellion against you and the Government. It may take time, but it will be done by the
President.” Upon inquiry, the Indians assured Dole that thousands of warriors would assist any
expedition in Indian Territory.192
With James Lane needling for a campaign, Confederates solidifying control of Indian
Territory, and an Indian delegation in Washington pleading for help, Lincoln acquiesced to an
Indian Expedition. The expedition’s goal was to regain control of Indian Territory and bring the
rebellious Indians back under the control of existing Federal-Indian treaties. On January 4, the
president also approved the enlistment of 4,000 Native American soldiers, whose enlistments
would begin immediately. Thus by January of 1862, preparations for an Indian Expedition were
underway.193
--The Union’s decision to invade Indian Territory in 1862 was made without reference to
Opothleyahola’s Rebellion in Creek and Cherokee Nations that winter. Indeed, by the New Year
word of fighting in Indian Territory had hardly reached Kansas and the first pitiful Indian
refugees were crossing the state line. Nevertheless, the failure of Opothleyahola’s Rebellion and
the resulting exile of his followers to Kansas produced an immense refugee crisis that could
neither be ignored nor dismissed. Enduring suffering and death amid a cold winter with few
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provisions, the Indian refugees’ constant demands for an expedition kept the project alive and
altered the expedition’s purpose. Thus, it is critical to understand the experience of Native
Americans refugees in Kansas and the political pressure they brought to bear on Federal
officials.
The decisive defeat of Opothleyahola’s Rebellion at Chustenahlah in Cherokee Nation on
December 26 sparked a sudden, desperate exodus northward by the Loyal Indians into Kansas.
The rapid collapse of Opothleyhola’s center during the battle left his followers little time to
gather their belongings. Instead, they fled with “what they had on their backs” amidst “the
wildest confusion.” As the battle lines broke and the Loyal Indians retreated north, they fought
not one but several opponents: Confederate pursuers, a blisteringly cold winter, and desperate
lack of supplies.194
At first, Opothleyahola’s followers simply sought to get away from their Confederate
foes. The Creeks and Seminoles scattered into small bands, each improvising its own northerly
escape. For several days after the battle, Confederates under victorious Col. James McIntosh,
joined by Col. Douglas Cooper’s and Col. Stand Watie’s troopers, chased the Loyal Indians
north. This aggressive pursuit of civilian parties forced the Indians to both fight constant rearguard actions against the Rebels while prompting them to pick up the pace. Jackman Pigeon
remembered the stories his mother Smaddie, a Creek Indian, told of their unhappy journey north.
“There were times, as she told,” Pigeon related, “when they were overtaken by their pursuers,
those serving with the Confederates,” but Opothleyahola’s sheer numbers allowed his followers
to fend off their attackers. At one point, Smaddie Pigeon’s party was overtaken by the
Confederates, and warriors were forced to “check the rear attackers.” Smaddie watched the
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subsequent fight unfold from a hilltop. “At dark, as the firing kept on, the scene…seemed to be
like the flicker of fireflies, with reports of guns heard and flashes here and there of the
shooting.”195
These attacks caused confusion, and families became separated during the exodus and
“knew nothing of the fate of their nearest relatives.” While some escaped, others fell behind and
were captured or killed, and acts of brutality took place. As James Scott recalled, “Some women
carrying children would be overtaken by Confederate soldiers and the soldiers snatched the
children from the arms of the mothers and smashed their heads against the trees.” Stories of such
cruelty migrated south as well as north. Watching Confederate troops return “from
Opothleyahotah’s [sic] camp, whither they went to give him, as they said a brushing,” Cherokee
missionary Stephen Foreman divulged to his diary, “It is estimated that they killed about two
hundred prisoners, including some women and children.” As Confederate troopers overran
parties of rebellious Indians trying to escape to Kansas, the lines between civilian and soldier
blurred.196
The Indians finally slipped through Confederate clutches as they neared the Kansas line,
but as the human enemy faded, the winter foe reared its ugly head. The environment proved
almost as vicious a foe as the Rebel pursuers. From their starting point at Chustenahlah in
western Cherokee Nation, the Loyal Indians trekked in north-northeasterly direction toward the
Verdigris River basin in southern Kansas. Over the course of several weeks, the scattered bands
of refugees completed a march over three hundred miles “with a bitter northwest wind in their
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faces.” Unfortunately, the winter of 1861-1862 was deemed the “most severe that occurred in
that part of the country for many years,” and snow dusted the rolling plains.197
The lack of proper provisions compounded the dangers of the cold. The Indians’ sudden
flight left them bereft of basic supplies: clothing, shelter, or food. The Indians were “thinly clad,”
“barely sufficient to hide their nakedness,” and “many of the Indians walked barefooted in the
sleet and snow.” Creek Indian Lindy Scott recalled “how the Indian followers of Opothle Yahola
had to suffer much during the intense cold. The leg, arm, toes or fingers of some of the Indians
were lost by being frozen and they would have to be amputated in the best manner possible.”
Tents and bedding had also been abandoned in the mad scramble after Chustenahlah, leaving the
Indians exposed to winter winds and snow. “Women gave birth to their offspring upon the naked
snow,” one horrified Indian agent reported, “and in some cases the new-born infants died for
want of clothing.” Starvation stared many in the face. Wagons of provisions, herds of cattle and
sheep all left behind meant Opothleyahola’s followers trekked north with very little. James Scott
remembered “We faced many hardships, we were often without food, the children cried from
weariness and the cold, we fled and left our wagons with much needed provisions, clothing and
other necessities…198
The dearth of sources regarding this sad exodus north keep much of it shrouded in
mystery, and it is impossible to know with certainty how many Native Americans perished
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winter. Given their destitute state and the thousands making the march, it seems probably the
casualties reached into the hundreds. An Indian agent lamented that “quite a number of them
froze to death on the route, and their bodies, with a shroud of snow, were left where they fell to
feed the hungry wolves.”199
While Creek, Seminole, and other Indian refugees trekked northward seeking safety,
United States authorities in Kansas scrambled upon hearing word of the Indians’ impending
arrival. Indian agents and army officials alike were caught completely unprepared for this wave
of migrants. The 1861 evacuation of Indian Territory by the U.S. Army and the subsequent
Confederate-Indian treaties severed communication between U.S. Indian agents and their
respective tribes. Confederate control of Indian Territory made the physical agencies
inaccessible, and Southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Coffin gave the Five
Tribes’ Indian agents leave. When the Indian delegation led by Creek Chief Oktaharsharjo
passed through Kansas in October, it gave Federal authorities some understanding of the
Unionist sentiment among the tribes, but little could be done immediately. It was not until
December that reports of violence in Indian Territory and the sudden “flight of the loyal Indians”
northward forced Coffin to quickly mobilize his Indian agents. He ordered them to gather at Fort
Roe, a small stockade on the Verdigris River in central Kansas, and it was to this location that
the thousands of refugees from Opothleyahola’s Rebellion fled. As they arrived, they “scattered
over a territory 200 miles in extent on the bleak plains” into makeshift camps along the Verdigris
and Fall Rivers.200
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The arrival of Opothleyahola’s followers and refugees from Indian Territory spawned a
staggering refugee crisis in southern and central Kansas. By January of 1862, thousands of
Native Americans were pouring into Kansan refugee camps daily. The Emporia News reported
with some trepidation that “twelve thousand of these Indians are on their way to Kansas,” and
although the figure proved exaggerated, it was not far off the mark. In late January, Army
surgeon A.B. Campbell placed the total number of Indian refugees at 4,500, though he noted “the
number was being constantly augmented by the daily arrival of other camps and families.” An
army captain similarly reported close to 5,000 refugees but “calculated their numbers would
swell to at least eight thousand, and probably ten thousand, men, women, children, and negroes.”
A fairly detailed, if unofficial, census of the refugees in early spring counted 5,000 Creeks, 1,096
Seminoles, 544 Yuchis, 315 Quapaws, 240 Cherokees, 197 Delawares, 140 Chickasaws, and
smattering of individuals from other tribes, totaling 7,600 in all. Among the Creeks and
Seminoles in particular, these numbers indicate massive population shift; by the spring of 1862,
over one-third of the Creek Nation (36.9%) now resided in Kansan refugee camps. The rate
proved worse for the Seminole; nearly half the tribe (48.6%) took refuge in Kansas. The vast
majority, though not all, of these refugees fought with Opothleyahola and fled north with him
through the winter.201
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The unrelenting flow of refugees, arriving at “twenty to sixty per day,” and the
unpreparedness of Federal officials meant that while Kansas offered protection from the
Confederates, it initially provided protection from little else. The refugee camps quickly became
centers of suffering, as hunger, cold, and disease took their toll. Indian agents, U.S. Army
officers, and local Kansans were stunned by the condition of the refugees and the camps.
Southern Superindent of Indian Affairs William Coffin admitted the “destitution, misery, and
suffering amongst them [the Indians] is beyond the power of any pen to portray.” Surgeon A.B.
Campbell thought it “impossible for me to depict the wretchedness of their condition.” The
Indians lacked shelter and clothing, which exposed them to “the severe winds and rains, so
common in Southern Kansas.” During a February visit, Surgeon Campbell found seven children
“without one thread upon their bodies.” A lack of food forced the refugees “to feed upon their
ponies and dogs,” but equally problematic was the lack of cooking utensils. Combined with a
shortage of wood on the Kansan prairies, “many of them [the Indians] eat their provisions
raw.”202
Unsurprisingly, exposure to the elements and the terrible condition of the refugee camps
resulted in widespread sickness, disease, and death. Surgeon Campbell reported frostbite and
foot injuries from the lack of shoes and “inflammatory diseases of the chest, throat and eyes.”
Others reported “consumption and pneumonia, brought on from exposure and privations of the
common necessaries of life.” One victim of illness was Opothleyahola’s daughter, found dying
of consumption. Over one hundred amputations had occurred by April, including one eight-year-
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old Creek child who lost both feet. Some Indians’ “frosted limbs rendered them unable to move
about.” Disgusted at the sights he witnessed, Campbell thundered that “common humanity
demands that more should be done at once, to save them from total destruction.”203
The meager march north during the winter, exposure to the elements, and the ravages of
deprivation and illness in the camp caused hundreds of death. The Creek Indian agent reported
240 deaths in his tribe by April; the total escalated almost 400 Creeks by September. The
Seminole agent reported a ten percent mortality rate, noting that “most of their deaths, however,
were caused from exposure while coming to Kansas last winter.” In October of 1862, William G.
Coffin, the Southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs, also placed the overall mortality rate
among the refugees at ten percent, which may have constituted as many as 500-700 deaths.204
As the refugees staggered into the river basins of southern Kansas, Indian agents quickly
made efforts to alleviate their suffering, with limited success. William G. Coffin, who oversaw
the Indian agents to the Five Tribes, found himself “without adequate means to meet the
emergency.” He thus appealed to the General David Hunter, commander of the Department of
Kansas, for assistance, and Hunter agreed to help. The Army provided what it could, but a more
permanent, reliable source of provisions was needed. The Office of Indian Affairs thus turned to
contractors to supply the Indians with necessary goods. Finally, local Kansans, moved by the
plight of the Indians, also donated sundry goods to the refugees.205
The results of these efforts were decidedly mixed. Federal authorities were able to
provide the Indians with rations and basic food items relatively quickly; by February local papers
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reported the Indians “have been relieved of from their starving condition.” Yet the food provided
was often meager, neither “sufficient in quantity or proper quality.” Refugees subsisted off cornmeal, flour, beef, and a little salt. In one camp, Indians were provided one pound of flour and a
little salt, which was meant to last the week. Other provisions, such as sugar, coffee, pepper and
vinegar, were only available for the ill. Not only was food limited, but the Indians were likewise
“extremely destitute of cooking utensils, and axes or hatchets,” making it difficult to gather
firewood and cook; “the want of cooking utensils compels many of them to eat their provisions
raw.” The Indians didn’t starve in Kansas, but their subsistence was meager and economical.206
Other provisions, including cloth, shoes, tents, blankets, and other sundry goods, proved
in shorter supply. In his visit to a refugee camp, Surgeon Campbell arrived with a wagonload of
clothes and bedding. He circled the camp with his wagon, doling out the goods until they were
gone and found himself “surrounded by hundreds of anxious faces, disappointed to find that
nothing remained for them.” The two Emporia reporters who visited the camp on Cottonwood
River brought “many articles, such as quilts, coats, pants, vests, boosts, shoes, etc.,” but the
supplies hardly met the demand.207
While Indian agents, military officials, and local white Kansans genuinely sought to
assist the exile Native Americans, contractors quickly took advantage of the crisis to sell the
Indians shoddy goods at high markups. This was not new. In the 19th century, political patronage
filled the Office of Indian Affairs with appointees who knew little (and often cared little) about
Native affairs. Contracts and contractors experienced little oversight, and the “Indian system,” as
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it was known, served as an avenue for corruption and fraud. Over the decades contractors and
traders honed their swindling of Indians and the Office of Indian Affairs alike into a veritable art.
The system was, as David Nichols has noted, “a system of, by, and for white men” who utilized
it to empower and enrich themselves.208
Fraud plagued contractors’ dealings with the Indian refugees in Kansas. Goods were not
purchased by the tribes themselves or their agents, but rather jointly by specially appointed agent
Dr. Kile and Southern Superintendent William Coffin. Thus, the Indians exercised no control
over what was purchased on their behalf, nor at what price. This opened the door for contractors
to sell the Indians inferior, shoddy goods at exorbitant markups. Instead of durable cloth or food,
the Seminoles were delivered “fine delaines and unbleached muslins,” completely “unsuitable”
for refugees but nevertheless paid for at high prices. Making the best of the situation, the
Seminoles sold off the expensive cloth at “one-fourth of their real value and cost” in exchange
for more practicable “green corn, chicken, eggs, etc.” One visitor to the Indian camps discovered
the Indians were being furnished with bacon condemned at Fort Leavenworth, which they judged
“unfit for a dog to eat.” The refugees were likewise furnished with condemned army tents; given
the shortage of shelter, however, the Indians nevertheless put the tents to good use. Overall, one
Indian agent accused “that money annuities are much more to the benefit of a few avaricious and
unscrupulous traders than to the Indians, and of much more benefit to a class of people who have
too long been permitted to control their trade.”209
However shoddy or inferior the food and provisions supplied by the contractors, it was all
paid for by the Indians themselves. With thousands of refugees to feed and clothe, Congress
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authorized tapping into the annuities owed the various tribes—held in arrears due to the rebellion
and the divided loyalties of the Indians—to pay for the refugees’ subsistence. It is not clear that
the Indians’ themselves were initially aware that their own annuities were being used to support
them. Upon learning that they themselves were paying for their provisions, the Seminoles angrily
complained to their Indian agent that the Federal government should foot the bill, since “they had
not been protected according to treaty stipulations.” The complaints yielded little effect.210
As spring dawned over the south Kansas plains, the refugees faced a new problem: dead
horses. Despite the loss of much of their property, many of the refugees still managed to escape
northward with roughly 4,000 horses and ponies in tow. Tired from the trek north, exposed to
bitter cold, snow, and sleet, with no shelter, and little feed in the dead of winter, nearly half of
the Indians’ ponies “died of cold and hunger in and around their camps” over the course of the
winter. Two thousand dead horses littered the prairies around the refugee encampments; several
hundred carcasses choked streambeds and made water “unfit for use.” While the weather was
cold, the carcasses remained frozen. Yet as spring sun thawed the plains, the corpses thawed as
well, posing health risks and creating an unbearable stench. Surgeon Campbell worried the
carcasses would “breed a pestilence amongst them,” and Indian agents understood the
“indispensable” need to remove the tribes elsewhere. In March and April, the Indian agents
oversaw the removal of the tribes from the Verdigris River toward the Neosho River basin to the
east. Exiled from their homes after a long winter sojourn, once again the refugees packed up their
meager belongings and moved thirty miles east to new encampments along the Neosho River.211
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The relocation of the refugees to the Neosho brought new challenges. The refugees’
initial encampments along the Verdigris River were located within lands reserved for various
Indian tribes. There were relatively few white settlers in the area, and the Indians could encamp
wherever suitable and draw upon natural resources as needed. The Neosho River Valley,
however, did not sit on Indian lands, but rather “was mostly owned and occupied by [white]
settlers.” In particular, the Indians’ new camps placed them near the small towns of LeRoy and
Neosho Falls. Capt. John Turner, a commissary officer who worked with the Indian agents, took
“very grave objection” to this relocation, prophesying, “No farmers would look with
complacency or quietude upon such a crowd of destitute people brought around them, and I
apprehend serious difficulties would arise.” In particular, Turner feared that Indians would strip
the prairies of what little timber they possessed—timber which local farmers owned and
“jealously” protected—and “commit great damages” to the countryside. Other Indian agents
echoed Turner’s concerns over possible disagreements among Indian refugees and white settlers
and the issue of timber.212
Ultimately, these fears proved overblown. White settlers and Indian refugees made
reasonable, if perhaps uncomfortable, neighbors. As Turner suspected, timber did prove to be an
issue initially. The Creeks “did not fully understand the value of timber,” and their agent George
Cutler exerted a “vast amount of labor” to prevent them from denuding the area of trees. Yet the
Creeks ultimately exercised restraint, and Cutler reported that “the general deportment of the
Indians here has been good, and elicited the warmest encomiums of the whites.” Agent George
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Snow likewise testified to the good behavior and “utmost propriety” of the Seminoles. Native
Americans and white Kansans managed the situation with aplomb.213
--Given the deplorable condition of the refugee camps, the biting cold, the scarcity of
supplies, the shady dealings with contractors, and yet another relocation to the Neosho River
Valley, Native American refugees in Kansas unanimously expressed their desire to return home.
They also demonstrated their willingness to fight within or alongside the Federal army in order
to liberate their homeland. Native American refugees were instrumental to the formation of the
First Indian Expedition and the enlistment of Native American soldiers into the Union army.
From the moment of their arrival in Kansas, Indian leaders and refugees alike clearly
expressed their desire to return home. Having battled the Confederacy under Opothleyahola, they
expected to march south soon with Federal soldiers at their side. On January 28, barely a month
sent their defeat at Chustenahlah, Opothleyahola and Halleck Tustenuggee wrote to President
Abraham Lincoln directly, detailing their suffering on the Kansas plains and begging Lincoln to
“listen to the prayers of their children” and send an army south to “sweep the rebels before them
like a terrible fire on the dry prairie.” That same month, the Emporia News reported, “The
Indians say that are not whipped yet, and are awaiting the marching of Lane’s army, which they
are anxious to join and go back and help fight to reclaim their homes.” A few months later,
Opothleyahola again audaciously declared to white visitors “that he and his people were willing,
on being properly armed, to fight their own way back.” Only when told of reports placing
Confederate strength in the Territory at 5,000-6,000 did Opothleyahola concede “he would now
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require assistance from our troops.” Despite being driven from their nations by force of arms,
Native Americans refugees wished to return home and would fight to do so.214
Federal Indian agents agreed with their Indian charges. Throughout 1862, Federal Indian
agents also pushed for the refugees to be returned south. “I would very respectfully recommend,”
George Cutler informed his superiors, “that they may be returned to their homes at the earliest
practicable moment, both for the welfare of the Indians and as an advantage to the government.”
Yet Cutler warned that their return could not occur “until their country is completely rid of the
rebels and a sufficient force can be left there to give them protection.” The Seminoles’ Agent
concurred, “[N]o time should be lost in taking them back to their country as soon as a sufficient
force of the federal army can be stationed in the Indian Territory to protect them.” 215
The terrible suffering of the refugees, their consistent demands to return home and their
willingness to fight, and their support by Indian agents ultimately shaped the very purpose of the
Indian Expedition. No longer was the expedition merely about reasserting military control over
Indian Territory or bringing recalcitrant Indians into the fold. Instead, when the expedition
finally marched in June, it was “especially intended to aid them [refugee Indians] to recover
possession of their homes and to bring back the Indian country under subjugation to the
Government.” The expedition then, fulfilled the wishes of the Indians who wanted to go home
and of the Federal government who no longer wanted to pay for their subsistence in Kansas. 216
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Just who would lead the expedition south, however, proved to be an issue of considerable
drama. Throughout the spring, politics within the Army and within Kansas produced a revolving
door of department and expedition commanders that delayed the expedition’s start and ultimately
left it in the hands of an inept Kansas politician-turned-general whose lackluster abilities would,
in the end, endanger the entire operation.
When the expedition was initially approved in January, both General David Hunter and
Senator James Lane angled to command it. Hunter commanded the Department of Kansas, but
Lane’s name had been attached to the expedition for some time. Although Lincoln offered Lane
a military position within the department subordinate to Hunter, Lane continued to act as though
he commanded the expedition. In an early January meeting with Secretary of War Cameron,
Lane intimated that he was to lead an expedition of 30,000 soldiers south, and that he had David
Hunter’s support in the matter…a clear lie. Lane immediately wired David Hunter “it is the
intention of the Government to order me to report to you for an active winter’s campaign,” a
message which seemed to imply Lane would command the expedition.217
Lane’s smoke and mirror politics frustrated Hunter, but they couldn’t change the reality
that David Hunter outranked him, and that Abraham Lincoln never intended Lane to supersede
Hunter in command. An exasperated Lincoln wrote to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton on
January 31 that “I have not intended, or do not intend that it [the expedition] shall be a great
exhausting affair; but a snug, sober column of 10,000 or 15,000,” a refutation of the 30,000 men
supposedly destined for the expedition. Further, Lincoln made clear the chain of command.
“Gen. Lane has been told by me many times that he is under the command of Gen. Hunter, and
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assented to it as often as told. It was the distinct agreement between him & men when I
appointed him, that he was to be under Hunter.”218
In early February, Lincoln quashed the confusion by penning a joint letter to Hunter and
Lane directly. Lincoln admitted he wanted “to avail the government of the service of both Gen.
Hunter and Gen. Lane.” Yet Lincoln explicitly stated that “Gen. Hunter is the senior officer, and
must command when they serve together…Gen. Lane must report to Gen. Hunter for duty.” If
Lane couldn’t agree to those terms, he must “decline the service.” With cold, clear terms before
him, Lane ran out of room for his ruses. He privately groused that Lincoln was “d—d liar, a
demagogue, and scoundrel” who betrayed a promise to make him major-general and left Lane
looking like “a braggart, a fool, and a humbug.” Although Lane relinquished his hopes of
battlefield glory, he would continue to play a role in shaping Kansas’ military affairs. 219
Ironically, despite all of James Lanes’ intrigues and David Hunter’s righteous protests,
neither would command the First Indian Expedition. In March, the Army reorganized its
geographical military departments and the Department of Kansas was subordinated under the
larger Department of the Mississippi, commanded by General Henry Halleck. With his
department downgraded, Hunter was sent east. He was replaced by Brigadier General John
Denver. Halleck felt that Denver’s prior experience as Kansas’ territorial governor made him
“best suited for the place,” able to keep a handle on Kansas politics. Instead, Kansas politics kept
a handle on John Denver. Senator James Lane disliked Denver and worried his appointment
would limit Lane’s import on military affairs. Consequently, Lane and his fellow Kansas Senator
Samuel Pomeroy complained to Lincoln of Denver’s posting. Lincoln intervened at Lane’s
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request, and Denver was soon subordinated to Brigadier General Samuel Sturgis, who took
command of the district in April.220
Sturgis, however, proved equally contentious, albeit for different reasons. Sturgis seems
to have thought little of the proposed Indian expedition, and he thought even less of the
enlistment of Native American troops. Although Abraham Lincoln ordered the recruitment and
armament of 4,000 Indians into Federal service on January 2, Lincoln’s directive did not settle
the matter, Sturgis believed “it was not the policy of our government to fight high-toned southern
gentlemen, with Indians.” Sturgis ordered a halt to Indian enlistment, threatening to arrest
officers who continued to recruit Native Americans. Sturgis’ draconian rule proved deeply
unpopular, and he was excoriated as an outsider by the Kansas press. Sturgis’ obstinacy and
unpopularity prompted his ouster within a month, and in early May, Brigadier General James
Blunt assumed command of the department.221
No Federal commander exerted greater influence on Indian Territory throughout the Civil
War than James Gilpatrick Blunt. Born in Maine, Blunt exhibited a sense of adventure early in
life, taking to the sea on merchant vessels in his youth. Blunt moved to Ohio and attended
medical college in the 1840s but, like James Lane, found himself drawn to Kansas during the
tumultuous 1850s. An outspoken abolitionist and ardent Republican, Blunt threw himself into
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Kansas’s partisan, paramilitary politics. Blunt made his mark in the first year of the war in
fighting along the Kansas-Missouri border as a member of “Lane’s Brigade,” and Blunt almost
certainly owed his promotion to his close relationship with James Lane. Upon learning of Blunt’s
promotion to brigadier general, the stunned Kansas press raged that the promotion was
politically-motivated. Blunt’s appointment to department command, however, was eased by the
general unpopularity of Sturgis. With Blunt’s appointment, the enlistment of Indian soldiers
definitively resumed, and the Indian Expedition once again became a priority.222
It should come as little surprise that certain officers balked enlisting Native Americans.
The United States military possessed a complicated history with Natives. Throughout early
American history, Indians posed a constant threat along the United States’ frontier, and the
United States clashed even with the Five Tribes, notably against Creeks during the Red Stick
War (1813-1814) and Seminoles during the Second (1835-1842) and the Third (1855-1858)
Seminole Wars. Yet in many of these conflicts, the United States also employed friendly Indians
as scouts, guides, and allies, whose knowledge of the land, unconventional warfare, and
indigenous foes proved useful. Yet these Native Americans were usually external allies, not
incorporated directly into the United States military.
Also tainting the prospect of utilizing Native American soldiers were the recent
depredations at the Battle of Pea Ridge. In March 1862, Union and Confederate armies clashed
at Pea Ridge in northwest Arkansas in a bloody two-day battle. Despite the fact that Confederate
treaties did not require Indians to fight outside of Indian Territory, the First and Second
Cherokee Mounted Rifles under Colonels John Drew and Stand Watie crossed the Arkansas line
and fought in Confederate ranks during the battle. Their participation proved controversial. In a
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grand charge alongside Texans and Missourians on March 7, the Cherokees overran a Federal
artillery battery and scattered troopers of the 3rd Iowa Cavalry. Confederate cavalrymen—white
and Indian alike—conglomerated around the captured guns, excited by the successful charge and
preoccupied with the scene around them. “The Indians,” remembered one Southerner, “swarmed
around the guns like bees, in great confusion, jabbering and yelling at a furious rate.” Excited by
battle and without orders, the situation quickly grew out of a hand.223
Although the exact details of what happened next are hazy, it is clear that certain
Cherokees killed wounded Iowans and scalped eight bodies. After the battle, an adjutant of the
Third Iowa Cavalry reported, “I also saw bodies of the same men [the 8 men scalped] which had
been wounded in parts not vital by bullets, and also pierced through the heart and neck with
knives,” evidence that “fully satisfied” the adjutant that his fellow Iowans had been “brutally
murdered.” Whatever brutality occurred, it ended when Federal artillery arrived on the field and
sent the Indians “hurriedly” retreating.224
The incident at Pea Ridge sparked a testy exchange between the Union and Confederate
army commanders following the battle, which ended in Confederate defeat. General Samuel
Curtis, who commanded the Federal army, sent his Confederate counterpart General Earl Van
Dorn a terse message conveying his “regrets that we find on the battlefield, contrary to civilized
warfare, many of the Federal dead who were tomahawked, scalped, and their bodies shamefully
mangled.” Curtis expressed his hope the war would not “degenerate to a savage warfare.” Van
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Dorn responded by noting that his Indian forces had for many years “been regarded as civilized
people” and riposted with a spurious claim that Confederate prisoners had been murdered “in
cold blood by their captors, who were alleged to be Germans.”225
The affair at Pea Ridge drew national attention, and undoubtedly cast the use of Native
American troops in a negative light. It compounded the commonly-held belief that all Indians
were savages, given to barbaric ways of war. Of course, there should have been little surprise
that Cherokees engaged in scalp-taking. Various Native American tribes had long taken scalps as
symbolic trophies, and the practice had been similarly adopted by white settlers at times. Indeed,
Confederate soldiers scalped Opothleyahola’s dead and committed other atrocities against
civilians in the winter of 1861. The scalping at Pea Ridge was not the first such incident to occur
in the Trans-Mississippi borderland during the war, nor would it be the last. While Samuel
Curtis, Samuel Sturgis, Henry Halleck and others balked at the use of Indian soldiers, in the end,
both the Union and Confederacy willingly drew from Native American tribes to fill out their
ranks, and they would likewise show an equal willingness to engage in “savage warfare” all their
own.
Throughout the spring of 1862, the United States recruited and enlisted Native Americans
into the First and Second Indian Home Guard (often referred to as the Indian regiments). The
Indian refugees of Kansas eagerly enlisted in these regiments for a simple reason: they wanted to
return home. More than anything else, the desire to escape Kansas and return to their fields and
fireplaces encouraged Indians to enlist; the Indians understood enlistment as a vehicle to liberate
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Indian Territory. Federal authorities supported this idea. In an interview with Opothleyahola and
other chiefs in late January, Commissioner Dole informed them, “Your enlistment is not done for
our advantage only; it will inure to your own benefit.” Although the stop-start nature of
recruitment “was very discouraging to the Indians—the cause of much dissatisfaction and loss of
confidence on their part,” the Indians remained adamant in their willingness to take up arms and
go home. When General Sturgis briefly halted enlistment in April, the leaders of the various
refugee tribes held a “grand council” and agreed to mount “an expedition upon their own
responsibility to their homes, in time to put a crop in the spring.” Opothleyahola and others
wanted to “fight their own way back.” Fortunately, recruitment resumed, and the refugees
quickly filled out several regiments.226
The Union army initially raised two regiments of Indian Home Guard. Their unique title
as “Home Guard” hints at their expected usage. General Halleck declared, “These Indians can be
used only against Indians or in defense of their own territory and homes.” Like the Confederacy,
the Federals only expected to utilize the Indian Home Guard in Indian Territory (although like
the Confederacy, the Union broke this promise and occasionally used the Indians outside their
borders). The First Indian Home Guard consisted of 800 Creeks and 200 Seminoles; essentially,
this regiment was filled by Opothleyahola’s warriors. Also dotting the First Indian’s ranks were
several dozen African-Creeks, whose knowledge of English made them critical interpreters
between white and Indian officers and soldiers. Unlike the Confederacy, Union Indian regiments
were commanded by white officers, although Indians often occupied captaincies and mid-level
regimental ranks. Among the captains of the First Indian Home Guard were Creek Indian
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Tuckabatchee Hacho (Opothleyahola’s nephew) and Seminole veterans Halleck Tustenuggee
and Billy Bowlegs, both leaders during Opothleyahola’s Rebellion. The commander of the First
Indian was Colonel Robert Furnas; among Furna’s staff was Major Albert Ellithorpe, a Chicago
entrepreneur whose journals offer great insight into the regiment’s service. The Second Indian
Home Guard was a more diverse affair, comprised of Indians from a variety of tribes and would
eventually be filled out with Osages and Cherokees. The Second Indian Home Guard was
commanded by John Ritchie, another veteran of “Lane’s Brigade.” 227
--By May, the various pieces of the Indian Expedition were coming together. After months
of turnover, the military situation seemed to be stabilizing in the hands of General Blunt (and,
perhaps, Senator Lane). The First Indian Home Guard was full; recruitment of the Second
continued at a brisk pace. Meanwhile, other regiments from Plains and Midwestern states
reported for duty at Fort Scott, a “miserable place” in southeast Kansas comprised of several
aging army barracks. Among these regiments was the 2nd Ohio Cavalry. Formed in the autumn of
1861, the 2nd Ohio had seen limited service combatting guerrillas along the Missouri-Kansas
line. Among the Ohioan ranks were a number of well-educated young men, many graduates of
Oberlin College, who kept meticulous diaries and frequently wrote home. Col. Charles
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Doubleday, a veteran of William Walker’s Nicaraguan filibuster in 1856, commanded the 2 nd
Ohio Cavalry. Due to the revolving nature of department commanders that spring, command of
the expedition’s forces had devolved to Doubleday, the senior-most colonel of those regiments
tasked to the expedition. Unlike his predecessors, Doubleday proved anxious to get the
expedition underway and proceed southward toward Fort Gibson “with as little delay as
possible.” Doubleday’s ambitious haste soon sparked the first engagement between Union and
Confederate forces in Indian Territory.228
Also among the expeditionary forces was the 9th Wisconsin Infantry, comprised almost
entirely of ethnic German immigrants to the United States. Many of these Germans had prior
military experience, either in the Mexican War or in the European revolutions of 1848, and
received routine praise for their “excellent discipline,” good health, and “soldierly bearing” as
one of the best regiments in the department. Hearty and hale, the Germans exhibited their energy
and zeal during their brief stay at Fort Scott, during which time they published a regimental
newspaper (Der Deutsch Krieger, “The German Warrior”), formed a regimental band, organized
“gymnastic exercises” among the men (many of whom were Turners), and grumbled about the
high cost of beer (10 cents). The 9th Wisconsin was commanded by Colonel Fredrick Salomon.
Hailing originally from Prussia, Frederick was one of four brothers, three of whom served in the
Union army. Yet Fredrick perhaps owed his colonelcy to his lone brother not in the army—
Governor Edward Salomon of Wisconsin. Despite his inexperience, Salomon proved a
competent officer, well-liked by his men. When rumors circulated that Salomon would receive
his brigadier’s stars in February, Salomon reportedly declared that “he would not be a general
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without the 9th Wisconsin, as he could travel a long ways and not find another such regiment.”
Episodes like this endeared Salomon to his men, and while he may have owed his position to his
brother, he was a capable, caring commander who would play a large role in the days ahead. 229
True to his word, Colonel Doubleday quickly set men into motion. On the first day of
June, Federal regiments left behind eastern Kansas and began marching south. The force
consisted of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry, 9th Wisconsin Infantry, elements of the 6th Kansas Cavalry and
10th Kansas Cavalry, and Captain Rabb’s 2nd Indiana Battery. Notably absent were the First and
Second Indian Home Guard, which despite nearing completion, remained in the vicinity of
Humboldt and Iola, near their refugee camps.230
As they marched through sparsely settled southeastern Kansas and neared Indian
Territory, white Union soldiers experienced their first interactions with Native Americans. Some
thirty-five miles north of Indian Territory, the blue-clad column approached a Catholic mission
among the Osage Indians, “a collection of some half-dozen large and well-built structures.” The
Osage proved curious to the newcomers, and “redskins came from different directions to see the
unusual sight.” “[V]ery much gratified” by the presence of Union soldiers, the natives were
especially “tickled” by the expedition’s artillery, dubbed “great shining pipes” and “shoot
wagons.” Hoping to “astonish” the Indian onlookers, Captain Rabb ordered his Indiana battery to
put on a demonstration, and the six guns unleashed a round of shells on a nearby hill. “At the
roar of the Cannon,” Private Jacob Haas of 9th Wisconsin recorded, “many [Indians] ran away

“From Fort Scott,” “A Trip to Fort Scott, Kansas,” “From the Ninth Regiment,” and “Letter from the
Ninth Regiment,” Quiner Scrapbooks, vol. 4, 153-154 and vol. 8, 56-57, WHS. One Ohio trooper thought the 9th
Wisconsin “the best infantry regiment in the department.” The Tenth Kansas Infantry worked to “out-drill the
Wisconsin Ninth,” a tacit admission the Ninth set the standard in discipline and drill. In general, the Ninth seemed to
garner praised and admiration from every quarter. “From the Second Cavalry,” Western Reserve Chronicle [Warren,
OH], July 9, 1862; Lawrence Republican, May 19, 1862.
230
Henry Whipple Chester, Recollections of the War of the Rebellion, eds. Alberta R. Adamson, Robert I.
Girardi, and Roger E. Bohn (Wheaton, IL: Wheaton History Center, 1996), 31.
229

144

and others closed their eyes and ears. Others laid hands over their mouths (Indian sign of fear).”
Other Indians rushed over the luckless hill at the firing’s conclusion and unsuccessfully
attempted to find shell fragments. While the Indians observed the artillery demonstration, the
Federals observed the Indians. The mission grounds were “swarming with fat-cheeked, blackeyed, black-haired Indian children,” some of whom were likewise naked but others “dressed in a
civilized manner” for school.” One Wisconsin correspondent thought that with a few decades
more of instruction, the educated Osages’ “effect on the country in the vicinity must be plainly
manifest.”231
After several days of marching, the Union regiments halted along the Spring River, a
“stream of surpassing beauty, clear, cool, and refreshing.” The camp made for a “beautiful
situation,” surrounded by a low ring of hills that afforded “an extensive view of the country” and
protection from enemies. Wheat and peach trees graced the countryside, and in the tall grass
rattlesnakes hid. All seemed taken with the area’s beauty. The soldiers sculpted small clay ovens
and baked bread and biscuits. Yet ominously, Henry Chester noted, “We were now near the
supposed location of the enemy, and heard rumors of being attacked before the night.” From
their camp on Spring River, the expeditionary force was less than two miles from the Indian
Territory line.232
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As the small column enjoyed the beauty and bounty of their Spring River encampment,
on June 4th word arrived from department headquarters at Fort Leavenworth that Colonel
Doubleday had been removed from command of the expedition and was to be replaced by
Colonel William Weer of the 10th Kansas Infantry. The Ohio colonel was further ordered to
cease his advance. Doubleday admitted, “the news rather surprised him,” and word of the change
caused a stir around the camp. “All seem astonished,” wrote one stunned Ohio trooper. Outraged
at his inexplicable removal, Doubleday resolved to resign “rather than submit to the persistent
efforts of these men to forward their own selfish ends.”233
It’s unclear what exactly prompted Doubleday’s ouster and Weer’s promotion. The order
came from General James Blunt, who had assumed command less than a month before. Perhaps
Blunt was simply exercising his discretion as department commander in appointing the man of
his choice to lead the expedition. Yet a more likely explanation lies, once again, with the
influence of Senator James Lane. William Weer was a veteran of antebellum Kansas politics.
“Mingling in the political broils and bleeding shrieks of Kansas,” one observer wrote, “he soon
rose high in the political circle, always being found where money was most plenty.” Like his
superior offices James Blunt, Weer was likewise a member of James Lane’s political circle,
having also served in “Lane’s Brigade” earlier in the war. In short, behind Blunt’ s appointment
of William Weer may well have been the hand of James Lane, working again to ensure his
Kansan supporters were in posts of importance. Certainly the Ohioans, whose leader had been
ousted from command, suspected Kansan political machinations were afoot. Captain Alvred
Nettelton of the 2nd Ohio thought Doubleday’s “supercession is little less than an insult…this

Lawrence Republican, “The Indian Expedition,” June 5, 1862; William Weer to Charles Doubleday,
June 6, 1862, Official Records 13, pgs. 418-419; Luman Harris Tenney, War Diary of Luman Harris Tenney
(Cleveland, OH: Evangelical Publishing House, 1914), 16-17; Cleveland Morning Leader, “From the Second
Cavalry,” June 13, 1862.
233

146

change of command is only another manifesto from the politico-military cabal at Leavenworth.”
Doubleday agreed, “despairing of ever being permitted to share in the glories of our arms while
confined under Kansas political domination.” Regardless of why yet another change in command
of the expedition occurred, the promotion of Colonel William Weer to the expedition’s head
would have disastrously profound implications for the Indian Expedition, Indian Territory, and
Indian refugees in the weeks ahead.234
Despite his removal from the head of the Indian Expedition and pending resignation,
Doubleday nevertheless faced the prospect of immediate action. The Ohio colonel had learned
that a small body of Confederates, reportedly numbering 1,500 men, were encamped amidst
Cowskin Prairie some thirty-five miles south in Cherokee Nation. The Confederates were under
the command of Stand Watie and included a mixed force of Watie’s Cherokees and several
hundred Missourians under Col. John Coffee. Further, several thousand Confederates under
Missouri General James Rains were reportedly gathering at Fort Smith, perhaps in preparation
for reinforcing Watie’s command. Determined to strike quickly while the opportunity lasted,
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Doubleday disregarded Weer’s order, dashed off a message to Weer informing him of the
situation, and marched advanced on Cowskin Prairie on June 6.235
Instead of advancing with his entire command, Col. Doubleday wisely elected to proceed
with a small force of artillery, cavalry, and infantry. The mixed force was comprised of two
battalions of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry, two companies of the 6th Kansas Cavalry, four companies of
the 9th Wisconsin Infantry, two companies of the 10th Kansas Infantry, and Rabb’s Indiana
battery—all told, roughly 1,000 men. For marching men, thirty-five miles was well over a single
day’s march; recognizing the need for speed, Doubleday arranged for over a dozen wagons to
carry the infantry south. The Ohioan had effectively turned his selected force into a mobile
command.236
After a long day’s ride of over thirty miles and two river crossings, the Union force
crested a ridge late that evening and was met with an exhilarating scene. The road led down into
the “lovely valley of Grand River.” Across “a velvet green prairie some four miles wide,” the
Grand River meandered along, its bank lined with “dense timber.” The trail continued down into
the valley, disappearing into the trees to a ford across the river. Several miles off to the right, on
the near side of the river, could be seen “dense smoke, supposed to proceed from the enemy’s
camp.” Mounted men could also be seen in the distance driving large herds of cattle. From the
rise, twenty-two year old Jacob Haas of the 9th Wisconsin admitted, “Quickly our guns were in
hands and we made sure that the same were loaded.”237
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Despite the late hour and “now declining sun,” Doubleday ordered the two battalions of
Ohio cavalry forward to “reconnoitre and find the exact location” of the enemy’s camp. A
battalion of Ohioans under Major Burnett advanced toward the right, in the direction of the
smoke. The other Ohio battalion under Major Miner advanced straight ahead toward the treelined banks of the Grand River and the ford, in hopes of cutting the Rebels off. Major Burnett’s
troops “beat the woods for two hours,” only to discover “the fire was made by an old nigger on
purpose to mislead us.” Major Miner’s troopers, however, encountered enemy pickets of Stand
Watie’s Cherokee command along the river. A brief exchange of shots occurred, and at least one
Confederate was captured, who revealed that Watie’s main camp was several miles still ahead.
238

While the cavalrymen scouted the brush, the infantry and artillery made their way down
the valley toward the ford. Learning that Watie’s camp was still ahead across the river,
Doubleday ordered the Kansans to deploy as skirmishers and cross the river. Fearing that the
“the gloomy woods” were “full of ‘em,” the Kansans refused to advance. “So mad, that the tears
fairly stood in his eyes,” Doubleday “asked if there was any two would volunteer to dismount
and cross the river to see if there was any enemy there.” A number of Ohioans volunteered,
riding down the dark, “narrow” path toward the river. The impetuous Germans of the 9 th
Wisconsin abandoned their wagons and followed suit. The Ohio cavalry and Wisconsin
skirmishers splashed across the river, the infantry wet to their waists. Jacob Haas recalled the
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“river bottom was sandy and our wagons had great difficulty crossing.” By 9 p.m. the Federal
force had forded the Grand River and “pushed forward close to the camp of the enemy.”239
Darkness hindered Doubleday’s ability to “accurately ascertain their [Confederates’]
precise position,” but he could see the camp of Stand Watie on a small grove ahead. Doubleday
ordered Rabb’s Indiana battery to the front, the cavalry scampering out of the roadway as the
“guns and caissons went thundering past as fast as 12 good horses could take ‘em.” Moving out
into open prairie, the Indiana guns took position on a small hill 500 yards from the enemy and
“threw a few shot and shell into their camp.” “The first shell burst right in the center of their
ranks,” recalled one observer gleefully, “killing two outright and wounding several more.”
Sergeant Luman Tenney of the 2nd Ohio looked on in excitement, too. “The shelling was
splendid,” Tenney enthused in his diary. “The shells would bound from tree to tree and burst
with a thundering noise.” When the shelling ceased, the infantry and cavalry advanced out of the
woods toward the enemy’s encampment, only to find it empty. As Captain Nettleton of the 2 nd
Ohio explained in a letter home, “The Cherokees cannot stand before what they call our
‘shooting wagons.’” Perhaps recalling the recent Kansan intrigue against his own colonel,
Nettleton continued, “The scream of a shell is nearly as terrible to the ears of a red man as
Gabriel’s bugle call will be to Kansas politicians.”240
Caught unaware by the Federals’ rapid southward movement and the sudden shelling of
their camp, the Confederates fled “with no great amount of ceremony,” and the “with no show of
resistance the motley crowd broke precipitately for the hills of Arkansas.” In the darkness, the
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Rebels’ “superior knowledge of the country,” allowed them to escape the clutches of the 2nd
Ohio in their rear. Tired from the long day, the soldiers slept on their arms that evening. The next
morning, the Federals took position in the Rebel’s abandoned camp, and although scouts
reported that the enemy had reorganized some fifteen miles south, Doubleday elected to heed
Weer’s orders and not pursue any further.241
Evidence of the Confederate’s panicked withdrawal littered their abandoned
encampment. “Their tents, swords, guns and pans with meat half fried all lay scattered on the
ground,” reported Jacob Haas. The Federals spent much of June 7 following the Confederates’
trail. The Rebels “scattered in bands of 50 or 60,” making them difficult to track. Although an
Ohio scouting party briefly skirmished with a small party of Rebels, most of the day was spent
rounding up the hundreds of horses and mules and over one thousand head of cattle abandoned
by the Confederates. Although the Rebels apparently suffered no killed or wounded, they did
lose several dozen men, “white, black, and red” as prisoners, a likely indication that black slaves
had accompanied the Confederates in the field.242
On the morning of June 8th, the victorious little command began its return trip back to the
camp on Spring River. Cavalry troopers played cowboy, herding droves of cattle and horses.
Several officers of the 2nd Ohio appropriated an abandoned rebel wagon and “had a gay time” on
the ride back. Yet darker reports of plunder and fraud marred the expedition’s return. In a July
newspaper expose, one correspondent charged Colonel Doubleday of fraud. Under Doubleday’s
orders, Captain Greeno of the 6th Kansas Cavalry requisitioned some 75 head of cattle from a
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“loyal woman” living along the Neosho River, who had escaped enemy depredations “on
account of her sex and widowhood.” The woman acquiesced to the deal on the promise that she
would be paid in several days’ time. Yet when the woman visited Colonel Doubleday at Camp
Spring River, she was told “that he could do nothing about it. Congress had made an
appropriation for such cases.” The widow received no payment for the cattle taken.243
Likewise, reports circulated that the Federals had taken horses from the various smaller
tribes of northeastern Indian Territory—Seneca, Quapaw, and Shawnee—without payment.
Other goods were confiscated from passerby, including the horse and saddle of an “Indian
woman… in defiance of her humble plea not to take them.” The Kansan correspondent reported
only several hundred horses and cattle “were taken from the enemy, and the rest from Union
men, women and loyal Indians.” The result was approximately $29,000 in property claims left to
the Federal government, while the captured livestock were “hurried north” and “turned over to
the beef contractor” at Fort Scott. Maybe, the correspondent charged, Colonel Doubleday’s
“retirement from the service, was not so much ‘Kanas political domination’ as was owing to the
profits of the expedition actually received.” Although diaries and letters reveal little about the
possibility of fraud, Sergeant Luman Tenney admitted to his diary on June 8th: “Jayhawked the
people badly.” Having skedaddled the enemy at Cowskin Prairie and plundered the countryside,
the small expedition as back in Camp Spring River by the evening of June 8 th.244
A relatively minor affair, the Battle of Cowskin Prairie nevertheless foreshadowed the
larger expedition to come in several ways. First, Confederate aversion to battle hinted at the
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growing disorganization of their command structure and their inability to challenge a wellorganized advancing foe. Second, the plundering and possible fraud committed by Federal
soldier against the denizens of Indian Territory marked only the beginning of years of rapacious
confiscations, marauding, and banditry by Union, Confederate, and criminal forces. Third, and
finally, the reappearance of Federal authorities in Indian Territory hastened the collapse of
Confederate-Cherokee relations. On the evening of June 8th, as Doubleday’s expeditionary forces
tramped into Camp Spring River across the Kansas line, to their “great surprise we saw a large
number of wild Indians with their small ponies and tents pitched close to ours.” Osages with
faces “painted yellow, blue, black and green” and “more civilized Cherokees” dotted the Federal
camp. In the coming days, more Indians “came who had been driven away by Indian rebels and
asked for help.” Colonel Doubleday’s June 6th expedition into Indian Territory marked the first
time Federal soldiers had entered Indian Territory since May of 1861. Within just a few days
after the brief reappearance of Federal authority, Indians from the Territory were hastening to
Camp Spring River to seek sanctuary. When the expedition returned to Indian Territory a few
weeks later five times larger in size, Confederate Indians would defect in droves.245
The skirmish at Cowskin Prairie was all that came of Colonel Doubleday’s brief tenure as
the Indian Expedition’s commander. Refusing to subordinate himself to another colonel,
Doubleday departed for Washington, D.C. in a futile attempt to regain command. Instead, the
First Indian Expedition would be led by Colonel William Weer. A competent, “efficient officer”
when sober, Weer was known to be “addicted to the liquor habit,” an unfortunate flaw that would
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make its mark in the days ahead. Yet with Doubleday gone, Weer gamely set about reorganizing
and strengthening the expedition for its formal push south into Indian Territory.246
--William Weer’s ascent to command of the Indian Expedition was symptomatic of the
complex political arena from which the venture was born. For President Lincoln, the Indian
Expedition was a means of reasserting military control over Indian Territory and repairing
broken relations with the Five Tribes. For James Lane, David Hunter, and others, however, the
expedition promised a chance at battlefield victory and its attendant glory. For Native American
refugees and their Indian agents, they forced the military to acknowledge their needs and
transform the expedition into a liberation of their homelands preceding a triumphant, perhaps
vengeful, return home. The likewise convinced the United States military to clothe, arm, and
train them as Indian Home Guard regiments.
Despite a tumultuous spring that witnesses a parade of incoming and outgoing expedition
commanders, the expeditionary forces enjoyed a minor success at Cowskin Prairie, and by
summer the Indian Expedition was ready to march. Yet Kansan politicking—so instrumental to
the venture’s existence in the first place—also left the entire expedition in the hands of a
questionable commander whose penchant for drink would spell ruin for the expedition in the
blisteringly hot, dry days ahead.
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“Sweating, Choking, Broiling”:
Environment, Leadership, and the Failure of the First Indian Expedition
“I have stood with arms folded and seen my men faint and fall away from me like the leaves of autumn because I
thought myself powerless to save them.” –Col. Frederick Salomon, 9th Wisconsin Infantry, July 18, 1862

--Sergeant Michael Zimmer quietly awoke in the middle of the night, having gone to sleep
just a few hours before. The thirty-eight year old carpenter, a veteran of the Mexican War, was
offered little explanation as to why, in the dead of night, he and his comrades of the 9th
Wisconsin being ordered “to fall in with rifle and leather, the rifles loaded with live
ammunition.” The men were anxious and confused; “we had to fall into battle order and expected
the attack at any moment.” Nor were Zimmer and the Wisconsin soldiers alone in rousing.
Despite the approaching midnight hour on a hot summer night, soldiers throughout the Indian
Expedition’s camp grimly socketed bayonets and shouldered arms in the darkness. Indiana
artillery crews loaded their guns with grapeshot and canister, and Ohio cavalrymen grabbed
carbines and mounted their horses. The camp stirred into motion at the prospect of violence.247
The threat, however, did not come from without, but from within. A mutiny was
underway. Colonel Frederick Salomon, commander of Zimmer’s 9 th Wisconsin and second-incommand of the expedition, determined expedition commander Colonel William Weer “was
either insane, premeditated treachery to his troops, or perhaps that his grossly intemperate habits
long continued had produced idiocy or monomania.” Meeting with other regimental commanders
in the expedition, “they all met by common consent, as it were, to look the matter in the face.
Starvation was imminent, and the man who should look after the command was habitually
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drunk.” The commanders agreed that Weer must be deposed, and Frederick Salomon ordered
Company C of his own Ninth Wisconsin Infantry to arrest Colonel Weer.248
Around 11 o’clock that night, Captain Eckhart led his stalwart Germans to William
Weer’s tent to demand the colonel’s surrender. Having already retired for the evening, Weer was
taken aback by the sudden arrival of an armed guard. Weer “showed a decided unwillingness to
go along, and attempted to open a lengthy debate with the captain.” Brooking no discussion,
Eckhardt again asked for Weer’s removal, which Weer refused. “You are my prisoner,” Captain
Eckhardt barked in broken English, and he ordered his company to “charge bayonets!” One
observer recalled that “the rifles came down with a click and a rattle, and as they closed in on
him [Weer], he saw they would obey any order the Captain gave them, and so he surrendered at
discretion.” In his nightshirt and bare feet, Weer was escorted to Colonel Salomon’s tent. Upon
entering Weer took stock of the men present; almost all of expedition’s commanders were
present. When Weer’s eyes found battery commander and fellow Kansan Captain Norman Allen,
the stunned colonel cried out “‘And you are here?’ and burst into tears.” Weer was promptly
arrested, and Colonel Salomon took command. 249
Mutiny successful, the First Indian Expedition abruptly reversed course. Colonel
Frederick Salomon immediately ordered the expedition to withdraw, and around 3 a.m. on July
19, 1862, blue-clad columns marched northward. Only the Indian Home Guard regiments were
left behind. Once again, Union forces seemed to be abandoning Indian Territory to its fate.250
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Why did the long-awaited Indian Expedition, which opened so promisingly in the first
weeks of July, culminate in mutiny? Both nature and man played a role in the expedition’s
failure. In recent years, Civil War scholars have begun to seriously examine the relationship
between the environment of the 1860s and the armies who marched and fought through it. The
environment possesses agency; it is not just a static landscape, but rather an active participant in
shaping military affairs. The failure of 1862 Indian Expedition exemplifies the environment’s
capacity—in this instance, through local weather—to dramatically alter military events. An
extraordinarily, historically hot summer, accompanied by water shortages and a dearth of forage,
sapped the energy, health, and morale of Union soldiers and their mounts.251
Faced with a hostile environment which imposed serious logistical, strategic, and morale
issues, the Expedition needed stout leadership and careful planning to overcome these obstacles.
Instead, the Expedition was saddled with William Weer, whose inebriation and incompetence
prevented Union forces from adequately addressing environmental issues. The result was an
increasingly sick, anxious, and angry force—officer and enlisted alike. When Frederick Salomon
and the expedition’s officers arrested Weer on the night of July 18, “the whole command was in
ecstacies [sic] over the deposing of the old vagabond.”252
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Yet the Expedition and its eventual failure produced profound impacts on military and
civil affairs within Indian Territory. For the thousands of destitute Indian refugees in Kansas, the
expedition’s failure prevented their return home. Yet another long Kansan winter awaited them.
The appearance of the Union army that summer caused thousands of Cherokees, including many
Confederate Cherokees and Chief John Ross, to defect to the Union cause. But the Federal
army’s subsequent retreat left defectors vulnerable and Native Americans even more wary of
Union promises of assistance. Meant to secure Indian Territory for the Union and allow refugees
to return home, the First Indian Expedition only deepened the suffering of Native Americans
while failing to oust the Confederate army’s hold over the Territory.
--In the warmth of late spring, however, such dark portents lay far in the future. Instead,
throughout June soldiers of the Indian Expedition busied themselves with the mundane details
necessary for any serious military campaign. Soldiers marched and drilled, commanders
requisitioned supplies, and everyone looked forward to finally taking the field. Unlike his
predecessor Charles Doubleday, William Weer initially proved more cautious in his preparations
for invading Indian Territory. Weer determined to advance only when ready and spent much of
June tending to the necessary, sundry affairs of conducting a proper expedition into enemy
territory.253
While making proper logistical preparations, Colonel Weer also grappled with “the one
thousand and one difficulties I have to encounter with the Indians.” Weer was uneasy about the
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possibility of violence as Union soldiers marched south; in particular, he worried the Indian
Home Guard would seek revenge upon their secessionist brethren. “The evident intention,” the
Kansas colonel warned, “is to Jayhawk.” Eventually, several Indian agents were tasked with
accompanying the expedition south. Not all Indian news caused headaches, however. Reports
reached Weer in Kansas that “large bodies of Union Indians exist among all these people clear to
Fort Cobb, and they await our advance in order to take the field in behalf of the Government.”
With the help of refugee Indians, Weer sent runners south “all through Indian country, notifying
those in secret that help is nigh.”254
Moreover, William Weer also understood the importance of advancing into Indian
Territory only when accompanied by the Indian Home Guard regiments, “as this expedition is
especially intended to aid them to recover possession of their homes and to bring back the Indian
country under subjection of the Government.” Weer wrangled with the Indian regiments and the
refugee community to get the Home Guard ready for action. The most difficult issue stemmed
from the Home Guards’ proximity to the refugee camps near Leroy. Enlisted Native Americans
looked not to their officers—Indian or white—for orders, but rather “run to the chiefs for advice,
and are controlled by them as against the captains.” Weer reassured the Indian officers of their
authority, which “highly pleased” them, and moved the regiments away from the refugee camps
“to get them away from the influence of the chiefs.” Even with officer authority reasserted, the
Indian regiments, especially the still-forming Second Indian Home Guard, were woefully lacking
in supplies. Weer also reported shortages in medicine and doctors, giving rise to illness among
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Native American soldiers, who “seem incapable of endurance.” Supplies, doctors, and mustering
officers were requested.255
Whatever difficulties the Indian soldiers posed, however, they left quite an impression
among all observers. Once the officers exerted control, Weer admitted the Indians “are very
docile, seeming anxious to learn and full of fight, as they are getting the war-whoop all the way
along.” After encountering a company of Seminoles from the 1st Indian Home Guard, Corporal
Robert McMahan thought them “beautifully formed” and was surprised by their well-uniformed
dress. Major Albert Ellithorpe, an energetic and ambitious thirty-seven year old Chicagoan and
staff officer in the 2nd Indian Home Guard, extoled the martial virtues of his soldiers. “I think I
have fully settled the fact of Indian capability & sussiptibility [sic] to arrive at a good state of
military discipline,” Ellithorpe declared, comparing their drill “equal to any white soldier.”
Ellithorpe enthused, “They will make brave & ambitious sholdiers [sic] I have no doubt. Our
country may well fell proud that these red men have last fell into the ranks to fight for our flag,
& aid in crushing treason.”256
Other Federal soldiers found the Native Americans’ martial abilities less inspiring, more
amusing. Upon “the pleasure of seeing the Indians drill,” Sergeant Zimmer confessed to his
diary, “It was too funny to describe everything.” The Fort Scott Bulletin described a dress parade
among the Indians, noting the “ceremonies progressed very well until the command ‘Parade
Rest’ was given, when, with a unanimous grunt of satisfaction, the Indians seated themselves
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comfortably on the ground.” “They understood the ‘rest’ perfectly,” joked the Bulletin, “but the
‘parade’ evidently has no place in their tactics.” The Bulletin predicted the Indian soldiers “will
be as valuable as a flock of sheep in time of action. They ought to be disbanded immediately.”257
Despite the misgivings of some of their white counterparts, the Indian soldiers would
soon have an opportunity to prove their worth in the field. On June 21, Col. Weer gathered his
various regiments around Fort Scott, including the First and Second Indian Home Guards, and
marched south towards Baxter Springs, near the Cherokee line. Weer intended to link up with the
Union force still at Baxter Springs, then “push on rapidly…until I am in the close neighborhood
of the enemy.”258
While Weer marched to unite his command, those troops still already stationed at Baxter
Springs continued to wait. The soldiers’ no longer waxed poetic about the beauty of the Spring
River region; instead, rising temperatures and boredom made the men restless. “Sweating,
choking, broiling as we do here in Southern Kansas,” one Ohio trooper complained, “with dusty
roads under our feet, tropical prairies on every side…dreaming of Cherokees, rattlesnakes, and
short rations, you need not wonder that we sometimes long for a snuff of the pure lake breeze.”
By mid-June, temperatures began skyrocketing above 100-110 degrees. “Think of it!” the
exasperated trooper groaned, “hot at noon, hot at night, and hot in the morning. Vulcan, it seems
to me, could almost do his smithing, or Thor forge his thunderbolts in such a temperature.”259
Under the sweltering Kansas sun, the men could only wait for their new commander to
arrive and the expedition to begin. One trooper predicted the soldiers would stay put until
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“definitely ascertained among wrangling Kansas politicians who shall be greatest in the kingdom
of Heaven, and lead this expedition where there is a full grown enemy.” Amidst “the magnificent
but lonely distances of this Dixian realm,” Captain Alvred Nettleton of the 2nd Ohio admitted
“our part of the war is rather stale.” One homesick Wisconsin soldier even committed suicide,
leaving behind a wife and five children. The solitary interlude at Baxter Springs proved an
unhappy one. Yet Captain Nettleton consoled himself that “Not every regiment…can indulge
each day in a Marathon before breakfast, a Solferino as siesta, and a Shiloh in the evening. On
the great chess-board there are many pawns—yes even valiant knights, that may never take a
piece, but all are working to the same end—the final checkmate.” Though hardly destined for a
Solferino or Shiloh, by the end of June, the long wait was over. The entire Indian Expedition
gathered in Baxter Springs, finally ready to invade Indian Territory.260
On the night of June 27, the evening before the expedition’s outset, white soldiers
gathered to witness their Native American counterparts perform a war dance. “Eager to see a
War Dance,” Jacob Haas of the 9th Wisconsin seemed taken by the thrilling event. Entering in a
“grave procession,” bodies painted and fastened with bells, feathers, and trinkets, the Indians
encircled a large bonfire and danced. To the German Haas, the Indians’ “bloodchurning shrieks,
beating of drum and jingling of bells, in the sheen of the fire colorfully painted and yelling like
demons, they looked like a host of crazy devils from the lower regions of hell.” Michael Zimmer

“From the Second Cavalry,” Cleveland Morning Leader, June 26, 1862; Zimmer, Michael Zimmer’s
Diary, 130-131; “From the Second Cavalry—The Indian Expedition,” Cleveland Morning Leader, June 23, 1862.
Michael Zimmer periodically recorded the temperature in his diary prior to and during the expedition, as did several
other soldiers. On June 17th, Zimmer recoded the temperature as 106º, and on June 24 at 110º in the shade. The
suicide was committed by Ludwig Salzwedel, a fifty-one year old private from La Crosse in Company F, 9th
Wisconsin. Though details as to why Salzwedel killed himself, Zimmer’s diary states that he left a note that
“remarked that he wanted to put an end to this life and humbug.” A later newspaper account in the Daily Wisconsin
of Milwaukee noted that an “investigation proved that he was subject to fits of mental aberration, thinking to
intensely of home and its various enjoyments.” Salzwedel was buried “on the green prairie not far from the clear and
swift Spring river,” and today his name is etched on a Civil War monument in Baxter Springs. Zimmer, Michael
Zimmer’s Diary, 130.
260

162

confessed it “awful to see how they brandish their tomahawks while they jump around the fire.”
A fearsome spectacle to the white soldiers, for the Native Americans, the dance was an important
ritual promising protection and success in the coming days.261
While the expedition danced, William Weer cut his opening orders for the campaign. The
Indian Expedition was divided into two brigades. The First Brigade was led by Colonel
Frederick Salomon and consisted of Salomon’s 9th Wisconsin Infantry, the 2nd Indian Home
Guards, 2nd Ohio Cavalry, and Rabb’s Indiana Battery. Col. William Judson commanded the
Second Brigade, composed of Judson’s own 1st Indian Home Guard, the 10th Kansas Infantry, 6th
and 9th Kansas Cavalry, and Allen’s Kansas Battery. Salomon’s First Brigade would depart south
on the morning of the 28th; Judson’s brigade would follow suit on the 29th. The brigades would
cross Grand River at Hudson’s Ferry and rendezvous at Cowskin Prairie, the site of Col.
Doubleday’s victory some three weeks prior. Weer ordered scouts to “scour the country between
Grand River and the Missouri State line” to guard the expedition’s eastern flank.262
At 1 a.m. on the morning of June 28th, reveille sounded throughout the Federal camps and
soldiers stirred, and by 3 a.m. the Expedition’s First Brigade was marching south across a
“landscape desolate and wild.” In an omen of weather to come, the temperature on the first day
of the march soared to 120º. The following day brought a respite of only 110º in the shade.
Michael Zimmer thought the weather “very hot,” and Colonel Salomon reported the brigade
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“suffered greatly during the march on account of the extreme heat and for want of water.” Yet
the expedition made rapid progress. Salomon’s First Brigade pushed south on the east side of the
Grand River, while Judson’s Second Brigade mirrored the movement from the west side.
Sweeping the countryside as the marched, they netted a few prisoners and livestock, and by the
29th the two brigades reunited at Round Grove (east of Grand River) on Cowskin Prairie, near the
battlefield from a month prior. Upon arrival, they discovered a small Confederate scouting party
of 150 men observing their movements, but the enemy disappeared upon approach. The
expedition made camp at Round Grove, yet reports of larger Confederate forces in the vicinity
kept the expedition on guard.263
Following in the wake of the Indian Expedition were hundreds of Indian refugees,
primarily Creeks and Seminoles, who believed the expedition would liberate Indian Territory
and allow them to return home. Unfortunately, records shed only little light on the experiences of
these returning refugees. Their absences from Union soldiers’ correspondence and diaries
suggests that they did not follow the Expedition’s columns directly, but rather made their own
way home. If these Creeks and Seminoles were to successfully resettle, the Expedition would
need to oust the Confederates from their strongholds around the Arkansas River and drive them
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back beyond the Canadian, thus liberating Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Nations. It was a tall
task.264
--Fortunately, the Rebels lurking around the Indian Expedition in the summer of 1862
belonged to a variety of hodge-podge Confederate outfits, the product of a confused, poorlyorganized Confederate command structure. The Confederate Department of Indian Territory was
led by Albert Pike, the portly, officious Arkansas lawyer responsible for the negotiation of the
Confederate treaties with the Five Tribes. As a reward for his diplomatic endeavors, Pike was
promoted to brigadier general and given command of the Indian department. In his early tenure,
however, Pike was an absentee commander; in November of 1861 he departed for Richmond to
submit the negotiated Indian treaties to the Confederate government for approval. His departure
proved untimely (or perhaps fortuitous, given Pike’s limited abilities as a military commander),
and he missed Opothleyahola’s Rebellion entirely. He returned in time to lead the Indians
through their poor performance at Pea Ridge, where he himself revealed his own inadequacies as
a commander.265
Despite his limited military experience, Pike styled himself something of a generalissimo.
In the spring of 1862, he developed a strategy that effectively removed him from the front and
gravely endangered Confederate Indian Territory. In the wake of the Confederate defeat at Pea
Ridge, Federal forces secured their foothold in Northwest Arkansas. The Federal presence
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undoubtedly weakened the Confederate position in neighboring Indian Territory, but in Pike’s
mind, Federal occupation of Northwest Arkansas invalidated any Confederate defense of Indian
Territory north of the Canadian River. Pike promptly retreated over one hundred miles south
deep into Choctaw Nation and began constructing an immense earthen fortification—dubbed
Fort McCulloch—along the banks of the Blue River. Pike’s command was barely twenty miles
from the Texas border, and 150 miles from the Kansas line.266
In Albert Pike’s mind, his strategy presented the best opportunity to defeat any inevitable
Federal invasion of Indian Territory, an invasion which could threaten Texas or southern
Arkansas. “The country south of the Canadian offers much better positions for such an action
than north of it,” Pike explained in June from Fort McCulloch, “and the nearer Texas it is fought
the better.” Pike’s proximity to Texas further allowed him to quickly gather reinforcements in
case of invasion, and besides, “there will be not time to erect [fortifications] at any point north of
this post.” In short, Pike took his 3,000 man command and withdrew into a defensive shell, much
too far south to challenge Weer’s pending invasion. Pike’s task as commander of the department
was to defend the Indian nations, as promised by the treaties Pike himself negotiated the previous
summer. Although Pike claimed, “If I can prevent the Indian country from being occupied by the
enemy I shall be content,” in reality, by electing to fight along the Blue River, Pike left most of
Indian Territory defenseless.267
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The lunacy of Pike’s strategy was apparent to everybody except him. General Thomas
Carmichael (T.C.) Hindman, the spry, energetic Arkansan placed in command of the TransMississippi Department in May, admitted that Pike’s “force does not amount to much, but there
is no earthly need of its remaining 150 miles south of the Kansas line throwing up
intrenchments.” Pike’s soldiers, suffering from sickness and low morale, concurred with
Hindman’s critique. Upon reaching “the so called Head Quarters” of Pike’s fort, Arkansan
Joseph Farr confessed to his wife, “I began to fear that we would never overtake old Pike in his
chase. But I believe he has finally come to the conclusion that he is far enough out of the way[.]
We are only 20 miles from the Texas line.” 268
Pike’s southerly post worried chiefs and commanders to the north. Cherokee Chief John
Ross pleaded to Jefferson Davis of the “unprotected state of the country,” since Pike’s command
was “not far north of Red River, in the Choctaw Nation, and more than 200 miles south of the
northern boundary of the Cherokee Nation.” Col. Douglas Cooper subtly critiqued Pike when he
reported “we are likely to resort to guerrilla warfare at least those who are outside the new lines
of defense.” Cooper’s further forewarned, “As matters now stand, if a Federal force should
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advance into Cherokee country I think Stand Watie would be driven out and a large majority of
the Cherokees go over to the Federals.” Cooper’s words proved prophetic.269
The June gathering of Federal forces in southern Kansas did not go unnoticed by the
Confederates. Increasingly concerned over the possibility of imminent invasion, in mid-June
General Hindman ordered Pike to move towards Cherokee Nation “and establish his
headquarters at Fort Gibson.” Pike declined, instead granting to Col. Douglas Cooper command
of “all the Confederate and allied troops north of the Canadian River,” which essentially gave
Cooper control over the few mounted Indian regiments in the region. In the case of Federal
invasion, Cooper was to “concentrate his troops on their flanks and front, impede their march as
greatly as possible, and draw them so far into the country that if defeated retreat may be ruinous
to them.” Cooper was not to risk battle “if success is doubtful.” Unaware that Pike was still at
Fort McCulloch, or that Pike placed Cooper in charge of Cherokee Nation’s defense, on June 26,
General Hindman placed Missouri Colonel J.J. Clarkson in command of all forces in the
Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Nations until Pike arrived. Thus, when the Federals invaded
Indian Territory a few days later, the local Confederate command structure was muddled, and
Generals Pike’s forces had yet to depart Fort McCulloch. Over the next few days, the Federal
Indian Expedition exploited their enemy’s confusion.270
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--On July 2nd, the expedition lurched southward from their temporary camp at Cowskin
Prairie. As the Federals approached Cabin Creek at nightfall, reports reached Colonel Judson,
commander of the Second Brigade, of Confederate activity in the area. It was rumored that Stand
Watie’s Cherokees had only recently departed the vicinity and left their supply train at Locust
Grove, a small post over thirty miles away on Cabin Creek. Anxious to clash with the enemy,
Judson put together a small force of 300 men, consisting of detachments from the 1st Indian
Home Guard (mounted), 9th Kansas Cavalry, 10th Kansas Infantry (loaded into wagons), and a
section of Allen’s Kansas Battery. The arrival of Colonel Weer at Cabin Creek, however,
displaced Col. Judson from command, as Weer elected to personally lead the attack on the
enemy train. Among the small force was Major Albert Ellithorpe, the Chicagoan who had yet to
see combat. With soldiers “piled promiscuously into wagons,” the tiny Federal force set out on
an impressive overnight march of thirty-five miles. Efforts were made to ensure secrecy; Indian
men in their homes were arrested to keep from alerting the Confederates. At a pair of these
homes, however, detachments of the 6th Kansas Cavalry startled and scattered a party of Rebel
scouts “like chaff before the wind.” Although the Kansans captured ten of the enemy, others fled
into the brush, threatening to sound the alarm at Locust Grove of the Federal advance. Unsure of
whether the Confederates knew of their advance, by sunrise the blue-clad command reached
Locust Grove unmolested.271
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The Confederate force at Locust Grove was comprised of seventy-five Missourians under
the command of Col. J.J. Clarkson. Originally an officer of the pro-Confederate Missouri State
Guard, Clarkson and his men had only recently mustered into Confederate service. Operating in
Indian Territory that summer, their presence was meant to reassure Confederate Cherokees of the
Confederacy’s commitment to their nation. Yet Clarkson’s presence only complicated an
increasingly fragmented Confederate command structure. As June turned to July, Clarkson fell
ill. Knowing the Federals were approaching, Clarkson gave Stand Watie most of his
Missourians, retaining only a small company of seventy-five to guard the Rebel baggage trains
on a small hill near Locust Grove. Although Clarkson explicitly ordered Watie to “cross to the
west side of Grand river and watch the enemy,” Watie failed to carry out the orders. In fact,
Watie’s men briefly encountered the 6th Kansas Cavalry on the east side of Grand River on July
3 and skirmished with them at Spavinaw Creek. Though a trifling affair resulting in a lone Rebel
casualty, the fight at Spavinaw Creek assured that Clarkson’s command was unsupported and
dangerously exposed to the advancing Federals on the morning of July 3, 1862.272
The Union force approaching Clarkson’s camp that morning did so without a leader.
During the overnight march, Col. Weer “made frequent visits to his bottle & the nearer we
approached the enemy the greater his excess.” Major Ellithorpe confided to his diary that “by the
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time the attack was made he [Weer] was in no condition to give an order.” Ironically, however,
Weer’s Confederate counterpart may well have been inebriated himself. Col. Clarkson had
apparently been warned of the Federals approach—perhaps by those men who escaped the
clutches of the 6th Kansas Cavalry overnight—but Clarkson and his officers took no action;
rumors flew they may have been “too drunk to attend to their duty.” Thus, the two forces were
possibly commanded by a pair of intoxicated colonels.273
Leaderless, the Federals nevertheless advanced toward enemy’s camp, located “upon the
summit of a hill, in the midst of a thicket.” Finding themselves in the vanguard of the Federal
advance as they approached, Lt. Col. Wattles and Major Ellithorpe of the 1 st Indian deployed
their mounted Indians and led the Creeks in a three-hundred yard charge up a “steep hill” just as
the sun rose on the horizon. The 9th Kansas Cavalry quickly joined in support, sensing “a fair
chance to try their hand.” Due to “utter disregard” or drunkenness by Colonel Clarkson, there
were no Confederate pickets on guard, and the “attack threw the enemy into great consternation.”
Although the “enemy commenced fire as soon as we rose over the brow of the hill,” Confederate
shots sailed high. The mounted Indians and Kansans swept through the Rebels’ encampment,
and “the enemy broke ranks and fled in terrible confusion, leaving every thing pertaining to their
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command.” The whole affair was over quickly, before the infantry or artillery could even fire a
shot.274
Despite Weer’s inebriation, the Locust Grove skirmish proved quite the little coup. The
Federals killed several Confederates and captured approximately 100 prisoners, including
Colonel Clarkson himself. Only three Union soldiers were killed, privates of the 1 st Indian and
9th Kansas, along with an assistant surgeon whose civilian garb led to his accidental shooting.
Adding to the victory were the captured goods: horses and mules, 1,500 head of cattle, thirty
wagons, 500 small arms, ammunition, and more. One special piece of loot was the diary of
George Falconer, one of Clarkson’s Missourians, found by Albert Ellithorpe amidst the detritus
of the enemy’s camp. Confiscating the journal for his own use as “one of the trophies taken this
morning,” Ellithorpe gleefully wrote, “So hasty was the flight [of the enemy] that the cooking
vesels were left upon the fires and their whiskey, todys ready prepared and untouched.”
Ellithorpe reckoned the value of the captured train at $100,000.275
Having routed the enemy, the victorious Federals now attempted to rouse their drunken
commander. Only after the short battle did Weer manage to survey the battlefield in a “state of
intoxication.” Yet “overcome either by fatigue, the glory of the victory, or by the effects of
certain hospital stores, the commander soon subsided to his ambulance, and became practically
non est.” The officers ineffectually tried to reawaken Weer but grew nervous at the isolated
nature of their position; the fleeing members of Clarkson’s command might well be raising the
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alarm elsewhere. “Our position was a critical one,” Ellithorpe recalled, and the officers agreed to
mount up and return to the main expeditionary force on Cabin Creek. After travelling ten miles,
Col. Weer finally awoke and ordered the little detachment to halt. Instead of traveling back to the
main encampment, Weer simply ordered the detachment to make camp at the nearby juncture of
Cabin Creek and Grand River, while he cut orders for the Indian Expedition’s main force to join
him.276
With a tidy victory in hand, Weer determined to “lay by on the 4 th to celebrate the day.”
The holiday gave the colonel another excuse to continue his drinking spree, and indeed, the
entire Indian Expedition took the opportunity to revel and imbibe along the banks of the Grand
River. The expedition’s artillery fired celebratory rounds. The 9 th Wisconsin’s band played. A
fight broke out among two soldiers in the 2nd Ohio. Indians plundered the captured goods from
Locust Grove. Soldiers feasted upon bean soup and boiled beef, and partook of “the Sutler’s
whiskey at $1 a quart.” Sergeant Luman Tenney of the 2nd Ohio Cavalry, a thoughtful, prudent
man, was “disgusted” by the behavior of the men. “Great day. So many drunk. Officers gave the
freest license to the men,” Tenney scorned. “One officer even told his men that the one who
wasn’t drunk that night should be ducked in Grand river…One reason everybody like Colonel
Doubleday so well,” Tenney reminisced, “was that he never drank.”277
The fight at Locust Grove and the accompanying Independence Day revelries revealed
the great flaw underlying the Indian Expedition of 1862. As Albert Ellithorpe opined, “The great
mishap of this expedition so far is the inefficient and unreliable character of the officer in
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command (Col Wm Weere).” However capable when sober, Weer’s predilection for alcohol
undermined the discipline and efficiency of the expedition, eventually to the point of its
endangerment. Weer’s drinking had few consequences when the expedition was well-supplied
and frolicking on the banks of the Grand River, with the enemy far away. Yet Weer’s faults grew
dangerous as the environmental, logistical, and strategic situation darkened in days ahead.278
For such a small skirmish, Locust Grove produced another great impact on the
Expedition and Indian Territory. In the wake of the engagement, the few remaining members of
Clarkson’s Missouri Battalion fled southward. Arriving in the Cherokee capital of Tahlequah,
some thirty miles south, word quickly spread of the disaster at Locust Grove and the Federal
advance. Stationed at Park Hill were several companies of John Drew’s 1 st Cherokee Mounted
Rifles. Comprised primarily of full-blooded Ross supporters, many of whom belonged to the
secretive Keetowah Society, Drew’s troopers possessed little devotion to the Confederacy. The
Federal army was in the vicinity, had routed a Confederate command, and captured Col.
Clarkson. The Confederate Cherokees’ loyalty faltered. Repeating the defections of the winter
previous, Drew’s regiment melted in the face of the enemy. Hundreds of Confederate Cherokees
poured into the Indian Expedition’s camp over the next few days. By July 6, 600 Cherokees had
defected and were enlisting in the rapidly filling-up 2nd Indian Home Guard. “Our little victory
has had a wonderful effect upon the Cherokees,” Weer crowed, “deciding all the wavering in our
favor…I consider the Cherokee country as virtually conquered.”279
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The defection of John Drew’s Cherokee regiment had been all but assured. The
regiment’s wavering Confederate loyalties were exposed during the winter campaign against
Opothleyahola. In the wake of the Pea Ridge debacle, discontent within the regiment continued
to mount, as did tensions with the pro-Confederate Cherokees of Stand Watie’s regiment.
Stephen Foreman, a Cherokee minister of mixed ancestry and Southern supporter, confided in
his diary in late June rumors of “a great deal of dissatisfaction” among Drew’s Cherokees
“because they feel restless as the time approaches for them all to go over to the Feds.” Foreman
further reported “the regiment has constant communication with the Fed army through those
Cherokees who joined Opath-le-yah-ho-lah.” The rumors recorded by Foreman were true.
Colonel Weer had been in contact with “a secret society of Union Indians called Ke-too-wah,”
whose reportedly numbered 2,000. Drew’s ranks were littered with Keetowah members. 280
Even more worrisome than possible collusion with the Federals was the possibility of
outright civil conflict between Drew’s and Watie’s rival Cherokee regiments. Foreman heard
wind of a plot “to cut off at one blow Col. Watie and his regiment, and all the half breeds who do
not belong to the Ross Party.” General T.C. Hindman, commanding the Trans-Mississippi
department, grew concerned “that extreme ill-feeling, approaching nearly to actual collision,
exists between the two Cherokee regiments.” Given the possibility of violence against Watie’s
command, defection to the Federal lines may well have been the least injurious course taken by
Drew’s men that summer.281
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The victory at Locust Grove and the defection of Drew’s Cherokees gave William Weer
confidence, and on the morning of July 6 the Indian Expedition left its Grand River encampment
and penetrated deeper into Cherokee Nation. As the sun rose in sky, temperatures likewise
surged. At least one thermometer accompanied the expedition southward with Dr. Louis Loehr,
assistant surgeon of the 9th Wisconsin. Soldiers of the expedition took part in the time-honored
tradition of grousing about the weather, and readings on Loehr’s thermometer often made the
rounds about camp. As the blue-clad soldiers tramped along the “very stony and rough” road
south on July 6, the temperature reached 111º in the shade. Ohio trooper Albert Houghton
confessed to his father, “I think it was the hottest day I ever saw.” Compounding the heat was the
complete absence of water along the expedition’s sixteen mile route.282
Over the next several days the expedition continued its march south along dusty roads,
under blistering heat, with little or no water. Morale soured. A march of sixteen miles on July 7
brought the men to several “beautiful springs” with “very bad water.” The fifteen mile hike on
July 8 was made without any water at all. Tramping along the rocky road amid “clouds of this
fine, black, prairie dust rendered our marches almost unendurable.” “The weather has been,
without one moment cessation, the hottest I ever saw,” complained one Ohioan, “the
thermometer ranging from 98 to 106 in the shade.” Soldiers who fell out during the march to find
water were punished; when one party of soldiers slipped off to a nearby stream, they “were
driven from the spring without a drop of water to wet their parched tongues, and forced to march
the remainder of the way under guard.” Sergeants who went in search of water returned to find
themselves demoted back into the ranks. The men grumbled that the “tyranny of some of our
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officers was unendurable,” and rumors floated around that during the march, Col. Weer “was
said to be drunk all the time, by his own rum.”283
The final day’s march on July 8 marked a dangerous low-point for the weary, overheated
soldiers. The expedition awoke at 2 a.m. and set off by 3, hoping to beat the heat to their
destination, which Colonel Weer assured the men was “in a very pleasant place” where the
command could “rest and recruit a few days.” For twelve hours, the soldiers “suffered greatly” as
they plodded south amid dust and 100º weather “without one drop of water.” Upon reaching their
destination at Flat Rock Creek, “what did we find?” one trooper angrily recounted. “Nothing but
a pool of putrid, stinking water, that was so nauseating and repulsive to both taste and smell, that
our famished horses would scarcely touch it.” Upon attempting to drink the water, the Ohioan
got sick and “did not try it again.” Jacob Haas likewise thought the water “all red and really unfit
to drink,” but admitted that “too many thirsty crowded around and it was almost impossible to
get to the water. Many were glad to suck wet sand.” Soldiers variously described it as “thick with
‘frog-spittle,’ and one-third hot,” and “swamp water, worse than old mud-run water.” Still, the
soldiers drank. Sick soldiers riding in ambulances begged of thirst. Angering the men were
rumors that Col. Weer learned from afternoon patrols that the site lacked water, but continued
anyways.284
Despite the lack of abundant, clean water, Col. Weer shockingly wanted to fortify the
position, located on a prominent hilltop. Weer “had the idea of digging wells and fortifying said
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sand hill—beautiful prospect for the summer season,” Wisconsin Major Hermann Schleuter
sardonically reported. “Boys called the camp=Camp Desperation.” Weer’s choice of location
seemed especially cruel given the proximity of the Grand River only a few miles away, and the
men travelled several miles that evening “hauling water from there as our only salvation.”
Bowing to human necessity, Weer moved the command several miles further to Grand River the
next morning and went into camp.285
Unsurprisingly, the days of extraordinary heat and lack of water eroded the health of the
Expedition’s soldiers. “Many, very many of our poor fellows,” reported an Ohio trooper, “have I
seen drop down by the wayside, from the effects of sunstroke.” Luman Tenney similarly reported
his comrades had been “sunstruck” due to the “melting weather we have had.” Disease and
sickness took its toll. One correspondent despaired that “our men were sickening and dying very
fast” due to the “boiling sun” and high temperatures, lack of good water, and fatiguing marches,
“all silently doing this work.” Another trooper angrily blamed Weer for their struggles: “He
marches the command with great rapidity, regardless of the suffering of his men and their
increasing debility in this severe climate.”286
Beast suffered alongside man, not only from heat, but from sun-withered grass that
offered little nutrition. Private William Wildman reported to his father it was “very hot and dry,
so dry that the grass is all drying up, the feed is not very big, nor it wont be without it rains
soon.” Wildman admitted, “Our horses are very poor, they don’t endure this climate like those
that are raised here.” Upon looking at his mare, “standing with her head down, too tired to eat,
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with the crust of dry sweat and dust that showed the hard usage,” Ohio trooper Isaac Gause broke
into tears. The expedition’s horses, especially the un-acclimated Ohio mounts, were “giving out
all the time, and were shot or abandoned.”287
The Indian Expedition was marching through an extraordinary hot summer. The highest
temperature ever recorded in Oklahoma reached 120º in 1936. If the temperatures recorded by
members of the expedition are accurate, the sweltering heat reached 120º not once, but several
times throughout the course of their campaign, perhaps even slightly exceeding that mark.
Regardless of any single days’ record-setting heat, it is apparent from letters and diaries that
much of the expedition occurred under temperatures above 100 º. These unusually broad
temperatures fit into a larger pattern of unusual climate across the American South during the
Civil War: draughts, searing summers, frigid winters, drastic precipitation, and other extreme
weather conditions plagued the nation. The extreme heat of Indian Territory—a small part of this
larger climatological trend—weakened Union soldiers, lowered morale, and eroded faith in
Colonel William Weer.288
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Arrival at Grand River on July 9 offered respite for the troops, who “eagerly climbed
down and swam and refreshed ourselves” the creek’s cool waters. The expedition’s halt at that
location owed itself to William Weer’s ongoing correspondence with Cherokee Chief John Ross
and Federal-Cherokee relations generally. On July 7, as his soldiers marched under the hot sun,
Weer penned a formal message to Ross, informing Ross of his approach “with an armed force of
regularly enlisted soldiers, instructed and prepared to enforce the observance of treaty
obligations by the Cherokee people.” Weer acknowledged that “a portion of the Cherokees have
been seduced by designing men” into the Confederacy, but Weer hoped the expedition’s
presence would restore “good feeling and the observance of law and order in this beautiful
country, now threatened with the horrors of civil war.” Weer requested an audience with Ross to
discuss bringing all Cherokees—pro-Union and pro-Confederate alike—back under Federal
authority. 289
For weeks, Colonel Weer had been assured that John Ross and most of the Cherokees
were truly loyal to the Union. Not long after assuming command in June, Weer confidently
predicted, “John Ross is undoubtedly with us, and will come out openly when we reach there.”
The massive defections among Drew’s Confederate Cherokees and the enlistment of hundreds of
Cherokees into the 2nd Indian Home Guard undoubtedly bolstered Weer’s belief that the
Cherokees would turn. It came as a surprise, then, when Ross politely declined Weer’s offer
almost immediately. Citing the Cherokees’ existing treaty with the Confederacy, Ross could not
honorably treat with Weer, and furthermore stated his belief that civil war “may be averted by
the observance of the strict principles of civilized and honorable warfare by the army now
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invading our country under your command.” Ross’ unexpected response left Weer stymied and
frustrated.290
Having heard reports of the Federal advance and Cherokee defections, Cherokee minister
Stephen Foreman visited Chief Ross several times during Ross’ deliberations over how to
respond to Weer’s communique. Foreman found Ross to be defensive and coy, with Ross
claiming “one thing is clear, we should have to submit to superior power.” Foreman suspected a
plot. “I could not help thinking that Mr. Ross was secretly approving the course of the Pin party
and publicly standing by the Treaty made with the Confederate States. Or in other words, he is
trying to be a northern and southern man both at the same time.” For Foreman, the truth of John
Ross’ loyalties lay in his actions. “If he is what he publically professes to be, a true Southern
man, who have these Pins gone North?” Ross had done nothing to prevent the flow of defections
to the Federal army. His mansion at Park Hill was guarded by Drew’s Cherokees, and unlike
many of his pro-Southern neighbors, neither Ross’ property nor slaves had been molested or
freed. For Foreman, this was evidence that Ross’ imminent defection was planned, and “Mr.
Ross and all of that stripe will go soon, as soon as the tricks are fixed for it.”291
Stephen Foreman’s suspicions regarding John Ross’ true loyalties were well-founded,
and many others—Northerners, Southerners, and Native Americans alike—suspected Ross of
playing political games. The reality was that Ross’ Cherokee-Confederate alliance has always
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been a marriage of convenience, not conviction. In the autumn of 1861, Ross finally backed the
Confederacy for several reasons: the ascendency of Rebel arms (especially regionally), a desire
to keep the Cherokee Nation and Five Tribes united in the face of a white mans’ civil war, and as
a way to cement his grip on the Cherokee chieftaincy over rival Stand Watie. By the summer of
1862, hardly any of those reasons still carried much weight. The Confederate defeat at Pea Ridge
and the failure of the Confederacy to protect Indian Territory revealed the South to be a weak,
unreliable ally. Opothleyahola’s Rebellion in the winter of 1861 shattered any hopes of a united
Indian Territory.
Worse, the Cherokee Nation itself seemed poised on the edge of civil war. Pin Indians
and Watie men murdered and robbed each other across the countryside, and Drew’s and Watie’s
regiments simmered with hostility towards each other. Drew’s regiment, the pet regiment of
Ross and his supporters, was defecting to the Federals by the hundreds. Watie’s regiment lurked
in the region, and Ross kept a guard at his house to protect him from the Federals, Watie’s men,
or both. The political and military ground was shifting under John Ross’ feet. Ross’ refusal to
meet with Col. Weer was not a reflection of deep loyalty to the Confederacy, but rather a bid to
buy time and see where how the situation evolved.
With matters in the Cherokee Nation unsettled, Weer decided to stay put at his camp on
the Grand River. On his approach to Cherokee Nation in early July, Weer made clear his
intention to “make a delay of some days when within striking distance of Tahlequah and Fort
Gibson, in order to give the Cherokees a chance to renew their treaty obligations to the
Government or be swept out of the country.” Although Chief Ross’ refusal to treat with Weer
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was unexpected, Weer decided to stick to his original plan and give the Cherokees time and
space to settle their internal affairs. 292
Weer’s decision is baffling. While perhaps John Ross needed time to think, that did not
preclude Weer from carryout out the goals of the expedition: liberating Indian Territory and
returning the refugees home. From his camp on Flat Rock Creek, Weer could have forded the
Arkansas River and continued his advance south. In fact, given that almost all of Creek Nation
resided south and west of the Arkansas River, Federal occupation south of the Arkansas would
be necessary for the thousands of Creek refugees to return home. Although Confederate forces
were finally beginning to rouse by early July, defeating the Confederates in the region was
always a necessary component to liberating Indian Territory. Moreover, a victory over the
meager Rebel forces likely would’ve hastened Cherokee defections and perhaps made an
impression on John Ross. In short, neither of the expedition’s goals could be accomplished by
waiting in camp along Grand River. Weer’s halt proved a faulty, fateful decision that would
ultimately cripple the entire expedition, and for the next ten days (from July 8-July 18) the
expedition stood still.
--While the Indian Expedition rested in the heart of Cherokee Nation and John Ross
deliberated his future course of action, the Confederates in Indian Territory finally began to stir.
The rousing of Confederate forces proved difficult, in large part due to General Albert Pike. Still
ensconced in his “bastion-on-the-Blue,” as one historian has described it, Pike repeatedly ignored
orders from General Hindman to take the field. Hindman’s orders from mid-June requesting Pike
to move in the direction of Fort Gibson had been ignored; instead, Pike gave Col. Douglas
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Cooper command of Rebels north of the Canadian River. Pike’s failure to take command
angered Hindman, as did Pike’s lethargy in forwarding troops to Arkansas.
On July 8, just as the Federal Indian Expedition was settling in near Tahlequah, Hindman
directly ordered Pike to take command of the Confederate forces around Fort Smith. Instead,
Pike angrily resigned. Given the time it would take for his resignation to reach Hindman, Pike
slowly set out with his troops towards Fort Smith. By July 15, his troops were at Boggy Depot,
barely twenty-five miles from Fort McCulloch. By the end of July, Pike received word that his
resignation had been accepted. Instead of returning to Arkansas as a private citizen, however, he
instead traveled to Fort Washita in Chickasaw Nation. From there, Pike published and mass
printed a scathing address that commiserated on the sad state of affairs in Indian Territory,
blamed Van Dorn and Hindman for the Indians’ troubles, and generally undermined Confederate
authority throughout the region. Pike promised to travel to Richmond personally and address the
Indians’ poor condition with the Confederacy.293
Albert Pike’s address was stunning display of arrogance and insubordination. Since
Pike’s days as negotiator for the Confederacy in 1861, he firmly believed the Confederate
Indians could only trust and be led by him. Although Pike may have hoped his address would
restore faith in him, the President, and the Confederate cause, it proved immensely short-sighted.
He failed to realize that his refusal to leave the Blue River instead opened up Indian Territory for
invasion, and the increasing instability within Cherokee Nation owed itself, in part, to his
inaction. A long-winded, incompetent commander, Pike’s myriad excuses and tribulations nearly
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prevented the Confederacy from mounting any opposition to the Federals’ invasion of Indian
Territory whatsoever.294
Pike’s proclamation spread quickly, eventually reaching Col. Douglas Cooper. “I
consider it dangerous,” Cooper reported to Hindman, “and have suppressed all copies in my
reach.” Cooper further thought Pike “partially deranged, and a dangerous person to be at liberty
among the Indians.” Albert Pike fled to Texas, an ignominious end for the man primarily
responsible for the creation of Confederate-Indian treaties. Pike’s litigious, narrow-minded
intransigence further meant that his entire force of over 2,000 never challenged the Federal
invasion. The task of opposing the Federals instead rested on the shoulders of Col. Douglas
Cooper, who once again was expected to secure Indian Territory for the Confederacy. 295
Placed in command by Albert Pike on June 23, Cooper established his headquarters at
Fort Davis on July 7, still expecting Pike to arrive and take command any day. Built in the winter
of 1861-1862, Fort Davis consisted of a motley collection of buildings overlooking the Arkansas
River’s southern bank. From Fort Davis, Cooper could monitor Federal movements across the
river, as well as keep an eye on old Fort Gibson, situated a few miles east of Fort Davis on the
Arkansas’ opposite bank. Thus situated, Cooper mustered a force of several thousand men from
various Indian regiments. He also ordered rifle pits to be constructed around Fort Davis.

Walter Brown penned a thorough biography of Albert Pike, and Chapter 31, “Pen-and-Ink Campaigning
in the Territory” provides a nice, albeit sympathetic, summation of the Pike-Hindman feud from Pike’s perspective.
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their faith in him, he [Pike] cogently reasoned that to vindicate himself against Van Dorn and Hindman would be
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he abandoned most of Indian Territory to the enemy. Pike knew his actions might be perceived as overly-defensive
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Reverend Henry Buckner, a Confederate sympathizer accompanying Chilly McIntosh’s Creek
battalion, told his wife “we felt prepared for them and anxiously hoped they would try to cross.”
Still, facing an enemy force of 7,000, there was little Cooper could do but vigilantly guard the
Arkansas River line. The Federals’ rapid advance and Pike’s immovability left the Confederates
unable to challenge the Indian Expedition directly. Reverend Buckner confessed, “They got to us
without fighting, and almost without us knowing that they were this side of Kansas. Pike’s forces
being at Red river, they rather caught us with our breeches down, and in a fix.”296
While Douglas Cooper scraped together a force to challenge the enemy, Federal forces
finally began stretching their muscle, sending tendrils out into the countryside to ascertain the
both the dispositions of the enemy and the Cherokee government. On July 14, several hundred
troopers of the Sixth Kansas Cavalry under Major Campbell left the expedition’s camps to
ascertain the enemy’s position. Riding towards Fort Gibson, the Kansans clashed with enemy
pickets and drove them for several miles before finally reaching Fort Gibson as evening
approached. The small Confederate garrison fled in the face of the Kansan advance, and
Campbell was able to occupy Fort Gibson. As Campbell quickly discovered, however, Fort
Gibson was a hollow prize. The Confederate force instead occupied Fort Davis, a newly
constructed fortification ensconced across the river on the south bank of the Arkansas.
Interrogations of locals suggested the Rebels numbered 6,000-7,000 (a gross overestimation).
Joined by William Weer and the bulk of the Sixth Kansas overnight, the Kansan troops
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continued south on July 15, confirming a large Confederate presence at Fort Davis and
exchanging shots with pickets across the river. The Kansans’ reconnaissance indicated that the
Confederates were not planning on giving open battle, instead relying upon fortifications to
command the Arkansas River line and the territory south of it.297
As Major Campbell and William Weer probed Fort Gibson, another small detachment of
the Sixth Kansas descended on the Cherokee capital of Tahlequah, presumably to ascertain the
political situation of John Ross and the loyalties of the Cherokee people. Led by Captain Harris
Greeno and accompanied by 50 Cherokee Indians, the troopers reached Tahlequah on the night
of July 14 and took stock of the situation. Unfortunately, the town lay abandoned; “all had fled
several days previous to my arrival.” Determined to find out more, Greeno led his troopers to the
small village of Park Hill the next morning, where John Ross and many other prominent
Cherokee resided. Two hundred Cherokee Indians awaited them, ready to defect and join the
Union army. Apparently, their desire to defect stemmed in part from the recent murder of several
loyal Cherokee by Stand Watie’s Confederates.298
For John Ross, the hour of decision had arrived. He could bid for time no longer. Early
that morning, before the blue-clad column entered Park Hill, Ross had received a copy of a
proclamation from Colonel Douglas Cooper. Cooper declared that all able-bodied Cherokee men
between the ages of eighteen and thirty-five should report to Confederate authorities and repel
the invader. The Confederacy was calling. Perhaps to discuss Cooper’s proclamation, a number
of John Ross’ family, friends, and confidents—many of whom were officers in John Drew’s
nearly extinct Cherokee regiment—were present at Ross’ home that morning. The timing of
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Captain Greeno’s arrival, then, proved awkward. With the Confederacy demanding Cherokee
conscription, while Federal officers waited in his parlor, John Ross wavered. Appraising the
situation, Captain Greeno determined “to decide the matter for him [and] I made them all
prisoners of war.” Ross and his compatriots were then immediately paroled. It was a clever
solution to a thorny problem. By arresting and paroling Ross, Greeno provided the Cherokee
chief with a legitimate reason to ignore Cooper’s proclamation. Still, it was a momentous act.
The Cherokee government now submitted to Federal authority, and Ross anxiously appealed to
Greeno for United States troops to reestablish order within the Nation.299
The arrest and parole of John Ross—essentially, the defection of the Cherokee
government to the Union—constituted a major political coup for William Weer and the Indian
Expedition. The incessant rumors and reports of the past year were proving true; when the
Federal army arrived in force, hundreds of Cherokees defected en masse. To be sure, Stand
Watie and other pro-Confederate Cherokees remained in the field. The Federal invasion and
Cherokee defections in the summer of 1862 finally split Cherokee Nation asunder, throwing
them into intra-tribal civil war.
---
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Yet while Federal forces finally achieved a key political breakthrough within Cherokee
Nation, the logistical and morale situation within the Expedition’s camp deteriorated rapidly.
When Union soldiers wearily arrived at their camp on the Grand River after the long march
south, morale had sunk dangerously low. The sweltering sun was bad enough; the inconsistent
access to potable water seemed worse, especially since Union soldiers increasingly believed that
Weer’s cruelty and incompetence was partly responsible for their suffering. Reflecting on the
morale of the men, Ohioan Luman Tenney admitted to his diary, “I feared there would be a
mutiny, so many boys hadn’t water and weren’t permitted to leave the ranks to get any.” 300
The Expedition’s long stint at the Grand River encampment ensured a steady supply of
good water, but inactivity did little to improve morale. Union soldiers could not understand why
Weer made his men march “with great rapidity, regardless of the suffering of his men and their
increasing debility in this severe climate,” only to suddenly halt in the face of the enemy. One
soldier groused of “the vicinity of the enemy being sufficient to check [Weer’s] movements.”
Another trooper judged Weer’s “bump of combativeness is somewhat small.” Largely unaware
of the delicate political situation in Indian Territory, the Expedition’s soldiers could not grasp
why they stood idle.301
Further sapping morale was the men’s increasingly low opinion of their commander.
Weer’s proclivity to drink was an open secret around camp, and his seeming indifference to his
men’s deprivation incensed enlisted and officers alike. One Ohioan recalled that “Col. Weir, on
our journey down, was said to be drunk all the time, by his own rum.” Major Albert Ellithorpe
thought it “a terible [sic] state of affairs, when the lines of any army are placed in the hands of a
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worthless drunken officer.” A story ran through camp that Weer had scorned the need for a large
supply train, instead chiding that “good soldiers could live on a pint of corn a day, soaked in
water, and then use the water to drink.” As one trooper mocked, “Col. Weir likes his corn
extracted in a different manner.”302
The men’s disdain for their commander is evident in one Ohio trooper’s description of
their commander to a newspaper back home. “I saw the worthy General once, and only once,
and the following is a pretty correct sketch of his stylish appearance: He is probably some 5 feet,
8 or 10 inches in height, portly person, sandy, bloated complexion, long, uncombed, sandy hair
and whiskers. His costume consisted of a dirty white shirt, hanging half out, and lopping over a
pair of dilapidated regulation pants, while a pair of old slippers, down at the heel, completed his
wardrobe.”303
The Indian Expedition, then, was plagued by low morale, stemming first from the
scorching Southern sun and irregular access to water, followed by days of inactivity in the face
of the enemy and growing lack of confidence and discontent with their inebriate commander.
Two greater dangers, however, seemingly posed existential threats that pushed the unhappy
expeditionary forces into open mutiny.
The first danger from Confederate forces arrived not to the front but supposedly from the
rear. William Weer had always been sensitive about the possibility of Confederate raiders
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striking his left flank out of Arkansas and Missouri as he marched south. Sometime in mid-July,
this phantom threat seemed to materialize, as Weer “received reliable information that a large
force of the enemy were moving to our rear,” supposedly in the vicinity of the Verdigris River.
It’s unclear whether any Confederate force actually threatened the Union rear. Back at Fort Scott,
General James Blunt worried that General Hindman in Arkansas might be contemplating a strike
into Indian Territory, thus cutting off the Expedition’s supply route and avenue of retreat. Blunt
wrote to Weer on the subject, advising him to advance with caution. Yet Weer never received
Blunt’s warnings and had no knowledge of the threat Hindman posed. Hindman himself never
made a westward lunge anyways. Confederate Indian forces were known to be operating out of
Fort Davis, and Albert Pike’s command still occupied a position far to the south. In all
probability, there was no Confederate force on the Verdigris River at all. Rumors and false
reports spread like wildfire throughout the Civil War, often proving false. It is likely that Weer’s
intelligence, portending a phantom Confederate force poised to strike at the Expedition’s rear,
was faulty. Despite the imaginary threat, Weer nevertheless took the reports seriously and at face
value.304
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The second danger looming over the Expedition was an increasing shortage of food,
caused by scarcity of local provisions and a breakdown in supply lines and communication with
the Department of Kansas. By mid-July, the Indian Expedition occupied an advance position
within Cherokee Nation, encamped on the Grand River over 150 miles south of Fort Scott. The
countryside proved incapable of sustaining the Expedition’s forces. The landscape lay bare of
food or forage, and drought and Confederate arsonists burned the surrounding prairies. With no
proper forage, cavalry mounts grazed on ill-nourishing grass. Although Weer thought the
Cherokee country “completely conquered,” he could barely patrol it, as his horses were
malnourished, and slow-moving wagons accompanied every patrol to feed the men. The nearly
1,500 Cherokee defectors to the Union flag all need food and supplies, further straining the
Expedition’s logistics. Although the Expedition was enduring, its logistical situation was
undoubtedly strained.305
With little local food available, the Indian Expedition’s survival was tethered to its supply
train reaching back to Fort Schott Kansas. Given Expedition’s considerable distance from its
base of operations, combined with the possibility of attacks by Confederate raiders, Weer should
have kept in constant communication with his supply train and provided escorts. Unfortunately,
during Colonel Weer’s rapid advance south, he lost communication with his supply trains. On
July 14, the trains failed to arrive on schedule. Weer had not received any communication from
Kansas in nearly two weeks, and he had no idea why the supplies failed to arrive or where they
could be found. Several attempts to locate the trains via scouting parties failed. Perhaps Weer
began to wonder whether the Confederate force supposedly threatening his rear had something to
do with the train’s tardiness. In fact, the supply train was just fine, parked 75 miles to the north
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on the Grand River, waiting for a Union escort to guide them to the Expedition’s camps. Colonel
Weer’s failure to manage his supply lines thus imperiled the entire Expedition. By mid-July, the
7,000 man Indian Expedition possessed only three days’ rations and faced the prospect of slow
starvation. The atmosphere in camp grew tense.306
Sensing the magnitude of the strategic and logistical obstacles he faced, though
apparently unaware of the mounting morale problems among his men, on July 17, Colonel Weer
called together the Expedition’s unit commanders in a council of war. The Kansan commander
revealed the dire situation to his officers. The supply train was three days overdue, and none of
the three couriers sent out to locate the supplies had returned. The expedition only possessed
three more days’ rations, and the countryside was too barren to provide much sustenance.
Twelve days had passed since Weer’s last communication with the Department of Kansas.
Setting aside the ominous logistical situation, the Arkansas River had swollen and was now
impassable; the expedition could not strike against the enemy at Fort Davis. Worse, Weer
announced “he had received reliable information that a large force of the enemy were moving to
our rear via the Verdigris River for the purpose of cutting off our train.”307
The news landed like a bombshell among the expedition’s officers. The council
unanimously determined “that our only safety lay in falling back to some point where we could
reopen communication and learn the whereabouts of our train and subsistence.” William Weer
agreed with his officers, promising to write orders of march for a northerly retreat. After the
council departed, however, “the decision seemed to enrage him.” Weer angrily declared “he
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would never leave the presence of the enemy, but would see them all in h—l first.” Reversing
course, Weer determined to stay in his present location and ordered the entire expedition placed
on half rations. Col. Frederick Salomon desperately appealed for Weer to reconsider, but the
Kansan “refused utterly.” William Weer had made his decision.308
On the evening of July 18, the officers of the expedition gathered in their own private
council of war without William Weer. The officers agreed “one course was left for them, and
although grave as it was, a unanimous voice said it must be done.” The commander of every
expedition unit agreed that Weer must be deposed. “As next in command to Colonel Weer, and
upon his express refusal to move at all for the salvation of his troops,” Colonel Salomon
confessed, “I felt the responsibility resting upon me.309
Salomon ordered Weer’s arrest, and Captain Eckhart of the Ninth Wisconsin detained
Weer. While the officers confronted their commander, the soldiers of the expedition were roused.
There was some concern that the expedition’s Kansas troops, especially Norman Allen’s Kansas
Battery and Weer’s own Tenth Kansas Infantry, would balk at the mutiny underway and back
their Kansas colonel. Trooper Isaac Gause of the Second Ohio Cavalry recalled, “Everything in
camp was in motion. Some were getting their arms, and some running for the horses. The
infantry fell in with fixed bayonets; the batteries loaded with grape and canister, and muzzles
turned toward the first brigade.” Reluctantly, however, the Kansan soldiers backed down and
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acquiesced to the mutiny. The First Indian Expedition now rested in the hands of Colonel
Frederick Salomon.310
Having taken command, Colonel Salomon issued a proclamation to expedition’s
commanders explaining his actions. The document likely reflected Salomon’s understanding of
the gravity of his actions, and his desire to clearly identify his reasons for usurping William
Weer. “In military as well as civil affairs great and violent wrongs need speedy and certain
remedies,” Salomon began. “Some one must act, and that at once, or starvation and capture were
the imminent hazards that looked us in the face.” The Wisconsin colonel recounted the reasons
for the necessity of the mutiny: the long, fatiguing marches south, the “putrid, stinking water”
forced on the men, the disregard of William Weer for his men, the lack of communication with
Kansas, the lost supply train, and the dwindling food stores. “I have stood with arms folded and
seen my men faint and fall away from me like the leaves of autumn,” Salomon lamented,
“because I thought myself powerless to save them.” Salomon ended his proclamation by
assuming responsibility for the affair and asking for the men’s patience and support.311
Salomon hardly needed to ask for the backing of the expedition’s enlisted men. In a letter
home, one Ohio soldier admitted, “The whole command was in ecstacies [sic] over the deposing
of the old vagabond, and Colonel Salomon was the delight and admiration of both officers and
soldiers.” In his diary, Luman Tenney summed it up nicely: “All were glad.” Major Hermann
Schlueter recorded similar sentiments, with one significant caveat, “All in good spirits again,
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except Col. Weir and 10 Kansas.” Although the Kansans submitted to the mutiny, some
remained unhappy with the embarrassing turn of events.312
The mutiny of the First Indian Expedition originated from a peculiar source. Unlike most
Civil War mutinies, the revolt emanated first not with enlisted volunteers but instead among the
expedition’s officers. The July 17 council of war looms large in the narrative of events. Had
Weer submitted to the council’s unanimous decision to retreat, the crisis may have been avoided.
But Weer’s final refusal to defer to the council sealed his fate. Officers deemed one of their peers
dangerously incompetent and agreed to remove him.313
While officers provided the first mutinous spark, however, the soldiers of the expedition
proved willing to stoke the flame. Support from the expedition’s enlisted ranks was vital to the
success of the whole affair. For the takeover to succeed, William Weer needed to be arrested,
dissenting Kansans needed to be quelled, and soldiers needed to be willing to submit to Colonel
Salomon’s authority. All of these things came to pass because the men of the expedition willed
it. Enduring extraordinary heat, unclean water, and limited provisions, the Expedition’s soldiers
suffered. Yet soldiers expected harsh conditions in field service. It was William Weer’s callous,
inebriated, incompetence that made soldiers’ suffering needless. In this aspect, the mutiny
reflected a prevailing sense of soldiers’ rights held by many volunteers. Forced to endure heat,
lack of water, harsh discipline, a drunken commander, and finally ten days of inactivity along the
Grand River, the expedition’s enlisted ranks believed that Colonel William Weer violated their
basic rights as soldiers. Once Weer violated this social contract, soldiers no longer felt bound to
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respect his martial authority. Thus, when Weer was arrested by Salomon, most of the
expedition’s soldiers were “in ecstacies.”314
Having assumed command of the Indian Expedition, Col. Salomon wasted no time in
taking action. At 2 o’clock on the morning of July 19, Union soldiers abandoned their camp on
the Grand River and began retreating north. Salomon left behind the three Indian Home Guard
regiments “as a corps of observation” to hold the countryside north of the Arkansas River, while
the main expedition retreated north to reestablish communication with the supply train and
Kansas.315
Throughout the entire mutiny, the Indian Home Guard regiments slept soundly in their
own camps nearby. Unaware of the dramatic turn of events, they awoke early on the morning of
July 19th to the unpleasant discovery that they were alone, with “but meager verbal and indefinite
orders or instructions from Colonel Salomon.” The commanders of the Indian units, “finding
themselves in the condition in which they were left and confusion among the rank and file of
their respective regiments,” agreed to coordinate and operate as a brigade, with Colonel Robert
Furnas of Nebraska as the overall commander. Despite the officers’ attempts to established
order, the sudden retreat of the bulk of the Indian Expedition unsurprisingly demoralized Native
American soldiers, and bouts of desertion afflicted the Indian regiments over the coming days.316
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The retreat of the Indian Expedition didn’t just worry natives in the Federal ranks, but
likewise provoked consternation and fear among Unionist Indians and refugees generally. Indian
Agents Edwin Carruth and H. Martin wrote to General Blunt, “We beg of you in behalf of the
Cherokee Nation, especially that portion of it, whites and Indians, who have for months slept in
thickets and cane, to do something speedily to arrest the desolation that will follow the shameful
retreat of our army.” The agents prophesied that if the Federal retreat continued, “the families of
the men who have flocked to the Union standard will be ruthlessly murdered.” “They ought to
have, they deserve,” the agents thundered, “protection, and we humbly pray that you will extend
such help as speedily as possible.” If the Union again abandoned Indian Territory, Unionist
Indians—both refugees who accompanied the expedition south and those who emerged from
hiding upon its arrival—would be vulnerable.317
--The July 18 mutiny sparked a precipitous retreat northward, but it didn’t quite end the
Indian Expedition. Instead, over the next few weeks Colonel Salomon tried to retain Union
influence over Cherokee Nation north of the Arkansas River, while simultaneously keeping most
of the expedition’s forces posted on the Kansas line. It was a half-in, half-out approach that
couldn’t accomplish what the expedition intended.
On July 19, the long-lost supply train was located at Hudson’s Crossing on the Grand
River. Colonel Salomon elected to station the expedition near that location, believing it offered
strategic and logistical value, particularly “ample grazing and good water.” One can sense
Salomon’s careful accounting of environmental factors when selecting his campsite, dubbed
“Camp Quapaw.” The camp was only a few miles from the Kansas state line. Salomon
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studiously avoided Weer’s mistakes and established clear lines of communication and supply
stretching from Kansas to Camp Quapaw and down the Indian brigade’s observation post along
the Arkansas River. Union patrols scoured the countryside. “Tahlequah, Fort Gibson, the upper
crossings of the Arkansas, and other points of importance” were occupied, and the expedition’s
health and morale improved. Although Colonel Salomon worried about the possibility of a strike
on his flank out of Arkansas or Missouri, all seemed well. From his advanced position with the
Indian Brigade along the Arkansas River, Colonel Furnas stated “we can hold our present
position, and keep the enemy on the other side of the Arkansas, we have no doubt.”318
Colonel Furnas’ declaration proved hasty. While Furnas’ Indian “corps of observation”
was strong enough to occupy Cherokee Nation, its advanced position left it dangerously exposed
to Cooper’s Confederates. Colonel Salomon’s force, now 70-80 miles north, was out of
supporting distance. By late-July, Douglas Cooper grew increasingly confident and ordered
several Rebel regiments to probe north of the Arkansas River, including Stand Watie’s 2 nd
Cherokee Mounted Rifles, who quickly struck out for Park Hill “intending to punish John Ross
and the Union people of that vicinity.” Watie’s forces, however, were intercepted at Bayou
Bernard, a crossroads just seven miles east of Fort Gibson, on July 27 by Union Indians under
Major William Phillips. A sharp clash ensued, and Watie’s Cherokees were driven back with
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considerable cost. Although a Federal victory, the fight at Bayou Bernard indicated that Cooper
was increasingly restless and aggressive. As Indian Agents Carruth and Martin confessed,
“Times were getting dangerous; the enemy…having got knowledge of the retreat of our white
troops.” Stretched thin by occupation duties and Rebel raids, and soon facing food shortages of
his own, Furnas’ command fell back towards the Kansas line.319
Although Colonel Frederick Salomon’s actions in the wake of the July 18 mutiny perhaps
saved the expedition from dire logistic and strategic straits along the Grand River, his retreat
north weakened the Union’s hold on northern Indian Territory and left the major Confederate
force in the region intact. Holding the region north of the Arkansas River was not enough to
allow many of the refugees to return home. In short, the mutiny and Salomon’s retreat ensured
that the First Indian Expedition would accomplish neither of its two goals: Federal authority was
not reasserted over the Five Tribes, nor could the majority of the Indian refugees return home.
While Cooper’s raids in late July forced the retreat of the Indian Brigade under Colonel
Furnas, newly-promoted Brigadier General Salomon learned that the murky Confederate threat
to the east, long a cause of anxiety for Weer and Salomon alike, finally materialized. By late
July, ominous reports of large concentrations of guerrillas in Arkansas began circulating among
Federal commanders in Missouri. In early August, these disparate Confederate commands burst
forth not into Indian Territory, but instead into southwest Missouri. Meager Union forces in the
region were overwhelmed, and several Union garrisons and towns were swallowed up by the
sudden invasion. The early August uprising in Missouri ended any possibility of the Indian
Expedition marching back south to challenge General Cooper’s Confederates. The expedition

319

Reports of Major William A. Phillips, July 27 and August 6, 1862, Official Records 13, 181-183; E.H.
Carruth and H.W. Martin to William G. Coffin, August 2, 1862, Annual Report of the Superintendent of Indian
Affairs, 162-164.

200

constituted the largest Union force in the region, and in a choice between Indian Territory or
Kansas and Missouri, Federal authorities made their preferences clear. Fort Scott must be
defended, and the Confederates driven back. With a crisis brewing, Colonel Salomon marched
much of the expedition’s forces back to Fort Scott in early August. The remainder of the
expedition soon followed suit. By the end of August, not a single Federal soldier occupied Indian
Territory; once again, the Union abandoned Indian Territory.320
Looking back over their expeditionary travails of the past month, many frustrated Union
soldiers believed their time in Indian Territory had been pointless. “As you perhaps already
know, the ‘Grand Indian Expedition’ has proved a failure,” opined one Ohio trooper, “no good
whatever being accomplished, and the whole thing being but an immense expense from which
the Government derived no possible benefit.” Many espoused the idea that the whole expedition
existed simply “for the caprices of Kansas politicians, and the whims of Kansas contractors.”
Private William Wildman angrily declared, “Kansas may go to thunder, for all I care, they can’t
talk ‘Bleeding Kansas to me.’ I have had enough of it.”321
While enlisted soldiers harped on the expedition’s seemingly superfluous nature, the
importance of the expedition and the real costs of its failure were evident in the thousands of
Union Indians whose lives were disastrously and, with the expedition’s failure, meaninglessly
uprooted. For the hundreds of Union refugees who accompanied the expedition south expecting
to return home and plant crops, the expedition’s failure meant another winter spent shivering in

320

John Schofield to J.C. Kelton, July 26, 1862, Official Records 13, 513-514; Richard Brownlee, Gray
Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865 (1958; repr., Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1985), 76-79, 92-97; Matt Matthews and Kip Lundberg, “Shot All to Pieces: The Battle of Lone
Jack, Missouri, August 16, 1862,” North and South vol. 7, no. 1 (January, 2004): 58-60; Frederick Salomon to
James Blunt, August 9, 1862, and Thomas Moonlight, “General Orders No. 4,” Official Records 13, 551-552, 595.
321
“The Condition of the Second Cavalry,” Cleveland Morning Leader, September 2, 1862; “From the 2d
Ohio Cavalry,” Cleveland Morning Leader, August 5, 1862; “From the 2d Cavalry,” Western Reserve Chronicle,
August 20, 1862.

201

Kansas refugee camps. For the thousands of Unionist Indians who emerged from hiding upon the
expedition’s approach, they faced reprisals or the prospect of becoming refugees themselves.
Given the intense heat and accompanying drought that summer, many Indians left their homes in
search of food. On July 25, Indian Agents Carruth and Martin reported from Cherokee Nation
that, “even now, while I write, women and children, with every imaginable means of
conveyance, are passing the house on their way to find the protection and bread their own
country cannot give.” In the wake of the Union army’s retreat, faced with prospect of
Confederate reprisals and withering crops, nearly 1,500 fresh Cherokee refugees accompanied
the expedition back into Kansas. Not only did the Indian Expedition fail to permanently liberate
Indian Territory or return the refugees to their homes, it actually exacerbated the refugee crisis
back in Kansas.322
From its outset, the First Indian Expedition faced severe environmental and leadership
obstacles that ultimately undermined its ability to accomplish its objectives. Its tardy launch in
early July, the product of political wrangling and continual leadership changes, gave the
expedition only a tight window in which to accomplish its objectives of securing Indian Territory
for the Union and allowing refugees to return home in time to plant crops for the winter. In their
rapid advance south, Union soldiers endured long marches under extraordinary heat, while
simultaneously suffering from a lack of clean water. While Colonel William Weer couldn’t
control the sun, he could control the pace of march and where his forces encamped. His
carelessness in regard to both speaks to poor leadership in the face of a harsh environment; his
men suffered for it, and morale sank.
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The Indian Expedition’s rapid advance is all the more baffling given Weer’s long
encampment on the Grand River in the face of the enemy. Had Weer advanced promptly across
the Arkansas River and defeated the much smaller Confederate force stationed at Fort Davis, the
expedition would have gone a long way towards driving the Confederates from the Territory.
Such an advance would have also opened up Creek and Seminole Nations for liberation, from
whence most of the native refugees hailed. A decisive victory over Rebel forces likely would’ve
driven even more Cherokees into the Union fold, and perhaps hastened John Ross’ defection.
Instead, Weer lingered for ten days along the Grand River, having lost communication with his
supply lines and allowing the Arkansas River to rise to impassible heights. Perhaps Weer’s welldocumented intemperate habits (even in the face of battle!) addled his decision-making process.
Regardless, all of these factors: the harsh environment, lack of water, sinking morale, inactivity
in the face of the enemy, Weer’s inebriation, and a deteriorating supply situation resulted in
mutiny.
The July 18 mutiny and subsequent retreat north marked the turning point for the
expedition. Although the Union command remained in Indian Territory for several more weeks
under Colonel Salomon’s leadership, the retreat of the expedition’s forces nearly to Kansas
weakened the Federals’ hold over Indian Territory and indicated that the Confederate presence
south of the Arkansas River would go unchallenged. Colonel Cooper’s increasing belligerence in
late July and the guerrilla uprising in southwest Missouri in August were merely the final blows
to the Indian Expedition, forcing Union troops to finally abandon Indian Territory yet again.
Thus, Union authorities needed to repeat the whole process in 1863; once again mounting
another expedition meant to liberate Indian Territory and return the refugees to their homes.
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“The Indians Are Not Cared For”:
Cabin Creek, Honey Springs, and the Failure of the Confederate-Indian Alliances
“All believe that one fact develops itself, and that is, that the Indians are not cared for, and that the Confederate
States are throwing them off to shift for themselves as best they can, contrary to the Treaty which provides
protection and pledges itself to keep out all intruders.”
—Cherokee Reverend Stephen Foreman, August 12, 1863323

--Colonel Thomas Bass stood by the riverbank and wept. A private moment of anguish, the
tearful colonel of the 20th Texas Cavalry was discovered by David Dumas, a nineteen year old
private of the 5th Texas Partisan Rangers. The two men’s regiments had stood together in the
maelstrom of battle the day before. Breaking the colonel’s solitude, David inquired as to what
was wrong. “David,” the colonel replied, “I have lost nearly all my brave boys and I feel as if my
heart will break. I had to see them fall like dead leaves from a tree without any support to offer
them.” Struck by the colonel’s emotion, Private Dumas “joined in the weeping, for among the
dead were many I had known and loved.” So the thirty-three year old colonel and nineteen year
old private cried together on the banks of the Canadian River. It was July 18, 1863, and the day
previous the Texans and their Indian allies fought and lost the Battle of Honey Springs.324
The largest battle fought in Indian Territory during the Civil War, the Battle of Honey
Springs marked the crescendo of the Union’s second invasion of Indian Territory, a military
venture which fared far better than its ill-fated predecessor. Weathering Confederate attempts to
oust them from the Territory, Federal forces garnered decisive victories at Cabin Creek and
Honey Springs that offered the Union permanent, if at times tenuous, control of Indian Territory
north of the Arkansas River. In the weeks following the engagements, blue-clad soldiers
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penetrated south of the Arkansas River into Choctaw Nations for the first time, resulting in the
fall of Fort Smith, Arkansas. By the autumn of 1863, the strategic situation in Indian Territory
and the wider Trans-Mississippi shifted permanently in favor of the Union.
Certainly the Federals played a decisive role in liberating northern Indian Territory that
summer. The bold, aggressive leadership of Union General James Blunt and his subordinates
Colonels William Phillips and William Cloud stands in stark contrast to the mediocre
generalship of Douglas Cooper and William Steele. Union soldiers, including whites, Native
Americans, and African-American, displayed great bravery and combat effectiveness in the field.
Refusing to repeat the mistakes of the summer previous, the Federals devoted much time and
energy to keeping their supply lines open, ensuring Union soldiers were well-armed, well-fed,
and amply supplied.
Yet the greatest determinant in Confederate defeats at Cabin Creek, Honey Springs, and
elsewhere was the inability and unwillingness of the Confederate States to fulfill its treaty
obligations to their Indian allies. Indian and Texan troops in the Territory suffered from a lack of
small arms, artillery, ammunition, clothing, equipment, wagons and the other sundry but vital
materials necessary to waging war. Arkansan reinforcements sent to the Territory’s defense
proved worthless: under-strength, demoralized, and ill-disciplined. The failure of the
Confederacy to uphold its treaty obligations stemmed not only from the serious material
shortages that plagued the Trans-Mississippi Department, but also from the racial prejudices of
white Confederates who increasingly viewed their Indian allies as militarily and racially inferior.
Despondent at a string of defeats and increasingly convinced the Confederacy had abandoned
them, Confederate Indians determined to rely upon each other in hopes of saving their respective
nations from Union occupation.
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Although the Confederacy worked hard to pull the Five Tribes into Confederate orbit in
1861, they ultimately failed to fulfill those alliances, failures that came to bitter fruition in 1863.
While Confederate leaders may have dreamed of a sprawling slave empire whose tendrils
stretched deep into the Trans-Mississippi, including control of Indian Territory, in reality
shortages of arms, ammunition, supplies, and manpower and racial prejudice meant that the
Confederacy routinely prioritized the security of the Confederacy they had—Arkansas, Texas,
Missouri—over the Confederacy of their dreams. The results proved disastrous for Indian
Territory.
--The Confederate resurgence of the previous August—the same uprising that forced the
Indian Expedition to retreat to Kansas—grew to even more dangerous proportions in September.
General Hindman, desperate to scrape together an army with which to challenge Union control
of northwestern Arkansas and southwestern Missouri, ordered various Confederate officers to
ride into Missouri and fill their ranks with fresh recruits. After minor victories at Lone Jack and
Independence in August, Rebel ranks swelled. With the Federal presence in Indian Territory
gone, General Hindman ordered Douglas Cooper to take his Indian Brigade along with a newly
arrived Texas cavalry into southwestern Missouri to join the growing Confederate presence
there. General Blunt’s forces in Kansas were likewise drawn to the region, including brigades
under the disgraced yet still commanding Colonel William Weer and freshly-promoted Brigadier
General Frederick Salomon. Somewhat ironically, the long-expected clash that never emerged in
Indian Territory in July now arrived in southwestern Missouri in September.325
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On September 30, 1862, a small Federal detachment reconnoitered in the direction of
Newtonia, Missouri. Discovering the town occupied by a similarly-sized Confederate garrison,
the Federal troops attacked the town. For nearly the next ten hours, what began as a simple
scouting expedition mushroomed into a substantial, see-saw battle involving approximately
4,500 Federals and 5,000-6,000 Confederates. After initial early morning clashes, General
Cooper arrived to take command in person, bringing along his own First Choctaw and
Chickasaw Mounted Rifles led by Lieutenant Colonel Tandy Walker. The Choctaws and
Chickasaws looked forward to the fray, “singing their war-songs and giving the war-whoop”;
they faced their first serious taste of combat since fighting Opothleyahola at Chustenahlah nearly
a year prior. The Rebel Indians were ready and made a dashing charge on the Union flank and
“put them to flight.” Confederate fortunes continued to prevail, and by noon the Southerners
firmly held the field.326
Yet the fight was far from over. General Salomon soon arrived on the field, and
throughout the afternoon battle was again joined. More Native American soldiers on both sides
faced the elephant for the first time and were given chances to prove themselves on the field of
battle. Around four o’clock, the haggard troopers of the First Choctaw Regiment under Col.
Sampson Folsom arrived on the after a thirty-five mile ride that morning. Folsom’s Choctaws
swooped down on the Federal line, supported by Walker’s Choctaws and Chickasaws. Their foe
during the ensuing clash was none other than the Third Indian Home Guard, Colonel William
Phillips commanding. Native Americans in both blue and gray battled each other as the sun sank
in the sky. Watching the battle unfold in front of him, Douglas Cooper admitted, “The booming
of cannon, the bursting of shells, the rattling crash of small arms, the cheering of our men, and
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the war-whoop of our Indian allies, all combined to render the scene both grand and terrific.”
After a full day’s fight, the outnumbered Federals retreated, leaving the Confederates in
command of the battlefield and Douglas Cooper with perhaps his finest victory of the war. The
Battle of Newtonia earned laurels for both Union and Confederate Native American troops.
Frederick Salomon praised the conduct of the Third Indian Home Guard; Douglas Cooper
likewise complimented his command for their “bravery and coolness” and paid particular thanks
to Lt. Col. Tandy Walker. The Rebel victory, however, proved hollow. Reinforcements under
Generals Blunt and Schofield arrived in the vicinity of Newtonia within a week, forcing the
Rebels to slink back to Arkansas and abandon their Missouri foothold.327
Both Blunt and Schofield proved anxious to pursue the fleeing foe. They marched into
Northwestern Arkansas in mid-October, camping near the old Pea Ridge battlefield. At this time,
Union forces in the region were reorganized into the Army of the Frontier under General
Schofield. General Blunt assumed command of the First Division (often called the “Kansas
Division”), comprised of three brigades under Brig. Gen. Frederick Salomon, Col. William
Weer, and Col. William F. Cloud. The division contained many veterans of the First Indian
Expedition, including all three Indian Home Guard regiments. Blunt and Schofield agreed to
pursue the enemy, and Blunt’s division was tasked with tracking down the Rebel contingent
under Col. Douglas Cooper which had disappeared back into Indian Territory. On October 20,
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Blunt led his forces towards the Arkansas-Territory line in pursuit of the Confederates and within
two days closed with his enemy.328
The Confederates under Douglas Cooper were encamped just inside Cherokee Nation on
Beattie’s Prairie near Old Fort Wayne, a long-abandoned military post hailing from the 1830s.
Cooper had been given orders to assemble his Indians for a raid into Kansas, a questionable
endeavor that if executed would likely have left Cooper in danger of being cut off from Indian
Territory. Delays in gathering his troops, however, hindered the proposed expedition, and
Cooper’s command only mustered some 1,500 men, including Col. Sampson Folsom’s First
Choctaw and Chickasaw Rifles, Col. Stand Watie’s First Cherokee Rifles, Col. Daniel
McIntosh’s First Creek Regiment, and Lt. Col. Chilly McIntosh’s Creek battalion. Also present
was an invaluable wagon train containing over 10,000 pounds of gunpowder. 329
Although James Blunt commanded far more men than his Confederate counterpart as he
approached Beattie’s Prairie on the morning of October 22, his dogged pursuit of the enemy and
poor management caused much of his command to fall behind. Indeed, less than 600 men of the
Second Kansas Cavalry accompanied Blunt as he advanced on the enemy’s camp. Undeterred by
his force’s size, confident in the impending arrival of reinforcements, and aggressive by nature,
Blunt attacked Cooper anyway. As one officer admired, Blunt’s decision was in “the most
approved Western style.” Hoping to pin the Confederates in place, Blunt ordered the Second
Kansas Cavalry to dismount and, supported by two mountain howitzers of the First Kansas
Battery, the Jayhawkers engaged the enemy in a sharp firefight at two hundred yards. Although
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the Confederates’ numbers soon threatened the Federal flanks, the timely arrival of the Sixth
Kansas Cavalry and Third Indian Home Guard bolstered the Union line.330
As the momentum began to shift, Captain Samuel Crawford led several hundred troopers
of twin Kansas regiments forward in a “gallant charge, driving in [the Confederate] center,
capturing their artillery, and bringing it in triumph from the field.” As the Rebels reeled from the
stunning assault, more Federal units arrived and the Rebels beat a hasty retreat. Stand Watie’s
Cherokees and Daniel McIntosh’s Creeks performed a smart rearguard action, fending off the
Sixth Kansas and Third Indian in a running seven-mile fight that ended only when Union horses
began to give out. Although the Rebels managed to escape the battlefield with their baggage train
intact, they left behind a captured three-gun battery and their pride on the field at Beattie’s
Prairie. The Union suffered five killed and five wounded; the Confederates reported three killed,
twenty-five wounded, and thirty-five missing.331
The skirmish at Old Fort Wayne was an embarrassing debacle for Cooper and the
Confederacy. Despite enjoying superior numbers and a defensive position, Cooper’s forces
nevertheless broke in the face of a smaller, yet more determined foe. Given how precious
artillery was for Confederate commanders in Indian Territory throughout the war, the loss of
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three guns was disastrous. Even worse was the sinking morale of Confederate Indians, who felt
“abandoned by their white brethren.” As with Pea Ridge in March, once again the Confederacy
ignored their treaties with the Five Tribes and had called them to service outside of Indian
Territory. Although Douglas Cooper and the Confederate Indians turned in a solid performance
at Newtonia, their victory was quickly marred by the defeat at Old Fort Wayne. While white
forces retreated further into Arkansas towards Van Buren and Fort Smith, Cooper took his
battered Indian command, destitute of clothing and demoralized, all the way back to Fort Davis
on the south-side of the Arkansas River. In doing so, they left Cherokee Nation north of Indian
Territory open for Federal invasion.332
By the end of October, the Confederate threat on Missouri had dissipated. General
Cooper’s force retreated deep into Indian Territory, and General Hindman’s army—
grandiloquently styled the First Corps of the Army of the Trans-Mississippi—withdrew behind
the shield of the Boston Mountains. Although Schofield and Blunt briefly contemplated allowing
Blunt’s Kansas Division to reoccupy Indian Territory and allow the Indian troops “to re-establish
themselves and their families,” the proposal was deemed too risky given that Hindman’s army
still lurked in western Arkansas. Thus, everything seemed to settle down for the winter and
Schofield moved back into Missouri with the bulk of the Army of the Frontier. James Blunt’s
Kansas Division remained in Northwest Arkansas to secure the Union’s presence in the area and
keep a watchful eye on the Boston Mountains to the south.333
Blunt nevertheless kept an interest in Indian Territory. In late October, he sent Colonel
William Phillips, commander of the Third Indian Home Guard and a rising star after strong
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performances at Bayou Menard and Newtonia, on a reconnaissance patrol into Indian Territory.
Phillips’s small command ventured all the way to Fort Gibson and back. Their findings seemed
fruitful. Indian faith in the Confederacy was sputtering, and yet more Native recruits bolstered
the Federal ranks. “Everything looks favorable in the Indian Territory if our advantages are
followed up,” Blunt optimistically reported. “It is all-important to occupy the Indian country as
far south as the Arkansas River.” Despite his position in Arkansas, James Blunt seems never to
have forgotten the failure of the First Indian Expedition, or the debt of the Federal government to
restore order and return the Loyal Indians to their homes.334
Just as the Confederacy violated their agreements in calling their Indian allies to service
beyond Indian Territory’s bounds, the Indian Home Guards likewise grew restless at their posts
within the Army of the Frontier. Unsurprisingly, discipline eroded as Indians slipped away from
their regiments to visit their families in the refugee camps in Kansas or to scout around Indian
Territory. Major Albert Ellithorpe blamed Opothleyahola for interfering with army affairs.
“Opothlesholan [sic] in his policy to distract the Indian Soldier from his obedience to the
commands of the Government is unquestionably rendering to the enemy the most signal aid.”
Ellithorpe wrote to Creek leaders around Leroy asking that “every man who was enlisted as a
soldier shall at once return to his command.” These issues were reflective of mounting Indian
frustrations. For over a year, Unionist Indians received endless promises of the liberation of their
country, and three full Indian Home Guard regiments were raised and equipped for the purpose.
Yet the First Indian Expedition proved a failure, and the Indian Home Guard was protecting
Arkansas. Although Blunt, Schofield, and others remained aware of the need to liberate Indian
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Territory, Native Americans were learning that other priorities in Missouri and Arkansas came
first.335
The Federals’ assumption that winter brought a halt to campaigning proved incorrect. In
fact, Schofield’s withdrawal of most of the Army of the Frontier left James Blunt’s Kansas
Division dangerously exposed in Northwest Arkansas. Although warned about his precarious
position, Blunt nevertheless decided to remain in region, another questionably bold decision in a
string of questionably bold decisions that were becoming the hallmark of Blunt’s campaign style.
Realizing that a Federal division lay isolated to his north, Thomas Hindman sensed an
opportunity and struck. In November, a division of Confederate cavalry led by Gen. John
Marmaduke left the security of the Boston Mountains and scouted north towards Cane Hill.
Marmaduke opined to Hindman that “I believe you can capture this force, if you can move
secretly and with celerity.” Marmaduke’s reports further convinced Hindman that the time was
ripe to undertake a winter offensive. General Hindman’s plan called for Marmaduke’s cavalry to
keep Blunt’s attention to the south, while the three divisions of Hindman’s First Corps swung
around the flank of the unsuspecting Kansas Division and struck from the rear.336
The Rebels’ offensive went awry almost immediately. Rather than allowing Marmaduke
to pin his division in place, Blunt attacked Marmaduke’s cavalry at Cane Hill on November 24.
In a sharp engagement, the Kansas Division—including the Indian Home Guard regiments—
decisively defeated Marmaduke’s cavalry. The clash at Cane Hill shaped the campaign is several
important ways. First, in taking the offensive, the Blunt’s division was pulled even further
south—more isolated than ever. Second, Marmaduke’s repulse should’ve been a red flag to
Hindman, an indication both of Blunt’s aggression and Marmaduke’s inability to keep the enemy
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pinned in place. Finally, after Cane Hill, Blunt grew wary of the possibility of further
Confederate attack, eventually calling on the division of Francis Herron to hurry south from
Missouri to join the Kansas Division.
Despite the defeat at Cane Hill, Hindman stuck to his plans and marched northward in
hopes of outflanking Blunt. Although Hindman successfully outmaneuvered his foe, he also
learned that Herron’s division was approaching from the north. Effectively positioned in between
two Union divisions with three of his own, Hindman made a final commitment to battle. The
aggressive Southerner hoped to defeat the enemy in detail, electing to strike at Herron’s division
first and then turning to finish off the trapped Kansas Division to the south. On December 7,
Hindman’s Confederate Army of the Trans-Mississippi attacked Francis Herron’s division of the
Army of the Frontier at Prairie Grove. Hearing cannons’ roar to his north, Blunt’s Kansas
Division quickly marched to the sound of the guns, hoping to arrive in time to unite with
Herron’s men and defeat the enemy. Desperate, deadly frontal assaults by Hindman and Herron
at Prairie Grove failed to dislodge either foe; such a stalemate inherently benefitted the Federals,
for with every passing moment, Blunt’s division inched nearer.
In the afternoon, the much-looked-for Kansas Division arrived and linked up with
Herron’s battered division. Once again, the Federals and Confederates exchanged heavy blows.
Included in the fierce afternoon fighting was the First Indian Home Guard, who performed well
under heavy fire during a front assault against the Confederate flank. As the sun set, the tired
blue and gray clad lines eyed each other warily across the fields of Prairie Grove. After a day of
brutal fighting, the Federals suffered approximately 1,251 casualties compared to 1,483
Confederates; neither side had gained an appreciable tactical advantage. Faced with a tactical
stalemate, the Confederates’ inability to defeat the enemy in detail left General Hindman no
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choice but to retreat south. The Battle of Prairie Grove shattered Confederate designs on
Missouri, opened Arkansas for invasion once again, and left the Army of the Frontier free to take
the field south in the spring.337
Collectively, the battles of Newtonia, Old Fort Wayne, and Prairie Grove influenced both
the course of the war in the Trans-Mississippi and provided invaluable combat experience to
many Native American regiments and their commanders. The Confederate defeat at Prairie
Grove permanently shifted the war south and paved the way for a second expedition into Indian
Territory. Both the Federal Indian Home Guard and Confederate Indian Brigade saw meaningful
combat during the campaigns; the Indian Home Guard garnered laurels, while their Confederate
counterparts turned in mixed-performances. For Douglas Cooper, these autumn clashes offered
both a well-earned victory at Newtonia and an embarrassing defeat at Old Fort Wayne. James
Blunt’s victories at Old Fort Wayne and especially Prairie Grove marked him as an aggressive,
confident commander on the rise. These two men and their Native American commands would
soon clash again in the summer of 1863.
--In early January, 1863, forty-four year old Brigadier General William Steele arrived in
Fort Smith, Arkansas. Possessing a slender face with heavy mustaches, Steele enjoyed an
admirable pedigree that suggested he could succeed in the struggling Department of Indian
Territory. A West Point graduate and Mexican War veteran, Steele commanded the 7th Texas
Cavalry during the ill-fated New Mexico Campaign in the spring of 1862, followed by a stint of
service in the Western Theater and promotion to brigadier general. With the tumultuous ouster of
Albert Pike from command of the Department of Indian Territory in the summer of 1862, Steele
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was tapped to replace Pike and assumed command of the department in January. Despite being
warned by General Hindman of the “exhausted condition of the country,” Steele was
nevertheless dismayed by the “gloomy” demoralization and destitution of his new command.
Over the next few months, Steele worked to overcome the logistical, morale, and manpower
difficulties faced by his command. The destitution of the Confederate Department of Indian
Territory in 1863 underscores the inability of the Confederacy to fulfill its material promises to
the Five Tribes and its prioritization of nearby Confederate regions over Indian Territory.338
On paper, Steele commanded nearly a division of Confederate soldiers. Colonel Douglas
Cooper’s Indian Brigade reportedly contained 6,000 men, occupying Fort Davis and the
Arkansas River line. Two regiments of Confederate cavalry, the First Arkansas Cavalry
(Monroe’s) and the First Texas Partisan Rangers, reported to Steele from Fort Smith. Also
attached to the department was a brigade of dismounted Texas cavalry and infantry under the
command of Col. Joseph Speight. In reality, these regiments were riddled with sickness, low
morale, and a lack of supplies. The Arkansas and Texas regiments in Fort Smith could only
muster 150 men fit for duty combined. Cooper’s Indians were bereft of supplies and increasingly
faithless in the Confederacy after the disaster at Old Fort Wayne. The Texas brigade also
suffered from a lack of supplies, regular desertion, and harbored considerable anger over having
been dismounted prior to the Battle of Prairie Grove.339

338

Ezra J. Warner, Generals in Gray: Lives of Confederate Commanders (1959, repr., Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1994), 41-42; “Report of Brig. Gen. William Steele,” February 15, 1864, Official
Records vol. 22:1, pgs. 28-36.
339
“Report of Brig. Gen. William Steele,” February 15, 1864, Official Records vol. 22:1, pgs. 28-36; Ralph
A. Wooster, Lone Star Regiments in Gray (Fort Worth, TX: Eakin Press, 2002), 247-252, 279-281; Alywn Barr,
Polignac’s Texas Brigade (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998), 1-8. Speight’s brigade was
comprised of the 22nd Texas Cavalry (Col. Robert Taylor), 31st Texas Cavalry (Col. Trezevant Hawpe), 34th Texas
Cavalry (Col. Almerine Alexander), and the Fifteenth Texas Infantry (Col. Joseph W. Speight). Also attached to the
brigade for a time was the 20th Texas Cavalry (Thomas Bass). The 29th, 22nd, 31st, and 34th Texas Cavalry regiments
hailed primarily from northern and eastern Texas, including many counties that had opposed secession. Rumors
swirled that many of the Texans harbored Unionist sentiments. Some of the Texans believed they were only to be

216

If the department’s manpower was deceptive, the logistical situation proved absolutely
dire. The various commands under William Steele lacked uniforms, arms, ammunition, and
wagons. Douglas Cooper reported his Indian troops were “almost destitute of clothing; miserably
equipped in all respects; poorly armed (many of them without arms).” Private Dallas Bowman, a
trooper in Cooper’s 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles, admitted to his uncle that “Our
horses have all died up from starvation…What few horses we have left was sent off to Fort
Washitaw, where they can get corn for them.” The First Texas Partisan Rangers possessed “not a
change of clothing nor an average of a blanket to the man.” Soldiers toted firearms either
obsolete or in disrepair. The Territory’s quartermaster and commissary departments were “were
found in the utmost confusion.” Desperate to improve the situation, Steele established workshops
to repair wagons and guns. Steele also placed “repeated requisitions” for arms and ammunitions,
pleas answered only by silence. Taking matters into his own hands, Steele sent officers down
into Texas to secure arms and ammunition and managed to secure 500 guns and a supply of
ammunition from San Antonio. These guns, procured only through Steele’s own initiative, were
“the only arms brought into the Territory” in 1863—Steele, Indian Territory, and its Native
American denizens were left to fend for themselves.340
The complete lack of provisions and forage proved to be the most critical logistical
shortfall, one that made General Steele’s orders nearly impossible to carry out. Upon taking
command of Indian Territory, Steele was tasked by General Hindman with holding the “line of
the Arkansas River.” Yet months of campaigning in 1862 combined with mounting banditry and
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guerrilla activity left Indian Territory bereft of provisions; there was simply not enough food and
forage to sustain large numbers of Confederate soldiers. The destitution of the countryside forced
Steele to disperse his army. The 1st Arkansas Cavalry was ordered to pester the Union army in
Northwest Arkansas. The 20th Texas Cavalry remained in Fort Smith on garrison duty. Cooper’s
Indians held the Arkansas line at Fort Davis, but Cooper allowed large numbers of his Indian
troopers to return home on furlough, a policy born of both a lack of discipline and the necessity
of keeping the troops fed. Finally, the Colonel Speight’s brigade of dismounted Texas cavalry
and infantry was ordered to winter in the Red River Valley along the Territory-Texas line, where
provisions could be had. Steele hoped that this dispersion of his forces would allow him to build
up supply depots for a spring campaign. Still, the Territory’s barren condition left Confederate
troops scattered across the region, and Steele worried that he would not be able to quickly gather
his forces and march once warmer weather arrived.341
Perhaps the only solace for the Confederacy and Steele was that the countryside’s
destitution likewise prevented the Federal army from concentrating in any significant numbers
north of the Arkansas River within the Territory. Instead, Cherokee Nation north of the Arkansas
became a relative no-man’s-land. Army patrols, irregular companies of Pin Indians, and bandits
crisscrossed and plagued the landscape and those few denizens who clung to their homesteads,
but presented no serious threat to the Confederacy’s control over southern Indian Territory.342
As spring approached, the strategic situation transformed as the prospect of renewed
campaigning loomed. In April, a small force under Colonel William Phillips carried out General
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Blunt’s orders to reoccupy Indian Territory north of the Arkansas. On the morning of April 25,
after an overnight march of thirty miles, Col. Phillips made his presence known by striking Stand
Watie’s regiment near Webber’s Falls. The attack caught the Confederate Cherokees off-guard,
and Watie’s men fled after suffering several casualties. The skirmish at Webber’s Falls not only
embarrassed Watie, but offered the bonus of preventing the Confederate Cherokee Legislature
from meeting in the town that day. Having announced the return of Federal forces to the region,
Colonel Phillips settled into Fort Gibson and set to work fortifying the post. “I do not think the
enemy can menace me with a heavy force for two or three weeks yet,” Phillips confidently
reported. “It would be ruinous to the Government cause, as well to these people, to abandon the
country,” Phillips continued. “I shall maintain my ground at all hazards.”343
The return of the Federal army to Indian Territory in April arrived at an inopportune
moment for General Steele, as his meager command was being further stripped by Confederate
authorities in other departments. Hoping to unify his scattered forces, Steele ordered Col.
Speight’s Texas brigade along the Red River to march north. After just a few days’ march,
however, Steele learned that Speight’s brigade had been reassigned to Louisiana.
“Notwithstanding this sudden and important depletion of my effective strength,” Steele resolved
to try and drive the enemy from Fort Gibson before his foe grew more entrenched or was
reinforced.344
Across six weeks from late May until the first of July, William Steele and William
Phillips conducted a complicated game of cat and mouse across the rolling prairies and woods of
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northern Cherokee Nation. General Steele played the cat, working to oust the enemy from his
fortified nest at Fort Gibson by striking at his supply trains. If Steele could use his superior
numbers to starve the garrison into submission, Fort Gibson and Cherokee Nation could be
retaken at minimal cost. Colonel Phillips played the mouse, mustering all his meager strength to
desperately fend off enemy attacks and keep the supply lines to Fort Scott open. Both sides
waged the campaign with alacrity and skill, and a series of sharp skirmishes climaxed in the First
Battle of Cabin Creek on July 1, 1863.
The Confederacy’s offensive kicked off in late May. A slim brigade of Confederate
cavalry, including Cherokees, Creeks, and the old Arkansas-Missouri guerrillas under John
Coffee, splashed across the Arkansas River on the night of May 19. An unwatchful scout failed
to spot the Rebels, and by daylight on May 20th the Confederates were within a few miles of the
fort. Constant construction under the observant eye of Colonel Phillips had turned Fort Gibson
into something of a miniature Gibraltar on the Arkansas, and the Confederates wisely elected not
to attack the post directly. Instead, they set about trying to round up and capture the immense
herd of livestock that ranged freely about the fort.
Recognizing the loss of the herd endangered his post as much as the enemy, Colonel
Phillips scrounged together “all the mounted men I could raise” and sent them forth to secure the
livestock. The advancing Federal troops clashed with the Southern counterparts in a series of
sharp firefights five miles from the fort’s earthworks. Twin parties of the 6th Kansas Cavalry and
3rd Indian Home Guard were both “nearly surrounded…but they gallantly cut their way through.”
As the fighting picked up, Colonel Phillips personally sallied forth with a mixed force of Indian
infantry and artillery and “drove the enemy” from the field. Rebel resistance weakened then
snapped, and the Confederates fled back across the safety of the Arkansas. Though Phillips
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hoped to pursue, a Rebel feint near Fort Gibson upriver forced the Federals to peel off and return
to their post. The “severe” clash at Fort Gibson resulted in approximately 26 Federal casualties;
Confederate casualties are unknown but likely higher. Though an incomplete victory, most of the
cattle herd was recovered, and a supply train arrived the day after the fight. Colonel Phillips and
Fort Gibson survived its first test.345
Over the next few weeks, the Confederates kept up the pressure on beleaguered Federal
post. Pickets exchanged shots across the Arkansas, occasionally punctuated by grander
Confederate cannonades. On May 28th, the Rebels once again slipped north of the Arkansas and
struck at a Union supply train but were rebuffed in a small skirmish and forced to retreat. In early
June, Stand Watie led a larger Confederate raid across the Arkansas in hopes of striking at Union
troops encamped at Baxter Springs just inside the Kansas line. Colonel Phillips was again ready
to react, but due to jaded horses could only move once he knew the precise location of the
Rebels. After confirming the Confederates had passed through Tahlequah, Phillips ordered Maj.
John Foreman of the 3rd Indian Home Guard in pursuit. The Rebel raid was foiled not by Union
pursuers, however, but by the high waters of the Grand River. Unable to cross, Watie led his men
south while Foreman’s Union Indians nipped at his heels. Meanwhile, Colonel Phillips, who
continued to oversee affairs from Fort Gibson, dispatched Col. Stephen Wattles of the 1 st Indian
Home Guard with 400 men to cut of Watie’s avenue of retreat. If all went well, the Rebel raiders
would be trapped between Foreman’s and Wattle’s columns.346
On June 16th, Col. Wattles caught up to Watie’s command at Greenleaf Prairie north of
the Arkansas River. Watie’s Cherokees had been reinforced in the night by Tandy Walker’s First
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Choctaw and the 29th Texas Cavalry, and Watie’s command was prepared to fight their way
through the Federals to make good their escape. Wattles gamely engaged the enemy in a see-saw
fight of several hours, but as ammunition ran low, Wattles disengaged in hopes of being
reinforced by Maj. Foreman’s column. Foreman’s haggard horses, however, had given out earlier
in the day. Upon learning the news, Wattles began to retreat. A relief column of 500 men arrived
to bolster Wattles’ force, but the break in hostilities offered Stand Watie a window through
which to slip away. The Cherokee raider re-crossed to the south side of the Arkansas on June
17th, having barely escaped Col. Phillips’ neatly-prepared trap.347
Colonel Phillips’s heroic efforts in keeping the supply lines open and repulsing Rebel
raiders throughout May and June did not go unnoticed. General Blunt placed great confidence in
Colonel Phillips and praised the “superhuman efforts to hold the country to the Arkansas River.”
Acknowledging the “hard pressed” situation at Fort Gibson and fearing another withdrawal from
the Indian Territory would be “disastrous,” Blunt organized a relief column to assist the besieged
defenders of Fort Gibson. The “endurance of hardships and privations, as well as their display of
patriotism and gallantry, entitle them to be promptly supported,” and by late June two eclectic
regiments and one artillery battery waited at Baxter Springs to be sent south to the front. 348
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The 1st Kansas Colored Infantry comprised the heart of the relief column. One of the
earliest African-American regiments raised for Union service, the origins of the 1 st Kansas
Colored rested with none other than Senator James Lane, the great advocate for enlistment of
Native American and African-American troops alike. Comprised of free blacks and runaway
slaves from throughout the region (including a number from Indian Territory), the 1st Kansas was
commanded by Col. James M. Williams, an ardent abolitionist, a Kansan, and a friend of James
Lane (Williams was yet another veteran of “Lane’s Brigade” early in the war, alongside James
Blunt, William Weer, and others). In October of 1862, the 1st Kansas Colored became the first
African-American regiment of the Civil War to see combat, repulsing Confederate guerrillas in a
small skirmish at Island Mound, Kansas. By the summer of 1863, the veterans of the 1st Kansas
were again ready to face their foes. Alongside the 1st Kansas Colored were six companies of the
2nd Colorado Infantry. Comprised of “hardy miners, inured to toil and privations, with but little
experience in the art of war,” the “Pike’s Peakers” were soon to see combat for the first time.
Finally, a section of the 2nd Kansas Battery rounded out the Federal column.349
News of the planned relief column quickly reached General William Steele. Indeed, so
well-appraised were the Confederates of the supply train’s whereabouts that trooper Wiley
Britton of the 6th Kansas complained from Fort Gibson, “Our hostile neighbors across the river
seem to be better informed of the movements of our train and troops in the country than we are.”
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With the supply train and reinforcements on the way, nearly six weeks of raiding reached a
crescendo. If the reinforcements managed to reach Fort Gibson from Baxter Springs, Colonel
Phillips’ force would likely be too strong to drive from the countryside. If the Confederacy
hoped to retain any chance of reclaiming Cherokee Nation, it needed to prevent the junction of
these twin Union forces and starve Fort Gibson into submission.350
Hoping to intercept the 200-wagon supply train, William Steele organized a two-pronged
raid north in late June. The western prong consisted of Colonel Stand Watie’s Cherokees, who
crossed Arkansas River and moved northward west of Grand River. Reinforcements from Col.
Cooper were sent along in support to provide reinforcement. Colonel Cabell’s decrepit
Arkansans constituted the eastern prong; Cabell’s men struck out from Northwestern Arkansas to
unite with Watie. General Steele felt confident that if the two forces could combine, they would
capture the enemy train.351
On June 25, the Federal supply train departed Baxter Springs and headed down into
Indian Territory, accompanied by nearly one thousand blue-clad Federal reinforcements.
Although the train was stopped by high water along the Neosho River for several days, it
managed to cross on the 29th and continued southwest of the Grand River. On June 30, the train’s
escort picked up the first signs of trouble when they uncovered a recently-made trail. A patrol of
twenty Cherokees from the 3rd Indian Home Guard tracked the path four miles before stumbling
into an advance picket post of Stand Watie’s command. The Federal Cherokees attacked the
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Confederate Cherokees and routed their surprised foe, killing four and taking three prisoners.
The skirmish alerted the Federals to the enemy’s nearby presence. 352
On July 1, the train continued south until it arrived at Cabin Creek, a 60-yard wide stream
swollen from recent rains. The east-west creek and its ford were guarded by Stand Watie’s
command, consisting of Watie’s 2nd Cherokee, Daniel McIntosh’s 1st Creek, and several
companies of Texan cavalry, numbering approximately 1,400. Watie stood alone, however;
neither Cooper’s reinforcements nor Cabell’s Arkansans—stymied along the east bank of the
flooded Grand River—arrived in time. Still, the Confederates enjoyed a significant numerical
advantage, although they possessed no artillery.353
Leading the Union vanguard was Major John Foreman of the Third Indian. Having
skirmished with Watie a month prior and unwilling to be stopped by Watie’s men before him,
Foreman advanced with his Indians and three mountain howitzers towards the enemy, who were
ensconced amid the brush on the south side of the creek “so thick a man could not be seen.” The
Indian forces opened up a “brisk fire” upon each other across Cabin Creek. The 1st Kansas
Colored Infantry and a lone 12-pound gun soon came up in support, led by Captain Ethan Earle.
The Federal artillery boomed and “scattered the [Confederate] Indians to the prairie back of the
bluff.”354
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The Texans, however, endured the bombardment. On the other side of Cabin Creek,
Private John Howard of the 5th Texas Partisan Rangers listened as the Yankees swabbed their
guns and weathered the storm of grape and canister. “It hardly looks like twenty men could stand
there under fire as we did,” Howard remembered, “but every one had a tree and if it had not been
for that we could not have lived.” Indeed, Captain Earle complained he could only spot a Rebel
“when a shot from our cannon cut down a tree or the brush so as to expose them.” Eventually,
the firefight wore down. The “raging and foaming” waters of Cabin Creek were too high for a
crossing, anyway. Though the fighting ceased, neither side retreated, and indeed, throughout the
night the Federals brought up the remainder of the reinforcement column and prepared to make a
second attack the next day. Watch was kept on the creek’s depth, which slowly receded
throughout the night.355
On the morning of July 2, the Federals resumed their offensive to drive Stand Watie from
Cabin Creek and clear the way south. In overall command was Col. James Williams of the 1 st
Kansas Colored, who devised the “column of attack” that would charge across Cabin Creek and
push the enemy back. Consisting of a company of Indians led by Major Foreman, the entire 1 st
Kansas Colored Infantry, a battalion of the 2nd Colorado Infantry, and several companies of
cavalry, the attack column would also enjoy extensive artillery support from five artillery pieces
situation broadly across their rear. At 8 a.m., Union guns unleashed a “brisk cannonade, with
shell and canister, upon the enemy’s position,” a bombardment that lasted for forty minutes.
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Having thoroughly shelled the opposite creek bank, William believed the enemy had retreated
and ordered the attack column forward.356
With Major Foreman at the attack column’s head, the first Indians began splashing across
Cabin Creek, only to be “met by a violent fire of musketry from the enemy,” who remained
hidden along the southern bank. Major Foreman suffered two wounds, his horse another five,
and the attack floundered as “their gallant leader” fell. Seeing Foreman fall, Colonel Williams
promptly intervened. He pulled the Indians back out of the creek and lined the infantry
companies up along the creek’s north bank. Again opening up heavy musketry and artillery fire,
Williams hoped another twenty minute fusillade would silence the enemy. A second crossing
attempt was made, this time with black Kansan infantry and a company of the 9th Kansas Cavalry
under Lieutenant Philbrick leading the way. The second attack worked. Blue-clad cavalry darted
across the creek, followed by stolid infantry, who despite “wading to the arm-pits in water,”
successfully “pushed the enemy up the bluff to the prairie.” Watie’s forlorn troopers fell back to
the edge of a prairie about 400 yards from the creek and reformed.357
Determined to pursue their foes, Colonel Williams’ force crossed the creek and formed
into line of battle to meet their Rebel foes. While the Federals maneuvered into position,
Lieutenant Philbrick’s Kansans pushed ahead, ordered by Williams to probe the enemy line.
Philbrick’s Kansans did more than that. Thundering across the prairie in a “gallantly executed”
charge, the Kansans broke the enemy’s center and “put him to flight.” Although Philbrick’s
unlikely charge may have spurred the Rebel retreat, Watie’s men were also falling short of
ammunition and were perhaps discouraged by the failure of either Cooper or Cabell to appear.
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Regardless, the haggard Confederate command fled, pursued for several miles by the Federals,
who ultimately gave up the chase for fear of leaving the supply train unattended. Rumors flew
among the Union ranks that Stand Watie personally swam the Grand River alongside several of
his men to make good his escape. The First Battle of Cabin Creek inflicted 3 killed and 30
wounded on the Federals; the Confederates lost perhaps as many as 50 dead and wounded, along
with nine taken prisoner.358
The Battle of First Cabin Creek marked the final opportunity for General William Steele
and the Confederacy to starve the Union garrison at Fort Gibson into submission. As Colonel
Asa Morgan, commander of the 30th Arkansas Infantry in Cabell’s Brigade, admitted to his wife
a few days after the battle, “Its [the supply train] capture would have ruined them at Gibson…if
Genl Steel did not feel himself strong enough to attack them before he cannot think of it now
they are reinforced.” Although General Steele did in fact think of attacking again, hopefully with
reinforcements from Texas, in reality the Confederacy had no more men to give. The Federals at
Fort Gibson, growing hungry on half-rations and anxiously awaiting word of the train’s fate to
their north, were thrilled at its arrival on July 5.359
The fight at Cabin Creek also continued to validate the use of both Native American and
African-American soldiers in the Union army. The Indian Home Guard proved instrumental in
tracking down the enemy and spearheading the advance across Cabin Creek. The 1st Kansas
Colored Infantry provided the heart of the attack column and earned the praise of Col. Phillips at
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Fort Gibson for having “fought well.” Trooper Wiley Britton of the 6th Kansas reveled in the
thought that “men who once delighted to ply the lash to the back of colored men were now
extremely anxious to get out of these same colored men as quickly as possible.” Britton further
considered the implications of black and white fighting together, hailing it as “a grand step in the
direction of wiping out the idea that man’s right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,
should depend on the color of his skin.” The tri-racial army—white, black, and native—
gathering at Fort Gibson would soon fight side-by-side again, for after the victory at First Cabin
Creek the Union seized the offensive and set out to strike a decisive blow against Confederate
Indian Territory.360
--A woman, her name lost to history, left Confederate Colonel Douglas Cooper’s camp and
headed north. Ostensibly a spy for the Confederate commander, she was in fact a double agent.
Fifteen miles below Fort Gibson she slipped across the Arkansas River into Union-patrolled
territory. The woman soon reported to Colonel William A. Phillips at Fort Gibson, producing
dispatches hidden in her bonnet and full of news about Cooper’s “modus operandi in getting
news from the Union camp.” Thankful for the information, Phillips sent the brave woman back
to Confederate lines with misinformation, coffee, and whiskey to share with Douglas Cooper.
“Believing that his thirst for the latter would be almost as great as his thirst for news,” Phillips
teased, “I sent him the desired articles, as an additional incentive to keep up the channel of
communication.”361
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Keeping secrets in war-torn Indian Territory proved impossible. Whoever the daring
young woman in both Union and Confederate employ was, she was one of many sources of
information that kept Union and Confederate commanders well abreast of each other’s
whereabouts and strengths in the summer of 1863. Pickets bantered, refugees kept open eyes,
travelers gossiped, and spies played friendly. Deadly games, but effective ones. Although
mobility and weather offered elements of surprise and chance, relatively little escaped the notice
of either General William Steele or Colonel William Phillips. It was through this intelligence
network that Colonel Phillips knew of Steele’s discombobulated state following Cabin Creek,
and Federal officers sensed an opportunity.
The defeat at Cabin Creek left General William Steele worried. Appeals for arms,
artillery, ammunition, provisions, and above all reinforcements fell on deaf ears in every quarter.
Knowing the enemy could not be dislodged from Fort Gibson, Steele feared the Federals would
try to cross the Arkansas and strike into southern Indian Territory and beyond. Heightened
activity by the Federals along the Arkansas furthered Rebel suspicions of attack, and they forced
Douglas Cooper’s brigade to withdraw to Elk Creek, a small tributary of the Arkansas some
twenty miles south along the Texas Road. From his headquarters at Fort Smith, General Steele
determined to unify his two brigades—Cooper’s Indians and Texans and Cabell’s Arkansans—to
face the enemy. The haggard condition of Cabell’s Arkansas brigade delayed their departure, but
on July 20, Cabell’s troops marched out of Fort Smith accompanied by General Steele. 362
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North of the Arkansas River, Brigadier General James Blunt also grew concerned over
the precarious state of the garrison at Fort Gibson and likewise determined to personally take
charge of affairs of Indian Territory. On July 5, Blunt departed from Fort Scott with 350 troopers
of the 6th Kansas Cavalry and a section of artillery, riding, he declared, “to save the command or
die in the attempt.” Travelling rapidly, the boisterous Kansan general and his small outfit entered
Fort Gibson on July 11, with a small but golden window of opportunity at hand. Blunt quickly
learned of Cooper’s retreat some fifteen miles below the Arkansas River; he was likewise
informed that Cooper expected reinforcements in the coming days. “I determined to take the
offensive,” Blunt declared, “and strike him [Cooper] if possible before they could arrive.”363
James Blunt’s heroic arrival did not fundamentally change the daunting strategic situation
faced the by the Union in Indian Territory. The Federal force at Fort Gibson likely hovered
around 3,000. Reports placed Douglas Cooper’s strength at 6,000, with Cabell en route with
another 3,000. Rumors also suggested more reinforcements might arrive from Texas. Moreover,
local geography hardly favored the Federals, either. The Arkansas River was swollen and
couldn’t be forded. The opposite bank was guarded by Rebel outposts fortified behind rifle-pits.
Any attempt to cross the river would give Cooper, twenty miles south at Elk Creek, plenty of
forewarning. Yet Blunt’s decision to attack was a product of his nature. The Kansan earned
victories against larger foes at Old Fort Wayne and Prairie Grove through decisive, aggressive
action. He felt assured he could win. “I have now learned where the game is,” he confessed, “and
ache to get across the river.” Observers trusted Blunt’s generalship. “Those who know General
Blunt, do not doubt his fighting qualities,” penned Kansan trooper Wiley Britton. “It is safe,
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therefore, to predict that the enemy will be obliged to fight very shortly, or retreat from their
camp on Elk Creek.” Kansas newspapers hailed Blunt’s departure to Fort Gibson, prophesying
that “stirring news may soon be expected.”364
Having determined to attack, Blunt set about overcoming the immediate obstacle in his
way: the Arkansas River. Unable to ford its swollen banks, Blunt oversaw the construction of
three flatboats to ferry his command across. Under the night sky on July 15, Blunt set out with
250 cavalry, four pieces of artillery, and marched 13 miles upriver. After sending the enemy’s
pickets flying, his troopers forded the river, “taking the ammunition chests over in a flat-boat,”
and moved down the south side of the river. Blunt hoped his tiny command could capture the
Rebel pickets opposite Fort Gibson from behind. The daring plan failed; the scouts fled back
towards Cooper’s camp. Meanwhile, the Federals spent the next day steadily ferrying their army
across the Arkansas River. By the evening of July 16, the entire force had crossed. The Union
army consisted of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Indian Home Guard, the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry, and
elements of the 2nd Colorado Infantry, 6th Kansas Cavalry, and 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry. The
Federals boasted an impressive array of artillery, including four guns of the 2 nd Kansas Battery,
four guns of the 3rd Kansas Battery (the formerly-Confederate guns captured at Old Fort Wayne),
and four guns attached to the cavalry. At 10 p.m. on July 16, the intrepid blue-clad column set
off to southward, hoping to decisively defeat their foes.365
---
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The young enslaved woman entertained a small child, swinging him from a grapevine on
the large tree in the yard by the house. The little boy—Istidji, meaning “little man”—belonged to
the woman’s master, and the fifteen-year old girl had been bought specifically “to look after de
little baby boy.” And so Lucinda Davis pushed the boy along the grapevine, entertaining him in
the cool summer air just before dawn.366
From her spot in the yard, Lucinda could survey the surrounding prairie and the nearby
Texas Road. As she scanned the horizons that morning, she spotted a rider galloping across the
plains toward the house, “jest a coming a-kiting and a-laying flat out on his hoss.” As the rider
approached, he let out a long war whoop and a warning: armies were marching their way for “a
big fight,” and everyone should flee. The rider then took off, continuing down the Texas Road
whooping all the way.367
Lucinda Davis’ master, an Upper Creek, immediately jumped into action, yelling for the
family and slaves to pack up essentials in the wagon. The urgent work fell to the black women;
the enslaved men had long since run off, including Lucinda Davis’ uncle, who had joined the
Union army’s ranks. By the time the wagon was loaded, however, it was too late. Confederate
Indian troops appeared on the horizon, followed by columns of butternut infantry and artillery.
The sky darkened, and the morning skies opened up as the Southern soldiers slogged by. Lucinda
Davis and the others simply watched from the roadside as the men marched off to war. 368
Suddenly, the hollow boom of guns could be heard off to the north, sounding like “hosses
lopin ‘cross a plank bridge.” At the sound of violence, the Rebels hurried faster toward their fate.
Lucinda, her fellow slaves, and their Indian masters took off across the prairie, taking shelter in a
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cave half-a-mile from the battlefield. The date was July 17, 1863, and the Battle of Honey
Springs was set to begin.369
In the days prior to the battle, Brigadier General Douglas Cooper kept a wary eye on
Federal movements to his north. The Confederate pickets along the Arkansas alerted Cooper to
Union activity, and by the 16th Cooper knew for sure that the Federals were crossing the
Arkansas in some force. The question was how many were crossing, and to what purpose? Were
the Federals launching a major invasion of southern Indian Territory, or merely setting out on a
large scouting expedition?370
Regardless of the Federals’ intentions, Douglas Cooper felt relatively prepared. His
brigade was nestled along Elk Creek, a shallow stream cutting west-east through the prairies
south of the Arkansas River. Elk Creek was fordable in several places, but the strength of
Cooper’s position was not the waterway proper, but rather the heavy timber and brush that lined
both banks. From timber’s edge on the north side of the creek, the Confederates enjoyed a
relatively open view of the rolling prairie to the north. The Texas Road, Indian Territory’s vital
north-south artery, bisected Elk Creek before passing Honey Springs, a small settlement a few
miles south which served as a Confederate supply depot. If the Federals were going to march
south, they would have to oust the Confederates from their position.
Having not only selected an excellent defensive position, Gen. Cooper further
strengthened his position by organizing his oversized brigade into four commands, each
responsible for defending a particular sector of the Elk Creek line. On the far right, the 1st and 2nd
Cherokee Regiments under Col. Stand Watie guarded Elk Creek around a pair of lower fords.
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The brigade’s Texan regiments bore responsibility for holding the center of the Elk Creek line,
through which the Texas Road forded the creek and continued south. The center consisted of the
20th Texas Cavalry under Col. Thomas Bass, 29th Texas Cavalry under Col. Charles DeMorse,
and the 5th Texas Partisan Rangers under Colonel Leonidas Martin; Col. Bass assumed overall
command of the Texas forces. Supporting the Texans was Cooper’s lone artillery battery, four
light howitzers under Capt. Roswell Lee. The left wing guarded Elk Creek’s upper fords and was
comprised of the 1st and 2nd Creek Regiments, Col. Daniel McIntosh commanding. Finally, Col.
Tandy Walker’s 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Rifles were kept in reserve alongside two small
squadrons of Texan cavalry under Capts. Scanland and Gillett. The three wings of the Cooper’s
brigade were ordered to hold the timber line north of Elk Creek, posting sufficient skirmishers in
the open prairie beyond. The entire force likely numbered around 5-6,000.371
Unfortunately for Douglas Cooper, his brigade was all that stood along Elk Creek in midJuly as the Federals marched south. From his headquarters at Fort Smith, General William Steele
took solace in the raging waters of the Arkansas River, failing to account for General Blunt’s
audacity or ingenuity. Thinking the river’s height afforded him more time than he really had,
Steele spent several days preparing Cabell’s brigade for the march west to reinforce Cooper.
Contrary to popular myth, William Cabell’s Arkansans were not anywhere near the battlefield on
July 17. In fact, Gens. Cabell and Steele only departed Fort Smith on July 20, several days after
the battle. Thus, through flawed assumptions and mismanagement, one of the two brigades
assigned to the defense of Indian Territory was absent for the greatest battle that took place
within its borders. It is somewhat fitting, then, that Confederate Indians and Texans, the political
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alliance that pulled the Five Tribes into the Civil War, would be responsible for fighting for the
Confederacy’s fate in the Territory on July 17, 1863.372
As the Federals marched south, Cooper sent his reserve cavalry—Walkers’ Choctaws and
Chickasaws and Gillett’s Texans—to patrol the roads north of Elk Creek leading from Fort
Smith. As the sun rose into a cloudy, ominous sky on July 17, Confederate Indians and Texans
spotted the vanguard of the Federal column several miles north of Elk Creek. After a full night’s
march, the advancing Federals were tired. Capt. William Gordon’s Company F, 6 th Kansas
Cavalry served as the column’s advance that morning, and at daybreak they were electrified by
the sudden appearance of Rebel cavalry to their front. Gordon’s troopers came under a “brisk
fire” and were driven back, only to be reinforced “at a gallop” by the other three companies of
the 6th Kansas. Now the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Texans began to give way, and the two
sides broke away as a steady rain began to fall from the sky. The Rebel cavalry fell back through
the rain to the main line at Elk Creek, while the Kansans licked their wounds and slowly resumed
their advance southward.373
As the Confederate cavalry arrived at Elk Creek with word of the Federal advance, they
also carried more ominous news. During the opening firefight with the Kansans, many of the
Rebels’ firearms refused to fire. Indeed, as the skies opened up, quite a few Southern guns
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became “wholly useless.” The Confederates’ misfortunes owed to “the very inferior quality of
the powder, the cartridges become worthless even upon exposure to damp atmosphere.” For
months and months, General William Steele requested, pleaded, and cajoled quartermasters in
other departments for arms and ammunition. His pleas went unanswered, so Steele turned south
and began purchasing Mexican gunpowder via agents in San Antonio. The Confederacy’s
inability and unwillingness to provision their Indian allies now came back to haunt it, for it was
this paltry Mexican substitute that now failed many Confederate soldiers at Honey Springs. 374
Having cleared the way of Confederate scouts, the Federals resumed their slog south.
General Blunt and his staff officers rode ahead and found the main Confederate line amidst the
brush and timber north of Elk Creek. As his exhausted troops approached the enemy position,
Blunt directed them to take shelter behind a small ridge and take two hours’ rest. A smart
decision reflective of a caring commander, the opportunity to eat and rest helped rejuvenate the
Union ranks. At 10 o’clock, the Federals roused themselves and formed into twin columns
paralleling each other on either side of the Texas Road; Col William Judson led the column on
the right, Col. William Phillips on the left. The Federals marched over the ridge and into the
Confederates’ view; a quarter-mile from the Rebel line the Union smoothly deployed from
column to “line of battle, covering the enemy’s entire front.” On the Federals’ right, a battalion
of the 3rd Wisconsin Cavalry secured the flank, followed by the 2nd Indian Home Guard and the
1st Kansas Colored Infantry, who deployed in the center of the Union line just to the right of the
Texas Road. To the left of the Texas Road, the 2nd Colorado Infantry also held the Union center.
To the left of the Pike’s Peakers stood the 1st Indian Home Guard, while four companies of the
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6th Kansas Cavalry secured the Federals’ left flank. In one massive line of battle, the Federals
advanced across the open prairie towards the Confederates who lurked in the brush ahead.375
The battle first erupted in the center. Three hundred yards from the Rebel’s position,
Capt. Henry Hopkin’s four-gun Kansan battery barked into action near the Texas Road and
began shelling the woods. Almost immediately, the Kansans drew a sharp response from Capt.
Roswell Lee’s four Texan guns posted amidst the Confederate center. A violent exchange of shot
and shell “filled the air with booms and grape” for over an hour, the duel growing in scope as
two 12-pound guns of Capt. Edward Smith’s Kansas battery joined in the shelling from a
position several hundred yards to the right of the Texas Road. Although the Kansan gunners
suffered several casualties, the crossfire from six Union guns eventually silenced the Texas
battery.376
While the artillery dueled, General Blunt rode up to Colonel James Williams of the 1 st
Kansas Colored and ordered them forward in support of Hopkin’s guns. “I wish you to keep an
eye to those guns of the enemy,” Blunt commanded, “and take them at the point of the bayonet,
if the opportunity offers.” Col. Williams turned to the black ranks of the 1st Kansas and calmly
informed them “we had work to do, and ordered them to ‘fix bayonets.’” “Every man stepped
promptly and firmly in his place,” and the blue-clad African-Americans advanced to within 50
yards of the Rebels concealed in the brush. Alongside the Kansans to the left was the 2 nd
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Colorado. Across the prairie, the men of the 20th and 29th Texas Cavalry and 5th Texas Partisan
Rangers lurked dismounted amid the brush. Armed with indifferent assortment of shotguns and
hunting rifles, Barney McDermott and his comrades in the 29 th Texas could only “lay low,”
watching as the enemy “marched on firing as the came and killed our men before they came in
range of our guns.” The Texans were ordered “not to fire till the enemy came within forty
yards.” Again, poor equipment hindered Confederates fighting in Indian Territory. Yet the
Federals marched ever closer, and the Texans took aim.377
At forty yards, the black Kansans pulled up alongside their white Colorado comrades,
and at the order of Colonel Williams belched forth a volley. Simultaneously, the Texans
unleashed a hellish volley of their own and “two long lines of smoke and flame” burst forth
between the Union and Confederate lines. Private McDermott informed his wife, “When they
came near enough, we let them have it and killed lots of them.” In these fierce opening volleys,
Col. Williams fell wounded, shot in the face, the right breast, and the hand, with his horse
mortally wounded beneath him. Through the smoke and din of battle, the Kansans’ second-incommand Lt. Col. John Bowles didn’t know command devolved upon him. Instead of charging
in with bayonet, black Kansans, white Coloradans, and Texan troopers simply stood their ground
and exchanged brutal gunfire at forty yards.378
While the battle burned bright at its core, the fighting quickly spread to the flanks.
Despite ample time to prepare for the Federal advance, not all of Douglas Cooper’s regiments
were in their proper positions when the fighting began, a symptom of Cooper’s inability to keep
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a handle on small details. On the Confederate right, a small detachment of the 2 nd Cherokee
fought alongside Bass’ battered Texans. Beyond the 2nd Cherokee, skirmishers of the 1st
Cherokee under Capt. Hugh Tinnin stretched out into an open flank. Instead of extending the
Confederate line to the right as Cooper’s pre-battle orders dictated, the bulk of the Cherokee
regiments were instead in the right-rear along Elk Creek proper. The Confederate right flank was
shorter than planned and was exposed.379
As Cooper rode forward along towards the Confederate center in the battle’s opening
hour, Capt. Tinnin’s Cherokee scouts soon reported Federals advancing beyond the Confederate
right flank. The advancing Federals, dismounted troopers of the 6th Kansas deployed as
skirmishers, were less a dedicated flanking party than a continuation of the main Union line.
Personally responding to the threat, Cooper quickly ordered half of Thomas Bass’ 20th Texas to
Tinnin’s aid. The Rebel general also pulled forward the remainder of the 2 nd Cherokee from Elk
Creek and personally placed them on the Confederate right flank. Tapping his reserves, half of
the 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles were also called up and sent to the right flank,
posting them along prairie’s edge. From his vantage point near the timber on the far right,
Cooper could look out across the prairie to the north and see the battle unfold. “I had a full view
of them,” Cooper reported, and he was surprised at the enemy’s strength, a force “larger than I
supposed they would bring from Gibson.” Not only were Federals advancing in open order on
his right, but he could see the enemy advancing on his center and, most worrisome, he spotted “a
heavy force wheeling off to their right and taking the road up the creek to the second crossing
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above the bridge—our weakest point.” In short, peering across the battlefield from the
Confederate right, Cooper realized the Federals threatened his immediate left.380
Riding away to the deal with yet another threat to his flank, Cooper left the fight on the
right flank to evolve naturally. Cooper’s reinforcements on the right flipped the tactical situation,
and the Confederates began harassing the 6th Kansas’ harried flanks. The Kansans soon received
help from the 1st Indian Home Guard, however, and the situation stabilized. For nearly an hour
and a half, a prolonged firefight simmered between Kansans and Indians in the prairie and
Confederate Indians amid the timber.381
The threat to the Confederate left spotted by Douglas Cooper were troopers of the 2nd
Indian Home Guard, led by Lt. Col. Frederick Schaurte. After the initial artillery duel between
Union and Confederate batteries, Schaurte led his men in skirmish order across the prairie
towards the Confederates west of the Texas Road. The Indians soon found the Texans ahead
among the timber, and the two sides picked at each other for several hours.382
Completely absent from this engagement were the 1st and 2nd Creek Regiments under
brothers Daniel and Chilly McIntosh. Gen. Cooper’s defensive plans for Elk Creek called for the
Creek regiments to guard the “upper ford” of Elk Creek, some distance from the middle and
lower fords, to secure the Confederates’ left flank. As the battle opened on the morning of July
17, the Creeks dutifully placed themselves in position on the far Confederate left, with the twin
Texan cavalry squadrons under Capts. Gillette and Scanland support. Among the Creek ranks
that day was Lieutenant George W. Grayson, a well-educated Lower Creek who left Arkansas
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College in Fayetteville to join the 2nd Creek Regiment in 1862. Having never before faced battle,
Grayson and his Creek countrymen took shelter in the “dense bottom” of Elk Creek and steeled
themselves for violence.383
Hoping to rouse his Creeks to the moment, Col. Chilly McIntosh addressed his men “with
the finest-war speech I ever heard,” Grayson would recall years later:
When you first saw the light, it was said of you ‘a man child is born.’ You must prove
today whether or not this saying of you was true. The sun that hangs over our heads has
no death, no end of days. It will continue indefinitely to rise and to set; but with you it is
different. Man must die sometime, and since he must die, he can find no nobler death
than that which overtakes him while fighting for his home, his fires and his country.”
The speech worked as intended, and Grayson and the other Creeks “listened breathlessly at the
rattle of small arms and an occasional exhausting whoop…anxious to take a hand in the affray.”
Grayson felt confident his men “could and would have made things alarmingly unpleasant for
whomever they might be pitted against.”384
With the Colonels McIntosh, Lieutenant Grayson, and hundreds of Creeks listening to the
roar of battle from their position on the Confederate left, there existed immense danger and
opportunity for both the Federals and Confederates on that sector of the battlefield. The Creeks’
far western posting on the upper ford meant there was a sizeable gap between the Creeks on the
left and the Texans on the center. The 2nd Indian Home Guard—the far right of the Union line—
was thus skirmishing against the left flank of the Confederate center, held by the Texans. If the
Creeks could sweep down from the upper ford of Elk Creek, they could endanger the Union right
flank. If, however, the Creeks did not arrive in time, the left flank of the Texan center might fold.
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When Gen. Cooper spotted the enemy first marching towards the Texans’ left, he rode
back towards the center of his line and fired off a dispatch to the Creeks, hoping to pull off just
such a decisive movement. He ordered them to “move down and support [the Texans]…and, if
possible, flank the enemy on our left.” Yet Cooper’s message never reached the Creeks. Instead
of swooping to the Texans’ rescue, the twin Creek regiments and accompanying Texan
squadrons maintained a lonely, wasted vigil over Elk Creek’s upper ford. Thus two whole
Confederate regiments never engaged the Federals during the battle’s decisive hours. 385
Instead of waiting to ensure the Creeks arrived, Cooper sped off to the rear in search for
reinforcements, hoping to bring up the rest of the Choctaw and Chickasaws held in reserve. Yet
again, however, confusion reigned and troops were not where they were supposed to be.
Mistaking an earlier order from General Cooper, instead of simply picketing a large hill in the
Confederate right-rear, the entirety of Tandy Walker’s troopers had moved to that location.
Although Cooper still ordered them forward, their distance precluded any prompt arrival on the
battlefield. Nearly two hours of sharp fighting in front of Elk Creek had elapsed, the battle was
coming to a decisive crescendo, and there were no more Confederate reserves on hand. 386
Around noon, the Confederate situation grew increasingly dire. The Texan regiments had
withstood a beating for nearly two hours amid mounting casualties. Barney McDermott of the
29th Texas lost two friends killed in the fighting, and watched another take a severe wound in the
head and retreat to the rear. “The bullets came faster than any of the boys saw before,” he
confessed to his wife. The colonel of the 29th, Charles DeMorse, was wounded early in the the
fray and forced to retire, turning command over to Lt. Colonel Otis Welch. Lee’s Texas battery
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was equally savaged, having lost a gun to a direct hit by Federal counterbattery fire, the entire
crew and all its horses either dead or wounded. The Texans were barely hanging on.387
The decisive moment hinged, oddly enough, on a small tactical error by the Federal 2 nd
Indian Home Guard. Perhaps sensing they were closing in on the Texan flank, the Native
troopers pushed forward in loose order until poised to enter the brushy timber of Elk Creek’s
northern bank. As the Indians pushed forward, they became disconnected from the black soldiers
of the 1st Kansas on their left. Lt. Col. John Bowles, finally assuming command for the fallen
Col. Williams, realized the danger and ordered the 2nd Indian to fall back into line. As the Indians
fell back, the weary Texans to their front assumed the Federals were retreating. The Texans
“commenced to press, as they supposed, upon a retreating foe. They advanced to within 25
paces,” reported Lt. Col. Bowles, “when they were met by a volley of musketry that sent them
back in great confusion and disorder.” In the Texans’ advance, their color-bearer was shot down.
Twice more the flag was raised, only to be shot down again, eventually “left by the enemy as a
trophy to our well-directed musketry.” The attack repulsed, the Texans receded and their line
soon began to buckle.388
The story of the Texan attack at Honey Springs, attributed by Lt. Col. Bowles to the 29th
Texas and the centerpiece of scholar’s descriptions of Honey Springs, deserves closer scrutiny.
This attack marked the crescendo of the battle, and its failure led the Confederate center to break.
Understanding the circumstances regarding the attack is pivotal to unlocking the course of the
engagement. The standard narrative of the attack hinges on the report of Kansan Lt. Col. Bowles,
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and although it is unlikely that Lt. Col. Bowles fabricated the story, there exist grounds to
question the accuracy of Bowles’—and thus historians’—narrative.
First, as noted earlier, the 29th Texas Cavalry actually constituted the left flank of the
Confederate line of battle at Honey Springs (discounting the Creek regiments, which were never
engaged). The fight flank of the Union line was occupied by the 2nd Indian Home Guard, with
the 3rd Wisconsin in support. It seems probable, then, that the primary foe facing the Texans
across the open prairie was not black Kansans, but rather skirmishing Indians and
Midwesterners. It’s certainly possible that the right flank of the 29th Texas perhaps engaged with
the right flank of the 1st Kansas Colored. If the 29th Texas Cavalry was engaged with elements of
three Union regiments, it’s difficult to imagine them charging obliquely towards the Kansans
with flank exposed to the Indians and Wisconsinites. In short, the 29 th Texas’ position on the
battlefield makes a full-throated charge upon the 1st Kansas Colored unlikely.389
Second, no Confederate accounts support the theory the 29th Texas made any forward
assault. Gen. Cooper’s report makes no mention of an assault, although given his position on the
right and rear, his report is of limited value. Yet neither the reports of Col. Charles DeMorse or
Lt. Col. Otis Welch of the 29th Texas, subsequently printed in newspapers back home, indicate
the Texans made an attack. In a letter to his wife written just days after the battle, Private Barney
McDermott of the 29th likewise fails to mention any advance. Almost certainly, the lines of the
29th Texas and the enemy came very close to each other during the battle; Lt. Col. Welch even
reported the enemy as nearing with twenty yards. But the failure by multiple officers and enlisted
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of the 29th Texas to report making any attack suggests the 29th Texas Cavalry never attacked the
enemy at Honey Springs at all.390
If we believe Lt. Col. Bowles’ correctly witnessed a Texan attack, but discount the
likelihood the 29th Texas made the assault, which Confederates charged at Honey Springs? A
plausible theory is that Lt. Col. Bowles simply misidentified the Rebel regiment to his front (of
which there were likely several). It’s possible that Col. Thomas Bass’ 20 th Texas Cavalry made
the decisive and failed attack at Honey Springs. The position of the 20th Texas—to the right of
the 29th Texas, in the center of the Rebel line, with the 1st Kansas Colored squarely to their
front—supports such a theory. Multiple Confederate and Union accounts indicate the
Confederate center collapsed at Honey Springs, including Lt. Col. Welch of the 29th who
reported that Bass’ regiment to his right retreated first. A failed advance by the 20 th Texas might
also help explain their inordinately high casualties during the battle. In short, if a Confederate
charge indeed took place at Honey Springs, the circumstances suggest it was made by the 20 th
Texas Cavalry, who swept forward only to be decimated, and subsequently retreated under
pressure from the enemy.
Regardless of which Texan regiment made the advance, the Texan center soon began to
buckle. The 20th Texas Regiment gave way, followed by the right wing of the 29th Texas.
Meanwhile, the left flank of the 29th Texas was threatened by the troopers of the 2nd Indian and
3rd Wisconsin, whose advance “forced the enemy to fall back upon their center.” On the opposite
side of the battlefield, the Confederate right flank was likewise pushed in by a charge of the 1 st
Indian Home Guard, with the 6th Kansas Cavalry supporting. Simultaneously, the entire
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Confederate line crumbled. Riding to the front after his failed attempt to find reinforcements,
General Cooper was surprised to find “our men in small parties giving way.” Dallas Bowman, a
Texan in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Rifles, admitted to his mother, “at last their firing began to
get too heavy for us…we were compelled to fall back, and our men began to scatter which
caused considerable confusion and we had a general stampede.” Private McDermott put it more
simply: “the Texas boys had to fly.” 391
The Confederates retreated in broken fashion, pausing at several points within the brushy
timber around Elk Creek in a futile effort to “make a stand with an attempt to check [the
Federals’] pursuit.” Unable to hold Elk Creek proper or any other point, General Cooper
confessed, “Our forces were now in full retreat and the enemy pressing them closely.” As the
Confederates fled, they entered the open prairie south of Elk Creek and made their way toward
the Confederate supply depot at Honey Springs. Fortunately for the broken Rebel regiments,
some of the Confederate units held in reserve finally began to arrive. Capt. Gillette’s Texan
squadron arrived from the left flank and, taking a position along the Texas Road, slowed the
Federals’ pursuit. Shortly thereafter, Col. Tandy Walker’s 1st Choctaw and Chickasaw Rifles
finally arrived and formed in the open prairie in front of Honey Springs. Determined to stave off
the enemy and buy time for the Confederate army and its supply train to safely retreat, the
mounted Choctaws and Chickasaws charged the advancing Federals, “giving them the war
whoop.” Although the Indians managed to delay the Federal advance, Union numbers ultimately
forced them to retreat. As the Rebels retreated from the battlefield, they left behind considerable
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stores of flour, salt, sugar, and other sundry goods in the Honey Springs that couldn’t be
destroyed in time. The Federals found all these items “very acceptable,” as some of them had
been without food since departing Fort Gibson.392
The largest engagement fought in Indian Territory, by sheer numbers the Battle of Honey
Springs was also the deadliest. Finding “the killed of the enemy very thick about us” at battle’s
end, the Federals reported burying roughly 150 Confederates. General Blunt claimed the Rebels
lost another 400 wounded (a dubious figure) and 77 captured. General Cooper similarly reported
134 killed and wounded, with 47 taken prisoner. As he often did, Cooper inflated enemy
casualties to above 200, when in fact the Federals lost 13 killed and 62 wounded. A fair estimate
would suggest that total casualties numbered between 250 and 300.393
Like a pair of exhausted prize fighters after a nasty bout, the two armies retreated in the
days following the battle. The victorious Federals, having crossed the Arkansas with the sole
intention of defeating the enemy before they were reinforced, withdrew back to Fort Gibson for
the time being. The Confederates—battered, bruised, and demoralized—withdrew south to
relative safety beyond the Canadian River. The arrival of General William Steele—with William
Cabell’s long awaited Arkansas brigade in tow—several days after the battle strengthened the
Rebel army to nearly 6,500. Moreover, a brigade of Texans under General Smith Bankhead was
also en route. Although disappointed by the failure of Cooper and Cabell to link up prior to
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battle, Steele hoped to revive his dreams of bagging the Federal supply train to Fort Gibson and
starving the Federals out of Indian Territory. Yet the reality of the Confederate situation soon
disabused Steele of the notion.394
The defeat at Honey Springs deeply demoralized the Confederate army in Indian
Territory. A few days after the battle, Private Barney McDermott bluntly declared to his wife, “I
believe they will whip us and whip us all the time until we are reinforced from Texas or some
other point. They are too strong for us….I know it for I have tried them and they are as good as
we are, better drilled and armed.” Privates David Dumas and John Howard both stumbled upon
Col. Thomas Bass crying along the riverside in the days following the engagement—Bass’ 20th
Texas Cavalry had suffered nearly half the Confederate army’s losses at Honey Springs.
Moreover, logistical problems continued to haunt the men. “The morale of the troops is
considerably affected by the band quality of powder which we have,” complained General
Steele. Rumors flew that the Yankees purposefully gave Mexico inferior gunpowder to supply
the Rebels. Among Cabell’s Arkansans, poor morale and distaste for service in Indian Territory
soon spurred massive bouts of desertion; by August, Arkansans were first “leaving nightly by
tens and fifties,” then “hundreds in a single night,” often accompanied by officers. Confederate
confidence—in their fighting ability, in their training, in their equipment—was shaken.395
The military events of the next few months did little to revive Confederate spirits. The
Arkansas reinforcements were proving worthless. The mass desertions among Cabell’s
Arkansans forced Steele to isolate their brigade, for fear the Arkansans’ sour morale would foster
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desertions in other regiments. Steele first sent the Arkansans south towards the Canadian and
Red Rivers, then in mid-August ordered them back east towards the vicinity of Fort Smith.
Within the span of a few weeks, despite reinforcement, Steele’s army was no larger than it was at
Honey Springs.396
While Confederate reinforcements deserted en masse, the Union army at Fort Gibson
continued to grow. On August 22, having heard reports that various Confederate commands had
coalesced around General Steele, General Blunt crossed the Arkansas River with 4,500 to again
take the fight to the enemy. Unbeknownst to Blunt, his offensive came at a fortuitous moment.
Cabell’s Arkansans had already left Steele’s camps, and reinforcements from Texas had yet to
arrive. Marching south along the Texas Road, on Federals soon approached Perryville, Choctaw
Nation, a tiny village that served as a major supply depot for Confederate forces. Although
Steele’s army held Perryville, the sad state of his army and the Federals’ superior numbers
convinced Steele to decline battle. On August 25-26, Confederate skirmishers fended off the
Union advance long enough for the Confederate army and supply train to retreat. As at Honey
Springs, the Rebel supply train escaped but the depot stores did not. Believing “nearly every
building contained Government stores,” General Blunt simply ordered “the burning of the whole
place.”397
William Cabell’s brigade of insubordinate Arkansans, sent in the direction of Fort Smith
to help defend that place, met equally dismal results. Having burned Perryville, Blunt turned east
in pursuit of Cabell. The two forces skirmished in the vicinity of Skullyville in Choctaw Nation
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on August 30-31, but Cabell wisely fell back toward Fort Smith, and Blunt sent a mixed force of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery in pursuit under the command of Col. William Cloud. On
September 1, Cloud’s Federals brought Cabell’s force to heel near Devil’s Backbone, a large
rocky spur 16 miles south of Fort Smith. Determined to hold his ground and allow his supply
trains time to reach Fort Smith, Cabell placed his troops in various defensive lines running up the
Backbone. The Federals advanced upon the position in the early afternoon, attacking along the
length of the Rebel line. At the outbreak of gunfire, the bulk of the Arkansans simply fled.
“There was nothing to make these regiments run,” raged Cabell, “except the sound of the
cannon.” Despite most of his men instantly routing, Cabell managed to stave off the advancing
Federals for three hours before retreating southeast, having given the supply trains sufficient time
to escape. The disgraceful defeat at of Cabell’s Arkansans at Devil’s Backbone left Fort Smith
virtually defenseless, and on that afternoon the Union army “quietly entered the town.” General
Blunt ordered the Confederate flag lowered and hoisted Old Glory above the post for the first
time since 1861.398
--The string of Federal victories in the summer of 1863—the sharp victory at Honey
Springs, the burning of Perryville, the fight at Devil’s Backbone and subsequent occupation of
Fort Smith—fundamentally altered the military situation in Indian Territory. With Fort Gibson
and Fort Smith firmly in Union hands, the Confederacy’s Arkansas River line proved untenable.
The Confederates were forced back south beyond the Canadian River, and the territory between
the Arkansas and Canadian became a veritable no-man’s land. Although many of the white
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regiments tasked with assisting their Indians allies in 1863 were of poor quality, never again
would the Confederacy devote as much manpower to the defense of Indian Territory. Cherokee
Nation was irretrievably lost, Creek and Seminole Nations occupied a see-sawing no-man’s land,
and Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations lay vulnerable to the south. The occupation of Fort Smith
was followed by the subsequent fall of Little Rock in mid-September, and in general Confederate
forces sullenly withdrew into southern Indian Territory and southern Arkansas. The tide of war
in Indian Territory, Arkansas, and the Trans-Mississippi shifted in the Federals’ favor, mirroring
Union strategic successes at Vicksburg and Gettysburg east of the Mississippi River.
Beyond the strategic implications of these setbacks, the disastrous string of defeats also
produced a profound crisis of loyalty among the Confederacy’s remaining Native American
allies. After Honey Springs, the Creeks withdrew in upon themselves. Daniel and Chilly
McIntosh’s regiments retreated into Creek Nation and refused to leave its boundaries, ignoring
General Steele’s summons. Essentially abandoning the Confederacy in favor of a strict defense
of their own nation, Steele worried the Confederate Creeks might defect altogether.399
More worrisome were signs of discontent among the Choctaws, widely considered
staunch Southern supporters. For the first time in the war, Federal soldiers penetrated into
Choctaw Nation during the Perryville expedition and the pursuit of General Cabell. Feeling the
sting of war and “disgusted” by the military situation, Union reports suggested the Choctaws
“are disposed to lay down their arms…friendly members of the Nation at work, and have strong
hopes that they will cease to fight, and return to treaty relations.”400
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Hoping to stamp out dissent within their tribe, the Choctaw National Council took up the
matter in their October sessions. The Council passed a resolution condemning neutrality and
affirming their loyalty to the Confederacy. Even more decisively, they declared that any who
sought “to destroy the confidence of the Choctaw people in the ability of the Confederate States
to sustain themselves” or “to induce this people to occupy a position of neutrality, or withdraw
their united support from the Confederates States, shall be a deemed and considered an enemy to
this Nation of people…and deserving the death of a traitor.” The draconian resolution suggests
that pro-Confederate Choctaw leaders took internal dissent seriously.401
Also frustrated with the Confederacy was Cherokee Colonel Stand Watie, their most
prominent and reliable Indian officer. In early August, Stand Watie wrote a flurry of letters
revealing his disillusionment with the Confederacy while likewise seeking to bolster Indian
morale. In a personal appeal to the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, Watie confessed, “Every
day seems to drive conviction to my heart that we, the Indians still true to the South must place
small reliance on assistance from abroad…I am loth to believe the Confederate authorities have
entirely abandoned the Cherokee country, but I see in the future scarcely a ray of hope from
them.” In a similar appeal to Creek officials, Watie admitted, “The promised protection of the
Confederate has been hardly observable…I much fear that we can reasonably look for no change
for the better, but that the Indians will have at last to rely upon their own exertions in the defense
of their country.” Writing angrily to Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the
entire Trans-Mississippi Department, Watie frustratingly demanded, “Can you give me
assurances of effective aid for the Indians? Or shall I renounce forever all expectations of
adequate assistance, and tell my people to rely upon themselves, and go down to ruin if they
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must in a manly effort to defend their homes.” From Stand Watie’s perspective, Confederate
Indians could simply no longer trust the Confederacy, and instead must rely upon each other for
defense in the coming days.402
Other Confederate Indian officers felt similarly. Captain James Bell, an officer in Stand
Watie’s command, requested a transfer in September of 1863. “We get neither justice or our
rights and I am not inclined to be an idle observer of the wrongs of my people any longer,” Bell
declared. “If to be a Southern man, to be alive to all the interests of the South & the Struggle they
are engaged in etc. would entitle them to any consideration whatever or to a just proportion of
notice in the different reports of Engagements with the Enemy, our people are justly deserving.
What have they ever received by slights and neglect.” To Watie directly, Bell wrote, “Shall we
bear it any longer or will you command us to bear it longer, if so you are knowing to the wrong
and encouraging it and we must regard you in the light of an Enemy.” Although Watie convinced
the zealous young James Bell to remain the ranks, Bell’s frustrations actually mirrored those of
Watie and many Confederate Indians that summer. The Confederacy let them down.403
Ultimately, those Native Americans who still stood by the Confederacy in 1863
continued to do so for the remainder of the war. There were no more mass defections as in 1861
or 1862, though perhaps some Indians still quietly pined for neutrality or peace. These
Confederate Indians were true believers in the necessity of winning the war, if no longer the
Confederacy as meaningful allies. As Stand Watie declared, “The only expectation of the North
to conquer the Indians Nations, is in the traitors that have deserted us, the negroes they have
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stolen from us, and a few Kansas jayhawkers they can spare from that detestable region. Shall we
allow ourselves to be subjugated and enslaved by such a class? No! Never!!”404
Yet the disappointment and disillusionment harbored by the Confederacy’s Indian allies
by the autumn of 1863 speaks to the profound failure of the Confederacy to fulfill her treaty
obligations to the Five Tribes. Required by treaty to keep white troops stationed in Indian
Territory, for the most part the Confederacy simply consigned its worst soldiers to the Territory.
Speight’s Texas brigade, assigned to the Department over winter before being sent to Louisiana
in the spring of 1863, suffered from deep demoralization and a lack of supplies. They were
replaced by William Cabell’s brigade of Arkansans, who failed to ever find the field of battle
that summer. Indeed, William Steele and Douglas Cooper may actually have been worse off for
having Cabell’s Arkansans in their ranks, given that the Arkansans’ dissatisfaction and desertion
ran like poison through the ranks. Although the three Texan regiments—the 5th Texas Partisan
Rangers, the 20th Texas Cavalry, and the 29th Texas Cavalry—directly attached to Douglas
Cooper’s Indian Brigade proved their worth in blood at Honey Springs, they were not enough.
Excepting those three Texan regiments, the rest of the white troops assigned to Indian Territory
in 1863 were mostly worthless.
Beyond manpower, the Confederacy likewise ignored the material needs of their Indian
allies. Confederate Indians and their Texan allies were almost universally ill-equipped, poorly
clothed, under paid. They marched on empty bellies, alongside broken-down wagons and jaded
horses. They often lacked arms and ammunition. As Stand Watie complained, “The Indian troops
who have been true to the Southern cause from the very first, have been treated in many
instances as though it were immaterial whether or not they were paid as promptly, or equipped as
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thoroughly as other soldiers.” The Confederacy’s failure to secure a substantial quantity of
quality gunpowder for Indian Territory forced William Steele to turn to San Antonio and Mexico
beyond, a dubious pipeline that paid terrible dividends during the Battle of Honey Springs, when
Confederate powder turned to paste.405
Of course, even had the Confederate soldiers been supplied with quality gunpowder, it
hardly would’ve rectified the wretched state of their guns. Those with firearms usually toted
shotguns, hunting rifles, and other antiquated arms that possessed a limited range and required
constant repair. When trading shots with Federal pickets across the Arkansas River, Rebel bullets
fell short. At Honey Springs, Confederate soldiers withstood Federal fire for some time before
they could return the favor, simply because their weapons couldn’t range that far. Almost
needless to say, the Rebels in Indian Territory likewise lacked artillery. At Cabin Creek,
Confederates endured a veritable storm of grape and shell, unable to respond because they had
no guns of their own. At Honey Springs, the Confederate’s lone Texas battery was outgunned,
overmatched, and knocked about. If the fighting quality and morale of Confederate troops in
Indian Territory sometimes lacked, perhaps it was partially owed to the disgraceful material
circumstances in which they constantly found themselves. The shortfalls of the Confederacy in
providing for its Native allies, whether in men or guns or accoutrement—severely harmed the
Confederacy’s military performance in Indian Territory.
The Confederacy’s inability and unwillingness to provide men and material to Indian
Territory throughout the war stemmed from several factors. Undeniably, the Confederacy simply
didn’t have enough to go around. Fighting a losing war against an amply-supplied opponent
advancing on all fronts, the Confederacy was forced to prioritize where its men and materials
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were needed most. Indian Territory ranked near the bottom of the list. The Confederacy routinely
prioritized the defense of Arkansas, Missouri, Louisiana, or Texas throughout the war. From a
military perspective, such triage made sense. Simply put, Little Rock or Helena or Shreveport or
Springfield were strategically more valuable than Tahlequah or Doaksville or North Fork Town.
This is not to say the Confederacy saw no strategic value in Indian Territory. Many Confederate
leaders and citizens believed it important that Indian Territory remain in Rebel hands, if anything
to keep Texas and Western Arkansas secure. But when forced to choose, the Confederacy valued
Indian Territory less.
Hard military realities were not the only factor at play, however. Many Confederates,
especially as the war dragged on, came to view their Indian allies as militarily and racially
inferior. In the winter of 1863, frustrated in his defense of Indian Territory and increasingly
unpopular with men and officers alike, General William Steele relinquished command of the
Department of Indian Territory. In his final report, he opined “that, with a few exceptions, the
Indians are wholly unreliable as troops of the line. The officers, as a general rule, are ignorant,
void of moral tone of character, and indisposed to enforce discipline among their men.” The
Indians seemed to think their military service “a voluntary contribution on their part, susceptible
of being withheld at their option.” Steele’s poor opinion was shared by many other Rebel
soldiers, who were mystified and disdainful of the Native Americans’ lack of discipline, constant
furloughs (official or not), odd martial customs and war-whoops. In white Confederate eyes,
their Native Americans allies weren’t worth much as soldiers.406
Faced with a shortage of guns in 1862, one Fort Smith quartermaster griped, “This dogon Indian business is enough to break up any government in the world…some 3,000 or 4,000
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stand of fine arms, and plenty of ammunition, are uselessly had and destroyed by these noaccount Indian commands. Stand Watie’s is the only one worth a cent, and they are mostly white
men.” Even Stand Watie, however, was not above reproach. In the spring of 1864, Watie was
promoted to brigadier general, becoming the Confederacy’s only Native American general
officer. Yet Watie’s promotion outraged Col. Charles DeMorse of the 29 th Texas Cavalry, who
asserted “The Indian is a physiologically recognized as an inferior race, and I respectfully protest
against the decision…as one to which no white officer, with a proper respect for the natural
dignity of his race, can submit.” The complaints of these white officers hint at the derisive racial
views many Confederates possessed in regards to their Indian comrades. These views are hardly
surprising. White Confederates were engaged in building a white-man’s slaveholding republic,
after all, and for centuries Southerners had enslaved, killed, and expelled Native Americans
across the continent. Although eager to secure Indian Territory at war’s outbreak, many
Confederates carried racial scorn for the Territory’s Native denizens.407
The failure of the Confederacy to fulfill its treaty obligations, due to material shortages
and racial prejudice, severely hampered Confederate military efforts in the summer of 1863 and
played a decisive role in the defeats of Cabin Creek and Honey Springs. Certainly other factors
were critical. The mediocre leadership of Confederate Generals William Steele and Douglas
Cooper stands in sharp contrast to the aggressive, confident offensives of General James Blunt
and Colonels William Phillips and William Cloud. The bravery and combat effectiveness of the
Union rank and file—including white, Native American, and African-American soldiers—is
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clear. Yet at every turn the Confederacy’s broken promises, material shortfalls, and substandard
reinforcements weakened their defense of Indian Territory. As Cherokee Reverend Stephen
Foreman simply stated, “All believe that one fact develops itself, and that is, that the Indians are
not cared for, and that the Confederate States are throwing them off to shift for themselves as
best they can.” Although the Confederacy bore great responsibility in pulling the Five Tribes into
the war, in the end, they left their Native American allies to fend for themselves, to disastrous
ends.

259

“The Evils of Disunion, Discord, and War”: Raids, Refugees, and Homefront, 1864-1865
“We can see nothing but Starvation before us, already we have had a taste of what is to come this winter…It was a
terrible mistake that we were not brought down here in time to raise a crop for ourselves, had that been done, we
could in great measure have supported ourselves.”
-Creek leaders to Commissioner William Dole408
---

The decisive defeat at Honey Springs undermined the Confederacy’s ability to regain
control of the Arkansas River Valley and the heart of Indian Territory. Unable to challenge the
Federal army directly, Confederate forces in Indian Territory instead found themselves caught up
in wider Trans-Mississippi affairs, making bloody and controversial contributions against the
1864 Federal Camden Expedition in southern Arkansas. They also engaged in a series of
spectacular raids that boosted both Confederate soldiers’ morale and physical comforts
considerably. Yet these splashy victories proved hollow and did little to change the strategic
outlook in the Trans-Mississippi or Indian Territory. Federal control over the Arkansas River
Valley, if not the surrounding countryside, remained relatively secure.
While the Confederacy failed to reverse the war’s tide in the region, the humanitarian
crisis in Indian Territory continued to grow unabated. The Loyal Indian refugees—having
endured years of refugee life in Kansas—finally returned home, only to find little food or
provisions for the winter ahead. Confederate Indians fled southward as the Union tightened their
control of the Arkansas River Valley—refugees flooded Choctaw and Chickasaw Nation along
the Red River and spilled over into northern Texas and southern Arkansas. Although banditry,
murder, assassinations, and theft plagued Indian Territory throughout much of the war, a
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veritable no-man’s land arose in the war’s latter years that facilitated a greater wave of violence
and terror. By the end of the war, the majority of Indian Territory’s denizens were refugees,
reliant upon either the Union or Confederate governments for sustenance and survival.
After four years of intra-tribal warfare, endless campaigning, guerrilla attacks and raids,
banditry, starvation, disease, refugee crises, and death, the Civil War in Indian Territory boiled
down to an uncertain end in the summer of 1865. As the Confederacy collapsed, the Five Tribes
met in council, hoping to present a united front towards the United States as Reconstruction
loomed. They sued for peace, and in June, Brigadier General Stand Watie became the last
Confederate general to surrender his command. The war was over. Yet Native Americans in
Indian Territory possessed relatively little leverage with the Federal government as
Reconstruction loomed. They worked to present a unified front towards the United States and
hoped to negotiate the best treaties possible in the face of an uncertain future.
--As 1864 dawned, Native Americans in Indian Territory found that the war had left them
behind. Having failed to dislodge the Federals from Fort Gibson the summer previous, the
Confederacy simply didn’t have the manpower or material strength to launch another sustained
offensive north. Instead, Southern commanders in Indian Territory contented themselves to
raiding and trying to keep the Federals out of North Texas. Although the Federals occasionally
extended their reach beyond the Arkansas River, they were largely content with control of Fort
Gibson itself. A miniature Gibraltar, Fort Gibson allowed the Federals to transport men and
goods via the Arkansas River and likewise gave them control over much of Cherokee Nation. As
the war ground into its third year, both the United and Confederate States shifted their strategic
focus elsewhere in the Trans-Mississippi.
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None of this boded well for the newly appointed Confederate commander in Indian
Territory, Brigadier General Samuel Bell Maxey. The latest in the revolving door of Confederate
district commanders, Maxey replaced the bitter and unpopular William Steele early in 1864. Yet
Sam Maxey’s background left him admirably suited for the challenge. A native of Kentucky,
Maxey graduated from West Point in the famous Class of 1846 alongside Thomas “Stonewall”
Jackson, George Meade, George McClellan, A.P. Hill, and others. Maxey saw combat as a junior
infantry officer in the Mexico City campaign, earning accolades at Cerro Gordo and Contreras.
Maxey resigned his commission following the war, practiced law, and moved to Texas. At the
outbreak of the Civil War, Maxey raised a regiment of Texas infantry and earned an early
promotion to brigadier general, followed by action in East Tennessee and during the Port Hudson
and Vicksburg Campaigns. A well-educated, experienced military officer sensitive to both Indian
and Texan politics, Maxey was perhaps the most professional, qualified Confederate commander
in Indian Territory during the war.409
Like many district commanders before him, Maxey assumed command with aspirations
of taking the offensive and reclaiming Indian Territory north of the Arkansas. And also like his
predecessors, the demanding strategic, material, and political realities of Indian Territory quickly
disabused him of the notion. Maxey inherited a district beset with every problem imaginable.
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Indian Territory was destitute of food, arms, clothing, or military equipment. Native allies’ faith
in the Confederacy was shaky, and desertion rampant. Leadership among the Rebel ranks was
poor. Years of campaigning, guerrilla warfare, and banditry left the civilian population
increasingly homeless and hungry. In short, the Rebel outlook was bleak. Writing to the newly
appointed General Maxey, one Confederate officer admitted, “Northern Texas and the Indian
Department have been neglected so long that they have become the most difficult and the most
responsible commands in the Trans-Mississippi Department. I tremble for you.” Maxey himself
confessed to his wife, “Truly this is a Herculean task…If I do succeed, I think I ought to be
entitled to some credit.”410
One of General Maxey’s first tasks was shoring up the fraying alliance between the
Confederate States and its Indian allies. The defeats of 1863, combined with the consistent
failure of the Confederacy to live up to its material promises, left pro-Confederate tribal
governments questioning the value of their alliance to the weakening Confederacy. These issues
nearly boiled to the surface in early February at Armstrong Academy in Choctaw Nation. There,
a “Grand Council” of the pro-Confederate Indian tribes met to discuss their collective course of
action. Tribal leaders gathered and discussed strategic options, including forging better
relationships with Plains tribes and the possibility of raiding into Kansas. Yet dissatisfaction with
the Confederacy and the war reared its head. Colonel Douglas Cooper admitted that only with
tribal pressure could Choctaw Chief Samuel Garland and other “grumblers and croakers…be
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hushed and the soft-shells crushed out.” Maxey himself gave an address to council to assuage
their concerns, which was well received.411
Further placating the Indian tribes, Maxey agreed to reorganize his military command
into three distinct Indian brigades formed along tribal lines: Cherokee, Choctaw and Chickasaw,
and Creek and Seminole. With nearly 8,000 Native Americans enlisted in Confederate service
(though likely less than half in the field), multiple brigades were warranted. Moreover, it was
hoped the reorganization would help spur recruitment and retention. The creation of new
brigades also placated Douglas Cooper, whose dissatisfaction at being passed over for district
command was well-known. With two new brigades, Colonel Douglas Cooper earned a
promotion to brigadier general.412
While General Maxey tried to keep the frayed threads of Indian alliances together, the
Federals at Fort Gibson stirred. Although the United States kept only a small garrison at the post
and held no real desire to conquer south of the Arkansas River, Colonel William A. Phillips—
who so valiantly defended the post the summer previous—sought to build on his prior successes
and launched a raid in Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in hopes of undermining Maxey’s work
and permanently splintering the alliances between the South and its remaining Indian allies.
--Colonel William Phillips inaugurated his grand raid south with a proclamation. His bold
words circulated among the soldiers of Fort Gibson in the days before the march south.
“Soldiers! I take you with me to clean out the Indian Nation south of the [Arkansas] river and
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drive away and destroy the rebels…I ask you to make your footsteps severe and terrible.” To the
Creek soldiers of the Indian Home Guard regiments, he offered a few special words of
motivation. “Muscogees! the time has now come when you are to remember the authors of all
your sufferings; those who started a needless and wicked war, who drove you from your homes,
who robbed you of your property. Stand by me faithfully and we will soon have peace.” On
February 1, the same day that tribal leaders met at Armstrong Academy to discuss their place
within the Confederacy, Phillips’s blue-clad troopers splashed across the Arkansas River and
rode south to strike at the enemy.413
Building upon the successes of the summer previous, Colonel Phillip’s raid was meant to
extend Union authority into southern Indian Territory for the first time since the start of the war.
Phillips hoped the sudden appearance of Union forces in Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations would
spark “a moral effect on the Indian nations” and encourage rebellious Indians to return to the
Union fold, just as many Cherokees had defected in 1862. Over the course of February, Phillips’s
raiders penetrated deep across southern Indian Territory, wreaking havoc and letting the
Chickasaws and Choctaws feel the sting of war.414
The Union raiders adopted a stick and carrot approach as they entered enemy territory.
With a mixed force of the 1st and 3rd Indian Home Guard, 14th Kansas Cavalry, and a battery of
howitzers, Colonel Phillips’s force drove south into Creek Nation, “sweeping the whole valley of
the upper Canadian and its tributaries north and south.” The Federals made their presence felt,
stripping an already meager countryside of corn and livestock. Just days into the raid, Colonel
Phillips promised “I shall leave no secesh in the country,” and his command carried out his
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prophecy with alacrity. The raiders ousted secessionist Indians from their homes, turning Rebels
into refugees and prompting Phillips to declare “secessionism is about wiped out.” The home of
Chickasaw Governor Winchester Colbert was burned down, and the frightened governor fled
south into Texas. As the Federals swept south, they met only scattered resistance, inflicting
approximately 125 casualties in small skirmishes with the enemy. Yet rumors warned Phillips
that Confederate forces were gathering at Boggy Depot, “which I rather like,” Phillips
determined, “as I would rather fight them there than hunt them up.”415
As the Federals advanced, Confederate forces retreated. Though Phillips’s command
numbered less than 1,000, the Rebels could not muster a force strong enough to stop them.
Indeed, Confederate officers worried whether they could hold the department headquarters at
Fort Towson or even prevent the Federals from striking into North Texas. On February 13, the
expedition’s lone significant engagement occurred at Middle Boggy Depot, where Union raiders
clashed with a small contingent of Rebel Seminoles, Choctaws, and Chickasaws. The
Confederates were “completely routed and pursued considerable distance,” but it was not the
decisive battle Phillips yearned for. Contributing to the grim nature of the raid, Confederates
reported after the fight that Seminole bodies “were mutilated, their throats cut from ear to ear.”
These atrocities were reportedly carried out by the white soldiers of the 14th Kansas Cavalry.416
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While Phillips’s raiders smashed Confederate support throughout the region by force,
they also sought to induce wavering Native Americans to reconcile with the United States. This
was not a forlorn fantasy. At the war’s outset, Creeks and Seminoles quickly divided over the
issue of a Confederate alliance, with thousands ultimately seeking refuge in Union Kansas or
enlisting in the Union Indian Home Guard. In 1862, Cherokees splintered upon the arrival of the
Union army, and Chief John Ross and thousands of other Cherokees defected from Confederate
ranks. Although the Choctaws and Chickasaws had remained loyal to the Confederacy through
1864, it was unclear whether this loyalty was born of strongly held Confederate sentiment or the
reality of being firmly in Confederate occupied territory. Phillips hoped the Union army could
further weaken Confederate-Indian relationships.
To this end, Colonel Phillips carried copies of Abraham Lincoln’s Proclamation of
Amnesty and Reconstruction, translated into Indian languages. Issued on December 8, 1863, the
proclamation offered amnesty to any who had raised arms against the government. Phillips
paired the proclamation with personal messages sent to Chickasaw Governor Winchester
Colbert, Chief John Jumper of the Seminoles, and the Choctaw General Council. In his letters,
Phillips asked these tribes to return to U.S. allegiance, predicting a swift end to the war and
warning of the consequences of continued resistance. “The President has issued a proclamation
in which he offers pardons and peace to those who, even in this moment of its destruction,
abandon this wicked and unnecessary war,” Phillips wrote to Governor Colbert. “You cannot fail
to see the end coming? Are you justified in shutting the eyes of your people to it? The offer now
made may never come back to you if neglected,” Phillips warned. “The great Government of the
United States will soon crush all the enemies. Let me know if you want to be among them.”417
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These letters failed to sway the tribal governments; they also came too late. By the time
Phillips’s missives reached the chiefs, the Confederate Indians had already met with General
Maxey and reaffirmed their loyalty to the Confederacy at Armstrong Academy just days before.
Although Native American support for the Confederacy had undoubtedly weakened over the
course of the war, among the Choctaws and Chickasaws, it ultimately did not break. It’s also
probable that these tribes hoped to avoid the destructive intra-tribal violence that had plagued
their Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole neighbors. Instead of prompting mass defection, most of
Phillips’s letters were simply handed over to Confederate authorities.418
Although most Choctaws and Chickasaws stayed true to their Southern alliances, a few
dissident Choctaws did attempt to go over to the Federal side. Setting up a provisional
government and selecting Thomas Edwards for governor, the Choctaws resolved “that our
primary allegiance is due to the Government of the United States.” In a proclamation, Edwards
pointed out the failures of the Confederacy. “Three years of strife and misery, should at least
convince you that the unnatural alliance which you have formed with the enemies of the United
States has been one of the heaviest calamities to befell your Nation. They made you brilliant
promises, but never fulfilled them.” Edwards called for a “quick and speedy return” to U.S.
allegiance. Though Edwards words reflected Phillips’s hopes, the dissident Choctaw government
were minority renegades. Most Choctaw leaders remained in opposition to the Union, and
Phillips refused to recognize Edwards and his defectors as a legitimate government.419
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Colonel Phillips’s decision was perhaps also influenced by his communications with his
superior officer, Major General Samuel Ryan Curtis (the victor of Pea Ridge). Kept appraised of
Phillips’s actions, Curtis praised the commander for his boldness. Yet he also made clear that
Phillips did not have permission “to offer terms of peace to rebels that imply a relinquishment of
legitimate forfeitures. The Choctaw Nation has clearly forfeited all right of property in the vast
domain we will have to protect.” Curtis and the United States sought to teach the rebellious
Choctaws a lesson, “to understand that what they hereafter receive is on the score of humility
and generosity.” Yet the United States also had expansion and material rights in mind. Curtis
waxed about the “vast resources of the Indian Territories,” and thought “in the convulsions of the
times try to improve the political institutions of these Indian nations to their own good and the
national prosperity.” Curtis’ orders to Phillips reflected the 19 th-century American belief that
Native Americans needed white help in “civilizing” themselves. But Curtis’ words also hinted at
the United States’ desire to lay claim to the material wealth of Indian Territory, and the
Choctaws’ allegiance to the Confederacy could serve as the legal underpinning to renegotiate
those claims.420
Colonel William Phillips’s February raid ultimately met with mixed results. Militarily,
Federal forces stripped the landscape of supplies, scattered small Confederate commands, routed
Confederate forces at Middle Boggy Depot, and generally demonstrated the inability of the
Confederacy to protect the region between the Arkansas and Red Rivers. Yet this show of
military force did not recreate the mass Native defections of 1862. The Choctaw and Chickasaw
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governments rebuffed Federal overtures and reaffirmed their Confederate allegiances, despite
their wariness towards Confederate pledges of aid. Those Choctaws that did signal their desire to
return to United States allegiance were too few to gain legitimacy. Moreover, attitudes towards
the Choctaws had hardened among the Union high command, who were already looking ahead to
renegotiated treaties that would further benefit the United States.
--While fighting in Indian Territory sputtered to a standstill, the war in the TransMississippi slowly built to a violent climax just a few hundred miles east. By 1864, the
Confederacy had reached a breaking point. The South’s reserves of manpower were nearly
exhausted, and Confederate transportation and logistical systems stretched thin. Hoping to
exploit the South’s deficit in men and material, newly appointed Ulysses S. Grant, commander of
all United States forces, coordinated a series of offensives across the nation designed to finally
break the Confederacy’s back. The theory was simple: if pressure could be applied everywhere,
the Confederacy would break somewhere.
In the Trans-Mississippi, the United States planned a two-pronged offensive along the
Arkansas-Louisiana corridor. The main thrust would be carried out by Major General Nathaniel
P. Banks and his Army of the Gulf. With nearly 30,000 men, Banks would strike out from
Alexandria, Louisiana towards Shreveport, following the course of the Red River with an
accompanying Union fleet in support. Banks’ expedition had several goals: the capture of
Shreveport, Confederate headquarters and a major Trans-Mississippi hub; the capture of muchneeded cotton for Northern mills; and opening a possible invasion route into East Texas, where
Abraham Lincoln hoped to install a reconstructed state government among Unionists.
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While General Banks and the Army of the Gulf marched north through Louisiana, a
secondary force under General Frederick Steele would march south from Little Rock. Moving
through southern Arkansas, Steele could threaten Shreveport from the north, forcing the
Confederates to split their already outnumbered forces. It was, in effect, a grand pincer
movement: Banks sweeping up the Red River Valley from the south; Steele pushing through the
piney woods of Arkansas from the north. Faced with large armies to their north and south, the
Federals expected General Edmund Kirby Smith to simply evacuate.
Much to their chagrin, the Confederates instead elected to fight. The Federal Red River
Campaign was a bloody disaster, a rare triumph for Confederate forces west of the Mississippi.
On April 7-8, General Richard Taylor led Confederate forces to a pair of strategic victories at
Mansfield and Pleasant Hill just south of Shreveport. At a high cost to both sides, General Taylor
battered and bruised his Union counterpart, severely shaking General Banks’ confidence and
ultimately sending the Federals into a headlong retreat down the Red River.421
While Nathanial Banks met disaster south of Shreveport, Frederick Steele’s expedition in
Arkansas fared little better. Leaving Little Rock with 10,400 men in late March, Steele found his
advance opposed by pestilent Confederate cavalry. Unable to confront Steele directly,
Confederate General Sterling Price instead relied on his five brigades of cavalry to slow Steele’s
advance and strike at his supply lines. Searching for more troops, Sterling Price requested aid
from Samuel Maxey, a request supported by Edmund Kirby Smith. Maxey immediately sent his
Texan cavalry brigade under Brigadier General Richard Gano to Price’s aid.422

421

The Red River Campaign has drawn the attention of many scholars. The classic treatment is Ludwell H.
Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics & Cotton in the Civil War (1958; repr., Kent, OH: Kent State University
Press, 1996).
422
Johnson, Red River Campaign, 170-179. Johnson’s Red River Campaign contains several chapters that
give a brief overview of the corollary Camden Expedition. The classic treatment of the Expedition is Edwin C.
Bearss’ Steele’s Retreat from Camden & the Battle of Jenkins’ Ferry, which is heavily reliant upon the Official
Records and a few published accounts. The modern standard is Michael J. Forsyth’s The Camden Expedition of

271

Yet Maxey also ordered Tandy Walker’s brigade of Choctaws towards the Arkansas line.
“Walker is a sensible man,” Maxey reported, “and I think will exert himself to take the brigade
where it may be needed, notwithstanding they are not required by the treaty to leave the
Territory.” General Maxey’s order was an adroit one. He respected the Confederate-Indian
treaties and did not order Walker to Price’s aid, but by sending the Choctaws to the Arkansas
line, he made the support available and left Walker with an obvious decision. Walker’s Choctaws
joined Gano’s Texans, and Maxey himself elected to head to Arkansas to take command of his
two-brigade division there.423
Despite their recent arrival, Maxey’s Texan and Indians soldiers quickly found
themselves in the midst of the fray. General Gano’s Texas cavalry skirmished with Federal
forces around Prairie d’Ane the first week of April, part of a wider Confederate effort to slow
Steele’s advance. Yet Steele’s larger forces continued to bully their way south, and on the
evening of April 14th, Federal forces occupied Camden, Arkansas in the southern part of the
state. The second largest town in Arkansas, Camden served as Steele’s base over the coming
weeks. It was also as far south as his ill-fated expedition got. With no direct supply line to Little
Rock, the Union army grew hungry, and Steele was forced to resort to sending large supply
trains into the surrounding countryside to forage for food. Echoing the Federals’ precarious
position at Fort Gibson the summer prior, Confederate forces targeted these supply trains as a
means to starve Steele into submission or retreat. In effect, Camden was besieged.424
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On April 18, General Maxey’s two brigades (numbering a paltry 1,335 men) joined
General John Sappington Marmaduke in a planned ambush of a Union supply train at the
crossroads of Poison Spring, Arkansas. Arriving late to the scene, Maxey humbly deferred to
Marmaduke’s leadership in the coming fight, despite Maxey’s seniority as general. Marmaduke’s
plan called for Maxey’s two brigades to make a pinning attack from the south. Once the Federals
were engaged, Marmaduke’s force would strike the Federals from the east. If all went well, the
1,169 man Federal escort would be overwhelmed, and the 198 wagons would fall into Rebel
hands. Among the Union escort were over 400 men of the First Kansas Colored Infantry, who
had clashed with Maxey’s Texans at Honey Springs the prior summer.425
The Confederate assault succeeded spectacularly. Maxey’s forces engaged the Federals in
a fierce firefight. The Texan regiments, led by Colonel Charles DeMorse of the 29th Texas,
anchored Maxey’s right during the battle and clashed with the Federals in the thickest of the fray,
“fighting as Texans know how to fight.” Their ferocity was fueled by a realization that the
African-American soldiers opposing them were the First Kansas Colored. In a destructive
moment of déjà vu, Texan cavalrymen and black Federals repeated their bloody performance at
Honey Springs in the piney hills of southern Arkansas. Eager for revenge, DeMorse’s troopers
cried out, “You First Kansas Niggers now buck to the Twenty-ninth Texas.”426
Col. Tandy Walker’s twin Choctaw and Chickasaw regiments supported the Texans from
the left, engaging the 18th Iowa Cavalry who had taken position in a wooded ravine. The Iowans
were rattled by the war whoops of the Choctaws, “a demoniac yell” as one Iowan captain
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recalled. Walker ordered his men to charge the position, and the Indians swept forward with “a
courage on the part of officers and men well becoming an army of veterans.” As DeMorse’s
Texans and Walker’s Indians slammed repeatedly into the Federal line, Marmaduke’s Arkansas
brigades finally arrived from the east to seal the Federals’ fate. Last ditch attempts to defend the
train and allow the wounded to escape failed, and Confederate forces swept over the train and
routed the blue-clad defenders. Among the Iowans, the retreat was hastened by the fear that “the
Indians were not far away.”427
As Maxey’s soldiers swept forward, the glow of victory quickly devolved into the
butchery of massacre. Texan cavalrymen, recalling their defeat at Honey Springs, took their
vengeance upon the wounded black soldiers of the First Kansas Colored. Confederate soldiers
executed wounded soldiers mercilessly, calling out “Where is the First Kansas Nigger now?”
Others responded, “All cut to pieces and got to hell by management.” During the fight,
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Lieutenant William Murphy Cravens, a white Arkansan serving as adjutant to the Choctaws,
reported to his wife, “We fought one African Regiment, and I got me a likely boy about 15
years-old.” Giving the enslaved boy to a Choctaw man “to keep when the fight was over,” the
Choctaw reported “the boy was dead: ‘White man shoot him up.’” As Rebels roamed the dead,
terrified black soldiers played dead, enduring the pain of their wounds and discomfort of wildlife
in hopes of surviving until nightfall.428
In the midst of the massacre were the Choctaws and Chickasaws of Tandy Walker’s
brigade. Scalping and stripping the dead, the Choctaws left quite an impression on observers.
“You ought to see Indians fight Negroes—kill and scalp them,” recalled Arkansan trooper
Charles Anderson. “Let me tell you, I never expected to see as many dead Negroes again. They
were so thick you could walk on them.” Private Charles Pidcocke of the 30th Texas Cavalry
wrote approvingly of the affair. “The Indians were turned loose just about the time our brigade
had them whipped. Gentlemen of the colored race suffered. The Choctaws killed every nigger
and stripped everything both black and white…This slaughter of the darkies may seem inhumane
to some people,” Pidcocke allowed,” but I for one cry bully for the Choctaws….I no longer
wonder that the war in Arkansas is war with the knife.” Killing and scalping the dead wasn’t
enough in once instance. After burying a white Union soldier, the Choctaws buried a pair of
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black Union soldiers vertically to serve as a grim headstone and footstone. Those who weren’t
slaughtering the wounded pilfered the wagon train for much-needed goods.429
Word of the Indians’ brutality spread quickly. Just days later, Confederate artilleryman
William Avera got “my first and only opportunity to see Genl Maxeys Indians.” He thought them
“a tough looking lot,” decked out in buckskin, feathers, with many toting multiple guns. Yet
Avera had heard “they were worth little, but to plunder the captured wagons” and that the
Indians “were anxious to scalp the killed negroes.” As Federal wounded and stragglers escaped
and made their way back to Union lines, news of the massacre likewise accompanied them.
Private Henry Strong of the 12th Kansas Infantry scribbled in his diary “the Rebels killed all the
darkies that fell into their hands,” including those attempting to surrender. These rumors
undoubtedly grew when a Union burial party returned to Poison Spring a few days after the fight.
“The white dead were scalped and all were stripped of clothing, which was worn by the rebels,”
an Iowa captain recalled. “To add insult to the dead officers of the colored regiment, they were
laid on their faces and a circle of their dead soldiers made around them.”430
Thoroughly documented both then and now, historians have offered various explanations
for the racial atrocity at Poison Spring. Dismissing Confederate explanations that the atrocity
stemmed from Federal plundering, Gregory Urwin convincingly argues “the perpetrators’
motives were racial.” Angered and threatened by emancipation and Union enlistment of AfricanAmericans (many of whom were runaway slaves), while likewise viewing armed black soldiers
as servile insurrection, Southerners believed the execution of black soldiers justified and
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necessary. Anne Bailey has also pointed out the Texan troops present were not known for their
discipline, an argument which could extend to the unruly Choctaws as well. Finally, the prior
defeat inflicted upon the 29th Texas and Confederate forces at Honey Springs added a regimental
feud which further exacerbated the situation.431
While these explanations all have merit, to understand the Choctaws’ role in the massacre
of Poison Spring, Arkansas, one must also recall the events of the prior two months in Indian
Territory. For the Choctaws and Chickasaws, the fight at Poison Spring offered a chance to
avenge Colonel Phillips’s February expedition. Just weeks prior to the battle, Choctaw and
Chickasaw Nations were touched for the first time by Federal raiders, who plundered crops,
livestock, burned homes, and reportedly mutilated Indian bodies. Having strewn mayhem,
Phillips’s raiders then escaped unscathed. These outrages were fresh upon the minds of Tandy
Walker’s Choctaws and Chickasaws on the eve of battle. Colonel Walker reported his men “met
and routed the [enemy], the ravagers of their country, the despoilers of their homes, and the
murderers of their women and children.” General Maxey echoed these sentiments in his own
report, noting the Choctaws “fought the very army (Thayer’s, from Fort Smith), that had
destroyed their once happy homes, insulted their women, and driven them with their children
destitute upon the world, and many an avenging blow was struck.” For the Choctaws and
Chickasaws, the killing of Union soldiers at Poison Spring was in part motivated by a desire for
revenge.432

Gregory J.W. Urwin, “‘We Cannot Treat Negroes…as Prisoners of War’”: Racial Atrocities and
Reprisals in Civil War Arkansas” in Civil War Arkansas: Beyond Battles and Leaders, edited by Anne J. Bailey and
Daniel E. Sutherland (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2000), 220; Anne J. Bailey, “Was There a
Massacre at Poison Springs?”, Military History of the Southwest 20, no. 2 (Fall, 1990), 164; Urwin, “Poison
Spring,” 125-128, Also see Black Flag Over Dixie: Racial Atrocities and Reprisals in the Civil War, edited by
Gregory J.W. Urwin (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2005).
432
“Report of Colonel Tandy Walker,” Official Records vol. 34:1, 849; “Report of Brig. Gen. Samuel B.
Maxey,” Official Records, vol. 34:1, 843.
431

277

Regardless of motivation, the massacre of black soldiers at Poison Spring went ignored
by Confederate officers and generals. Neither General Maxey nor his two brigade commanders
made any mention of it in their official reports. Indeed, Maxey’s reputation soared following the
victory, and he showered praise on his soldiers, including the Choctaws, for whom he predicted
the victory “will adorn the brightest pages in the national history of the Choctaws.” Biographers
of Maxey likewise avoid mention of the post-battle slaughter. Such silence in unacceptable.
Samuel Bell Maxey bore direct responsibility for his troops’ actions at Poison Spring. His men,
both DeMorse’s Texans and Walker’s Choctaws and Chickasaws, appear to have been the
primary instigators of the slaughter. The inability or unwillingness of Maxey, DeMorse, Walker,
and other Confederate officers to halt the massacre speaks to their condoning of it.433
In the wake of Poison Spring, Maxey’s division returned to Indian Territory. Maxey’s
contribution to the victory earned him a promotion to major general, and once again the Texan
commander turned his attention back to ousting the Federals from Indian Territory.
--The steamboat ferry slowly chugged along the high waters of the Arkansas River, having
left Fort Smith earlier in the day and bound for the Union garrison at Fort Gibson. The boat was
laden with sundry goods: hundreds of barrels of flour, thousands of pounds of bacon, 20 sacks of
much treasured green coffee, brown sugar, and other quartermaster’s stores. Upon dropping off
the goods to the hungry Federal troopers at the fort, the J.R. Williams would load up on vital salt
and lime and make the return trip down the Arkansas to Fort Smith. To guard these supplies, the
Union commander at Fort Smith—General John Thayer—sent along 26 men of the 12th Kansas
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Infantry, led by Second Lieutenant Horace Cook. Enjoying the steamboat ride was Private Henry
Albert Strong, a young gray-eyed farmer from Mound City, Kansas. Also onboard was
Lieutenant Huston, a quartermaster for the 14th Kansas Cavalry returning to his unit.434
Around four in the afternoon on June 15, 1864, approximately 50 miles from Fort Smith,
the J.R. Williams rounded the bend at Pheasant Bluff on the river. Unbeknownst to the ship’s
crew and the Union escort, perched atop the bluff were three artillery pieces. They had been
carefully positioned and camouflaged with brush by twenty-one year old Captain George
Washington Grayson of the 2nd Creek Regiment. Alongside Grayson atop the bluff were
hundreds of Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles under the command of Colonel Stand Watie.
Knowing the Arkansas’ waters were rising, Watie’s men had laid the ambushed days before,
patiently waiting for prey to arrive. As the Williams paddled into view, their prey had arrived.435
The Confederates fired a single shot over the Williams’ bow as a warning. When the boat
refused, the Rebel troopers “opened up on him in fine style and soon filled the air with the roar
of cannon and rattle of small arms.” Posted up on the hurricane deck, Henry Strong ran below to
grab his rifle to try and defend the steamboat. Faced with three artillery pieces and hundreds of
foes, however, the J.R. Williams and its small Federal escort stood little chance. Confederate
artillery carved into the ship, and with just a few rounds, the Williams’ engineer and fireman
were killed and its boiler punctured. Heavily outnumbered, the handful of Kansan infantrymen
made a brief, valiant, but futile defense. Henry Strong and his comrades hid “behind the freight
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and returned the fire to the best advantage we could.” On the southern bank, Captain Grayson
recalled the enemy “fired one volley without effect.” While the Federals tried to make a firefight
of it, the desperate pilot cleverly steered the ship towards the northern bank of the Arkansas
River.436
Realizing the futility of their situation and with a plausible means of escape, Lieutenant
Cook ordered his infantrymen to bail and dash for the treeline on the northern bank. Cook,
Strong, and his mates “all jumped overboard, water waist deep and waded ashore.” It was a long
forty yards to the treeline, and the Confederates “kept up a most terrific fire,” but only two
Federals were lightly wounded. With the ship damaged and its Federal escort fled, the Williams’
captain and pilot raised a white flag from the pilot house. Also onboard was Lieutenant Huston,
who apparently hid below decks during the fight and now jumped at the chance to surrender.
Watching from the northern shore, Lieutenant Cook and his men had hoped to use their rifles to
keep the Rebels at bay from the ship. To their dismay, they watched as Confederates took
possession of the surrendered boat and floated her towards the southern shore. Unable to do
more, Cook, Strong, and the Kansans spent a long, hungry day making their way back to Fort
Smith overland.437
The Confederates were overjoyed with their captured loot. Col. Watie appointed a guard
and set to work moving the captured goods to the shore. Having faced material shortages nearly
the entire war, discipline broke down among the Rebel raiders when faced with such a plethora
of goods: bacon, hominy, salt pork, flour, brown sugar, coffee, tin cups, and more. Watie
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lamented that the “Creeks and Seminoles immediately broke off to carry their booty home.”
Worse than the erosion of discipline, Watie had no means to immediately transport the goods;
there were no wagons and the roads were in “wretched condition.” Ironically, when presented
with a sudden opportunity to mitigate their woeful supplies, the Confederates didn’t have the
logistical capability to move it. And it would only be so long before the Federals returned.
The following afternoon, Lieutenant Cook, Private Strong, and the Kansans wearily
arrived at Fort Smith and reported the disastrous capture of the J.R. Williams. Angry, General
Thayer dispatched the 2nd Indian Home Guard from that place, and on the morning of June 17th
the Indians reached the north bank of Arkansas, opposite the wrecked Williams and the
Confederate camp. A frustrated Watie couldn’t afford to fight the Federals with his meager
numbers, but also lacked the ability to carry the goods away. Captain Washington outlined
Watie’s predicament: “Here we were only a scout of some fifteen hundred men far away from
our base, with light artillery of great value to our army. To jeopardize this as well as other
interests only in the hope of saving a quantity of hominy and salt pork was not wise military
judgement.” Watie ordered his soldiers to take all they could carry, and the remainder was set
alight. The Federals pursued briefly, but were checked. Content with forcing Watie to abandon
the loot, they retreated back towards Fort Smith.438
The attack on the J.R. Williams marked the first clash in Confederate efforts to retake
control of the Arkansas River Valley in the summer of 1864. Like his predecessors, Maxey
understood the “true defense of this Territory, and consequently of Northern Texas, was north of
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the Arkansas River.” Although Phillips’s Expedition and the Red River Campaign delayed his
campaign, he believed it vital to retake Fort Gibson and Fort Smith. To do this, Maxey identified
the same weakness that General Steele had pinpointed in 1863: the weakness of Federal logistics.
“The forces at Fort Gibson and Fort Smith must now depend to a great extent upon wagon
trains,” Maxey reported. “When the Arkansas rise, if the navigation of the river is left
uninterrupted, they can get everything they want and lay in spring supplies.” With the Federals
holed up in their fortifications, striking the Federals’ supply lines was the key to weakening and
perhaps ousting the Union from Indian Territory. Although the navigable waters of the Arkansas
did indeed offer a convenient means of resupply for Fort Gibson, Watie’s attack on the J.R.
Williams exposed the weakness of that water route and forced the Federals to once again rely on
long and vulnerable supply trains to keep Fort Gibson’s garrison supplied. 439
--The repulse of the General Steele’s Camden Expedition and the destruction of the J.R.
Williams bolstered Rebel morale and kept Federal forces on the defensive. As the summer wore
on, Confederates searched for another opportunity to weaken Federal control in the region and
perhaps wrest control of the Arkansas Valley from the Union’s grasp. In late July, just such an
opening presented itself. Douglas Cooper received reports of a Federal detachment of cavalry
grazing on Massard Prairie, five miles south of Fort Smith. Away from the extensive
fortifications of Fort Smith, 200 troopers of the 6th Kansas Cavalry lay vulnerable to attack. Yet
shortages of forage demanded that Yankee troopers graze their mounts outside the town’s
fortified lines.440
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Seizing his chance, Douglas Cooper quickly concocted a complex plan involving Indian
and Texan troops attacking the Union forces from multiple approaches. General Richard Gano
would lead the forces in the field. When Gano arrived in the vicinity, he discovered fewer Indian
soldiers had arrived than expected. Scrapping Cooper’s complicated battle plan, Gano elected
instead for a simple, straightforward attack on the unsuspecting enemy. In the predawn hours of
July 27, nearly 600 Confederate troopers gathered for an attack less than a mile south of Massard
Prairie.441
The Confederates struck at sunrise. Sweeping north, the mounted Rebels stormed into the
Federal picket line. Although Union pickets quickly fired on the oncoming foes, they were
driven back into the main camp almost immediately, affording almost no time for the Kansan
troopers to gather their mounts. A hasty message asking for aid was sent to the nearby 14 th
Kansas Cavalry (encamped some two miles away). Within minutes, the Confederates burst out of
the southern timber line and swept forward into Massard Prairie. Unable to gather their mounts
in time, Union troopers fought as infantry. Their commander, Captain David Mefford, managed
to form the troopers into a battle line and attempted to drive off the Confederate host. Though
severely outnumbered, the Yankee troopers toted Sharps carbines and revolvers, and their
firepower checked the initial charges of the Rebels. Yet Confederates countered the Federal
firepower by sweeping forward in brief charges, firing their guns, then retiring out of range of
the enemy carbines. Captain Mefford kept up a valiant fighting retreat, falling back towards a
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house on the north side of the prairie. “The men behaved splendidly,” one Kansan lieutenant
recalled, “repulsing repeated charges of the enemy’s cavalry, Captain Mefford doing all in his
power to keep the men well in hand and stimulating them by his example.”442
Yet Confederate numbers soon took their toll. Confederate troopers surrounded Captain
Mefford’s beleaguered command and chased down they few mounted Federals who attempted to
escape northward. While the majority of the Confederate command kept up the attacks, others
fell out to strip the dead of much-needed supplies. With no prospect of escape and no idea if the
14th Kansas Cavalry was en route, Captain Mefford and the Kansans were forced to surrender.
The 6th Kansas Cavalry suffered 10 killed, 20 wounded, and at least 120 captured (including
Captain Mefford). The Confederates suffered 7 or 8 killed and 26 wounded.443
Adding to the sweetness of their tidy little victory, Confederate troopers gathered a
veritable fortune of small arms and supplies strewn across the prairie. The Rebels netted
themselves 200 Sharps carbines and 400 revolvers. For haggard troopers who carried hunting
rifles, shotguns, or infantry arms for much of the war, such arms were a delight. Besides
firearms, the Rebels secured horses, sutler’s stores, and other much needed equipment. One
captured wagon contained the regimental flag and records of the 6th Kansas. Lieutenant William
Murphy Cravens of the Choctaw Regiment confided to his wife Mary, “Soldiers came back,
especially the Choctaws, loaded with clothing and plunder of every kind. Guns, saddles, pistols,
camp kettles, buckets, cups, blankets, hats, boots, and the ponys [sic] fairly groaned under their
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tremendous freightage which in bulk at least would often have exceeded the ponys themselves.”
What the Confederates couldn’t keep, they burned. Douglas Cooper credited the “brilliant and
dashing affair” to General Gano.444
Encouraged by their success at Massard Prairie, Confederate officers contemplated a
more serious attack on Fort Smith. Yet the town and post of Fort Smith were ringed by wellengineered fortifications, including several strong forts along the southward Texas Road. As
General John Thayer, Union commander of Fort Smith, crowed, “The place is
impregnable…[with] a continuous line of rifle-pits, with an extensive abatis form the Arkansas
around to the Poteau River.” Thayer felt secure in his control of the Arkansas River Valley: “I
have no fears as to this place [Fort Smith] or Gibson.” Yet Thayer’s garrison was not overly
large, and if the Confederates could retake Fort Smith, it would leave the entire Arkansas River
Valley (including Fort Gibson) vulnerable.445
Taking several days to gather a larger force, General Douglas Cooper advanced again
towards Fort Smith on the morning of July 31. Douglas’ force approached Fort Smith from the
south and included Gano’s Texas brigade, Stand Watie’s Cherokee brigade, and Sampson
Folsom’s Choctaw brigade. While Cooper moved toward the city’s southern defenses,
Confederate Creeks demonstrated against the Federal earthworks near the Poteau River west of
the city.446
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In the vanguard, Stand Watie’s Cherokees moved ahead long the Texas Road toward Fort
Smith, with Texans and Choctaws in reserve. The Cherokees swept forward, running over picket
outpost of the none other than the 6th Kansas, who yet again found themselves bullied by a larger
Confederate force. The Kansan troopers fell back towards Fort Smith’s entrenchments, while
Watie’s troopers scoured the captured picket posts. Watie and his troopers enjoyed “a good
dinner prepared and several camp kettles full of hot Lincoln coffee.”447
Both the Federals and Confederates began to consolidate their positions. Federal forces
began to appear in larger numbers, while Douglas Cooper ordered the rest of his command up to
Watie’s support. With a two-gun battery in support, the Confederates pushed the Federals back
and began shelling the city’s fortifications. Yet the Federals continued to bring up more men,
including the rest of the 6th Kansas Cavalry and portions of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry. Also
pulled forward were the Parrott rifles of the 2nd Kansas Battery, whose range and accuracy far
eclipsed the Confederates smoothbore howitzers. Countering the Confederate battery fire, a onesided artillery duel quickly silenced the Confederate guns. As Kansan Private Henry Strong
noted, “Our batteries played them so lively that they had to retreat back out of range.” The
Confederate guns withdrew, and as the Federals shifted their artillery fire toward the Confederate
troopers, the entire command retreated. The next day, Cooper withdrew his brigades back into
Indian Territory. Though Cooper declared “a vigorous attack with the whole force, though
doubtless it would have been attended with heavy loss on our side, I believe would have resulted
in the capture of the place,” his troopers were “tired and hungry,” mounts were haggard, and the
Choctaws enlistment was about to expire. Although Cooper hoped the Federals might evacuate
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the fort on their own accord, they did not, and Cooper was satisfied the Fort Smith’s defenses
were too much to overcome.448
The Battle of Massard Prairie and the subsequent probe of Fort Smith represented the
Confederacy’s last serious attempt to retake control of the Arkansas River Valley. Massard
Prairie and the fight at Fort Smith allowed the Rebels to capture or destroy a fair amount of
supplies. The luckless 6th Kansas Cavalry was likewise ravaged. Union citizens around Fort
Smith, panicked by the burst of Confederate activity, flooded the city and created logistical
nightmares for Federal officials. Yet the great prize—control of Fort Smith itself—eluded the
Confederates. As long as the Arkansas River Valley and its bastions at Fort Gibson and Fort
Smith remained in enemy hands, the Confederates had little strategic control over the region.449
Praised by Douglas Cooper for his service, General Richard Gano was instead privately
frustrated with the whole affair. Having fought with cavalier John Hunt Morgan earlier in the
war, Gano had grown “accustomed to a more efficient and exciting service” and felt dissatisfied
with the ineptitude and tedium of service in Indian Territory. Writing a confidential letter to
Samuel Maxey, Gano confided, “I had it in my power also to have exhausted and taken Fort
Smith, if we had had forage & water for our horses, but without forage and not allowed closely
to invest, the marches to & soon broke down our horses.” Gano believed had the besieged the
town and attacked enemy wagon trains, Fort Smith would’ve fallen. But the lack of Rebels’ lack
of supplies “was the great hindrance.” Moreover, Gano expressed his lack of faith in the abilities

“Report of Brig. Gen. Douglas H. Cooper,” August 10, 1864, Official Records 41:1, 31-36; Strong, “A
Rough Introduction to This Sunny Land”, 54; Arey, “‘The Place Is Well Fortified’,” 7-8.
449
“Report of Brig. Gen. Douglas H. Cooper,” August 10, 1864, Official Records 41:1, 31-36.
448

287

of Confederate Indians units, sentiments which his men shared (although Gano never publicly
revealed this opinion). He hoped to transfer out of Indian Territory.450
While Cooper and Gano’s assertions that Fort Smith could have been taken are debatable,
Gano’s private frustrations reflected the discontent among Confederate officers and men alike at
the constant failures within Indian Territory. His letter also reveals the doubts harbored by white
soldiers as to the efficacy of their Indian allies. Somewhat ironically, however, Gano and his
troopers were soon to experience one of the most daring and spectacular Confederate victories of
the war.
--However dour Richard Gano’s outlook on Indian Territory, it improved radically within a
few weeks. “I feel in rather good humor today and some what hopeful, probably because there is
a prospect for fish to day for dinner,” Gano wrote to General Maxey, “but more likely…because
you are going to send me an order to north of the Arkansas River, and do all the damage to the
Yanks I can up there.” The good-natured, aggressive Kentuckian looked forward to the prospect
of combat, confident that “Genl Stand Watie would cooperate with us…and I am satisfied some
good opportunities have and are being presented. What say you?”451
General Gano was not alone in his desire to take the field. Stand Watie had likewise been
agitating for some time to strike north. The timing of these commanders couldn’t have been
better. Within the wider Trans-Mississippi theater, Lieutenant General Edmund Kirby Smith had
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already approved a major expedition north from Arkansas into Missouri under General Sterling
Price. When General Maxey forwarded his commanders’ desire to take the offensive, General
Smith acquiesced and ordered “the two expeditions should march so as to be in the field of
operations about the same time.” Generals Gano and Watie would cooperate and strike before
October 1.452
Eager for mischief, Generals Gano and Watie met in mid-September to hash out the
details of their grand raid. Their plans were shaped by the arrival of fresh intelligence from
Douglas Cooper, who had learned of an isolated Federal detachment cutting hay near the Grand
River in Cherokee Nation. It was further expected that a Federal supply wagon from Fort Scott
should be passing through the area any day. Watie was thoroughly familiar with the area, having
clashed and been defeated by Federal forces at Cabin Creek off the Grand River the prior
summer. The two men would sweep north, attack the hay camp, strike any nearby supply trains,
threaten Fort Gibson if the opportunity presented, then ride back south. Of the same rank, the
two men simply agreed to act “together and harmoniously” rather than designate an overall
commander. Gano’s brigade numbered 1,200 Texans with six guns, and Watie’s forces consisted
of 800 Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole Indians.453
The Rebel raiders crossed the Arkansas River on September 15, and the following day
they crossed the Verdigris River and approached the Federal detachment gathering hay. The
Federals were stationed along the Texas Road on Flat Rock Creek, not far from the Grand River
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and over a dozen miles north of Fort Gibson. The pair of Confederate generals quickly agreed
upon a plan, sending First Cherokee and Thirtieth Texas Cavalry on a flanking maneuver
towards the south around the enemy’s right flank. While the Texans and Cherokees maneuvered
around the unsuspecting foe, Gano and Watie watched from a nearby hilltop, and with “spy
glasses could see them at working making hay, little dreaming that the rebels were watching
them.” Having surveilled the area while the flanking column moved along, the generals deployed
their forces for the main attack: Watie’s Indians on the left, Gano’s Texans in the center and
right. The Rebel forces swept forward, with the flanking detachment firmly in behind the enemy.
“The clouds looked somber,” Gano reported, “and the V-shape procession grand as we moved
forward in the work of death.”454
The unsuspecting Federal detachment guarding the hay party consisted of 125 men
belonging to the veteran 1st Kansas Colored Infantry and the 2nd Kansas Cavalry. Union pickets
offered an early warning of the enemy’s advance, estimating the Rebel force at 200, and the
small escort party formed in a ravine “to repel an attack or protect the hay.” Yet it quickly
became clear the Rebels were far larger than believed. The Rebels attacked the small Federal
force “from five different points.” Dismounted Confederates advanced while the cavalry made
several charges, “handsomely repulsed by the colored infantry and dismounted cavalry.” General
Gano sent an officer forward to demand the Federals’ surrender, but “they fired upon my flag
and then commenced the work of death in earnest.” The Federals continued to fight, but pushed
back into Flat Rock Creek and surrounded by the enemy, their situation was hopeless. Desperate,
the Kansan troopers made a mounted charge attempting to break out, but only fifteen managed to
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escape. Left to fend for themselves, black soldiers of the 1st Kansas Colored fell back along Flat
Rock Creek and continued to resist until ammunition ran out. Compounding their disaster, Texan
artillery was brought up. “One shot was thrown in their midst, and had the desired effect” one
Rebel reported, “they scattered in all directions along the Creek.”455
As was becoming standard in racial clashes in the region, Confederate soldiers showed
the African-American soldiers no mercy and killed many blacks after the battle. The only
survivors were the few Kansans who broke out and a few black soldiers who “concealed
themselves in a ravine untill [sic] dark and then crawled away.” General Gano crowed, “The sun
witnessed our complete success, and its last lingering rays rested upon a field of blood. Seventythree Federals, mostly negroes, lay dead upon the field.” Gano remained silent on how those
black soldiers died. Private Jefferson Baze of the 30th Texas Cavalry was less obtuse. He
remembered “the negroes were nearly all killed in a little creek…The water was red with the
blood of the dead negroes.” Writing back to the Clarksville Standard in Texas, an unnamed
correspondent reported that some black soldiers attempted to hide in the creek with their noses
just above the water. The “native sagacity” of the Indians flushed out the black soldiers. “Call to
memory the Choctaws at Poison Springs,” the Texan admitted, “and you have the remainder of
the fight described.” After the butchery was over, Watie’s Indians pulled the black bodies from
the ravine and stripped them.456
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Having defeated the small Union contingent, Rebel forces plundered the small Federal
camp for goods. They set alight several thousand tons of hay, likewise destroying the mowing
machines, wagons, and other equipment. Yet the Rebels did not linger. They learned from
captured Kansans that the wagon train from Fort Scott was headed down the Texas Road and
was indeed in the vicinity. Over the next few days, Confederate forces spread out along the
Texas Road and clashed with several small parties of Federals, keeping a watchful eye for the
coveted supply train.457
While the Rebels kept lookout, the Federal wagon train received warning from Fort
Gibson that Confederate raiders were prowling the area. With 300 wagons and a considerable
mule herd to protect, Major Henry Hopkins—commander of the train’s escort—was ordered to
hurry ahead to Cabin Creek, a strong defensive position which included a small stockade. From
there, Hopkins and his men would await further orders. Included among Hopkins’ 610 man
escort were elements of the 2nd, 6th, and 14th Cavalry, along with 310 Cherokees of the 1st and 2nd
Indian Home Guard. The wagon train and escort reached the apparent safety of Cabin Creek on
the morning of September 18. Furthermore, the Federals knew that a relief column consisting of
six companies of the 3rd Indian Home Guard was en route. Unbeknownst to Hopkins, another
relief force of 2,500 men, including the remainder of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry, was on the
way from the vicinity of Fort Smith under Col. James Williams.458
Within a few hours, Confederates discovered the Federals’ whereabouts. General Gano
personally led a 400-man scouting party north along the Texas Road, and in the afternoon, the
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Kentuckian discovered the Federal train encamped at Cabin Creek. Undetected for the moment,
Gano fired off a message to Stand Watie to bring up the rest of the Confederate force. While
Gano’s Texans awaited reinforcements, the Federals roused to the Rebels’ presence but did not
determine their strength. Finally, around midnight, Watie arrived. The Kentuckian and Cherokee
generals “agreed to move on the enemy at once, who was aware of our approach, but entirely
ignorant of our numbers.” Facing north, Watie’s Indians formed on the left while Gano’s Texans
occupied the right. The Rebels occupied “an elevated prairie that descended to the enemy’s
position on the creek.” With the bright moon to shining behind them, the 2,000 Rebels
advanced.459
Major Henry Hopkins’ Federal escort occupied a strong position. The Federals were
formed in line of battle north of Cabin Creek, awaiting the Rebels approach amidst the cover of
the timber and brush lining the creek. On the left side of their line, the Federals enjoyed the
benefit of Joseph L. Martin’s small home, which had been transformed into an impromptu
fortification by the addition of a wooden stockade. In front of the small post, the Federals had
aligned ten large ricks of hay parallel to the creek, offering additional cover. Behind the post, the
Federal wagon train was partially circled, and the train’s teamsters were armed. In front of the
Federal line, picket posts offered early warning, and around midnight the Federal pickets
sounded the alarm.460
Unsure of what to expect, Major Hopkins ordered Captain Patrick Cosgrove of the 2nd
Kansas Cavalry to reinforce the forward picket post with two dozen men. Riding forward in the
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moonlit darkness, Cosgrove nearly blundered into the Confederate lines. Pulling back, he sent
word of the Rebel advance and took command of the pickets’ skirmishing with the advancing
foe. As the Confederates drew nearer, the two sides came within speaking distance of one
another, and a somewhat absurd conversation between Captain Cosgrove and General Gano
broke out. Perhaps hoping to secure a surrender, Gano called out for the enemy to identify
themselves. Cosgrove simply replied, “Federals.” Returning the question, Gano responded
“Rebels, by God.” Cosgrove then “called on God to damn us,” as Gano later noted, “and invited
us to come forward.” Gano asked for a flag of truce, and Captain Cosgrove dutifully sent word
back to Major Hopkins of the offer. Hopkins was willing to meet with the Rebels and ordered
Cosgrove to accept the flag.461
Yet this back and forth took time, and Gano interpreted the delay as a bit of Yankee
trickery. Growing suspicious the Federals were attempting to withdraw the wagon train, Gano
advanced his men another two hundred yards. The Federals in turn saw the Rebels’ advance as
an abuse of the irregular truce. With both sides impatient and misunderstanding the situation, the
truce broke down. Commanding only a small picket post, Cosgrove refused to allow the
Confederates to advance further and opened fire. The Rebels charged and pushed Cosgrove back,
and around 3 a.m. fighting erupted along the entire length of the Union and Confederate lines.
Major Hopkins still didn’t fully understand his predicament; he still believed he was facing 600800 Confederate raiders bereft of artillery. Holding off such a force seemed manageable,
especially with reinforcements from the 3rd Indian on the way. Hopkins was willing to fight it out
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and “encouraged my men to hold out until daylight,” when the Kansan captain hoped
reinforcements would arrive.462
Engaged in a rare night battle, the fighting was confused. Though the “firing was heavy
and incessant,” Stand Watie confessed “it was difficult to ascertain the enemy’s exact position
and strength.” Yet Major Hopkins was becoming aware the Confederate foe to his front was far
greater than expected. When the Confederates opened up with artillery, it proved an ugly
surprise. In a reverse of the First Battle of Cabin Creek a year prior, the Confederates now
enjoyed the advantage in artillery and opened up a devastating “cross-fire” on the Federals’
position. As the Confederates advanced in two lines and artillery rounds landed nearby, Union
teamsters panicked and “stampeded,” cutting mules free from the wagons and riding north
towards Fort Scott. The teamsters’ rout not only left the Federal forces shorthanded, but it also
stranded the wagon train. The train’s immobility proved critical. During the night, Watie’s
Indians managed to overrun part of the Federal wagon train on the far right of the Union line and
withdraw them to the Rebel rear.463
With part of the train in Confederate hands and the rest of the train immobile, Gano
ordered his forces “back under the brow of the hill” to rest for an hour until daybreak. As the sun
rose, the Confederate raiders gained full view of the enemy position for the first time. Still
fearful the trains might escape, Watie ordered his Cherokee regiments on the left to cross the
creek with support of Texan artillery. Though unnecessary (the trains were stuck), this lodgment
on the north side of the creek offered an “advantageous position” for a renewed Confederate
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assault. Confederate artillery opened from 100 yards, focusing fire on the hay ricks, wagon train,
and stockade.464
While Watie’s Cherokees and the Texan guns wreaked havoc among the Federals, Gano
sent John Jumper’s Seminoles and the 30th Texas Cavalry on a wide flanking maneuver to the
left. The Confederates’ attack bent back the Federal right flank, with Gano personally leading a
charge of the 30th Texas, but the blue-clad troopers rallied and made a stand. The battle boiled to
a violent crescendo. “Crash after crash swept Yankees, negroes, Pins, and mules away from the
land of the living,” enthused Gano, “and the brave Indians, having replenished their ammunition,
came again to the work, and all with a loud shout rushed on to victory, driving the enemy beyond
their fortifications, from where they fled in wild confusion.” As the flank gave way and the
escort fled, Major Hopkins desperately tried to gather the “scattered troops” of his command and
reform them near the Grand River, several miles to the east. The wagon train was lost, and the
Confederate avenged their loss on the same ground a year prior. The Federals reported no more
than 35 casualties at the Second Battle of Cabin Creek, but their Confederate foes claimed 97
killed and 111 taken prisoners. Confederate reports claimed 7 killed and 38 wounded among
their own ranks.465
With the Federals routed, the Confederate raiders took stock of their newly captured, long
sought-after wagon train. Approximately $1,500,000 worth of goods now lay in Rebel hands,
including sutler’s goods and governments stores. The Confederate generals were able to clothe
their entire 2,000 man command from the train’s stores. Reports reached Union lines that
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Confederate Cherokees got drunk on liquor found in the trains and killed wounded. While the
Rebel raiders pilfered the train, Generals Gano and Watie worked to get the train mobile. Over
100 wagons were simply too broke down to travel and were set alight. So too were thousands of
pounds of hay burned, and the dense smoke was visible to the routed Federals miles away. The
remaining 130 wagon, along with 740 mules, were hitched up and prepared to move. The
Confederates were anxious to get the immense train moving south, in hopes of quickly reaching
the relatively safe territory south of the Arkansas River.466
The Confederates’ escape from Cabin Creek did not come easily. Although
reinforcements had not arrived in time to save Major Hopkins or the train, they were not far off,
either. As the Confederates worked their way south on September 19, they found the brigade of
Colonel James M. Williams, including the bulk of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry, blocking their
path at Pryor’s Creek. Word had reached William’s Federals of the disaster at Cabin Creek, and
they were hopeful they could block the Rebels’ escape. Yet the Federals were in poor condition
for a fight. They had marched eighty-two miles in forty-six hours and were “exhausted from hard
marching without rest.” Still, the game if tired Federals nevertheless formed into line of battle,
and Col. Williams deployed his Parrott rifles to good effect. The Federals’ rifled artillery enjoyed
longer ranger and greater accuracy than the Confederates’ guns. Captain John Graton of the 1st
Kansas Colored happily recounted to his wife that “the second shot from our guns struck right in
front of theirs you had better believe there was some scampering to get away from there.”
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Throughout the day, scattered skirmishing sputtered along and artillery dueled. Captain Graton
got the impression the enemy “did not seem very anxious to attack.”467
John Graton’s comment proved prescient. Although Watie and Gano both claimed they
pushed Williams’ force back several miles (Williams’ report claimed the opposite), Confederates
had no real interest in a fight. Their focus was escaping with their captured wagon train. To that
effect, Richard Gano engaged in some trickery of his own. Ordering a single empty wagon to be
run over a patch of stony ground throughout the night, Gano hoped to give the impression the
wagon train was being parked in the Rebel rear. In reality, the train was sent “with all possible
dispatch toward the Arkansas River.” The next morning, the Federals discovered to their chagrin
the enemy “had got the train beyond our reach.” Since the Rebels were primarily cavalry, they
were simply able to ride away from the battlefield once the train made goods its escape, leaving
Colonel Williams and his foot soldiers frustrated.468
Hurrying south “with all dispatch day and night” over the next few days, the
Confederates made good their escape. The Rebel raiders returned to a hero’s welcome. General
Douglas Cooper issued congratulatory orders, declaring “The brilliancy and completeness of this
expedition has not been excelled in the history of the war.” Generals Gano and Watie were
complimentary to each other and their respective commands; Watie praised “the greatest
unanimity and good feeling existed between the officers and men of the two brigades.” General
Samuel Bell Maxey heralded the raid as part of a wider series of Confederate successes that
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summer: repelling the Federal invaders in Arkansas, the capture of the J.R. Williams, the victory
at Massard Prairie and operations around Fort Smith, the and now the victories at Flat Rock and
Cabin Creeks. Confederate morale soared in the wake of these victories, no doubt in part due to
the material spoils that accompanied them. Yet Maxey also conceded “there is a cruel enemy still
cursing your country; there is still work to do.”469
General Maxey’s words highlight the hollowness of Confederate operations in Indian
Territory and Arkansas in 1864. The 1864 campaign season was a veritable flurry of activity;
arguably the most military active season in Indian Territory during the entire war. Confederates
enjoyed an unprecedented string of successes, and Federal commanders were frustrated. The
United States’ attempt to liberate southern Arkansas and north Louisiana had been disastrously
foiled, and defeats at Massard Prairie and Cabin Creek were embarrassing and spoke of
mismanagement.
Yet Confederate victories failed to alter the larger strategic picture in any way. The
Federals still firmly controlled Fort Gibson, Fort Smith, Little Rock, and the Arkansas River line.
Though the defeat at Cabin Creek ensured the garrison at Fort Gibson would go hungry for a
while, the Confederates hasty escape southward attested to the United States’ firm control over
the territory north of the Arkansas. In 1863, Fort Gibson was a lone Federal outpost on the
Arkansas River, far in advance of the Union line of operations. The capture of a wagon train the
year prior would’ve meant starvation, surrender, or evacuation. By 1864, however, the loss of
their wagon train was an embarrassment, a discomfort, and nothing more. For all their tidy
victories and brilliant raids, Confederate forces in Indian Territory were still trapped south of the
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Arkansas River; for Confederate Indians, their homelands were still occupied by the enemy. That
situation wouldn’t change in the coming months.470
The 1864 campaigns also witnessed a crescendo in racial atrocity and scalping in Indian
Territory. The most infamous example were Choctaw and Texan atrocities at Poison Spring,
usually (and rightly) attributed to racial motivations. Yet in the case of the Choctaw, these
atrocities also stemmed from a desire for revenge for the plunder of their homelands just weeks
earlier by Federal forces under Colonel William Phillips, whose Kansan troopers reportedly
mutilated Indian bodies. As the campaign season wore on, the massacre of African-American
soldiers continued at Flat Rock Creek and Cabin Creek. In short, by the end of the Civil War,
racial massacres and mutilation were fundamental aspects of wartime Indian Territory.
The 1864 campaigns also proved to be the last. As if compensating for the tide of battles,
raids, and skirmishes in 1864, both Confederate and Union forces settled down for the autumn
and winter seasons. The Second Battle of Cabin Creek proved to be the last major engagement of
the Civil War in Indian Territory. While militarily quiet, the always roiling military politics of
Indian Territory continued unabated in the last winter of the war. Douglas Cooper, continually
aggrieved that he did not hold district command, continued a quiet campaign to oust Samuel Bell
Maxey—by all account an efficient and well-liked commander—from his post. Cooper’s
complaints eventually reached his old friend Jefferson Davis and Richmond. General Maxey,
sensing the ground shifting underneath his feet, resigned. Douglas Cooper was appointed
commander of the District of Indian Territory in the spring of 1865. A mediocre officer
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inheriting a weary, exhausted district, Cooper ironically could do little militarily when he finally
ascended to the command he always wanted.
Federal forces likewise underwent command changes. General J.J. Reynolds assumed
command of the District, and General Cyrus Bussey took command of the critical border post of
Fort Smith. Yet as the Union army focused on strangling Richmond and cutting the Confederacy
in two in the Western Theater, Federal forces in the Trans-Mississippi were largely content to
cling to the Arkansas River line. After years of intra-tribal warfare, Federal invasions, ceaseless
raiding, innumerable skirmishes, the war in Indian Territory quietly began to fade away.
--It was in this chaotic summer of expeditions and raids and massacres that the Loyal
Indian refugees finally returned home. Having spent years struggling to survive in camps in
central Kansas, they accompanied the Union army wagon trains to Fort Gibson in June of 1864.
It was not the jubilant homecoming they might’ve hoped for. “We can see nothing but Starvation
before us, already we have had a taste of what is to come this winter,” Creek leaders pleaded to
Indian Commissioner William Dole within a month of arriving at Fort Gibson. “It was a terrible
mistake that we were not brought down here in time to raise a crop for ourselves, had that been
done, we could in great measure have supported ourselves.” The Loyal Indians had simply traded
refugee camps in Kansas for new ones near the Arkansas River.471
This was not the first time Native American refugees from Indian Territory attempted to
return home. Hundreds, perhaps even over a thousand, of Creeks and Seminoles had
accompanied the First Indian Expedition into the Territory in the summer of 1862. With many
Native American men serving in the Indian Home Guard, it’s probable many of these refugees
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were family members. When the expeditionary forces mutinied and retreated north to Kansas,
many of the refugees felt “entirely unprotected” and worried the Rebels would “cause a reign of
terror among the loyal Indian families who had returned to their homes.”472
In the summer of 1863, as Federal forces returned to Indian Territory again to occupy
Fort Gibson, Colonel William Phillips requested that the Cherokees in Kansas be allowed to
return home. The Cherokees and their Indian Agent Justin Harlan were assured by Colonel
Phillips they would be protected upon their return. Roughly 1,000 Cherokee Indians returned to
Cherokee Nation, and Agent Harlan provided vital seed and farming supplies necessary to
raising a crop. Yet Union military authorities proved overzealous in their capabilities. Col.
Phillips and his forces were clinging to their defenses at Fort Gibson, fighting to keep the supply
lines open. Unable to protect the Loyal Cherokees in the countryside, in May Rebel raiders under
Stand Watie prowled the countryside and “robbed the women and children of everything they
could find,” stripping the refugees of food, horses, livestock, wagons, seeds and farming tools,
clothing, and bedding. Reports of murder and burned homes circulated as well. As Agent Harlon
mourned, “Their destitution is almost complete.” Bereft of security, property, or food, the
Cherokees moved towards Fort Gibson for protection. The cause of the Cherokees’ woes, the
Union army now had to feed and clothe the Cherokee refugees at Fort Gibson throughout the
winter of 1863-1864.473
By the spring of 1864, despite these earlier migrations of refugees to Indian Territory,
thousands of Native American refugees still resided in Kansas. Yet the victory at Honey Springs
and permanent occupations of Fort Gibson and Fort Smith afforded an opportunity for larger
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numbers of refugees to return home. As ever, the Loyal Indians desired to return home. Due to
winter conditions, scarce grass, and high water conditions, however, the Indians did not depart
for Indian Territory until mid-May. Southern Superintendent of Indian Affairs William Coffin
oversaw the removal of 5,000 Native Americans from Kansas down into Indian Territory, a
relatively smooth journey took nearly a month. On June 15, the Loyal Indians arrived in the
vicinity of Fort Gibson.474
While the delayed departure date from Kansas afforded easier travel, it also ensured the
Native refugees arrived too late to plant crops. Creek Chief Oktaharsharjo learned that Indians
who had already migrated to Indian Territory nearly starved in the winter of 1863-1864,
resorting to “hunt out the little corn that fell from the Horses and Mules of the military.” With
thousands more refugee mouths to feed as the winter of 1864-1865 approached, Oktaharsharjo
worried “the suffering must be much greater next winter, than it was last, unless the most prompt
and energetic steps are taken to procure and transport supplies to this place.” Military authorities
struggled to keep the Indians fed, each arrival of a wagon train bringing just enough to stave off
starvation.475
For the Loyal Creeks in particular, their return to Indian Territory proved difficult. While
Cherokees could return to their homes north of the Arkansas River, much of the Creek Nation
lay in the no-man’s-land south of the Arkansas. In January, Oktaharsharjo reported that his
people were encamped in low-lying swampland across the river “within two or three of our own
country and wishing anxiously to be in our own dear country; but without any prospect of
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moving into it.” Oktaharsharjo pleaded with U.S. authorities to offer protection, citing “the
Treaties made by them to our forefathers,” which “guarantee to us protections and in accordance
with these treaties we hope & beg for protection.” The Creeks also emphasized their desire to
“raise our own provisions for next year,” which necessitated returning home.476
Unfortunately for the Creeks and many other refugees, returning home simply wasn’t a
viable option. Focused on decisively defeating the Confederacy elsewhere, relatively few troops
were assigned to Indian Territory. Without the protection of Federal troops, it was unsafe for
many to return home, which in turn meant the Loyal Indians remained refugees—entirely
dependent on the United States for survival.
The return of the Loyal Indians in 1864 contributed dramatically to an already
burgeoning refugee crises in Indian Territory. After two Federal invasions in 1862 and 1863, the
Phillips’s Expedition into Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations in 1864, and innumerable raids,
skirmishes, and guerrilla actions, most of Indian Territory’s civilian denizens were destitute. As
we have seen, the war in Indian Territory often proved brutal, with scalpings and atrocities
occurring with some frequency. Yet this military brutality mirrored the blurring of military and
civilian lines throughout the war years. As control of Indian Territory continually changed hands,
often leaving no one in charge at all, it was easy for soldiers to engaged in theft and murder.
Guerrillas turned bandit. Civilians settled old scores. And the ranks of the refugees continually
swelled.
Civilians often suffered at the hands of Indians whose loyalties differed from their own.
Cherokee minister Stephen Foreman, a self-professed “Watie man,” complained of the violence
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that pro-Union “Pin” Indians waged against their own people in the summer of 1862. His diary
recorded the litany of rumors and misdeeds that spoke of fear sweeping the countryside. “Mr.
Ursery, a white man with a Cherokee family—they [Pins] cut him up alive.” He heard rumors o
the murder of his brother Alex Foreman, and also of Abijah Hicks, “an inoffensive man and if
killed, it was either for his abolition sentiments or his property, for no one with a good horse or
any property is safe.” As several points Reverend Foreman feared for his own life, sleeping in his
cornfield at the behest of his children who “urged me to leave and save my life if I could.”477
The rumor of Abjiah Hicks proved true. Despite Abijah’s pro-Northern and abolitionist
persuasion, he was reportedly killed “by the ‘Pins,’ but through mistake intending to kill another
man,” his widowed wife Hannah Hicks mourned. “If it was a mistake ‘twas a terrible one for
me,” she grieved to her diary. Despite her Northern sentiments, Hannah helped hide her neighbor
Reverend Foreman from Pin Indians. She helped him despite rumors that he had encouraged the
death of her husband for his Northern sentiments. The relationship between Hannah and Stephen
speaks to the divided loyalties and confused politics that resided among Indian neighbors during
the war.478
Hannah Hicks’s collective wartime experiences speak to the devastation visited upon
civilians by soldiers. Her brother Dwight was jailed with “no charge against him, only that he has
confessed that his preference of opinion is for the North.” Although her brother was eventually
paroled, the twenty-eight year old Hannah was left to raise her five children alone. On November
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8, 1862 she reported a rumor that Stand Watie’s men vowed to “rob every woman whose
husband had gone to the Federals, and every woman who has Northern principles, which would
include us of course.” Nine days later the rumor came true, and Confederate Cherokees whom
she knew—“who have often eaten in my house”—ransacked her house and “overhauled every
closet, trunk, box, & drawer they could find.”479
Elizabeth Watts, a Cherokee child, recalled her family moving to the vicinity of Fort
Gibson during the war. Her father enlisted in the Union army and was stationed at Fort Gibson,
where Elizabeth and her mother could also draw rations. Despite their proximity to the fort, they
were still visited by four Rebel raiders who “stripped us of everything,” including cutting the
feather bed to “let the feathers fly in the wind.” They took the Watts’ food, including the green
onions in the yard. “Mother took her best dress and sat on it to hide it,” Elizabeth recalled. “They
made her get up and tore the dress into strings.” Elizabeth remembered that towards the end of
the war, “There was lots of raiding parties. They would go over the country, burning all the
houses, cabins, barns, and cribs, carrying all the beds and chairs away, and killing or driving
away the cattle.”480
While looting and banditry proved commonplace, so too did more brutal acts take place
against civilians. James Barnes, a fourteen year old Arkansan boy, watched Choctaw raiders drag
a sick man from his bed, “set him up against a tree and shot him to death.” Christine Bates,
teenager during the war, recalled “Northern men were so mean to the Choctaw women, they
would jerk the ear rings from their ears, and lock them in one stuffy room together, keeping them
there for days.”481
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Unsurprisingly, given years of discriminate and indiscriminate looting and killing,
thousands of Native Americans in Indian Territory became refugees, either homeless or entirely
dependent upon Union or Confederate officials for survival. The return of the Loyal Indians from
Kansas, unable to plant crops or return home, only exacerbated this refugee crisis. In late 1864,
Indian Superintendent William Coffin reported 15,000 “destitute Indians, dependent upon the
government for their support. While some Cherokees had managed to raise a humble corn crop,
Coffin confessed the crops were exposed “to be plundered and stolen by the vast number of
guerillas and thieves, who are infesting their country.” Feeding these Indians fell to the U.S.
government and army.482
The situation was much the same among the Confederate-controlled portions of Indian
Territory. Repeated Federal invasions of Indian Territory prompted many Confederate
Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles to head south and seek shelter in Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations or North Texas. “Refugees from the Cherokee Nation came in bunches and settled near
us during the war,” recalled Chickasaw Elizabeth Kemp Mead, whose family lived on the Red
River. “They were without food,” and young Elizabeth watched the refugees cook mulberry
leaves and briar root to stave off starvation. Nearly 15,000 Confederate Indian refugees flooded
south, entirely dependent upon Confederate authorities or kind neighbors for relief.483
The refugee crisis by 1864-1865 reached staggering proportions. Some 29,000 Native
American refugees existed between the United States and Confederacy. Given that the Five
Tribes’ population in 1860 was approximately 48,000, nearly 60% of the Territory’s population
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were refugees. Three out of every five Indians required assistance from the government.
Although we do not know the definitive number of wartime refugees in the South, Indian
Territory surely ranks as one of the most destitute and refugee-ridden regions across the United
States.484
Union and Confederate authorities alike struggled to sustain such a huge refugee
population. Refugees in Union controlled regions often moved to Federal posts for security and
access to supplies. Others trekked to forts from longer distances to secure food. As the Cherokee
Tomahawk newspaper mused of its hometown Fort Gibson in March, 1865, “Although not
exactly a ‘city of Refuge,’ it may be styled a Refugee city—the greater part of its denizens being
left to the tender mercies of Agents and providence (principally Providence).” Jennie McCoy
Chambers and her family, who “‘refugeed’ in the Cherokee Nation until the close of the War,”
routinely walked to Federal posts and back “for supplies from the Government, and many times
almost starved.” The cost of feeding these Indian refugees was estimated as at least $600,000.485
Under the leadership of Samuel Bell Maxey, who believed it “an act of humanity to
provide as best I could for these suffering exiled friends and neighbors,” the Confederacy
established refugee camps throughout Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations. Maxey appointed
officers to take charge of various issues, and distributed food from the Confederate commissary.
Although this system was not perfect, it kept Confederate refugees alive and placated. 486
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By 1865, Native Americans in Indian Territory were destitute, dependent upon the
government for survival. As the end of war loomed on the horizon, so did the task of forging new
treaties with the United States government. Already riven by pro-Confederate factions that
weakened the Indians’ standing in the eyes of the Federal government, their refugee status and
reliance upon the government for survival left them with relatively little leverage with which to
negotiate.
--In May 1865, dozens of Native Americans made their way west to Cotton Wood Grove,
along the Washita River in western Chickasaw Nation. It was a relatively remote spot, but
unlikely to be bothered by Federals and closer to the Plains Indians, who had been invited.
Among the Confederate Indian delegations headed to Camp Napoleon were the Cherokee,
Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole, along with the Caddo, Osage, and Comanche. Also
destined for Camp Napoleon were “our brothers of the plains,” including Kiowas, Arapahoes,
Chivans, Lipans, Anadarkoes, and yet more bands of Caddos and Comanches. As the delegations
arrived and the council grew in size, the place was dubbed Camp Napoleon.487
On May 26, 1865, the “united nations of the Indian Territory” at Camp Napoleon signed
a compact which hopefully would allow them to weather the coming days. The compact
addressed the fears of both the Five Tribes and the Plains Indians. The Indians acknowledged
that “the history of the past admonishes the red man that his one great and powerful race is
rapidly passing away as snow beneath the summer sun.” They mourned that due to “the
vicissitudes of time and change and misfortune and evils of disunion, discord, and war among
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themselves are but a wreck of their former greatness.” They worried “on account of our
weakness being reduced and hemmed into a small and precarious country that we can scarcely
call our own and in which we cannot remain in safety and pursue or peaceful avocations.”488
Faced with uncertainty, both as a race and in the more immediate days ahead as the
Confederacy collapsed, the tribes committed themselves to “an Indian confederacy or band of
brothers, having for its object the peace, the happiness, and the protection of all alike, and the
preservation of our race.” They swore “peace and friendship” among the tribes present and
declared their “great principle” to be, “‘An Indian shall not spill an Indian’s blood.’” 489
The Camp Napoleon Council represented a desperate attempt on the part of Confederate
and Plains Native Americans to present a unified front in a time of great uncertainty. Although
the compact makes no direct reference to the United States, the end of the war was coming.
Knowing that they must forge new treaties with the United States, the Camp Napoleon Council
urged the tribes to act in concert to protect their collective sovereignty. Ironically, on the exact
same day Native Americans met in council to plan for their post-war fate, General Edmund
Kirby Smith surrendered all forces in the Department of Trans-Mississippi to the United
States.490
Even before the news reached Indian Territory, however, General Douglas Cooper grew
concerned over the future of the Five Tribes. Knowing the Indians had already laid the
foundation for unified action, Cooper called for a “‘Grand Council of the Six Allied Nations’” to
meet in Choctaw Nation to “take into consideration the present condition of the country and
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determine what course the ‘allies’ will take.” Until the Grand Council could meet, Cooper hoped
to avoid “collision with the Federals.”491
On June 15, at Cleata Yamaha in Choctaw Nation, delegates from the Five Tribes
gathered to determine a final course of action. Referencing the unity of Camp Napoleon, the
delegates resolved to end hostilities with the opposition factions within their own tribes—the
Loyal Indians who remained allied to the United States—and invite them “to co-operate with this
council in its efforts to contract anew friendly relations with the United States Government.” The
council called for commissioners to treat with the United States. Finally, they called for “a
cessation of hostilities in order that there be time and opportunity to negotiate with the United
States Government.” The Confederate Indians were ready to surrender.492
Federal military authorities dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Asa C. Matthews to receive
the surrender of the Indian nations and their forces. On June 19, Lt. Col. Matthews met with
Principal Chief Peter Pitchlynn of the Choctaw Nation, who had advocated so strongly in favor
of neutrality at the beginning of the war. It was now Pitchlynn’s duty to end the war he never
wanted, and he issued a proclamation for “an immediate cessation of hostilities.” 493
On June 23, 1865, Lieutenant Colonel Asa Matthews and Brigadier General Stand Watie
met near Doaksville, Choctaw Nation. The two had already agreed to a ceasefire the week prior,
but the time had come to formally surrender. Gen. Watie commanded the last significant body of
Confederate forces yet to surrender, the Indian division. Most had already been furloughed or
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simply headed home. The two men agreed upon and signed formal terms of surrender for the
Cherokee Nation and Watie’s command. Formerly Confederate Indians were to peaceably return
home. The United States promised to protect them from “not only encroachments on the part of
the whites, but also from the Indians who have been engaged in the service of the United States.”
These same terms were extended to the Creeks, Seminoles, and Osages. On July 14, the
Chickasaw Nation submitted to Federal authority—the rebellious factions of all Five Tribes had
submitted to United States control.494
The surrender of the Confederate Five Tribes and the Indian Division of the Confederate
army in June-July, 1865 marked the end of the Civil War in Indian Territory, the TransMississippi, and the continental United States. The Confederate-Indians alliances, forged amid
the fears and excitement and fraud of 1861, finally ceased to be. After four years of violent intratribal warfare, ceaseless raids and guerrilla activity, multiple Federal invasions, Native
participation in the wider Trans-Mississippi theater, and the havoc wreaked upon civilian
communities, the war was over.
Though the firing ended and the quiet of peace returned, the destitution, death, and
uncertainty of the future lingered. Thousands of starving Indian refugees required provisions.
Almost immediately after surrendering, Cherokee authorities pleaded to Federal forces for aid
for the “destitute Indians.” Stand Watie likewise reached out to friends in Texas for assistance.
For many Native Americans, the end of the war did little to assuage the simple struggle for
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survival. As already noted, nearly three of every five Native Americans was dependent on the
government for subsistence.495
Many Native Americans did not survive. Although we will never know the exact total
lost, the estimated wartime deaths are staggering. During the Civil War, an estimated 4,000
Cherokees (one in five), 2,500 Creeks (one in four), 500 Seminoles (one in five), 500
Chickasaws (one in nine), and perhaps 1,500 Choctaws (one in ten) perished during the Civil
War. These deaths left tremendous holes in society. By war’s end, for example, one third of
Cherokee women were widows, and 1,200 Cherokee children (one in four) were orphans. The
Civil War ravaged Native American populations in Indian Territory. It’s worth recalling that this
population disaster came barely two decades in the wake of removal, which drastically reduced
Native populations as well. The Civil War represented the second great population catastrophe
for the Five Tribes in the nineteenth century.496
Yet for all the devastation, bloodshed, and death, profound questions remained
unanswered for the Five Tribes. As Lt. Col. Matthews signed the surrender treaties with the Five
Tribes, he also stipulated tribal delegates meet at Armstrong Academy, Choctaw Nation on
September 1 to “settle all questions between the Indian nations and the Government.” The
questions were myriad. What would the new treaty terms with the United States be? What
penalties would the United States impose on the Five Tribes? What distinctions—if any—would
be made between Loyal Indians and Confederate Indians? Could these two factions, which had
so bitterly waged war against one another, reconcile? What would the legal future of these tribes
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be? Would they retain sovereignty over their nations? The Civil War radically altered Native
American tribes and their relationships with each other. It remained to be seen how the war
reshaped their relationship with the United States and their national sovereignty.497
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“The Ruthless White Man Demanded It”: The Postbellum Era
“It is a source of gratification to know that the government is determined to make a change in the policy heretofore
with the Indian tribes, by so far as possible removing all into an Indian Territory, and inducing them to adopt our
form of government, which we think is far better for them than their scattered tribal condition.” -J.W. Dunn, Creek
Indian Agent, 1865498

--United States Commissioner of Indian Affairs Dennis Cooley addressed the onlookers in
the hall in front of him. The meeting between the United States and Indian tribes, once slated for
the Armstrong Academy, had been moved to Fort Smith. Special arrangements were made to
outfit a room large enough to hold delegations from twelve Native tribes, including the
Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole. After several days of preparations and
arrivals, Cooley now opened the council on Friday, September 8, 1865. The Native Americans
did not like what Commissioner Cooley had to say.499
“Portions of several tribes and nations have attempted to throw off their allegiance to the
United States…and have been in open war with those who remained loyal and true, and at war
with the United States. All such have rightfully forfeited all annuities and interests in the lands in
the Indian territory,” Cooley declared. “The President is willing to hear his erring children in
extenuation of their great crime. He has authorized us to make new treaties with such nations and
tribes as are willing to be at peace among themselves and with the United States.” 500
The United States carried seven demands to the Native Americans of Indian Territory.
First, the Indians must agree to peace with each other and the United States. Second, Natives in
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Indian Territory must aid the United States in ensuring peaceful relations with the Plains Indian
tribes. Third, slaves must be emancipated and arrangements made for African-Americans
“incorporation into the tribes on an equal footing with the original members, or suitably provided
for.” Fourth, that slavery be outlawed forever. Fifth, tribes in Indian Territory must sale lands to
the United States to accommodate the removal of “the friendly tribes in Kansas and elsewhere.”
Sixth, “that all the nations and tribes in the Indian territory be formed into one consolidated
government.” Seventh, that whites were still barred from living in Indian Territory, unless given
permission by the United States or tribal governments.501
Commissioner Cooley’s statements made the United States’ position clear. The Five
Tribes, having rebelled against the United States, must now pay the price through new treaties.
The United States’ treaty stipulations promised radical change: slavery was abolished, AfricanAmericans would be incorporated as tribal members (or “suitably provided for”), yet more
Native lands would be taken, and most importantly, the United States desired the Five Tribes
form a single Native government, extinguishing tribal distinctions. More broadly, the United
States hoped to form Indian Territory into a true territory with a single government and likewise
impose allotment, whereby lands were no longer held by tribes themselves but instead by
individuals (thus opening up large amounts of land for further settlement). These moves would,
from the United States’ perspective, bring civilization and assimilation to the Indians. The finer
points of these treaties were not negotiated at Fort Smith. Instead, Cooley asked the tribes to send
delegations of five men each to Washington, D.C. to finalize and sign new treaties with the
United States.502
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Throughout the following year, the Five Tribes negotiated new treaties in Washington,
signing them in 1866. The Reconstruction treaty terms were not the same for each tribe. Instead,
the favorability of the final terms depended on the ability of each tribe to successfully pursue its
agenda. This, in turn, hinged on the capability and willingness of each tribe to present a united
front towards the United States government. The Choctaws and Chickasaws, who largely
escaped the divisiveness of intra-tribal warfare, successfully rallied together and negotiated
favorable terms, even going so far as to hire external white lawyers to lobby on their behalf. The
Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles, torn apart by the Civil War, failed miserably to present a
united front. Indeed, the Creeks and Choctaws sent dueling factions (one “Loyal,” one
“Southern”) to Washington and spent much of their energy trying to deny the legitimacy of the
opposing party while trumpeting the legality of their own.503
The terrible irony of the Reconstruction treaty terms is that they were least favorable to
the most loyal tribes (Creek, Seminole, and Cherokee) and most favorable to those tribes who
largely remained loyal the Confederacy until the end (Choctaw, Chickasaw). Despite the
thousands of Cherokees, Creeks, and Seminoles who fought for the Union, their terms proved the
most punitive, primarily due to their inability to unify during negotiations. While the Civil War
undermined the sovereignty of all the Five Tribes, it proved the most damaging to those Native
Americans who sacrificed the utmost to ensure the United States emerged victorious.504
The Cherokees proved unwilling to reconcile their factional divides. As their Indian agent
lamented, “The bitterness existing between the loyal and disloyal Cherokees is intense…I fear no
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human power can reconcile them.” Thus, the Cherokees sent two delegations to Washington, one
representing the Loyal Cherokees and the other the Southern Cherokees (as they came to be
called). Among the Loyal Cherokee delegation were Chief John Ross, seventy-five years old and
bedridden, and John B. Jones, one of the two Baptist missionary founders of the Keetowah
Society. The Southern Cherokee delegation included former Confederate Brigadier General
Stand Watie.505
Presenting a divided front, the United States took advantage, and the resulting treaty cost
the Cherokees substantially. Refusing to accede to John Ross’ leadership, the Southern
Cherokees hoped to negotiate an entirely separate treaty—in essence, formally dividing the
Cherokees in two. And while the Federal government did negotiate two separate treaties, it
ultimately only accepted the more favorable one. With two competing delegations, the United
States played them off each other and made considerable gains. The Cherokees sold their Neutral
Lands (a small strip of land to which they laid claim in Kansas) at $1.25 per acre to the United
States and placed the Cherokee Strip (northwestern Indian Territory) in a Federal trust, and
further agreed to allow other tribes to settle on Cherokee lands. Cherokee freedmen (persons
formerly enslaved by Cherokees) were given citizenship.506
Just like the Cherokee, the Creeks were also divided into Loyal and Southern factions.
The Loyal delegation included Oktaharsharjo, and the Southern delegation included former
Confederate Colonel Daniel McIntosh. Perhaps more than any other tribe, the Creeks held bitter
divisions from the war. The Loyal Creeks were adamant they be distinguished from their
Southern brethren, who had driven them from their homes in 1861. “We now most respectfully
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ask you if you can show us one single instance in which more suffering has been endured or
greater sacrifices made for the cause of the Union,” their delegation exclaimed at Fort Smith,
“and we most respectfully ask and beg not to be classed with the guilty.”507
Yet classed with the guilty they were. The Loyal delegation arrived first in Washington
and drew up a treaty with the United States before the Southern delegates—who hoped to
cooperate—arrived. The Southern delegates weren’t recognized by the United States, nor shown
the treaty upon their arrival. When they finally discovered the terms, they were shocked. The
treaty sold the western half of Creek Nation for a mere thirty cents per acre, the funds of which
would compensate Loyal Creeks for wartime losses. The treaty made African Creeks tribal
citizens and set aside land for their use. Southern delegates protested, and the United States
referred them to the Loyal Creek delegation. While a unified Creek delegation might’ve
negotiated a better deal, the Loyal Creeks simply refused to work with their former Confederate
compatriots. They were also desirous to ensure that Creek freedmen were assured citizenship,
something the Southern delegation opposed. In short, in a choice between standing firm beside
the United States or working with their former enemies, the Loyal Creek delegation chose
loyalty to the United States. However noble, it cost the Creek Nation dearly, as they lost half
their territorial holdings.508
The Seminoles sent a single delegation to Washington, although it contained both Loyal
and Southern delegates. The Seminoles, numbering barely 2,000, completely destitute and reliant
upon the United States for subsistence, had no leverage whatsoever. The Seminoles sold their
entire nation to the United States, over two million acres, at fifteen cents per acre. They were
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then sold 200,000 acres of former Creek land (for which the United States paid thirty cents an
acre) at fifty cents an acre. The sole Southern Seminole delegate, John F. Brown, protested but to
no avail. The Civil War and Treaty of 1866 devastated the tribe. As one scholar noted, “By 1866,
after thirty years in the West, the Seminoles found themselves with little property, no schools, no
unified government, a meager subsistence, and in much the same physical state as when they had
migrated from Florida.”509
The Choctaws and Chickasaws, free from the factionalism that plagued the other Five
Tribes, secured better terms. Their delegation consisted of a number of former Confederate
officers, notably Robert M. Jones. To assist them was John H.B. Latrobe, a pro-Union lawyer
from Baltimore, who was tasked with securing the antebellum money owed the Choctaws and
Chickasaws. Also assisting the Choctaws and Chickasaws was their former Indian agent and
Confederate Brigadier General Douglas Hancock Cooper.510
Their political unity and white allies paid off. Unlike the other tribes, the Choctaws and
Chickasaw gained concessions. They managed to secure promises from the U.S. to honor
antebellum treaties, ensuring annuities would continue flowing. While the Choctaws and
Chickasaws abolished slavery, they firmly opposed citizenship for freedmen. Pointing to the
United States’ stipulation at Fort Smith that freedmen need only be “suitably provided for,” they
instead gave freedmen forty acres while negotiating a clause that tasked the United States with
removing the freedmen within two years. The United States never removed the freedmen,
however, leaving them “in a kind of legal limbo” for decades. The tribes did sell the Leased
District (southwestern Indian Territory) to the United States for $300,000, but since almost no
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Choctaws and Chickasaws lived there, this acceptable. All told, the Choctaws and Chickasaws
secured incredibly favorable treaty rights from the United States, certainly the most lenient of the
Five Tribes. Though they had stood firmly by the Confederacy until the final surrender, their
unity at the negotiating table paid dividends.511
Aside from individual land sales and the issue of freedmen, all of the Five Tribes made
several other critical concessions in the 1866 treaties. The tribes each promised rights of way to
at least two railroad lines within their territory (one north-south, one east-west). When the first
railroads arrived in 1870, “the inexorable advance of technology and white settlement began.”
Railroads literally changed the human geography of the region; old tribal towns and meeting
places vanished as new towns popped up along railroad routes. Whites used railroads to enter
Indian Territory, legally or not. In 1885, there were 25,000 whites in Indian Territory; by 1890,
there were 140,000, outnumbering the Native population. Railroads reshaped Indian Territory
and undermined the Five Tribes’ ability to maintain their sovereignty and control their
borders.512
The United States also required the Five Tribes to form a single territorial government,
headed by an elected council of Native delegates. Native Americans understood this as a threat to
their individual tribal identities and opposed “territorialization” or statehood adamantly.
Delegates were selected, a constitution was drawn up (the “Okmulgee constitution”), and the
council met off-and-on throughout the 1870s, but the constitution and subsequent versions were
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never ratified. It was clear Native Americans had little intention of forming a territorial
government, and by drawing out the affair, they managed to kill it off.513
The Five Tribes also faced the threat of allotment. The United States wanted Native
Americans to parcel out their land (allot it) to individuals and families and thus end the practice
of tribal land claims, believing allotment would facilitate assimilation into American society.
Despite the United States’ agenda, the Five Tribes neutralized the threat of allotment in the 1866
treaties. While the treaties contained an allotment provision, it would only occur if tribal
governments “through their respective legislative councils, agree to the survey and division of
their land.” Since the Five Tribes did not want to see tribal lands parceled off, the clause
effectively prevented allotment. Still, as with the United States’ request for a territorial
government, it was clear the United States’ long-term goal was the dissolution of tribal
governments.514
Collectively, the 1866 Reconstruction Treaties between the United States and the Five
Tribes marked an important moment of transition. The Civil War in Indian Territory constituted
an Indian Civil War, waged over issues of acculturation, slavery, and the bitter politics of
removal. And certainly, issues of acculturation and factionalism continued after the war—with
factionalism on full display during treaty negotiations in Washington. Among the Creek and
Cherokee tribes especially, factionalism continued to plague national affairs and even flared into
violence occasionally in the postbellum era.
Yet at the 1866 treaties attest, in the wake of the Civil War, a host of new challenges to
Native American sovereignty loomed on the horizon. The treaties secured railroad rights which
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would bring white settlers and the outside world flooding into Indian Territory over the next
several decades. And while the Five Tribes largely managed to dodge the United States’ attempts
to impose territorial government or allotment, it was clear the United States would continue to
pursue these policies in the future.
And over time, the United States succeeded in implementing their designs of abolishing
tribal governments, tribal lands, and tribal sovereignty. In the decades following the Civil War,
the United States defeated the Plains Indian tribes and forced many of them—including the
Apache, Arapaho, Cheyenne, Comanche, and Kiowa—onto reservations in western Indian
Territory, the land purchased from the Five Tribes in 1866. In the 1870s, the United States
ceased treating Native Americans as sovereign states, no longer negotiating treaties but rather
deciding Indian policy in the halls of Congress. In the 1880s, allotment came to Indian Territory,
and the western Indian reservations were carved into parcels and opened to white settlement. In
1890, the western half of Indian Territory became Oklahoma Territory and the “Twin
Territories” uneasily coexisted. In 1897, the Dawes Commission finally forced the Five Tribes to
accept allotment as well. Over the next few years, membership of the tribes was determined
(known as the Dawes Rolls) and land parceled out. The Five Tribes—the nations, their
governments, their sovereignty—dismantled. In 1907, Oklahoma became the forty-sixth state to
enter the Union.
Reflecting on the dissolution of Native governments in his old age, Creek George
Washington Grayson, who had once fought as a young lieutenant under Stand Watie in the Civil
War, lamented:
“Here we, a people who had been a self-governing people for hundreds and possibly a
thousand years, who had a government and administer its affairs ages before such an
entity as the Untied States was ever dreamed of, are asked and admonished that we must
323

give up all idea of local government, change our system of land holding to that which we
confidently believed had pauperized thousands of white people—all for why; not because
we had violated any treaties with the United States which guaranteed in solemn terms our
undisturbed possession of these; not because of any respectable number of Indians were
clamoring for a change of conditions; not because any non-enforcement of law prevailed
to a greater extent in Indian territory than elsewhere; but simply because regardless of the
plain dictates of justice and a christian conscious, the ruthless white man demanded it.”515
--Ultimately, the American Civil War in Indian Territory unleashed profound waves of
bloodshed and destruction that hinged on Native American issues of acculturation, slavery, and
removal. Pulled into fraudulent Confederate alliances that reflected the views of only wealthy,
privileged Native Americans, four years of Civil War ravaged the landscape and its people,
inflicting untold suffering and death. Weakened by war and riven with internal strife, the Five
Tribes of Indian Territory struggled at the negotiating table in 1866. The railroads, land runs,
allotment, and final dissolution of their governments lay in the future, but the roots of Native
dispossession resided in the Indian Civil War.
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